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STUDIES 
Csaba VARGA Kelsen's Theory of Law-Application* 
(Evolution, ambiguities, open questions) 
Right from his first theoretical treatises, Kelsen had pretensions to formulate a 
comprehensive, great theory. His thinking follows its own path; at the same time the set 
of problems treated in his oeuvre as well as his whole theoretical activity are tinged 
throughout with constant problems. As a result, his lifework is composed—apart from a 
great number of volumes—of incredibly manifold essays and critical reflexions as well as 
of restatements. Still, this monumental theory lacks a proper doctrine of law-application. 
And the huge literature whether criticising, appreciating or elaborating Kelsen's work, 
reflects in an apparently correct manner the actual situation, viz. that its pretension to a 
theory of law-application does not occupy any central issue in it. 
Nevertheless, the present paper will attempt to unfold the still existing concept of a 
law-application theory from 1911 to the 1960s. Such a summary as an aggregate of the 
Pure Theory of Law and, in general, of his way of legal theoretical thinking, may in itself 
involve certain lessons. It may, however, be just as interesting from a methodological 
* Abbreviations: US—Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (Tubingen: Mohr 1911); AS—Allgemeine 
Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer 1925); GATS—Az államelmélet alapvonalai [Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie 
des Staates (Wien, Als Manuskript gedruckt, 1926)] translated by Gyula Moór (Szeged: Városi Nyomda és 
Könyvkiadó Rt. 1927); RR—Reine Rechtslehre Einleitung in die rechtswissenschafliche Problematik (Leipzig 
und Wien: Deuticke 1943); GTLS—General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1946); RR II—Reine Rechtslehre zweite, vollständig neu bearbeitete 
und erweitertete Auflage [1960] (Wien: Deuticke 1983); PTL—Pure Theory of IMW, translated [from the 2nd 
ed.] by Max Knight (Berkeley, etc.: University of California Press 1967); ATN—Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, 
ed. Kurt Ringhofer and Robert Walter (Wien: Manzsche 1979). 
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aspect, namely from the one of the strict discipline and consistency of theory-structuring 
on the one hand, at the same time—owing to the questions which have remained open—as 
a choice of the possible intrinsic developments, dilemmas, of disturbing or stimulating 
ambiguities, in the course of which even controversial conclusions often put a question 
mark to his own basic concepts and directions. The theory of law-application found in 
Kelsen's posthumous theory of norms is concerned mostly with a separate set of 
problems. Therefore a separate study is needed to process this from the perspective of 
the theory of law-application. 
1. Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre 
Kelsen's first venture into the field of legal theory, entitled Hauptprobleme der Staats-
rechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssätze (1911), forecasts later problems in 
many of their elements. Characteristically, it enables an eventual further development 
without major contradictions or breaches. The standpoint taken by him in this period can 
be ascertained from a conscious self-limitation in the treatment of problems and from 
what he remains silent about. At the same time, his system is rather taut and closed. His 
attitude towards the law-application can be deduced both from his ideals concerning the 
science of law and of his narrow interpretation of the concept of imputation which he 
considers as the central category of the nonnative sphere. To wit: legal science is the 
geometry of the formal presentation; thus the imputation's only factor consists of the 
norm. Accordingly, the application of law, while being indispensable, is merely an 
accidental factor, not a constituent part in the legal process. 
As a consequence, he has little to say about the "'application' of the norm". The first 
thing he stresses is a sharp differentiation between whether the norm is used as a basis 
of reference for mere comparison, or we apply it in a normative context with con-
sequences.1 Still, whether it is used as an accidental yardstick, or whether the norm leads 
to a (possibly vital) nonnative consequence, Kelsen sees no difference, no specific trait 
deserving further examination.2 The second tenet is the requirement of the applicability 
1 HS, pp. 15-17. When we limit ourselves to "merely comparing a concluded action with a norm, and to 
proving its harmony with the norm in an objective manner", then the "norm will merely serve as the indifferent 
object of such comparison", and only "as a yardstick of that which has already happened". Obviously, here no 
"volitive relation" will be present. "When judging whether a mountain is high or low, or a motion is swift or 
slow, the rules we employ possess no norm-generating meaning." Ibid., p. 15. However, a different situation 
may also occur. "That judgment which states the correspondence of a given action with a given norm, or the 
lack of such correspondence, may be linked with the approval or disapproval of the action by the person who 
is judging." Ibid., p. 16. That is the field of the normative application of norms. 
2 Moreover, as will be clear presently, only the deferentiation is necessary: viz. that the criterion of the 
existence of the norm should be linked to its normative application, more precisely, through the mediation of 
the latter, to the Sollen-component present in any elementary norm-unit "The essence of the norm lies not in 
its being a rule of adjudication, but in being such a rule which shall be considered by the adjudicated as an 
affirmative or disapproving judgement." HS, p. 17. But that will transfer the criterion of the norm from its 
meaning to circumstances inherent in the use of language. From a structural point tliis is the same as when 
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of a proposition of the law to individual cases,3 and the third is the possibility of 
institutional applicability by the court, as essential features of the law.4 Accordingly, 
merely the factual possibility of judicial application would be needed; neither the actual 
process of application, nor its way or outcome could add any essential surplus element 
to law. 
Of course, Kelsen could not state anything different in the context of his theory. In 
fact he considered the imputation as the only determinant of the norm.5 Incidentally, ha 
had already stated that the science of law—as "the geometry of the entire phenomenon of 
law"—treated the law as a formal category;6 therefore its manifestations should be 
examined from formal points of view, while the probing of its actual content should be 
left to other sciences.7 Looking at it from the aspect of theoretical consistency, Kelsen 
is undoubtedly right. For if we consider the operation of law from the aspect of its formal 
manifestation, then the implementation of the law is nothing more than the application 
of a complete, ready-made law to an individual case. That would not change the 
proposition of the law in any way; on the contrary, it would merely validate it in a given 
case, thus reconfirming it. From the formal aspect, the law itself professes this of itself; 
the entire structure, institutional system and ideology of modem law suggest this.8 And 
even approaching the question from the other side: should any shaping of the law be 
included in these processes, that does not show on the formal side; accordingly, the 
formal manifestation cannot consider it in any way. As it is, it could be rightfully 
he—later on—proves that validity should be considered as a precondition of the concept of norm: "By the word 
'validity' we designate the specific existence of a norm". PTL, p. 10. With this, as we know, he has involved 
himself in contradictions, as well as in the necessity of artificial explanations. The doubts that arise hereby are: 
Is it a norm which is applied not as a norm? What changes will ensue in a norm upon the acquisition and the 
loss of its validity? Or else, when its original validity is being replaced by a different validity? Is the law's 
validity a function of a human will, actually and concretely backing it? As to the juxtaposition of the so-called 
expressivist concept which finds the criterion of the norm in the human act of prescription, and the so-called 
hyletic concept accepted by modern norm theories, finding the criterion in its conceptual meaning (i.e. in the 
operator transforming description into prescription), cf. Eugen Bulygin 'Norms and Logic (Kelsen and 
Weinberger on the Ontology of Norms)' Law and Philosophy 4 (1985) 2. 
3 "The precept of a customary law will differ from the moral law in that the former is applied for an 
individual case even when it is not complied with, just in a case when it is not complied with." HS, p. 35. 
4 "The court—symbolizing an external organization—is so important for the law that, from among all the 
norms by which a legal community is governed, and which are followed by that community, only those may 
be recognized as legal norms, which are actually applied by the court (or, in a more complex statehood, by 
other state bodies as well)." HS, p. 236. 
5 "... imputation rests solely and exclusively on the Sollen, i.e. the norm." HS, p. 75. 
6 "In view of its formal character, the legal science too may be designated (by a not in every respect fitting 
analogy) as the geometry of the total legal phenomenon." HS, p. 93. 
7 "The legal science will only consider the form of such a phenomenon, the substance of which should be 
dealt with by the sociology and the historical and political disciplines... Owing to its specific cognitive tools, 
the science of 'law' can only approach one side of tliis 'legal' phenomenon." HS, p. 92. 
8 VARGA, Cs.: 'Logic of Law and Judicial Activity: A Gap Between Ideals, Reality and Future 
Perspectives' in Legal Development and Comparative Law, ed. Zoltán Péteri and Vanda Lamm (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó 1982), para. 2, pp. 52 et seq. 
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supposed that any content concealed behind the formal façade is simply indifferent unless 
it is reflected in the form; just like the definition of a sphere cannot take into account that 
which is inside.9 
In this way, the tenet presumed by the law's institutional-ideological structure (and 
confirmed by its procedure) is that the application of law is nothing more than the 
restatement of a proposition of the law with reference to (and in the mirror of) individual 
cases. If such a tenet were necessary for any reason, it was possible to formulate 
one—ignorant of the actual contents lying behind iL Let us recall, Kelsen himself had 
pointed at such contact points where social pressure resulted in law, where "being" was 
converted into "ought". However, in order to maintain the consistency of his system of 
thought, he had to induce the said transitions from outside, as an external phenomenon, 
into the system of law while stressing that it could not be grasped within the law, or with 
the help of its own construction: from inside it was impossible either to define or to 
explain or to confirm it.10 
2. Allgemeine Staatslehre 
One and a half decades later (1925), in the summary of his General Theory of the State, 
Kelsen had to offer a more detailed treatment. In accordance with the thematic 
enlargemenL administration no longer appears simply as one of the State's duties," but 
as a strictly legal and juristic activity.12 Consequendy, administrative discretion (i.e. the 
right of free weighing of pros and cons) in the realm of administrative action, too, 
appears as a question of law-application. Ultimately, on the overall theoretical plane, law-
application will become an operation vested with an autonomous importance and content. 
At the same time, the formality of explanation was to remain intact. Earlier, Kelsen had 
conceived the law-application solely as a means of imputation on the basis of norms, and 
only subject to the given norm. Presently, law-application itself had turned into a kind 
9 "It would be a similar methodological fault to take into consideration the material which the spheric shape, 
in the given case, conceals." US, p. 93. 
10 "How a lastingly unapplied precept of law ceases to be a norm, or how the breach of an obligation lasting 
several years leads gradually to the loss of its character, i.e. how an Ought becomes destroyed owing to the 
Being, or vice versa, all this is a situation not to be grasped by a juristic construction, or juristically, it is a 
mystery." HS, p. 334. Or, "There must be a point where the process of social life encroaches in a recurring 
manner on the body of die State; a transitory area where the amorphous elements of society are crystallized into 
tiie solid form of die law and State. That is die area where custom and morals, economic and religious interests, 
are being turned into legal precepts, into the substance of the State's will, and that area is die legislative act. 
This is the great mystery of die law and State..." HS, p. 411. 
11 The Hauptprobleme der Staatslehre, widiin an overview of "the legal obligations of the state organs" 
(Chapter 19), treats the set of problems of public administration (and in it, the free weighing)—not touching 
upon die administration of justice and law application proper. 
12 The Allgemeine Staatslehre deals, within an overview of die "establishment of the state order", both the 
part entitled "Administration as law-application" (AS, § 35, para C) and die one entitled "Legislation and 
application of law: two steps in the process of the creation of law" (§ 33c, para. F). 
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of law-making. In this way, Kelsen did not give up either his formal approach, or the 
tenet of normative imputation; it is merely that he extends the norm-basis of 
imputation—formerly conceived as law-nlaking—with the act of law-application. 
His new standpoint can be summarized in the following few theses. First, law-appli-
cation is the medium, in which the general, abstract norm takes on an individual, concrete 
form.13 Secondly, law-application in this respect is not just an implementation, but rather 
the creation of an individual norm on the basis of the general norm.14 Thirdly, all this 
is not merely the repeated declaration of the enacted law, but also the constitution of 
something added to iL15 Fourthly, the so-called free weighing (viz. the possibility of 
discretion) being admitted in the decision-making process is not a degeneration of the 
administrative activity (nor is it a characteristic trait thereof), but a property of law-
application theoretically present in every case.16- 17 Fifthly, since law-making cannot 
be complete, cannot encompass the entire content, but can merely attempt a relative 
definition, law-application will, of necessity, gain an autonomous significance in the legal 
process.18 
13 "Without the judgement the abstract law would be unable to take on a concrete shape." AS, p. 233. 
14 "Therefore the judgment... is notliing but an individual legal norm; viz. the individualization or concreti-
zation of an abstract or general legal norm." AS, p. 233. "Accordingly, the act of law-application is just as much 
a legal enactment, law-making, establishment of law, as is the legislative act; either of them is just one of the 
two steps in the process of creating law." AS, pp. 233-234. 
15 "The judgment of the court is called 'declaration of law', jurisdiction, as if it would merely pronounce that 
which was already law—in the general norm." AS, p. 233. 
16 "Just as there must be a substantive difference between the abstract notion and the concrete concept, 
likewise there must be a necessary difference between the higher and the lower grade of law-concretization, and 
that difference is the so-called 'free weighing'." AS, p. 243. 
17 Kelsen would later declare this in an ultimate and unequivocal manner in a resumed (but this time concise) 
summarization: "If we take into consideration that the three traditional functions: legislative, judicial and 
executive, can be essentially reduced to two, since the judicial and die executive one can be equally included 
in the concept of the execution of laws, then we will realize dial die contrast of law-making and law-application 
which would be expressed by the contrast between the legislation and execution—legis latio and legis executio 
—is by no means absolute but a very much relative one, expressing—as it does—merely die relation of two 
consecutive grades of the law-creating process... The tenet, according to wliich execution, as applied by the 
public administrative bodies, should principially be different from die judicial execution because of die 'free 
weighing' of the former, is untenable, since more or less every act of execution is subject to die free weighing 
of the executing body, because die general norm can never fully determine die legal act called to individualize 
it; while such a legal act is only possible on the strength of a general norm somehow determining iL" GATS, 
pp. 65-66 and 71. 
18 "Any law-application, i.e. any concretizadon of the general norm, any transition from a higher level of law-
making to a lower level, is nothing more dian a filling-in of a frame, nothing more dian an activity within the 
limits enacted by a higher-level norm. The higher grade can never fully determine the lower one; at the lower 
grade such substantive elements will always be present which had not been present on the higher level, as in 
fact, no further steps could come about in the process of the unfolding of the law: every further step would be 
superfluous." Or, expressed in die context of administration and law: "He who applies the law, will judge 
according to the law, bound by die law. That process can freely ensue widiin the limits set by the legal norm; 
diis is free compliance with the State's purposes widiin given legal limitations." AS, p. 243. 
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In contrast with the former theses characterizing law-application as a one-way, non-
autonomous process, lacking a particular operation of its own, this new explanation 
suggests a multi-chanced, a somewhat dynalnic process, showing a certain grade of 
independence. Still, it does not affect the basic formalism of Kelsen's view on law. 
According to Kelsen, the normative basis of imputation will still be determined by the 
legislator. What is merely admitted is that law-application is nothing more than a frame 
which—from the aspect of the law-maker, but only from the law-maker's aspect—will 
freely be filled up by-those who apply the law. Thus, in the groundwork providing the 
norm for the imputation, the law-applier will become associated with the law-maker. 
More precisely, considering the concrete procedural choices of the players who may 
actually enter the game of imputation, the law-applier will replace the law-maker in 
a direct manner. It is interesting to note (and considering the theoretical sources and 
contexts, it is no mere chance) that Kelsen discovers and explains this essential feature 
of the law-application in connection with the so-called free weighing (i.e., discretion), 
in the chapter dealing with the executive power, more precisely with the administrative 
activity." According to Kelsen, law-application does not generate an unlimited or 
indeterminate autonomy. The autonomy manifests itself only through adhering to the 
legislative enactments, within the frame of implementing the former. Thus, the 
autonomy of law-application is only a relative one: it does not affect the primacy of the 
law. Consequently, it does not change the ideological picture of the operation of modern 
formal law: the legislator, instead of providing a final specification in determining the 
legal processes, has to be content with providing a framework which, when it comes to 
specifications, will inevitably admit alternative solutions. 
It is worthwhile noting the openness of this theory, despite its apparently closed 
character; merely starting from its own tenets, how it could be developed in opposite 
directions. As it is, the multi-step process of law-making could be interpreted in a 
restrictive manner, as a specification; on the other hand it can also be interpreted as a 
set of choices, recurring in time, progressing through its changes—just as it indeed 
manifests itself in the legal cultures based upon case-law, following precedents in 
judicial practice. Obviously, Kelsen had attempted to build up his theory of law-
application in the former direction, i.e. within a nonnativistic framework; yet, 
theoretically speaking, he might have chosen a non-normativist, sociological path, too. 
19 Even more interesting is that at this point he does not say anything more or anything different about 
discretion than what he had already stated in the Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: "Neither the terms under 
which the State acts, nor the character and manner of its action гае ever exhaustively determined in the legal 
precepts... The free weighing by the state bodies is nothing but the inevitable difference between the abstract 
will of the State and the concrete actions of the State as expressed by the administration." HS, pp. 504 and 506. 
Thus, we are faced not with the application of new theses but with the linking of problems that had seemed to 
be separate, i.e. the recognition of the common essence of law-application and public administration from the 
aspect of formal legal rationalisation. 
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3. Reine Rechtslehre 
In the period of drafting the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen incorporates his earlier assess-
ments on the theory of law-application into his new theory as self-evident, obvious 
elements. These are, at the same time, consolidated as Kelsen widens their theoretical 
basis. 
This applies, first of all, to his Stufenbautheorie, or theory of gradation. This con-
struction was conceived back in 1925, when speaking about the steps of creation, Kelsen 
had referred to the subordinate structure of the state functions, when presenting the role 
of the Constitution;20 by now it has become the fundamental principle in the set-up of 
positive law and of the order established by the latter, and provides its theoretical 
explanation at the same time.21 In the light of the theory of gradation, positive law's 
order shows a hierarchic construction in which, starting with the basic norm, up to the 
last, individual act of enforcement or legal transaction, each component represents a 
stepping stone leading from the abstract general towards concretization and individuali-
zation. Thus, law-application is essentially a long-lasting, step-by-step process; it can no 
longer be considered as the actualising counterpole of an abstract norm. In the said 
hierarchic structure each intermediate step shows a dual face: it implements the 
superordinated norm as a law-applying concretization/individualization of the former; at 
the same time, in the process of further concretization/individualization it functions as 
law-making for the lower level. 
In this way the constructive contribution by law-application becomes manifest. Kelsen 
not only stresses the interdependence and successive intertwining quality of law-making 
and law-application (as apparently conceptually opposed entities)22 but he also finds an 
open parallelism between the judicial law-implementation and the actual legislation, 
referring to the character, the limitations, and the logical openness of the normative 
breakdown at each level.23 In a similar way, the creative possibilities and relatively wide 
room for manoeuvre of law-application is further confirmed in that public administration 
is, as far as the legal nature and limitations of norm-application are concerned, treated 
on the same level with judicial law-implementation. More precisely, while in 1934—owing 
to the novelty of this appreciation—he emphasizes the essential unity of the two in an 
20 AS, Chapter VII. The grades of bringing into existence. § 36. The Constitution. A. The subordination, not 
coordination of the state functions: The theory of gradation. 
21 RR, p. V. The legal order and its graded build-up. 
22 "The opposition of the creation or making of the law, on the one hand, and the execution or application 
of the law, on the other, is far from being much absolute, as is attributed to it by the traditional jurisprudence 
for which the said opposition has a high significance." RR, p. 82. 
23 "The task of obtaining a correct judgment or correct administrative act from the law, is essentially identical 
with the task of creating correct laws within the framework of the Constitution... To be sure, there may be a 
difference between the two but it is a quantitative and not a qualitative one. The difference merely lies in the 
fact that the legislator's constraint in questions of substance is much less than that of the judge; the legislator 
enjoys relatively more freedom in law-making than the judge does." RR, p. 98. 
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emphasized manner;24 by 1946, in the American edition of the General Theory of Law 
and State, he restates the relevant theses from the aspect of the theory of state;23 by 
1960, in the revised and enlarged second edition of the Pure Theory of Law, the said 
statements are treated as simply common knowledge.26 As can be read from his 
references, Kelsen treats any kind of implementation of any kind of legal norm as law-
application, and after briefly stating this, he has nothing more to say about the unity.27 
As a result of this, the entire problem of discretion—which had been regarded by both the 
European and the Anglo-American legal literature as the source of the freedom (even 
arbitrariness) of public administration—has become a most specific issue of law-
application. 
Finally, the imputation had to be revised in view of this new outlook. It still remains 
a key concept which, in the peculiar order of "ought"-projections, links a given behaviour 
with its consequence. However, it is no longer a simple projection of the enacted norm 
resulting from the application of the norm (as it had been in 1911), nor is it a 
concretization born in the two-step creation of law (as in 1925), but the completing arch 
of a multi-step, composite process. One pillar of this arch rests on the—merely 
hypothetical—source of its validity, it then arches over the generalized-abstract enactments 
and their step-by-step concretizing-individualizing breakdowns, in order finally to arrive 
at the actual, normative consequence drawn for the given case. Thus, the concept of 
imputation will gradually become farther and farther removed from its original 
application specifically anchored in law; instead it becomes a principle based on causality 
(but no longer governed by it), i.e. a principle expressing the fundamental connections 
of the man-made, artificial world of norms.28 
Theory of gradation 
The theory of gradation, projected onto the Kelsenian understanding of law-application, 
yields two consequences. 
24 "Like jurisdiction, so also the administration manifests itself... in the individualization and concretization 
of laws... In such a way... the judicial sentence and the administrative act—through which individual norms are 
being stated—bodi manifest themselves as the execution of the law." RR, pp. 80 and 83. 
25 Part Two, II. G.b. The powers or functions of the State: legislation and execution: "By the executive as 
well as by the judicial power, general legal norms are executed; the difference is merely that, in the one case, 
it is courts, in the other, so-called 'executive' or administrative organs, to which the execution of general norms 
is entrusted. The common trichotomy is thus at bottom a dichotomy, the fundamental distinction of legis laiio 
and legis executio." GTLS, pp. 255-256. 
26 E.g. RR II, para. 45—changing the wording of RR, para 32 so that it will mean just that. 
27 "The administrative authorities... have to apply genera] legal norms prescribing sanctions and these 
functions differ from the jurisdiction of courts not in their content, but only in the nature of the functioning 
organ." RTL, p. 263. 
28 "The principle... that we apply when describing a normative order of human behaviour, may be called 
imputation... 'Imputation' means a normative relation." RTL, pp. 76 and 90. 
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The first is the relative unity of the processes of norm-making and norm-
application.29 This means ab ovo that the unfolding of the norm is not a logical 
necessity or an unequivocal process, but rather a creative contribution, i.e. one admitting 
of several alternatives and lifting these to the normative level; it is merely one grade in 
a multi-graded process. At the same time it must be seen that when we speak of law-
making and law-application in the conventional and historically approved manner (by 
treating these as different activities of bodies fulfilling different functions) and, 
subsequently, we explain law-application as law-making, then we will have differing 
concepts overlapping each other. Namely, analytical concepts will be projected onto 
descriptive ones.30 The result of the analysis will merely be restricted to some essential 
aspect of the given process (an aspect which may be common to another process as well 
and thus not warranting the differentiation under this aspect); nevertheless that result 
cannot bring into dispute the demarcation of law-making and law-application as socially 
institutionalized functions and activities, thus it will not vitiate the grounds of such 
demarcation. 
The other Kelsenian conclusion relates to the hierarchic nature of the gradual 
construction of law and of the legal order. According to this tenet the entire normative 
process is displayed between two extreme points; these extreme poles being the 
foundation of the nonnative order's validity by means of a hypothetical basic norm 
(hypothetische Grundnorm) and the causal realization of the consequence attached to the 
given behaviour in the nonnative order. Within these two extreme points, the nonnative 
process is nothing but a gradually narrowing nonnative breakdown in which an abstract-
general enactment becomes gradually and continually concretized until it is reconstrued 
in the causal event.31 Accordingly, while the first mentioned conclusion stresses the 
presence of creation in the process of application, the second conclusion places the 
implementing (applicative) creation in a broader context, designating its place in the 
process of the individualizing breakdown of the general legal postulate. 
Although Kelsen designates the normative subordination of the "lower norm" as a 
metaphorical term, yet he declares the legal order built along the mediation of validity 
29 "Application of law is at the same time creation of law. These two concepts are not in absolute opposition 
to each other... It is not quite correct to distinguish between law-creating and law-applying acts. Because apart 
from the borderline cases... between wliich the legal process takes place, every legal act is at the same time the 
application of a higher norm and die creation of a lower norm." PTL, p. 234. 
30 Kelsen liimself is aware of Ulis. At least in describing the philosophy of die division of powers, he states: 
"The common trichotomy [of the legislative function and of the executive and die judicial functions] is thus 
at bottom a dichotomy, the fundamental disdnctjon of legis latio and legis executio." (Or, in the title: 
"Legislation and Execuüon.") GTLS, Part Two, para G.b., pp. 255-256. With that, he does not dispute the 
validity of trichotomy elsewhere, inasmuch as diey are "in the course of the shaping of posidve law, pardcularly 
outstanding or otherwise polidcally important resdng points of the process of law-making." GATS, p. 66. 
31 "...the process that begins with the establishment of the Consdtution... and leads to the execution of die 
sanction... is a process of increasing individualisation and concredzation." PTL, p. 237. 
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to be a hierarchical system.32 In the said hierarchical system, law-applif ation is nothing 
more than the creation of an individual norm through the implementation of a general 
legal norm. Kelsen regards the application of the general legal norm as being of 
paramount importance—brooking no exception—so much so that he even presumes the 
existence of a general legal norm behind a decision based on an ambiguous provision of 
law.33 He professes the same presumption whenever a case-related judicial decision is 
used as a precedent,34 in fact behind any decision using the fiction of "a general, even 
though not a positive, norm of material law",35 whenever such a decision declares not 
a dismissing (negative) sentence but—having the necessary powers thereto—deals with the 
disputes issue at its discretion, on its merits.36 
Thus, the theory of gradation outlines on the one hand a pyramid standing on its foot, 
since the entire legal process is built on a single hypothetical basic norm. On the other 
hand, it also shows another pyramid placed on its peak, superimposed on the former, 
since in the course of the final individual acts of execution the general-abstract validity, 
expressed by the basic norm, receives its concrete shape. At the same time, we should 
keep in mind that the graded building and its hierarchical structure have a normative 
character. In other words, the structure is normative not just because it is composed of 
norms, but also because the very structuring principle rests on normative expectations. 
Nevertheless, if we take seriously Kelsen's undertaking37 to answer the question, 
"What is law and of what kind is it?"—then we must at once voice our reservations. To 
wit: it is one question to consider the definite character and direction of structuring as 
a desirable issue, and another question to follow this tenet in the practice of creating 
those individual norms. This difference is all the more important since, as it will be 
revealed later, whatever our opinion is on whether an enactment has been complied with 
or not, our judgment must rest "on a specific, more precisely normative, inter-
pretation".38 As to the normative interpretation, in the following we shall see that it 
32 "The relationsliip between the norm that regulates the creation of another norm and the norm created in 
conformity with the former can be metaphorically presented as a relationship of super- and subordination. The 
norm wltich regulates the creation of another norm is the higher, the norm created in conformity with the former 
is the lower one. The legal order is not a system of coordinated norms of equal level, but a hierarchy of 
different levels of legal norms." PTL, p. 221. 
33 Where "the interpretation implicit in the decision assumes the character of a general norm". PTL, p. 250. 
34 "The judicial decision of a concrete case gives direction to the decision of similar cases in that the 
individual norm wltich the judicial decision represents is generalized. This generalization, that is, the 
formulation of the general norm, may be done by the court that created the precedent; but it can also be left 
to other courts bound by the precedential decision." Ibidem. 
35 "...a general, even though not a positive, norm of material law". PTL, p. 244. 
36 "It is usually said that the court is authorized to function as a legislator. This is not quite correct if by 
'legislating' is meant the creation of general legal norms. For the court is only authorized to create an individual 
norm, valid for the single, present case. But the court creates this individual norm by applying a general norm 
which the court considers 'just' or desirable—a norm which the positive legislator failed to create. The court-
created individual norm is justifiable only as application of such a not positive, general norm." Ibidem. 
37 RR, p. 1. 
38 RR II, p. 4. 
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cannot stand alone: it can only exist in a normative context. In other words, only an 
authority proceeding within its jurisdiction and powers can constitute the result of 
normative interpretation. Moreover, we must state as a matter of principle that in the 
graded construction the relation between norms of various levels—i.e. conditioning and 
conditioned ones—is not necessarily a hierarchical relation. It can also be a relation of 
interrelated priorities, in which merely the sequence, the origin and the foundation of 
validity are manifested." 
Similarly, one might raise the question, is it warranted or at all necessary to use the 
gradation theory in a dual way in the Kelsenian oeuvre? Is it necessary that the dialectic 
interrelation of law-application and law-making should be explained in the official 
hierarchy of the sources of law going from the top downwards? Is it inevitable that the 
theory of gradation should become the only possible theoretical model for the 
foundation of validity? Putting it another way: is the hierarchical mediation and the 
vertical deduction of validity the only way by which the unity of legal order can be 
demonstrated? For Kelsen, his own choice of a natural paradigm might have appeared 
obvious. Nevertheless, it has resulted in the survival of such models of thought which 
had become worn out even by him. As it is, a chain of validity based on a hypothetical 
basic norm which would deduce the validity from an external and superior, yet all-
embracing, source is, ultimately, a transcendental presumption. It is nothing but "a 
secularized form of natural-law concepts based on religious, respectively theological 
considerations", which illustrates the law as the aggregate of hierarchically super- and 
sub-ordinated determinations—although, in reality, in the case of a state-organized legal 
system it is rather "a system, without a centre and without a peak".40 
The constitutive character of law-application 
The theory of gradation has little to say about law-application itself; it rather designates 
its place, its points of attachment within the juridical process. Nevertheless, in an 
indirect manner, it has staked out the conceivable understanding of law-application. 
The most important conclusion that can be drawn from the gradation theory of law 
can be summarized in that law-application—in contrast to the traditional meaning 
suggested by the term jurisdictio—does not declare but constitutes the law. Although 
Kelsen fails to give a general definition to enable the production of theoretical principle, 
yet his standpoint is unequivocal: law-application is every bit of a "constitutive 
character", and the body entrusted with it has a "constitutive function". The contribution 
of law-application manifests itself in various ways in the different stages of the process. 
39 KRAWIETZ, W.: 'Die Lehre vom Stufenbau des Rechts—eine säkularisierte politische Theologie?' in 
Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche Basis bei Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz und Helmut Schelsky (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot 1984), p. 266 [Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5]. 
40 KRAWIETZ, para. II and p. 269. 
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The first step is the identification of the existence of some general norm, as a valid 
norm of the law.41 In Kelsen's view this serves a dual purpose: a valid, applicable norm 
is the natural precondition for law-application; at the same time—on a higher level—that 
would create the legal relevance, viz. that in the concrete case a legal situation should 
evolve.42 
If the identification and choice of the norm have an equally constitutive character, 
then this also applies to the legal definition of facts that constitute a case. Kelsen explains 
this, second, grade of constitutivity in a protracted treatment, not devoid of certain 
contradictions. Accordingly, the question would immediately arise, whether it is an 
indispensable element of the legal order that, when a fact becomes qualified under a 
normative aspect, it will (or should) also designate both the agency and its procedure 
exclusively empowered to qualify the given fact as a fact in law? Despite Kelsen's 
positive answei43 it seems that this is in fact a practical question which could freely be 
regulated in the course of legislation, merely because in the absence of a regulation (or 
some kind of procedural formalization) a fact could be declared to be a fact in law by 
anybody, anytime, and so the said person could rank as an official agent applying the 
law. Incidentally, Kelsen himself had recognized this, although in a different period and 
different context44 Accordingly, some degree of formalization of the procedure seems, 
in general, necessary, but it will in every case be the legislator who will decide on its 
terms, degree, and manner under practical considerations. In itself, it seems equally 
convincing when Kelsen considers the official cognizance of a fact as the only means 
towards the establishment of a fact in law;45 so much so that in his reconstruction he 
states this to be an element of the norm attaching a sanction to the fact.46 
At the same time we must immediately put a question mark behind the statement that 
here, essentially, and in every case, we are dealing with the act of a natural fact's being 
transformed into a normative fact. For if we take into consideration all the circumstances 
41 RR II, p. 243. 
42 "Only by the ascertainment implied in the judicial decision that a general norm, to be applied by the court, 
is valid... does the norm become applicable in the concrete case, and thereby a legal situation is created for this 
case which did not exist before the decision." PTL, p. 238. 
43 "If a legal order attaches a certain consequence to a certain fact as condition, then this order must also 
determine the organ who and die procedure by which the existence of the conditioning fact is to be ascertained 
in a concrete case." PTL, p. 239. 
44 In his posthumous work he writes: "1. Every man should keep one's promise made to another. 2. Maier 
has to keep his promise to pay 1000 to Schulz." In connection widi these norms, "The validity of norm 2 is 
based on the validity of norm 1, no matter who had enacted norm 2. For norm 1 does not determine who has 
the power to enact norm 2. Everybody is empowered to enact norm 2." ATN, pp. 214-215. 
45 "...even the ascertainment of the facts that a delict had been committed represents an entirely constitutive 
function of the court... It is only by this ascertainment that the fact reaches the realm of law; only then does 
a natural fact become a legal fact—is it created as a legal fact" PTL, p. 239. 
46 "This is so because the legal rule does not say: 'If a certain individual has committed murder, then a 
punishment ought to be imposed upon him.' The legal rule says: 'If the authorized court in a procedure 
determined by the legal order has ascertained, with the force of law, that a certain individual has committed 
a murder, then the court ought to impose a punishment upon that individual." PTL P- 240. 
Kelsen's Theory of Law-Application 15 
and situations which may bring into dispute the officially established fact being identical 
with the actual fact, moreover when we recall the finalizing effect of the legal force of 
a judgement, then it will become immediately apparent: in the formalized proceedings the 
actual fact is replaced by the allegation of the fact—i.e. the formal and official declaration 
of its being the case.47 This, however, both in principle and according to its actual 
structure, contradicts the claim according to which the official establishment of fact, 
although it is "not a way of taking cognition of the law, but of creating it", yet it shows 
a parallel with the cognition of natural facts.48 
The third domain in which the constitutive character of law-application manifests 
itself is the creation of the individual norm by filling the framework which the general 
norm determines, in a discretionary manner. As Kelsen himself has stated with increasing 
forced since the '30s: the legislatory determination is never an exhaustive one. 
Accordingly, the recourse to discretion is inevitable with regard to the components, thus, 
the applicable law is never merely a definition but also involves a framework freely to 
be filled in.49 At a later date, Kelsen himself—speaking about legal interpretation—would 
specifically state: the filling of the framework within the legal limits drawn by the 
applicable general norm is entirely free. At the same time the said freedom is not 
identical with free weighing, nor is it a discretionary power permitting preventing an 
action, nor is it empowered, to permit or deny something; it simply means that within the 
limits of a basic, existing regulation, the details not affected by the regulation can be 
concretized in an unbound manner. (Concretization in this case means at the same time 
a legally valid regulation, i.e. a determination.) 
Theoretical question marks 
The stress on the constitutive character of law-application is understandable. At the same 
time, Kelsen's work does not clear up the non-negligible question: What is the theoretical 
significance of all this? Of course, we must immediately remark: in the arch of Kelsenian 
thinking it does not appear as a gap. As it is, in his picture of the law, the entire legal 
process consists of volitive acts, all these acts having a law-making significance—with the 
exception of the last, concrete-individual act of execution. Whether we agree with this 
47 "In juristic thinking the ascertainment of the fact by the competent authority replaces the fact that in 
nonjuristic thinking is the condition for the coercive act. Only this ascertainment is the conditioning 'fact'..." 
Ibid. 
48 RR 11, p. 247. 
49 "This definition, however, can never be complete. The higher-grade norm cannot bind the act by which 
it is executed, in every direction. There must always remain a space for free weighing, with a wider or narrower 
space for manoeuvring, so that the higher-grade norm, in relation to the act executing iL., has always the 
character of a framework to be filled in by the former." RR, p. 91, Further: "But even in the case in which the 
content of the individual legal norm to be created by the court is predetermined by a positive general legal 
norm, a certain amount of discretion must be reserved for the law-creating function of the court. The positive 
general norm cannot predetermine all the factors which make up the peculiarities of the concrete case." PTL, 
pp. 244-245. 
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view or not, we may state that the said explanation is not fitted to prove, from the point 
of view of underlying constitutivity, the homogeneity of the various components and 
reflexions of the law-applying process. Nor does it enable it to apply demarcations. 
The said constitutivity simply cannot be homogeneous. For instance, as regards the 
discretionary filling of the normative framework, it has been shown that this is a result 
of the decision made. It is, therefore, a result to which cognition can merely provide the 
basis; however, cognition alone does not provide the result That, however, means that 
the specific process of law-application is the only channel for producing the result (not 
only because the result is vested with a specific normative quality, but also in view of 
its entire structure and mechanism). In other words, the constitutive function will directly 
come about through the shaping of factual content. 
On the other hand, we may reflect on the question: Where is the constitutivity when 
one has to decide about the validity of the applicable law, or when a fact must be 
established in a legal way? Undoubtedly, in these situations we do not deal merely with 
a pure cognition, since it is entirely different when, for instance, the doctrinal study of 
law treats law or the relation between the facts and the law, from the case when the law 
itself provides distinctions, i.e. when a competent authority—proceeding in its own formal 
way—not only narrows down the result but excludes from the beginning an open 
discussion of the result. We might choose the answer by saying that in the last two cases 
we are faced with the direct inclusion of the result within the law, i.e. fitting it into the 
law's rules of the game. Looking at it from the external aspect we might say: this is a 
procedural formalization—in other words, a formal gesture is being completed in, 
procedurally, a due time and due manner. In other words, it is an act which—regardless 
of any cognition—can provide a surplus, namely that it starts a motion within the 
normative order by generating a formal proceeding, thus evoking, in a direct manner, the 
process of imputation. Thus, its constitutive significance is, primarily, a procedural 
50 At times, Kelsen seems to admit (for instance when he describes the judicial establishment of facts as being 
parallel to their cognition, cf. RR, p. 247) that the said procedural constitutivity merely means a cognition 
possessing the surplus of the legal character of the final result. However, tliis picture does not take into 
consideration that this type of the so-called establishment of fact is done in terms of classifications according 
to models offered by the positive law. It is, thus, inextricably intertwined with qualification which is a 
normative process with unconditional, absolute ending, primarily carried out under aspects and for purposes 
different from cognition. Cf. PERELMAN, Ch. 'La distinction du fait et du droit: Le point de vue du logicien' 
in Le fait et le droit, Études de logique juridique (Brussels: Bruylant 1961), p. 271; VARGA, Cs. 'On the 
Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning' Logique et Analyse 1973 Nos. 61-62, pp. 50-54; VARGA, 
Cs. 'Law-application and Its Theoretical Conception' Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie LXVII (1981) 
4, pp. 465-468. At the same time, it is characteristic of the entire reasoning that in its fundamental definition 
il uses practical aspects demarcating it from the theoretical one; namely that instead of unfolding the features 
inherent in the subject, it is directed towards the desired classification (pigeonholing and submission) within 
the set of concepts defined within the normative system. Wliile logically this endorses the form of subsumption, 
yet the system which claims the pigeonholing classification is practice-oriented instead of being governed by 
epistemological considerations. The very process, in the course of which the juristic classification of the subject 
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The theory of interpretation 
Kelsen's theory of interpretation illustrates the character and complexity of the 
constitutive function of law-application, as well as f rom fresh aspects. 
Primarily, he differentiates between the cognitive (e.g. scholarly, jurisprudential) 
interpretation and the authentic interpretation carried out by the law-implementing body. 
The cognitive interpretation of the law identifies the frameworks offered by the applicable 
law, i.e. the possible meanings and the various options for decision. Normative inter-
pretation will choose one of the former as the individual norm to be used in the concrete 
case of law-application. Thus, the first is a cognitive act, the lattere-as the creation of an 
individual norm—is an act of volition. 
Kelsen stresses that the filling of the framework determined by the general legal norm 
in the course of law-application is no longer bound by the law,51 further that any norma-
tive influence on the process of filling the frames could only take place through the free 
use of meta-juristic norm systems.52 Consequently, anything that ensues in the course of 
the said frame-filling was no longer a question of legal theory but that of legal policy."53 
It is questionable, therefore, whether can it be tenned as interpretation at all? The 
answer to this widely debated question is mostly rather sceptic, running against the 
Kelsenian view.54 While the contemporary critical answers had all originated from 
takes place, is majored by the assessment of the social desirability of die normative consequences to be attached 
to the result of classification. Thus, any epistemological approach can involve an instrumental significance at 
the most. Cf. VARGA, Cs. The Place of Law in Lukács' World Concept (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1958), 
Chapter 5, para. 4, pp. 145 et seq. Meanwhile it seems Uiat the correspondence between the natural language 
and the normative one at some optimal level, as well as die requirement of coherence, consequentiality and 
social backing in the socio-jurisdc pracdce of normadve classifications, are by now one of die precondidons 
of die entire normative process. All this is so deeply anchored in the social existence of die law dial it appears 
to some theoreticians to be the "inner morality" of law. Cf. FULLER L. L. The Morality of Law (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press 1964), Chapter II and VARGA, Cs. 'Reflections on Law, and on its Inner 
Morality' Rivista Intemazionale di Filosofia del Diritto LXVII (1985) 3, p. 444. 
51 "From an aspect focussing solely on posidve law, there will not ensue any criterion on die basis of which 
the one possibility available witliin die frames of the applicable law could be preferred to die other... It would 
be a futile effort to try to provide die legal basis of die one by excluding the odier." RR, p. 96. 
52 "Inasmuch as—in die course of legisladon—beyond die necessary definidon of die framework within 
which the act is to be determined there is space for the cogniuve process, then the latter will not relate to the 
cognition of the posidve law but to odier norm which may eventually lead to the creadon of law. These are the 
norms of morals, fairness, further: social value judgments, usually labelled as welfare, public interest, progress, 
and so on. The positive law has nodiing to say about dieir validity and ascertainment. From tliis aspect, any 
definiuon can only be characterized from the negadve side: diese are, then, definidons not originadng from the 
posidve law proper." RR, pp. 98-99. 
53 RR, p. 98. 
54 Rodolfo Sacco explained in his II concetto di interprelazione nel diritto (Torino 1947) dial "die continued 
mixing up of interpretadon and application" was untenable (p. 131), since Kelsen had merely spoken about "die 
most convenient choice of the method of law-application" (p. 118, note 6). G. Mario Losano disclosed in his 
'II probléma dell'interpretazione in Hans Kelsen" Rivista intemazionale di Filosofia del diritto XLV (1968) 3-4 
dial the Kelsenian concept of law-interpretadon was a distortion of die concept of interpretation. As it is in the 
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Kelsen and may have been true within their own logic, they all failed to recognize the 
essential duality of the legal process, a duality that can be traced all along Kelsen's 
expositions and never explicitly denied. Namely, that according to the presuppositions 
providing the foundations of the official ideology of law and of the operation of its 
institutional set-up, the processes ensuing in law show an analogy to the process of 
cognition; moreover, apparently, they may not even be distinguished from the latter. In 
respect of law-application, we have been made to see as such the "judicial establishment" 
of the validity of the applicable law and the facts of the case. Further, in addition, the 
cognitive interpretation which, according to Kelsen, first reveals the legal framework of 
the decision, whereupon it only necessitates a volitive act, viz. the decision resulting in 
an authentic interpretation. In reality, however, judicial interpretation (owing to its 
normative environment and practical determination) shows hardly any common feature 
with the scholarly interpretation. Another argument against the common character is that 
it is the interpretator himself who will qualify judicial interpretation as such, achieving 
this with reference to its officially declared function. Meanwhile its actual structure does 
indeed demarcate it from any kind of interpretation. 
Notwithstanding the above, it was just the ideologically declared community of 
purpose and the apparent similarity of structure that enabled it to be admitted as being 
analogic to cognitive interpretation. We will qualify it as interpretation because we were 
made to accept it as the ideal expression of its ideal operation. Moreover, it is qualified 
as interpretation because revealing and defining meaning is one of its real features. In other 
words, whatever the outcome of the normative interpretation, revealing and unfolding a 
meaning must be necessarily included, even with a selective effect It boasts, therefore, the 
same status as does the logic in law: the ontological definition of law makes their presence 
inevitable (a presence that appears for us determinative), whilst the actual incongruencies 
will, just as inevitably, induce the law's operation of a differing homogeneity.55 
While the scientific interpretation of the norm starts from the norms themselves, and 
has the purpose of unfolding its substance, in the normative interpretation all this merely 
constitutes a passing, intermediary medium, in order that a proper practical answer can 
be reached by referring to that norm, by invoking its authority. Putting it in another way, 
the norm is never the purpose or aim but a means to be shaped and providing a form, in 
the process of normative interpretation. 
Procedural outlook of law? 
In the textual environment of the Pure Theory of Law, there is an apparently inorganic 
reflexion to be found. Whether this reflexion can be incorporated into the Kelsenian 
case of authentic interpretation. Kelsen replaced tire concept of interpretation based on die structure of cognitive 
interpretation, by a concept relying on a single function of interpretation. Ultimately, Kelsen designated the 
individual norm-creation as interpretation (pp. 213-215). 
55 Cf. VARGA, Cs. The Place of Law..., para. 5.3.2 and 5.4.2-3. 
Kelsen's Theory of Law-Application 19 
doctrine of law-application, may stand the test of the consistency, of the freedom from 
contradictions of the entire Kelsenian oeuvre. According to the said reflexion, in the 
course of an authentic interpretation, the choice is not necessarily made from the various 
alternatives unfolded by the cognitive interpretation. It is also possible that the individual 
norm thus found should be independent from the former. And if the given decision 
obtains a legal force,56 this latter norm will become final in the legal order, too. 
The dilemma is obvious. If we accept the basic doctrine of the Pure Theory of Law 
in the theory of gradation (i.e. the concept of individualization and concretization 
through the breakdown of the general norm), then the authentic interpretation will 
narrow down—unequivocally—to a category within the cognitive interpretation; the only 
task of authentic interpretation being the choice among the possible varieties unfolded 
by cognitive interpretation. If we accept the possibility of choice from beyond these 
varieties, then this will not narrow the norm but rather extend it; such a choice will 
employ an external solution instead of the alternatives limited by the cognitive 
interpretation; it will thus violate the interpretative character of authentic interpretation. 
It rests, therefore, on a misunderstanding, since it declares that it sets aside the norm 
which it professes to be applying.57 On the other hand, if we focus in the theory of 
gradation on the dialectics of law-making and law-application, viz. when we only 
perceive the possibility of creation at any point in the normative process and its 
constitutive significance, then the cognitive interpretation will be reduced to a mere 
ideal-typical, descriptive category, accompanied by a volitive act, which, as Kelsen 
himself states,58 will demarcate the authentic interpretation from any other type of 
interpretation. Putting it in another way, this means that the volitive contribution within 
the authentic interpretation shows a specifically constitutive aspect which, in its turn, 
provides the possibility that, eventually, even the contingency mentioned by Kelsen 
might ensue—under the guise of norm-application. 
It is to be noticed that although in the text of the enlarged, second edition of the 
Pure Theory of Law, the above reflexion may seem merely inconsequential, haphazard 
and even irrelevant, yet it is not quite alone in the Kelsenian oeuvre, though we suspect 
that the author did not wish to consider it in a manner consistent to its weight As it is, 
in the American edition of the Pure Theory of Law, i.e. the General Theory of Law and 
State, after outlining his concept on law-application (included in the set of problems 
relating to the hierarchy of norms, where he also touched upon the issues of the judicial 
56 "By way of authentic interpretation of a norm by the law-applying organ not only one of the possibilities 
may be realized that have been shown by the cognitive interpretation of the norm to be applied; but also a norm 
may be created which lies entirely outside the frame of the norm to be applied... as soon as die validity of litis 
norm cannot be rescinded, as soon as this norm has gained Ute force of a final judgment" PTL, pp. 354-355. 
57 Losano writes thus: "is based of an ambiguity", "does not apply" (p. 531). However, he too would force 
the analogy of cognitive process on normative decision-making. That is why he blamed Kelsen that while 
cognitive interpretation was also interpretation according to its structure, authentic interpretation was only so 
according to its function. 
58 RR II, p. 351. 
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act, of the applied norm, of the gap of law, and of the judge-made "general" norm), he 
unfolds his tenet as a "conflict between the norms created at different levels." He cites 
his classic American source (which is also a citation): "Bishop Hoadly has said: 
'Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he 
who is truly the Law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first 
wrote or spoke them'; a fortiori, whoever hath an absolute authority not only to 
interpret the Law, but to say what the Law is, is truly the Law-giver."59 As it is, Gray, 
Kelsen's source, had made his conclusions in too simplistic, short-circuited a manner,60 
and that is what evoked Kelsen's condemning criticism and the entire exposition 
supporting the latter. Meanwhile he fails to notice that he merely restates in a theoretical 
manner that which Bishop Hoadly had already stated.61 
Now Kelsen's problem is the following: the foundation of the validity through the 
superior norm presupposes that it corresponds with the superior norm. However, the 
establishment of this correspondence (i.e. whether or not it exists) can be effected, with 
a legal relevance, only with a law-applying decision. All this, therefore, presupposes a 
determined process of a determined body, i.e. the formalized result of a formal 
proceeding: its constitutive contribution. Since, however, after the decision has become 
final by having gained a legal force, it can no longer be disputed whether the 
constitutive contribution involved by the act of law-application had expressed "real" and 
"actual" components in a formalized result, there will be no absolute guarantee as to the 
"reality" and "actuality" of the said correspondence.62 After the possibilities of appeal 
or legal remedies have been exhausted, excluding any further legal action in the case, 
the logic of the postulates of the legal order will irredeemably assert itself and become 
all exclusive. Thus, the logical reconstruction of the sequence yields the following 
result: "The law-applying organ has either, authorized by the legal order, created a new 
substantive law; or it has, according to its own assertion, applied pre-existing 
substantive law."63 This logic, as a fundamental feature of the existence and operation 
of the legal order, is entirely sealed, self-sufficient and self-reproductive. So much so 
59 GRAY, J. Ch. The Nature and Sources of the Law 2nd ed. (New York 1927), p. 102. 
60 "The courts put life into the dead words of the statute." GRAY, p. 125. 
61 "It is difficult to understand why the words of a statute which, according to its meaning, is binding upon 
the courts should be dead, whereas the words of a judicial decision which, according to its meaning, is binding 
upon the parties should be living." GTLS, p. 154. 
62 "The lower norm belongs, together with the higher norm, to the same legal order only insofar as the former 
corresponds to the latter. But, who shall decide...? Only an organ that has to apply the higher norm can form 
such a decision. Just as the existence of a fact to which a legal norm attaches certain consequences can be 
ascertained only by an organ in a certain procedure (both determined by the legal order), the question whether 
a lower norm corresponds to a higher norm can be decided only by an organ in a certain procedure (both 
determined by the legal order)." Ibidem. 
63 GTLS, p. 155. "The decision of a court of last resort cannot be considered to be illegal as long as it has 
to be considered as a court decision at all. It is a fact Uiat the question whether there exists a general norm 
which has to be applied by the court and what the content of this norm is can legally be answered only by this 
court." Ibidem. 
Kelsen's Theory of Law-Application 21 
that even the harshest facts of life cannot encroach upon it, unless the law itself 
provides the possibility of legal transformation (i.e. the transformation of the given facts 
into legal ones and their being contested as such), at least as long as the legal order 
prevails as such. Incidentally, that is suggested by a Kelsenian example elsewhere. 
According to the said statement, any legislatory enactment must be considered 
constitutional until the contrary is proven. Approaching the problem from the other side, 
this means that inasmuch as the creation or the contents of a legislative act are 
unconstitutional, but the declaration of its unconstitutionality cannot be legally made, 
then the constitutional provision responsible for the "conflict" should be regarded as 
merely being a proposal.64 
As we have seen, Kelsen had noted these ideas. However, he did not unfold them 
as a doctrine of law-application; he did not amplify the theoretical possibilities inherent 
in them, and failed to follow their thread till the end. 
In light of these ideas, the foundation of validity no longer seems unambiguous. 
Though Kelsen's entire work is based on the consistent separation of Being and Ought 
to Be, his exposition suggests that—progressing downwards in the graded structure of 
the legal ordei^-it is the application of the superior norm that mediates the validity of 
the legal order to the lower norm (created by the individualizing-concretizing act in the 
course of application) and thus lends the norm its legal character. At the same time, the 
connexion between the said norms is characterized by the apparently ontological 
relationship of Being between those Ought-enactments. The superior norm will "define", 
will "lend a framework to", or will offer "alternative interpretations", while the lower 
norm will "correspond", will provide an "interpretation option" "within the framework". 
Here, a general philosophical-methodological question could be raised (the answer being 
a task of legal ontology): Whether these inter-norm relations are existential ones? 
Whether the relations between the Ought-enactments are "Ought-relations"? In that case, 
they could not even be interpreted or determined by means of the model of existential 
relationships between beings? But the question may also be put in a narrower context. 
And that is the essence of the Kelsenian concept How can this relationship be unfolded, 
identified or defined so that it could be relevant for the law? At this po in t Kelsen's 
answer is unambiguous: only by the determined act of the determined organ; and the 
result of the said process, Kelsen affirms, is not of a declarative but of a constitutive 
character. Yet constitutivity—as we have seen—shows a dual face, dual aspect. As to its 
contents it means that the said result could not come about without the given process 
(e.g. through a simple cognitive process), as a necessary conclusion. From the 
procedural aspect that means the following: whenever the legal order fails to designate 
a body which could contest it, or when such a body has already exhausted its legal 
remedies, then the result will become final within the legal order. It may be that on the 
64 "If a statute enacted by the legislative organ is considered to be valid although it has been created in 
another way or has another content than that prescribed by the Constitution, we must assume that the 
prescriptions of the Constitution concerning legislation have an alternative character." GTLS, p. 156. 
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social plane sharp debates will develop, revealing its contradictions, or even unmasking 
its perfidy, yet as long as the legal order prevails, the only answer accepted by and 
governing for the law will still be that result. 
At this point, however, the entire line of thought becomes reversed. If all that is 
true, namely, the normative regulation may ascribe definite requirements to definite 
behaviour; it may designate definite organs and procedures to be followed by them, and 
the normative process may show a structural and/or functional correspondence, 
parallelism or analogy with the cognitive process—nevertheless, even if these are 
essential, inevitable elements in the legal process, it is not these that will appear directly 
for the law in a relevant manner, but rather those official, formal institutional 
declarations which report on the faultless "compliance", "fulfilment" or "realization" of 
the norms. More precisely, the elements of the legal process, whether deriving from the 
existential sphere of factual reality (i.e., from the "Is") or from the sphere of the 
normative regulation (i.e., from the "Ought"), they will not appear by themselves (in se) 
in the legal process but only and exclusively as referred to in procedure. That is, when 
(1) the law's regulatory system provides a procedure in which the said elements can be 
referred to, and (2) the reference to them ensues in a procedural way, i.e. in due course, 
at the time and in the manner determined by the regulation. Now, we know that as soon 
as this procedurality has ensued, the said elements will be relevant solely as components 
of the procedure, i.e. their presence in and relevancy for the law will depend exclusively 
on their being established in procedure. Recalling the above points we might say that 
the original qualities of the said elements may only be interesting inasmuch as there 
exists a procedural possibility, in the course of which their procedural conformity can 
be contested in procedure. However, as soon as this process is closed, i.e. from the 
moment when the natural fact is transformed into a legal fact with the finality of res 
adjudicata, the formerly mentioned original qualities will become at once for all 
uninteresting, irrelevant in law. It can be seen that, although the positive law does not 
usually declare the identity of the legal force and the quality of lawfulness, yet the 
doctrinal reconstruction of procedural provisions will yield a tacit presumptio iuris et 
de iure, according to which that which is res judicata shall also be deemed lawful.65 
This is where formalism governs legal processes. As it is, any data or consideration can 
only obtain a role in the legal process in a formalized way. And once it has obtained 
that role, it will—to all intents and purposes—become firmly incorporated into the system, 
in its formalized establishment 
This sequence of deduction will push the entire Kelsenian theory towards a 
procedural approach. According to its logic, the legal system possesses a specific, ideal 
motion. For that motion, in determining its direction and in designating its ideal, the 
legal enactment provides the driving force. That driving force, however, cannot operate 
unless in a procedural medium, within formal-procedural frameworks, and the degree 
65 VARGA, Cs. and SZÁJER, J. "Presumption and Fiction: Means of Legal Technique" Archiv fúr Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie LXXIV (1988) 2. 
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of formalization is such that this procedural mediation will ultimately become 
autonomous and—on the plane of the final criteria of the system of fulfilment 
characteristic of the legal order-i t will gain an exclusive significance. 
Self-transcendence of the Pure Theory? 
Kelsen makes us "see that in the legal processes there are no guarantees either in 
respect of their correspondence with the legal norms, or to their consistency. The legal 
process merely ensures the sealing and termination of the procedure, where the last 
possible and/or applied normative qualification is being finalized. That which qualifies 
as "correspondence", "consequence", or "consistency" according to the estimation 
relevant in law, need not necessarily receive the same qualification outside the legal 
order, i.e. either according to a professional (legal-doctrinal, legal-political), or 
according to a social, lay estimation. Does all this point to the possible arbitrariness 
or anarchy in the law? Theoretically, it does. Yes, at least until the destruction of the 
order, when, upon the fading away of its effectiveness, its validity will also become 
pointless.66 At the same time, we have pointed out that this was not a doctrine 
elaborated by Kelsen; it was merely a single sentence from the enlarged second edition 
of the Reine Rechtslehre (1960) and its only precedent could be found in a short 
excursion from the line of thought of the General Theory of Law and State (1960), for 
the sake of criticizing the Common Law tenet on the exclusivity of judge-made law. 
This seems to be confirmed by the fact that his thinking, up to the end of the Second 
World War, had been captured by an implicit trust in the natural meaning of words; 
so much so that he could not even imagine doubting the lawfulness of legal acts; his 
sematic premises always show a static standpoint.67 While he accepts that the choice 
among the various meanings should be subject to the context, yet he rejects the 
possibility of the dynamic aspect of the meaning.68 At the same time it must be 
pointed out that Kelsen apparently had to reckon consciously with the chances of a 
theoretical opening, issuing from this productive ambiguity. If no sooner, then by the 
time he last revised his Pure Theory of Law. As it is, when that happened (in 
66 "A legal order is regarded as valid, if its norms are by and large effective (that is, actually applied and 
obeyed)... Effectiveness is a condition for validity..." PTL, pp. 212 and 213. 
67 Cf. KELSEN, H. 'Value Judgments in die Science of Law' Journal of Social Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence VII (1942), particularly para. VIII, in which the assessment of lawfulness of a court decision was 
simply regarded as a consequence of die applied norm. 
68 In his posthumous effort of resumption-summarization, Kelsen writes: "It stands undisputed diat the 
wording of a norm can be interpreted in several ways. However, it is not opportune to interpret this fact in a 
way like WRÓBLEWSKI, J. ('The Problem of die Meaning of die Legal Norm' österreichische Zeitschrift fúr 
öffentliches Recht XIV (1964) 3-4, p. 265: 'since the contex of die understanding and applying of the legal 
norm is changing, the norm in question changes its meaning'.] does. The norm does not 'change' its meaning, 
it merely has several different meanings (or senses)." ATN, p. 221, note 1. For a dynamic dieory of 
interpretation, cf. WRÓBLEWSKI, J. Zagadnienia teorii wykladnii prawa ludowego [Outlines for a theory of 
the interpretation fo people's law] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze 1959), pp. 151 et seq. 
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1965-66), he did not touch upon the part in question.69 Yet, if there is a theoretical 
possibility for arbitrariness, for anarchy, one might justly ask: What prevents the law 
from a final decadence or, simply, from falling apart? What holds it together at all? 
Kelsen did not even arrive at putting this question. Accordingly, it cannot be our task, 
here, to provide a theoretically developed answer. Rather a kind of indication in which 
by determining the global effectiveness as a condition of the validity of the legal order, 
Kelsen had already staked out the direction. 
So what is the essence of such a theoretical opening? The legislator legislates, the 
law-maker makes law. The state administration administers on behalf of the state and 
the judiciary administers justice. How this peculiar world comes about, how it 
operates—that is, what qualifies as a legal organ, what is the jurisdiction of such an 
organ, and what procedure it will follow—, all this is determined by positive law, at 
least in our legal and institutional culture. In a like way, the positive law will 
determine the frames serving as a model of the decision to be taken in the course of 
the said organ's proceedings. Whether the act of an organ qualifies as that of a "legal 
organ's legal act" is identical to the question, whether such an act's formal-procedural 
features—and also its merits—correspond to the definition of the positive law. That 
question can be decided—with a legal relevancy—only in the course of the legal 
operation of a legal organ. This establishment is primarily and directly entrusted to the 
organ about to proceed. In order to enable the repeated weighing of the decision of the 
first organ having proceeded in the case—i.e. the repeated weighing whether the first 
organ's autonomous qualification about its own decision (viz. that the latter did 
correspond, both formally and in substance, to the provisions of the positive law), the 
law may create institutional possibilities of appeal, recourse or revision. In the course 
of this second procedure another legal organ will, through its own legal act, either 
confirm or reject the correspondence. Meanwhile this second organ will also declare 
of its own decision that it corresponds to the provisions of the positive law, both 
formally and in substance. 
The legal order may allow the repetition of such a revision and the subsequent 
confirming (or rejecting) justification through several instances. All this, however, will 
not change the finality, the closure of the legal process. It will not change the fact that 
a body, by declaring its own proceeding as lawful, will at the same time declare its 
decision as being in accordance with the law also on its merits. In the case when the 
said decision is (1) either undebatable (because there is no legal possibility to contest 
it), or (2) undebated (where there is a possibility but those legally empowered to do it 
failed to avail themselves of this possibility in due time, manner and form)—then the 
said decision, being a legal decision, will be unassailably embodied in the normative 
order of the law, with all the consequences thereof, viz. its intrinsic qualifications, and 
69 ERNE, R. 'Eine letzte authentische Revision der Reinen Rechtslehre' in Rechtssystem und gesellschaftliche 
Basis bei Hans Kelsen, ed. Werner Krawietz and Helmut Schlesky (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1984) 
[Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 5]. 
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the normativity resulting from the latter. Its legal validity will thus become undebatable. 
The normative enactment will maintain this quality as long as it is not replaced by 
another normative enactment released by the correct level organ empowered to do it; 
while the normative qualification will be safeguarded as long as the legal order prevails 
(that is the case of legal force). 
As we have seen, the facts and their interrelations, by themselves, are not 
components of the law's normative framework. They will become legally relevant and 
referable (i.e. fit for serving as a basis of normative conclusions) only when a legal 
organ, in the course of its procedure ending in a legal act, i.e. officially and formally, 
states their existence. And that applies both to those natural facts, to the judicial 
establishment of which the positive law attaches a legal sanction, and in the context of 
correspondence between the applied normative enactment and the normative rule born 
through the application. It is independent and irrelevant what those extraneous to the 
legal procedure think of it (independent of the fact whether these persons and bodies, 
not privy to the procedure, are political or social movements, journalistic media, 
scholars—including jurisprudents—or even a lawyer acting as a private individual, citizen, 
or moralist). It is immaterial whether, in connection with the law's self-qualification, 
there is a consensus, or whether an outcry is raised against it, unmasking it as an abuse. 
Who watches the watchmen? 
To the classic question of "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"70 the law did not—because 
it could not—provide an answer. The only possibility available to law is to outline 
patterns of behaviour, procedure and decision-making, with the help of language. When 
treated as components of a uniform order, these will enable the creation of the 
institutional, ideological and doctrinal set-up of the legal order. Linguistic mediation is 
a mediation with the help of signs, while their meaning is governed by metalinguistic 
media. As it is a meta-juristic question whether the law is availed of, and complied 
with, similarly the law has no direct responsibility in how it is being interpreted. The 
interpretation of the law is the product of the social environment adopting and applying 
it (measurably by sociological means) just like the pure fact of implementation or non-
implementation. The said medium is the "audience" to which reference is made by the 
modern theories of argumentation, by the logical, semantic and praxeological 
reconstructions—as a presumed postulate, point of reference, and sociological reality 
determining the entire process. The life of everyday language—as is well known—is a 
complex, based on the social practice of communication which reproduces itself through 
continuous feedback. Well, as far as its normative interrelationships go, we have to 
conceive law as an autonomous product, yet in actual life it is embedded in general 
70 JUVENALIS Satura, VI, 347. Cf. RHEINSTEIN, M. 'Who watches the watchmen?' in Interpretations of 
Modem Legal Philosophies Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound, ed. Paul Sayre (New York: Oxford University 
Press 1947), pp. 589 et seq. 
26 Csaba Varga 
social practice. Since the linguistic objectivization consists of a mass of signs (which 
gains its social reality for us thanks to their meaning), so also the law's system of signs 
will become a social factor owing to its meaning. The meaning, however, is not a self-
identical definition, or an encoded phenomenon, but a living and uninterrupted 
continuity. It is generated through the practice of the society which accepts it as such 
and by accepting also renders it conventional. 
However autonomous the legal meaning has become, its autonomy must be fed from 
the standard, colloquial everyday language, and can only continually reproduce itself in 
a constant relation with the latter. Thus, its autonomy, or self-sufficiency, is a relative, 
even secondary one. Accordingly, the normative components of the legal action stand 
under the constant control of Mr. "Everyman". By the said components we refer to the 
self-qualification made by the organ qualifying the facts and the underlying nonnative 
enactments, whereby qualification itself is said to follow from the norms and thereby 
to base a normative appreciation. This is what the everyday man will check on the basis 
of the cognizance of the nonns and interpreting them according to everyday language 
conventions. Nevertheless, the law's language is not merely a self-sufficient entity, not 
one simply related and attached to common language. There is a certain logic in its self-
sufficiency, where a certain continuity and consistency manifests itself. And what is 
more important, this logic, its distortions and flaws, will not remain within the closed 
circle of the law and the legal profession. All these may be observed, controlled from 
the basis of common language. At least in their major lines or trends, since—in the long 
run—the political intentions of the state behind the continuity or breach of the law will 
become manifest. Politics, to which we are referring, may drive the law into 
inconsistencies, it may force it into artificial deductions and justifications; nevertheless, 
whether it be guided by any kind of intention or by the inevitable bankruptcy, it cannot 
wantonly waste away the minimum of social support. It cannot squander the minimum 
of conventional common language, or the mere possibility of communication. As soon 
as these minimal thresholds are overstepped, the ruling position expressed in and carried 
by the Law will necessarily fall apart. In the latter case what remains is a chaotic 
confusion of compulsive actions showing the features of a gradually isolated and 
reckless anarchy. At this point the legal order will have lost its organizing power 
(whether this power has been inhuman, even genocidal, so at times in our century), 
without even showing a certain degree of organization providing the necessary points 
of attachment. 
The procedural character of the legal event means that nothing can become an 
inherent component of the legal order unless a legally-recognized authority has lifted 
it, in a determined manner, into the law. From that there follows the admission that the 
nonnative breakdown, the concrete shaping of the conclusion and coherence (i.e. the 
actual formation of the nonnative interrelations) will be dependent upon the organs 
acting in the name of law. Of course, only theoretically and within certain boundaries; 
these boundaries are, however, defined by the social implementation practice of the law 
and its event—i.e. by the social practice having indirectly accepted them. That is, it is 
not the law that designates them. Arbitrariness is thus not excluded. However, even if 
Kelsen's Theory of Law-Application 27 
we have positivated a fixed system of rules, it is up to the conventionalizing practice 
of society to decide what qualifies as arbitrary in the law's application. The society must 
decide on how far this remains within the boundaries of law, i.e. within the frames of 
the "realization" of the law. These questions touch upon normative relationships. Thus 
their social cognition and valuation may not turn into criteria; at the same time, they 
provide the general (one might say: the ontological) basis of the entire process. 
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I. The Plight of the Hungarian Landless 
At the end of the 19th century, Hungary (then a Kingdom united with Austria within 
the Habsburg Empire) was burdened with an unsolved land problem.1 The situation was 
similar to that of Ireland, although stemming from entirely different historical 
antecedents. In Hungary, serfdom had not been abolished until 1848, and even after that, 
archaic conditions of land tenure persisted in the country's agricultural sector. More than 
half of the arable land belonged (incidentally until after World War II, 1945) to huge 
estates, so-called latifundia.2 The management of these estates was, in most instances, 
outdated; technology and administrative procedure were backward; mismanagement 
often reigned. 
1848 was a year of revolution in Europe. In Hungary, the turmoil lasted until 1849. 
The Magyars rebelled against the Habsburgs but were defeated. The next 18 years were 
* Translated from the German by Susan N. Faulkner, Ph. D. 
1 On the general situation and on the land question in the Kingdom of Hungary see Gyula SZEKFÜ, 
HÓMAN-SZEKFŰ, Magyar történet ['Hungarian History'], Vol. V. 2nd ed. Budapest, 1936, pp. 537 ff.; Erik 
MOLNÁR et al., Magyarország története ['History of Hungary'], Vol. II. 2nd ed. (Budapest, 1967), pp. 188 
ff. Magda M. SOMLYAI (publ.), Földreform 1945 ['Land Reform, 1945'] Budapest, 1965, pp. 7 ff. 
2 According to Aladár MÓD, 400 év küzdelem az önálló Magyarországért. [The 400-year battle for an 
independent Hungary], 7th ed., Budapest, 1954, p. 357. In 1895, 1,945 large estate owners shared 13.7 million 
"hold" (about one-third of the agricultural land of Hungary), while 1 358 875 smallholders had to be content 
with 2.5 million (about 6 per cent of the agricultural land). 
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marked by oppression and hostility. But in 1867, an inter-state agreement, called 
Compromise, brought about reconciliation between Austria and Hungary. This was 
followed by a decade of economic prosperity, and the condition of the poor smallholders 
and of the landless agricultural laborers also became more bearable. Moreover, growing 
industrialization created new urban jobs and many farm laborers migrated to the cities 
to escape from rural penury. 
Yet soon, during the great European agricultural crisis of the 1880s, want and 
misery again engulfed the small farmers and the landless agrarian proletariat, and an 
enormous wave of overseas migration from Hungary developed.3 But not only the very 
poor—many owners of medium sized and even of larger farms got into trouble. 
The landless poor, including dependents, were estimated to number 6 million, that 
is, about one third of the total population of the country.4 As the crisis worsened, there 
was widespread unrest among these masses.5 In the 1890s, disquiet often erupted into 
open uproar. It was in these days that for the first time embryonic land reform 
aspirations surfaced in the Kingdom: a politically articulate tiny minority among 
Hungary's poor peasant millions was desparately looking for a way out, for some goal 
that could be communicated to the untutored masses. The first pioneers found what they 
needed in the program of the Hungarian Social-Democratic Party.6 
In actual fact, the Hungarian Social-Democrats did not have an elaborate plan for 
a land reform; but in firm adherence to Marx's teachings and unlike the 1875 Gotha 
program of the German Social-Democracy,7 their program included the thesis that 
"landed property and all means of production should be placed under public 
ownership".8 The first known spokesman for the aroused propertyless rural population, 
the agricultural laborer János Szántó-Kovács, adopted this item on the program as his 
slogan. He was arrested in 1895 and sentenced to 5 years in jail for incitement.9 He 
declared himself to be a Social-Democrat and to be striving for the nationalization of 
the large estates. But he emphatically (and truthfully) denied having agitated for the 
carving up to the latifundia among those without land. 
It might appear incomprehensible, if only at first glance, that the rural proletariat in 
contrast, for instance, to the majority of dissatisfied tenant fanners in Ireland10 did not 
seek farm ownership, but instead wanted to be employed at government-owned estates. 
3 Between 1899 and 1911, more than one million Hungarian residents emigrated overseas A. MÓD: op. cit., 
p. 369: cf. also HORVÁTH, Z.: Die Jahrhunderlwende in Ungarn, Neuwied. Budapest, 1966, p. 345. 
4 MOLNÁR: op. ciL, p. 189. 
5 MOLNÁR: op. cit., pp. 130 ff. 
6 Op. cit., p. 136 fn. 
7 MÓD: op. ciL, p. 376 fn. 
8 Op. cit.; also see MOLNÁR, op. cit., p. 124. 
9 On Szántó-Kovács cf. Ágnes KENYERES (ed.), Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon ['Hungarian biographical 
lexicon'], Vol. II. BudapesL 1969, p. 705 fn.; SZEKFŰ: op. ciL, p. 542; MOLNÁR: op. cit., p. 141; SOMLYA1: 
op. ciL, p. 13, and SÜLE: Sozialdemokratie in Ungarn, Cologne, 1967, p. 33. 
10 Cf. PALMER, N. D.: The First Land League Crisis, New Haven, 1940, passim. 
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But these people, like their fathers before them, had never had land of their own. They 
had rather always sought to find work at large estates. Moreover, the situation of the 
small landowners did not arouse their envy, for these small farmers did not have it 
much easier. They carried the additional burden of worries about over-mortgaging their 
property, and with it the terrible fear (one shown by statistics, not to be unjustified") 
of losing it. The unpropertied farmhands of Szántó-Kovács' kind had to perform their 
labors for starvation wages, but were glad even to find a job. Thus it is understandable 
that when they dreamed, it was not of owning their "own soil", but of getting fair wages 
and secure employment, a dream which the program of nationalization of the large 
estates promised to fulfil.12 
At first, when the dissatisfaction of the small and medium-sized farmers began to 
take concrete form, the desire for breaking up large estates into small parcels became 
a political demand—as in the program written by the farmer András Áchim,13 who 
founded the first substantial Hungarian farmers'party.14 According to Áchim's program 
the tremendous estate entails, the vast church lands, and all other estates above 10,000 
"hold" [1 "hold" = 0.57 hectares = 1.4 acres] were to be nationalized and then parcelled 
out into small rentable plots; later on, Áchim reduced the upper limit of the properties 
to be left untouched to 1,000 "hold".15 
Actually, since the end of the eighties, some owners of latifundia and medium sized 
estates had been giving consideration to the elimination of the manifold social ills. Yet 
even while their proposals were later to be represented as, inter alia, a first step toward 
a land reform movement,16 more likely these were proposals which, with few 
exceptions, could never be realized. They were proposals which were designed to 
improve the existing order through a far-reaching lease system17 or through dividing 
up state and community property into parcels,18 and thereby to secure the existing 
order against crises. Another intention, at times stated explicitly, was to arrest the "racial 
loss" which Hungary had sustained by the already mentioned emigrations, by 
establishing Magyar settlements in the territories of the national minorities.19 
Within the conservative, Hungarian Christian-Socialist movement, the so-called 
progressive wing might be said to have represented most closely those ideas which 
could be described as land reform-styled. The most important spokesman of this wing 
11 See MÓD: op. cil., pp. 360 ff. 
12 SOMLYAI: op. cit., p. 11. 
13 On Achim see REINERT-TÁRNOKY, I.: "Áchim Lfiker) András", Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte 
Siidosteuropas, Munich, 1972, p. 10 f. 
14 Op. cit. 
15 Loc. cit. 
16 Thus IVÁN, J.: Földbirtokreform és társadalmunk 1890-1914 ['Landownership reform and our society 
1890-1914'] Budapest, 1935, pp. 4 ff., 34 ff., 55 ff., 80 ff. 
17 Op. cit., p. 67. 
18 Op. cit., p. 105. 
19 Op. cit., p. 41 fn, 43 fn, 53. 
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was Ottokár Prohászka,20 after 1905 the Bishop of Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg). 
Prohászka, a celebrated ecclesiastical figure of his time, emphasized that the 
unpropertied agrarians should be helped to obtain land, but that this goal was opposed, 
not only by economic liberalism and what he called Jewish plutocracy, but also by the 
latifundia system.21 As early as 1898, he declared—a statement revolutionary not only 
for his time, but for Hungary as a whole until 1945—that sooner or later there would 
inevitably come a secularization of church lands.22 
In 1916, the Bishop made the acquaintance of Adolf Damaschke, then visiting 
Budapest, and as a result became an active follower of the program of the union of 
German Land Reformers.23 At that time, he himself publicized a land reform proposal 
which suggested the creation of war veterans' homesteads.24 However, his antisemitic 
and antiliberal position forbade a joining of forces with the Leftist land reformers, of 
whom we shall speak shortly, and his conservative side rejected land reform ideas, even 
those of Damaschke's brand.25 As a result, the Bishop's proposals were not 
implemented. 
Those who espoused land reform in Hungary until 1914, whether in the direction 
of socialization or of parcelling large estates, were Socialist politicians. Two notable 
groups among them were members of the Social Science Society and of the club of the 
reform-happy young students, the Galilei Circle. These two organizations were the 
spiritual pioneers of the "bourgeois" revolution in Hungary of October 1918.26 But 
these efforts did not, prior to World War I, achieve any political significance, much less 
any movement toward land reform. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that, in 1913, the largest Hungarian encyclopedia of 
the 20th century did not mention, under the heading "Földbirtokreform" (landownership 
reform), any Hungarian movement, not even any Magyar authors. Rather it cited, first, 
the earlier English precursors and, second, it spoke of Henry George27 as "initiator of 
landownership reform in the narrower sense". It then went on to describe in detail the 
German land reform movement and the relevant socialist, especially Marxist efforts. 
Only the last sentence of the encyclopedia article dealt with Hungary. It says: The 
Hungarian Social-Democratic Party "still could not agree on an appropriate agrarian 
20 Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, II. p. 444; on Prohászka see also HORVÁTH: op. cit., p. 249. 
21 IVÁN: op. cit., p. 70. 
22 Loc. cit. 
23 DAMASCHKE: Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, Jena, 1922, II. p. 336; DAMASCHKE: Zeitenwende, 
Leipzig, 1925, p. 294. 
24 PROHÁSZKA, О.: "Ein Antrag zur Durchführung der Kriegerheimstätten in Ungarn, Jahrbuch der 
Bodenreform XII. 1912, pp. 129-133. 
25 DAMASCHKE: Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, II. p. 337. 
26 HORVÁTH: op. cit., p. 120 ff., 240 ff.: aboul the Galilei Circle: op. cit., p. 351 ff. and IGNOTUS, P.: 
Hungary, London, 1972, p. 141. 
27 On Henry George and his teachings cf. SILAGI, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1986, pp. 
201-213, 373-384. 
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program [i.e. one which also took the needs for protection of the small farmers into 
consideration]".28 To be sure, behind this sentence is hidden the fact that the agrarian 
problem was the subject of controversial discussions within the party, notwithstanding 
the lack of definitive conclusions.29 
The land reform scene came to life at last in June of 1914, when the avantgarde of 
the Leftist intelligentsia, active partly in the Masonic lodges, and partly in the 
Sociological Society, founded a radical agrarian party which was to become the 
spearhead of the republican October revolution in 1918.30 In its platform, radical land 
reform stood in foremost place.31 Among its principles (as well of the Independence 
Party, founded in 1916 by the "Hungarian Kerensky", Count Michael Károlyi,32 head 
of the short-lived bourgeois revolution of 1918/19) was the demand for "democratic land 
reform."33 
Furthermore, the promise of "far-reaching" land reform34 was in the foreground of 
the republican government's program, but now enhanced by a significant fiscal-political 
element. In a History of Hungary, published in 1967 under the aegis of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences in a second, revised edition, we read the following in connection 
with the land reform endeavours of the revolutionary government of 1918: "The 
majority of the bourgeois radicals sought to introduce, consistent with the teachings of 
an American economist, Henry George, a land value tax in order to solve the land 
problems, and wanted to use the revenues of this tax (this land value tax would have 
been equal to the annual land rent) for social purposes. Their ideas included the 
confiscation of part of the large landed estates... Some of the Socialists leaned toward 
this conception, while other [Socialists] championed the cause of private property based 
on small farm holdings."35 
II. Julius J. Pikier, Effective Publicist of Georgism 
How did it happen that Georgism, which had played no role whatsoever in Hungary 
until 1914, moved so strongly into the foreground in 1918, if only—as we shall see—for 
a short time and without lasting effects? This was due to appearance of a single 
individual, a physician and statistician, Julius J. Pikler36 (1864-1952).37 
28 Révai Nagy Lexikona (Révai's Great Encyclopedia]. Vol. VII. Budapest, 1913, p. 757 fn. 
29 SÜLE, op. cit., p. 140 ff. 
30 Op. cit., p. 166. 
31 MOLNÁR: op. cit., p. 255. 
32 On Count Károlyi, cf., Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, I. Budapest, 1967. p. 870. 
33 DAMASCHKE: Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, II. p. 336. 
34 Op. cit., 337. 
35 MOLNÁR: op. cit., p. 297. 
36 The Hungarian form of his first name is Gyula. In his German and English publications he himself used 
the international form "Julius". (The translation of Hungarian first names was customary in Hungary before 
1945 in interchange with foreign countries.) 
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No writings exist about Pikier except for short articles in encyclopedias and a 
footnote in a work about the intellectual history of Hungary.38 One of his surviving 
students,39 however, portrays him rather effusively as "a personality of manifold 
knowledge, of superior intellectual force, and of utterly irresistible powers of 
persuasion."40 
The Georgist doctrine had actually reached Hungary earlier: the Pester Lloyd, the 
German-language daily of the Hungarian intelligentsia, reported in 1886-the only 
significant periodical to do so—in two lead articles the efforts of the Land League just 
founded in Berlin.41 But Pikier did not leam about the doctrine until shortly before the 
first World War. The intermediary was the sociologist Robert Braun (1879-1937),42  
who maintained a close relationship with the American world of learning. Braun, prior 
to World War I, had met with the American adherents of the Single Tax theory.43  
Braun started the publication of George's work in Hungarian translation. In 1909, he 
began by issuing a Magyar version of Protection or Free Trade (Vámvédelem vagy 
szabadkeresedelem), followed in 1912 by the rendering of a Georgist novel written in 
English in 1894,44 and in 1914 he brought out Progress and Poverty, for the first time 
in Hungarian (Haladás és szegénység).45 A review of this work may be counted as 
Pikler's own first Georgist publication. 
Pikier had studied medicine in Vienna and, after receiving his accreditation, settled 
in Kőröshegy as circuit doctor. Then he worked for some time in Budapest as a panel 
doctor. After having made a name for himself with publications in the areas of medicine 
and statistics, particularly mortality statistics, he entered, in 1897, the service of the 
37 Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, II. p. 416; Julius J. Pikier should not be confused with his cousin, legal scholar 
and psychologist Julius Pikier 1864-1937 (ibid.). 
38 IGNOTUS, P.; "Die intellektuelle Linke im Ungarn der 'Horthy-Zeif ", Sudost-Forschungen XXVII. 
Munich, 1968, pp. 148-241 (239). In die footnote, Pikler's place of work of many years is given as the National 
Statistics Bureau instead of, correctly, the Budapest Public Statistics Office. 
39 Insofar as in the following comments no other sources are indicated, the portrayal of die person and of the 
influence of Pikler's is based on data supplied by his closest collaborator in the area of Georgism, the architect 
and urban planner, Aladár Sós as well as oral information of a student of Pikier, economist and historian Robert 
Major. On Sós, cf. Révai XXI, 1935, p. 752. See also SILAGI, "Aladár Sós", U n d & Liberty, London, 
LXXXII. 1975. p. 73. 
40 Ignotus speaks of Pikler's "numerous enthusiastic students, who were fascinated by Ids incorrupdble, razor-
sharp logic" ("Die intellektuelle Linke...", p. 239). 
41 WEHBERG, H.: A. Theodor Stamm und die Anfänge der deutschen Bodenreformbewegung, Bonn, 1911, 
p. 25. 
42 Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, I. p. 263. 
43 The editor of die Single Tax Year Book, Joseph Dana MILLER, wrote in 1917 in his contribution 
"Historical Addenda", p. 194: "his visit to America a few years ago is pleasantly remembered by many Single 
Taxers in New York and other cides". 
44 Kormányzóságom története. The English original was entitled The Story of my Dictatorship and appeared 
initially anonymously in 1894 in England. It describes how a politician, called to be dictator of England, 
translates George's program into acdon for the welfare of all. 
45 In 1921, Braun published a translation of Henry George's Social Problems ('Társadalmi problémák'). 
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Statistics Office in the capital, where, in 1906, he was named Deputy Director. Both as 
country doctor in the backward province and as panel doctor in Budapest—then 
synonymous with doctor for the poor-he obtained an insight into the misery of the 
masses, an insight to which he gave expression as an author. 
Pikler's interests were multi-faceted; whenever he encountered problems, he tried 
to solve them by strictly logical and rational means. In the realm of the rational he was 
at one with George, but the emotional warmth of the American was alien to him. (By 
the way, the same reproach often leveled at George, that he operated with eternally valid 
natural laws and lacked a historical sense, was also directed at Pikier.) 
There is no complete bibliography of Pikler's publications, but even the extant data 
about his works demonstrate a decided versatility. He published not only medical and 
statistical works;46 in 1910, he subjected the ballyhoo about the "calculating horses of 
Elberfeld"47 to a devastating critique. In 1927, he offered in Schmoller 's Year Book (a 
German economic journal), a proposal for solving the problems of monetary stability.48 
Finally, in 1940, he began writing a study in which he as a Jew was also interested 
existentially. It was initially meant to concern itself with discovering the sources of the 
social phenomenon of the hostility toward Jews. But this work eventually expanded to 
become a far-reaching analysis and inventory not only of antisemitism, but—as Pikier 
put it—of "antiism" in general.49 
As Deputy Director of the Public Statistics Office in Budapest, Pikier attended, 
together with Robert Braun, the International Congress of Georgists held in Oxford in 
1923.50 At that time he reported in a speech that, in 1913, he had occupied himself 
46 An incomplete list of Pikler's medical and statistical writings: Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, II. 416. According 
to this article, Pikier edited "for some time" the German-language periodical Pester Medizinisch Chirurgische 
Presse and contributed to it "numerous medicial and social-hygiene articles". 
47 See KRALL, К.: Denkende Tiere, 4th ed. Leipzig, 1912, passim. 
48 PIKLER, J. J.: "Zur Frage der Dynamik und Systematologie des Geldes", Schmollers Jahrbuch, LI Munich, 
1927, pp. 723-760 (reprint of an address given by the author before the Oesterreicliische Politische Gesellschaft 
in Vienna). 
49 According to Sós the voluminous manuscript of the unifinished work is lost. Pikler also wrote a whole 
series of combative and controversial essays, such as for the Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift, inter alia 
about genetics, on die definition of life, and about the psychology of lying. 
50 This and the following paragraph are based on Julius J. Pikier, A magyar városi telekértekadó elméleti és 
gyakorlati tanulságai ['The theoretical and practical lessons from the Hungarian city land value tax'], ms. 
Budapest, 1924, p. 46. The subtide of the 65-page brochure reads as follows: "Expansion of die speech given 
at the International Conference in Oxford, August 13-20, 1923". Meant is the internadonal conference of 
Georgists, which takes place at several years' intervals in diverse places diroughout die world. Tliis brochure 
was the "Bible" of the Hungarian Georgists between the two world wars, and was labeled the "speech of 
Oxford" by them. The text appears to be a transcripuon rich in the rhetorical elements of a speech, but in view 
of its size only part of it could have been read to the audience. It is impossible to determine at diis point what 
was actually spoken and what was expansion or subsequent addiuon. An excerpt of die Oxford speech is 
recorded in the Conference report: "Land Value Policy in Hungary. Theoretical and Practical Lessons", 
International Conference on the Taxation of Land Values, Oxford, 1923, Official report of proceedings London, 
1923, pp. 45-50. This excerpt was reprinted in 1960 as "A Land Values Classic" in Land & Liberty, LXVII. 
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with housing statistics and with the housing shortage." He steeped himself in the 
problem and, in the process, turned to the literature of the German land reform 
movement. From it he learned a great deal, but he rejected "its practices which were 
false and which complicated things (value increase tax, land tax, estate entail—styled 
restitution of family-owned farms, purchase and sale of land through the community 
etc.)" 
His own thinking and the study of Henry George's works led him to the conviction 
that the solution of the land question—nay, of the entire social question—could be found 
in the idea of the "pure, simple, and concession-less land value tax". "Thereupon I 
determined to institute the urban land value tax in Hungary, in the hopes of expanding 
it in time into a tax which would embrace all real estate in the whole country", Pikier 
writes. 
He deliberately decided upon doing this by himself, without founding any 
movement, any organization, any party—for this purpose, or even without tying himself 
to any particular political group. He believed that he could reach his goal simply 
through logical argumentation, if he could just get the ear of the men in authority. 
His first publication about Henry George's doctrine, as already stated, was devoted 
to the Hungarian edition of Progress and Poverty. The review article appeared in the 
influential scholarly journal Huszadik Század [Twentieth Century],52 the organ of the 
Social Science Society. According to its program, this Society had originally been 
supra-partisan, apolitical, but was now dominated by the pioneers of the bourgeois 
revolution of 1918.53 
The Freemason Pikier held his first speech about a land value tax in his lodge 
"Demokrácia". His remarks evoked a strong echo among the Hungarian Masons, 
although the group as a whole did not identify itself with Georgist theses.54 
As the respected Deputy Director of a high city administration office, Pikier found 
many doors open to him. In addition, with the help of his Masonic brethren, he obtained 
entrance even there where perhaps as statistician, however much esteemed, he might not 
have been able to find a hearing. 
As lobbyist, then, for the idea of the land value tax, he conducted what might be 
called a one-man campaign. To gain support, he wrote for the great liberal daily 
founded by the Masons, Világ (the word means "world" as well as "light")55 and for 
the official periodical of the capital, Városi Szemle [Urban Review], He also held 
pp. 165-168; 185 fn, and a separate reprint of the article in the journal was distributed as a pamphlet by the 
British Georgists. (In my text the Hungarian brochure is cited as "Oxford speech".) 
51 On the housing scarcity cf. KISS, Gy.: A budapesti várospolitika ['The communal policy of Budapest'], 
2nd ed. Budapest, 1958, p. 95 ff. 
52 On Huszadik század see Ignotus, Hungary, p. 112 fn and HORVÄTH: op. cit., p. 121, 129 fn. 
53 HORVÁTH: op. cit., p. 121, 240 fn. 
54 Information by letter from A. SÓS. 
55 SZABÓ, A.: Az Eötvös-Páholy hetvenéves története ['The 70-year history of the Lodge Eötvös'], Budapest, 
1947, p. 17 ff. 
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speeches at the Social Science Society, in the Galilei Circle, and before any union or 
group whose interest he could arouse. In fact, he went so far as to use personal 
conversations to win over resistant city politicians.56 
Pikier did not, however, propagandize overtly for Georgism or for the single Tax. 
He merely pointed out again and again that he was proposing a new kind of taxation. 
This was the argument which had the strongest effect on the councillors of the City of 
Budapest, battling a constant deficit57—for it promised revenues while increasing 
production of homes and thus served to ameliorate the shortage housing. Yet it was 
eminently fair, required little administrative cost, and could not be fraudulently evaded, 
it was only later that Pikier indicated that, of course, other taxes, those which were anti-
social, production-inhibiting, and corruption-inciting, could (and must) be eliminated at 
the same rate that revenues from the new taxes, land value taxes based on generally 
accepted valuation, were flowing in.58 
After the town of Arad (today Romania) had accepted the land value tax in May of 
1917,59 Pikier achieved a breakthrough in Budapest in November. Here, in 1917, he 
won over the Mayor, István Bárczy,60 his deputy, Ferenc Harrer, and the head of a 
large center-party, Vilmos Vázsonyi,61 who, during the last years of the war, was at 
times also Minister of Justice. 
In November of 1917, the Budapest City Council also adopted, with a large 
majority, an "Ordinance for the city land value tax in Budapest",62 which was 
proclaimed on December 17th of the same year with the approval of the Ministers of 
Finance and of Interior. 
According to this ordinance, a land tax was to be instituted, based on generally 
accepted valuation and strictly in accord with orthodox Georgist principles.63 There 
was no mention—yet—of any taking away by taxation of the whole land rent, and the 
annual tax rate amounted to only 0.5 percent of the assessed land value (Par. 14 of the 
Ordinance); at the same time, a special city tax, the so-called "rent-dime", was reduced 
by 50 percent (Par. 20). The tax basis was the generally accepted land value, defined 
as follows: "As per the paragraph below, the city land value tax is determined according 
to the market value of the parcel of land. The value of the improvements existing in and 
above the land (construction above and below ground, trees, plants, etc.) are not to be 
taken into consideration in the computation of the tax basis". (Par. 4) The market value 
56 Information by letter from A. SÓS. 
57 KISS: op. cit., II. p. 977. 
58 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 46 fn. 
59 DAMASCHKE: Geschichte der Nationalökonomie, II. p. 337. 
60 Magyar Életrajzi Lexikon, I. p. 115. 
61 Op. cit., II. p. 977. 
62 The German translation of the regulation is reprinted in the Jalirbuch der Bodenreform, XVIII. 1918, pp. 
174-179; the most important sections, together with a commentary by Pikier, are contained in the excerpt from 
the Hungarian'speech published by the English Georgists (see Note 48). 
63 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 43. 
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was to be determined every three years (Par. 5). A special city office was created for 
the evaluation of the land value (Par. 6); Julius J. Pikler was appointed Director of the 
Budapest Land Valuation Office. 
Pikier had no doubt that the favourable experiences with the land value tax would 
inevitably lead to a gradual increase by the city administrations of the 0.5 percent tax 
rate, along with an equal decrease of other taxes, until the rate corresponded to the 
entire land rent, in other words, to about 5 percent The image he had before him as 
goal was something similar to the tax system of Germany's protectorate in China, 
Kiautschou (1894-1914), the province he characterized as late as 1948 as the "model 
state".64 
After his success in Budapest Pikier travelled in 1917 and 1918 throughout Hungary 
and proceeded everywhere in the same way as in Budapest, except that in his attempts 
to persuade the provinces he could now point to the ordinances passed in the capital. 
Within twelve months, seven other cities had decided to institute the land value tax: 
Szeged, Debrecen, Kaposvár, Újpest (today part of Budapest), Győr, Marosvásárhely 
(today Tîrgu Mure§, in Romania), and Sopron.65 
In the cases of Szeged and Debrecen, Pikler's success was especially remarkable, 
since these towns at that time (1918) could not be called towns in West European terms, 
but were rather enormous agrarian settlements around an urban core, a tiny one in 
proportion to the expanse of the total area. So, for example, the entire precinct of 
Debrecen, the city which in Hungary was called the "Calvinist Rome", had a diameter 
of 70 kilometers—with around 80,000 inhabitants.66 Pikler's land value tax, in accord 
with Georgist doctrine, placed a levy on each site without exception, on each piece of 
real estate, whether urban or rural, at the same percentage of the generally accepted 
value. Thus, in Debrecen the Georgist program was accepted (though, it is true, formally 
through city ordinances) in a large agricultural area; and Pikier reports that he was 
surprised at having been able to convince the leader of the small fanners in Debrecen 
more quickly of the justice and usefulness of the new tax than the upper class.67 
During 1918, an appraisal was made in all applicable cities of the value of all real 
estate property—without consideration for their use, possible construction, or 
improvements; the imposition of the tax was to begin in Budapest on January 1, 1919 
(Par. 1 of the Ordinance). 
Shortly before, however, on October 31, 1918, the revolution broke out in the 
capital. The comment cited above in the Hungarian History of the Budapest Academy 
illustrates how strongly even the historical writings of Marxists who clearly rejected 
Henry George's teachings have assessed the Georgist influences at that time. But in 
64 PIKLER, J. J.: "Der Weg zum Musterstaat", Neue Welt und Judenstaat, II. 14 Vienna, 1949, p. 8. On the 
tax system of Kiautschou cf. SILAGI, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1984, pp. 167-177. 
65 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 48 fn. 
66 Op. cit., p. 49. 
67 Loc. cit. 
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actuality this impact was due, in Pikler's own opinion, rather to his personal 
propagandists efforts and to the example of the land value tax introduced in nine cities. 
These two factors lent the Georgist program a sort of nationalistic flavour, so much 
so that the republican regime of Count Michael Károlyi, eager to stabilize its popularity, 
included in its agenda among other items the introduction of a land value tax throughout 
the country. This was alongside other demands which were deemed to be effective 
propaganda weapons, but which were incompatible with Georgism.681 fact, however, 
it did not come to a realization of this statement of intentions. 
On March 21, 1919, the regime of Count Károlyi was replaced by the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic which in turn broke down on August 1. And on August 3, Romanian 
troops marched into Budapest and occupied the capital until the middle of November. 
On November 16, 1919, Admiral Miklós Horthy with his national army seized power 
in Hungary; as a result, groups of conservative right-wingers attained control of the 
government.69 The change also meant the end of the relatively liberal self-government 
bodies in the cities.70 
The Budapest Ordinance concerning the land value tax was not actually rescinded 
by any of these changing administrations, but to the political disorders was added the 
rapid decline in value of the Hungarian currency. An inflation now set in which was 
similar in magnitude to the Austrian one, so that by 1919 the revenues from the tax, 
which had been based on the land value assessments of the previous year, were reduced 
to insignificance. 
The rightist parties, which were supported by the tenement house owners' lobby and 
which ruled in Budapest at the time, now organized a campaign against Pikier.71 Their 
principal objection (at the time a very effective one) against the land value tax was 
simply that this was an invention of the (then banned) Masons and of the Jews. Pikier, 
though still head of the capital's Land Valuation Office, had no contact with the new 
city delegates; but he writes that these men still could not bring themselves to abolish 
without a proper substitute the Ordinance of December 1917. During the decisive City 
Council debate, the speakers took turns countering each other's arguments directed 
against this Ordinance.72 Finally, in 1921, it was decided that, while at that time the 
law was not to be rescinded, the collection of the tax was to be suspended for the time 
being. The legal department of the city was instructed to formulate a new, more 
"Christian" and more truly nationalistic land value tax ordinance.73 
Things remained at that stage. The city agencies have not returned to the matter 
since then. 
68 Op. cit., p. 50. 
69 IGNOTUS: Hungary-, p. 141 ff. 
70 IGNOTUS: "Die intellektuelle Linke ...", p. 156. 
71 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 50. 
72 Op. cit., p. 51. 
73 Op. cit., p. 52. 
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III. Pikler's Influence Abroad 
The news of Julius J. Pikler's initial successes in Hungary reached Vienna during the 
first World War.74 The Viennese Socio-Pedagogical Society, founded by the Austrian 
Freemasons,75 invited him to give an address in Vienna. Pikler's arguments were 
persuasive in Vienna as well: the Cristian Socialists mayor, Dr. Richard Weiskirchner, 
and his deputy, von Goldemund, received Pikier and became converted by him to the 
idea of the land value tax.76 Thus, already before the dissolution of the monarchy, the 
preparations began here too for the passing of appropriate legislation, which were not 
even undercut, whether by the revolutionary upheaval, by the reform of the franchise, 
by Weiskirchner's defeat at the polls on May 4, 1919, or by the entry of a two-thirds 
Socialist majority into the City Council.77 
The contact with Pikier had been interrupted since the beginning of 1919, but on 
December 18, 1919, the "law concerning a tax on the current land value (land value tax) 
in the metropolitan area of the City of Vienna" was passed.78 It followed in several 
ways the Budapest model, and the tax rate of 0.5 percent of the market price was taken 
over as well. But one major difference, a fact which later drove Pikier to bitter protest, 
lay in the provision that the amount was to be based on the landowners' self-
appraisal.79 Pikier saw in this a direct violation of the spirit of Georgism which 
required the creation of a tax measure through which no one could gain an advantage 
by cheating the community; and for the same reason, no one should be exposed to the 
temptation of making false statements. In a system truly governed by natural law, there 
would be no tax declarations, and the evaluation of a piece of land should, as had been 
done in Hungary, be done through an independent assessment office. This office, if 
required, would have to justify its assessment in writing to the concerned taxpayer, and 
would have to make all values available for public inspection in order to facilitate 
comparisons (in Budapest, par. 8 of the City Ordinance provided that the values be 
issued as a city publication); and its decisions could be appealed in court.80 
74 Op. cit., p. 53. 
75 As King of Hungary the monarch permitted legal, open activities of the Freemasons; as Emperor of 
Austria, however, he upheld to the last the ban on the Lodges issued there at the end of the 18th century. This 
was the case through 1918, the end of the dual monarchy. As a result, when the Austrian Freemasons desired 
to take part in Lodge activities, they travelled to Hungary; at home they functioned under camouflage, through 
humanitarian and reform associations such as the "Social-Pedagogical Society". [Gustav] Kuèss, [Bernhard] 
Scheichelbauer, 200 Jahre Freimaurerei in Österreich Vienna, 1959, p. 117 fn. 161 fn.) 
76 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 53. 
77 TILL, R.: Geschichte von Wien in Daten Vienna, 1948, p. 151; Karl ZIAK, ed., Unvergängliches Wien 
Vienna, 1964, p. 404. 
78 Entwurf für ein "Wirtschaftsbefreiungsgesetz", 6th document of the Bund Österreichischer Bodenreformer, 
2nd ed. Vienna, 1933, р. 3. 
79 Op. cit., p. 4. 
80 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 20 ff. 
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Whether the self-appraisal actually would have had a negative effect of this sort 
could not be determined empirically in Vienna. The valuations were carried out in 1920, 
and the tax collections began in 1921; but the revenues which, with a relatively stable 
currency, would have been quite substantial, appeared in the whirl of the galloping 
inflation from a fiscal standpoint to be hardly worth the trouble.81 The Socialist 
majority in the City Council showed from the outset little enthusiasm for this tax. On 
one hand, the little man, whose grandparents had built a meagre cottage at the far-away 
city limits, and who still lived modestly in this tiny home while the city had grown 
beyond his piece of land, the value of which had grown a thousand-fold—this little man 
was now to be burdened with a high tax. On the other hand, the wealthy tenement house 
owner on the parcel next to him would not have to pay more land value tax than the 
modest neighbour and, as far as his rental edifice was concerned, would be as tax-
exempt as the little man's cottage. This did not sit well with a Marxist Socialist.82 The 
Georgist thinking was that this wealthy man was useful to the community as a residence 
provider by using his land for rental apartments, while the poor neighbour was with-
holding a costly site from the community. Therefore, objectively speaking, the latter was 
a land speculator, even though the ultimate, unearned super-gain might not fall to him 
but to his heirs. However, such a viewpoint was incomprehensible to the Viennese 
Socialists. 
In Budapest as in Vienna, it was doubtless the inflation and the thereby diminished 
revenues from the land value tax which helped its enemies to achieve to witness the 
wrecking, not only of his project, based on Henry George's teachings, but also of the 
law of his conception. In Vienna, it was the Socialists whose ideology drove them to 
tax, not the land but the members of the propertied class, their enemies. They officially 
abolished the Viennese land value tax at the end of 1923.83 In contrast, in Budapest 
it was the real estate owners who, supported by the majority in the City Council, 
prevented for understandable reasons of self-interest the taxation of their private land 
monopolies. 
The news of Pikler's seemingly thoroughgoing success in Budapest reached, long 
after the demand for a land value tax had vanished in Hungary, into far-off foreign 
countries. In consequence of an article in the British Georgist journal, Land & Liberty,in 
which Dr. Pikier reported about his activities,84 he was invited at the beginning of the 
1920s by land reformers in northern Germany and Denmark to make a lecturing tour. 
Pikler was able, through financial support of the United Committee for the Taxation of 
81 KNAB, P.: Bodenwertbesteuerung in Österreich, London, 1959, p. 2. 
82 SCHWARZL, J.: Franz, Camillo und Siegfried Sitte, Vienna, 1949, p. 4. 
83 TILL: op. cit., p. 153. A home building tax was substituted for the previous realty tax to finance the 
municipal housing projects which later became world famous. But the new tax, however much it may have 
served a useful purpose, was by Georgist standards inhibiting to production and therefore inimical to the 
economy. 
84 PIKLER, J. J.: "The Valuation and Taxation of Land Value in Budapest", Land & Liberty, XXVII. 1920, 
p. 549 fn, and Pikier, "Hungary", op. cit., XXIX. 1922, p. 276. 
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Land Values in London to make this trip, which ordinarily would have been impossible 
for a Hungarian, in straitened circumstances as a result of the war. In addition to 
Copenhagen, he visited the Hanseatic cities of Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, where 
he spent, respectively, two, four and eight days.85 
True, the periodical Land Reform of the Union of German Land Reformers, 
published by Adolf Damaschke, did not take any notice of the Hungarian's trip through 
northern Germany. But how Pikler was received there is indicated by a letter about the 
visit of the chairman of Bremen's Land Reformers, Otto Erich Günther, to the editor 
of Land & Liberty. In this letter, characterized by the editor as "enthusiastic", we read: 
"Dr. Pikler's presence and activity in Bremen was entirely in keeping with our 
method of conducting our campaign, which aims at the introduction of as clean a form 
of Taxation of Land Values as possible. This has been our aim during all the years we 
have been working for the cause, and we have always put stress on this in our 
negotiaüons with friend and foe, in public and privately. It was our former chairman, 
Mr. Elwert, who, being a subscriber to Land & Liberty, had his attention drawn to Dr. 
Pikier by an article in that journal describing his work in Budapest... . In looking back 
upon Dr. Pikler's visit I can but say that the high expectations we had placed in it have 
been far surpassed. Quite apart from his being a charming man to know, he put an 
enormous amount of energy and self-sacrifice into his work, that we cannot but cherish 
the memory of his visit and personality among the pleasantest experiences we have had 
for a long time."86 
Pikler also left a deep impression with his audience by the lecture, cited previously 
in this chapter, before the participants at the International Georgist Congress in Oxford 
in 1923. The correspondent of the British Georgist periodical wrote about this event: 
"Dr. Percy McDougall presided, and said he was introducing one of their friends 
whom they were all waiüng to hear because of his eminent services as chief of the Land 
Valuation Department of Budapest. Dr. Pikier had already taken some part in their 
deliberations, and in these contributions had given them an insight into the great talents 
he possessed. Dr. Julius J. Pikier had chosen as the ütle of his address, 'Theoretical and 
Tactical Lessons to be learned from the Land-Value Policy in Hungary'... . Dr. Pikler's 
address, which occupied more than an hour's time, marshalled in masterly fashion a 
whole dossier of facts and arguments. It made a profound impression on his audience, 
and speakers in the discussion were glad to express their hearty appreciation of his 
informing treatment of the subject, especially complimenting on the way in which he 
had dealt with questions of controversy."87 
In the years of Admiral Horthy's regency, Pikler's influence was shattered, and his 
potential for effectiveness was extinguished. He did, it is true, continue to enjoy much 
respect in the circles of the liberal intelligentsia. But the strict and uncompromising 
85 PIKLER: Oxford Speech, p. 53; "Notes and News", Land & Liberty, XXX. 1923, p. 59. 
86 "Notes and News", Land <4 Liberty, XXX. 1923, p. 175. 
87 "Und Value Policy in Hungary," Land <4 Liberty, XXX. 1923, p. 175. 
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logicality of his theories and the extreme sharpness of his polemics had the result that, 
in Hungary after 1920, he could assemble only a small group of compatriots who, under 
a conservative regime, had become as ineffective as he. He lectured and took part in 
panel discussions. On those occasions he was assured, as reports his closest collaborator 
Aladár Sós, of complete success owing both to his arguments and to his sarcastic 
comments, but his sarcasm did little to gain friends among the other participants in the 
debates. From 1934 to 1937 he published (together with Sós) a scholarly journal Állam 
és polgár [State and Citizen], in which he sought to deepen the theoretical basis of 
Henry George's system and to solve, along his own lines of thinking, some problems 
not touched upon by George. 
Pikier held fast to the Georgist tenets, as well as to the differentiation between two 
kinds of property, "the land (site) and men (respectively, labour power and its 
products)."88 He believed that he could divide every social system according to the 
ways in which it dealt with these two kinds of property, of which the first (land) 
belonged by right to the community and the other (labour power and its products) 
definitely to the individual.89 
Pikler was asked in 1948, four years before his death, at the end of an interview 
granted a German-language, Viennese, Jewish periodical, "Do you have hopes for the 
actualization of your teachings?". He gave an answer which was typical for his thinking, 
so opposed to any political compromise or compromise of any sort, and so strictly 
rationalistic, but indicative at the same time of his presentiment that his efforts were 
going to fail: "We are against collectivism, against a planned economy, in fact against 
any unnecessary ties or any avoidable coercion. Yet, we are also just as unrelenting in 
our hostility toward the misusers of monopolies as are the Communists. In other words, 
we are thoroughly out of step with the times. But I believe I know one thing: Our 
propositions are equal in rank of logic to the arithmetic equations of the multiplication 
table. Even if today someone were to forbid, in the name of some ideals, the use of the 
multiplication table, and were to turn the masses against it through the appropriate 
educational-propagandistic measures-the equation 2 x 2 = 4 would still win through in 
the end. That I shall hardly live to see this happen is my private grief and sorrow."90 
88 SABBATAI, D.: "Ein humanistischer Sozialismus. Gespräch mit dem Sozialphilosophen Dr. Julius J. 
Pikler," Neuse Welt und Judenstaat, I. 2. 1948, p. 8. 
89 See also "A helyes társadalmi rendszer problémája" ['The problem of the согтей social order'], Állam 
és polgár, 1934, No. 1. pp. 2-12 (10 ff.) 
90 SABBATAI: loc. cit. 
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Alternative Penal Sanctions Lenke FEHER 
It is a world-wide phenomenon and recognition, that the development of criminal law 
as a possible answer for the criminality, has became overdimensioned in many respects. 
The traditional role of the criminal law is more and more enlargened, sometimes loosing 
its "last resort" character. Some of this enrichment can be regarded, as the natural 
consequence of the social development, so their rationality are unquestionable. Some are 
however, only an artificial shifting over the problems to the field of criminal law. This 
lattest has a lion's shares, that some are speaking about the inflation of the criminal law. 
In special field of the social life we can speak about over-regulation, while in other 
respects it is nearly untouched by criminal law. But not only the criminalisation has 
such dimensions. The criminal justice itself, trying to solve the problem: the courts are 
facing too much cases, in consequence of it is more and more difficult to keep the 
balance, to finish the procedure during rational period, to focus to the rights and 
interests of the victim and reach the goals of the criminal policy.1 
All of this has concluded, that in the field of criminalisation as well as criminal 
procedure there is a tendency to decrease the competence of the criminal law. 
* Paper for the XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law (31 July-6 August 1994 Athens). 
1 LÉVAI, M.: Társadalmi, politikai változások és a bűnözés. Válogatás a 11. Nemzetközi Kriminológiai 
Kongresszus előadásaiból (Budapest, 1993. aug. 22-27) MKT. (Social, political changes and criminality. 
Selected papers of 11th International Congress on Criminology. Budapest, 22-27 of August, Hungarian 
Association of Criminology.) p. 123. 
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Minimising the intervention means more responsibility, control and social participation 
in the criminalisation process.2 
Concerning the sanction system, there is a tendency of humanisation. This means 
the humanisation of the content of prison sentence as well as the existence come into 
the limelight and use of the catalogue of alternative punishments. All of this arise the 
question of retributive or restorative justice. 
In a broader sense—as restitution, restoration of the legal order, which had been 
violated by the crime—every criminal justice system has restorative purposes, tendencies. 
Inflicting a punishment, however, means always a malum, a negative experience for the 
offender, a retribution, for the crime committed. 
Restorative efforts from time to time appeared in the history of criminal law. The 
restoration has sometimes symbolic, sometimes more instrumental character. 
The vast majority of crimes are defined, as dangerous to the society, even if the victim 
is a natural person. The prevailing criminal justice system—in the name of the society—pro-
secute the criminal offender, bringing accusation and proceeding against him at trial. This 
method has more garantees and efficiency than the individual victim's action. 
In a great number of the crimes of public prosecution, the crime is strictly directed 
against the citizens personality and/or property. According to this fact, the expectation 
would be a similar rate of victim's initiation to start a criminal procedure. In reality this 
occures only in two-third part of the cases. The difference can be explained by the fact, 
that according to the cost-benefit balancing, sometimes more favourable for the victim to 
disregard a smaller loss of damage, than a long, time-consuming and unpleasant procedure. 
According to our law, the necessary condition to qualify a person as a victim: to be 
hurted in rights or legal interests. This forms a basis to appear at the authority in the role 
of the victim, who has to be informed of all the important decisions already in the pre-
trial phasis. 
As the accused is represented by the prosecutor in the case of public accusation, the 
victim's procedural role changes radically. The victim, who initiated the procedure, who 
is the starting point of this process, paradox manner will not arrive to the centre of the 
procedure, on the opposite: step by step displaced to a marginal position. 
The criminal procedure has its strict rules and participants are acting in certain roles. 
In this way, the will, wishes and claims of the victim have a limited possibility to be 
fulfiled. The accusation-monopoly of the state has a special consequence: the response 
to the crime given by criminal law is more repressive, than reparative or restitutive. For 
this very reason we have to pay more attention to secure the rights and legitim interests 
of the victim. In such manner we can avoid or reduce the risk of the so-called "secondary 
victimisation". 
Whenever a crime is committed against person or property, the citizen suffers 
physical and/or psychical hanns, damages. This is the primarily, actual process of 
2 KIRÁLY, T .: A büntetőeljárás reformja elé. (Towards the Reform of Criminal Procedure.) In: Magyar Jog. 
(Hungarian Law Review.) 1993/5. pp. 257-261. 
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victimisation. If the criminal proceeding is directed only for the official, organisational 
interests, the victim still remain in a handicapped situation and the result is the 
"secondary victimisation", for which no more the offender is to be blamed, but the organs 
and persons, participating in the criminal procedure. In this case however, the criminal 
procedure is serving the system, but not the justice. 
The criminal procedure, which is neglecting the interests of the victim, compounds 
a future risk of the victim's reluctancy to initiate and help the criminal procedure, proving 
the evidence. In further consequence this will increase the hidden criminality; this could 
positively effect the bravery to commit new crimes, etc. If the criminal procedure 
neglects the victim's interests in such degree, that the organisational interests of proving 
evidence are considerably dominant, the victim can be violated in his human rights. 
In the case of crimes against person, the victims is primarily motivated by claim of 
moral compensation. Therefore the process can cause a new trauma, a similar harm, as 
itself the crime. We cannot avoid this unpleasant consequence by overruled procedure, 
but such a practice, which takes into consideration not only the official, organisational, 
but the individual interests, too. When people are selected—who should act in criminal 
justice—we have to pay attention not only to their professional knowledge, but also to 
their human qualities and suitabilities. 
It is said, that the criminal law has developed a phase of so-called autonomous and 
repressive character, while the post-modem law needs a responsive direction.3 I am 
convinced, that in the present criminal law all the three features have to be represented 
in a harmony. The criminal law always has been more or less repressive, because it has 
punitive sanctions. This character cannot be denied even by the most treatment-oriented 
criminal law. But to a certain degree, extent, the criminal law has to be autonomous, to 
avoid to serve only the dominant political streams and interests. It is also an acceptable 
wish to strenghten the responsive character of the criminal law in the special meaning, 
to be able to follow the social interests. It cannot be so much autonomous, as for instance 
to sanctionalise a great number of acts which are not against public moral, because this 
would be a dictatorical overemphasising of the autonomy. At the same time it will be 
unreasonable also, because the massive law-breaking—which would arise among such 
circumstances—would reduce and not increase the respect of law. However, I have to 
remark, that the massive rule—breaking not necessarily represents the innaccuracy of 
norms, but by this way the problems of other fields of social life also can be 
demonstrated. In this case the correction is not the task of criminal law alone. 
Returning again to our original subject, all of this (namely my remarks on the 
repressive, autonomous and responsive character of criminal law) means, that in 
strengthening of the victim's position, the responsive character can be a basis. This is 
emphasised at the institution of mediation, which helps to reach an agreement between 
the offender and victim. Of course, this way is effective only in milder cases. 
3 HALLIDAY, T. C.: Civic ProfessioDalism: Melding the Sociology of Law and Lawyers in Historical 
and Comparative Research Onati Proceedings 1. Legal Culture and Everyday Life, 1989. p. 104. 
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I should like to emphasize: the transformation of individual harm to social one, 
cannot neglect the victims' interests, neither in a general not in a concrete level. The 
criminal punishment is a special kind of social reaction to the crime, that is anyway 
responsive. The repressive character, the inclination of stabilisation of law and social 
order also cannot be denied. From the victims' view, to punish the offender, serves also 
a moral judgement Most of the cases however, the victims' aim is connected with 
material compensation. 
It is not accidental, that at the end of our decade the victimology reached its high 
time, after the failure of the expectations, concerning the offender-oriented treatment 
ideology. Instead of the "offender and his crime" has been emphasized for now the 
relationship of the "crime and the victim". In such manner, the system which has been 
enclosed to itself, starts opening to the direction of the society. The former types of 
sanctions, emphasizing the retribution, the punitive need of the society, were replaced by 
the new variations, directed to the victims' demand of compensation and conciliation. 
This can be regarded as the crisis of the former criminal policy, as well as the 
revolutionaly change to a new one. The extremes dominantly outline again: it is possible 
to look for solutions outside, or inside the criminal law. To convert the criminal law 
however, into civil law or social conflict-management, is not a real alternative. The 
appearence of the former mentioned idea—in the abolitionist or moderate abolitionist 
tendencies—is almost necessary, but any way natural fact. A model, a piece of life is 
picked out and applied as a schema in the criminal procedure or instead of. It is only one 
step further, to neglect and replace the criminal law itself. This attempt however, is 
obviously overdimensioned. The former and recently emphasized elements of the model, 
factually arising the question of retributive and/or restorative justice. How far can we go 
in retribution and restoration? Which are the limits of the restorative efforts? Explanation 
and discussion of this problem however, would lead too far, for this reason here and now 
I do not intend more detailed to deal with. 
Compensation of the harm, damage suffered by the victim in the consequence of the 
crime can be reached partly or wholly by the way of 
a) restitution, given by the offender 
b) state compensation 
c) victim-support services (as for instance White Ring) 
d) insurance. 
The notion on restitution given by the offender (Schadengutmachung) and mediation 
are in close connection. The former, includes on the one hand the material equilising 
accomplishment, respectively the restitution of the harm on the legal object, on the other 
hand, the settlement of the interaction-malfunction, between the offender and victim, as 
well as the emotional reconciliation.4 
4 NAGY, F.: Jóvátétel, mint a konfliktusfeloldó büntető igazságszolgáltatás egyik formája. (Restitution as 
one form of the conglict management in criminal justice.) Separatum, 1993. p. 10. 
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The mediation means reconciliation between the offender and the victim. It is a form, 
a possible model of dispute settlement The reconciliation, as a procedure is taken place 
out of the criminal procedure, as well as in its initiative, pre-trial phase. The buds of the 
other compensation models can be found in the substantial criminal law, in the criminal 
procedure, as well as in the law enforcement I would refer only to their list. In the 
substantial criminal law, the restitution can be a) excluding cause of punishability b) 
sanction-variant c) sanction-surrogate d) mitigating circumstance of inflicting the 
punishment e) other. In the criminal procedure, the claim to compensation, results in 
adhesive procedure, while the fulfilment of restitution can result in stopping the 
procedure, or putting aside of accusation. At the same time, in the law enforcement, the 
compensation can be a prerequisite, a prescription of the conditional release, but its other 
relations can have relevance, too. 
The persons, involved in mediation are acting in the next roles: the offender, the 
victim and the mediator. The lattest is a person with special training and special abilities; 
he can be psychologist, pedagogue, social worker etc. Extremely important starting point 
of the mediation is the voluntariness of the parties (offender, victim) acting in the 
procedure, as well as the confession of the offender that he is guilty in committing the 
crime. The advantage of mediation, is recognised in its informality, avoidability of the 
cast of the criminal procedure, as well as the dramatic reproducement of the events and 
the professional jargon. In such manner, the disadvantages of courtroom communication 
can be easily eliminated. 
The communication in the mediation process is directed by the mediator, 
concentrating to create such conditions and forms of compensation which are acceptable 
for both parties. At the same time it includes of course, the detailed discussion of the 
crime, releasing from the emotional tensions, helping the interpretation of the events and 
negotiate of the conflict. The correct behaviour of the offender in the process, even if is 
not guaranteed, but supported by the fact, that unsuccessful mediation is followed by the 
re-starting criminal procedure, with its morally stigmatising and other disadvantages. State 
intervention is preconditioned by the deficit of the private conflict resolution, as an author 
has formulated.5 
The aim is the reconciliation and to reach an appropriate form of compensation. This 
means, that the victim, sooner can get the compensation for the material kinds of losses 
and damages. Beside this, he can put questions, to understand the motivations of the 
offender. The mediator is responsible for keeping the negotiations to proceed favourably, 
to help the concentration for the most important questions. This role is active, directed 
to a target-oriented conflict-management and conflict-resolution. 
Theoretically, the mediator's role can also be performed by a respectable layman, 
who acts as a non-payed social-worker. I am still concerned about the activity of a 
5 WALTER, M.: Alternativen zum Strafrecht. Separatum, 1989. Cited by: BARABÁS A. T.: Egyezség a 
büntetőeljárásban? (Reconciliation in the criminal justice?) In: Magyar Jog. (Hungarian Law Review.) 1992/7. 
p. 467. 
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professional, who is specially trained for this task. It is more suitable, effective and there 
is good reason, that both parties are more willing to accept the intervention of such 
mediator. 
The criminal prosecution authority has competence, to initiate mediation procedure, 
as it declares the circle of the so-called "crimes of less severity". In such cases, there is 
possibility to avoid the state intervention, to apply diversion from the criminal procedure. 
In the criminal procedural systems, following the principle of "discretion" the public 
prosecutor's office is authorized to exercise discretion within the framework of applicable 
law, in deciding whether or not the interest of criminal justice would be served by 
pursuing a specific offence through the court Consequently, in such systems mediation 
is used on a large-scale. In the countries, where the legality is the guiding principle, this 
is a more complicated question.6 
In Hungary the present legal system does not make possible the mediation procedure. 
Traits of mediation as nearly everywhere, can be found in our substantial and procedural 
criminal law, too. According to § 318 of the Criminal Procedure Law, in the cases of 
private complaint there is a personal hearing, ordered by the court trying to reconcile 
between the parties. Formally, this constitutes a part of the criminal procedure. Actually, 
it is different from the mediation in two respects: 
1) it is obligatory to attend, 
2) it is directed not only to the conflict settlement, but to the exact statement of facts, 
concerning the crime (consequently, the legal representatives also can attend it).7 
Other element of mediation can be discovered also in the substantial criminal law. 
§ 332 of the Criminal Code is regulating the active repentance as follows: 
Punishment may be unrestrictedly mitigated—in a case deserving special consideration, 
it may even be waived—where the perpetrator of theft, embezzlement, fraud, malversation, 
wilful damaging, receiving goods unlawfully acquired, unlawful appropriation or arbitrary 
taking away of a vehicle, reports the act, before it is discovered, to the authority or to the 
injured person, and compensates for the damage, or does his best that can be expected 
from him (her) in order to repair the prejudice. 
All of these are only the nucleus of the idea of mediation, which can constitute the 
ideological bases suitable to develop. 
In the Hungarian criminal procedure (§ 55 of the Criminal Procedural Law) the 
victim—his successor, or the prosecutor-can assert civil claim to receive compensation 
for the losses concerning the crime, committed against him. This is happening among the 
framework of the so-called adhesive procedure. 
The idea of mediation started in the years of 60-s in the USA and developed a great 
variety of projects, it is equally successful in Great Britain, too. 
6 PUSZTAI, L.: Elterelés a büntető útról. (Diversion in tire criminal procedure.) In: Kriminológiai és 
Kriminalisztikai tanulmányok. (Studies on Criminology and Criminalities.) BM Kiadó, 1991. p. 35. 
7 MORVÁI, К.: Meditáció a mediációról. (Meditation in Mediation.) In: Magyar Jog. (Hungarian Law 
Review) 1989/2. p. 153. 
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There are different European models on mediation, like the Austrian or the German 
models, (the Braunschweig project,8 in Reutlingen the "Handschlag",9 in Cologne (Köln) 
the "Waage",10 or in Mönchengladbach the Stop program). In Austria the conflict 
settlements has two forms. On the one hand, the law, related to the young offenders, 
provides the possibility of mediation for the initiation of prosecutor and with the help of 
probation officer as mediator. On the other hand, limited to the average criminality, the 
judge has the competence to decide on the special form of conflict resolution, combined 
with certain obligations of the offender (community work, attendance at traffic course, 
etc.). Both forms has very positive results. It is worth mentioning, that the second model 
does not arise constitutional concents. The success of mediation, applied in the case of 
youth criminality, supported the idea of adapting it also for adults, when the crime is 
punishable max. up to 3 years imprisonment (StGb § 42). 
It is necessary to stress, that the mediation in the case of adult offenders is not an 
equal alternative of the traditional fine or imprisonment The momentums of personal 
involvement in the wrongful act and the consideration of prevention, sometimes serves 
as an obstacle of mediation, as conflict-settlement 
It is unavoidable to emphasize the formal, as well as the substantial difference of the 
mediation and other sanctions, which are preconditioning its careful application. Beside 
this the object of reconciliation is not possible to define (which is unusual in the criminal 
law) therefore the framework of application is necessary to precise." 
"There is a paragraph within the existing Austrian Juvenile Justice Law stating that 
the prosecutor can renounce or -more figurative—step back from the prosecution (Absehen 
von der Strafverfolgung), whenever he expects or presumes, that in case of an indictment 
the defendent would be sentenced to no more than a small fine or a short-term 
confinement and notwithstanding considerations of special deterrence. 
Thus on tiptoes the principle of discretion seems at last to have entered the Austrian 
Criminal Procedural Law, and most interesting in a way, that is apt to strengthen the 
authority of the state prosecutor's office. The use of his right to drop an indictment is 
interpreted as "negative sentencing" or "negative justice": the prosecutor is still the 
"master of the criminal procedure"! Within the Austrian model of conflict resolution it 
is the state prosecutor, who exercises discretion as to whether a case that has come to his 
8 HILSE, J—SCHALK, К.: Hintergrund und Konzeption eines Modellprojekts zur Arbeit der 
Jugendgerichtshilfe. In: KERNER, H. J.-KURY, H.-SESSAR, K. (Ed.): Deutsche Forschungen zur 
Kriminalitätsentsehung und Kriminalitätskontrolle II. pp. 896-1022. 
9 RÖSSNER, J.: Jugendstrafe als Jugendkonflikthilfe. In: MÜLLER, D.-OTTO, J. (Ed.): Damit Erziehung 
nicht zur Strafe wird. Bielefeld, 1987. pp. 231-261. KUHN, A. and RÖSSNER, D. (1987): Konstruktive 
Tatverarbeitung im Jugendstrafrecht: Handschlag statt Urteil. Zeitschrift für Rechtspolilik N. 20. pp. 267-270. 
et al. 
10 SCHROLL, H. V.: Konfliktusrendezés a felnöttkoruakkal kapcsolatban. Juristische Blätter, 1 9 9 2 / 2 -
translated by György Berkes. Magyar Jog (Hungarian Law Review), 1992/7. pp. 444-448. 
11 KERNER, H. J.-MARKS, E.-RÖSSNER, E—SCHRECKLING, J.: Täter-Opfer Ausgleich im 
Jugendstrafrecht DVJJ-Rundbrief, 1990/131. 
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notice is to be handed back to the people, out of whose conflicts it has arisen or whether 
an indictment is drawn up. It is up to him to renounce further state intervention, 
according to the penal code, whenever he regards the result of an informal agreement 
brought about by the intervention and help of the social worker "sufficient". This paradox 
of enlarging the disretionary powers of the state agency cannot be denied, but it can be 
explained out of the history and out of the existing structures of this institution. Very 
shortly the conflict resolution scheme has offered state prosecutors a veritable chance to 
rebuild or redefine their role, taking a stance toward looking and concentrating on people, 
instead working on files."12 
The mediation techniques has several variations, consequently it is situation—adéquat 
and flexible. From the catalogue of the numerous arguments favouring the mediation I 
should like to bring into the limelight the followings: 
— it forms a new, very much humanized kind of sanction (which can be regarded as 
an alternative of short-time imprisonment); 
— in processual meaning it is a form of diversion; 
— keeping and solving the conflict, where it was originated; 
— maintaining the social peace; 
— eliminating the disadvantages of courtroom communication (by an informal 
aunosphere, actively involving the parties, keeping the flexibility of roles and rules); 
— helping the offender to face his crime and to understand the standpoint of the 
victim; 
— meeting the victims' demand for compensation and emotional satisfaction; 
— hopefuly developing a higher level of conflict—management in the society. 
The mediation can be such station of the procedure, which can solve the problem, but 
in the case of failure, the machinery of the criminal justice re-starts again. Consequently, 
it is necessary to form such a structure, which is possible to integrate into the present 
system, as mediation and reintegrate, as unsuccessful mediation. 
At any case, it has primarily importance, to clarify our expectations, concerning this 
form of diversion, its price and bakuicing between costs and benefits. The fundamental 
question still remains open, how to integrate the mediation to our legal system in 
accordance with the Constitution of Hungary'3 and according to the "legality principle" 
of the criminal procedure. Acting in this direction, we cannot avoid of thinking and re-
thinking the whole criminal policy and the criminal justice system. 
12 PELIKAN, Chr.: Conflict Resolution between Victims and Offenders in Austria and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) Separatum, Austria 1991. pp. 16-20. 
13 According to the Constitution: In the Republic of Hungary the criminal justice is exercised by the Supreme 
Court, the City Court, the district courts and die local courts. Consequently, other organs than court cannot 
practice such activity. 
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Conclusions 
The existence of the catalogue of alternative sanctions means at the same time that 
the criminal punishment has a new conception. The imprisonment express in a very direct 
way, that the response given to the crime by the criminal law is more repressive, than 
reparative or restitutive. This punishment is strengthening the norm, the legal order and 
isolates the offender from the society. The alternative punishment has not so directly 
repressive character. It is primarily responsive, restorative by the way of payment, 
compensation, restitution of the harm suffered by the victim. The punishment has more 
individual character, the offender is called for doing something to eliminate, compensate, 
restitute the harm, caused by him. The offender is not isolated from the community, the 
society, his rights are not so drastically limited as in the case of imprisonment. When the 
offender is not willing to collaborate, the alternative sanction has to be changed into an 
other form. This flexibility of alternative punishments is very important and modern 
characteristic of the sanction system. 
In the international meetings we are frequently witnessed of arising the discussion 
concerning the dangers when applying fine as an alternative punishment. Some are 
emphasizing that—simply speaking—the poor people has the greater risk to get in prison, 
as they are not able to pay the sum of money imposed on them as a punishment. For this 
reason there is a great importance of such institutions, like suspended fine, the payment 
in instalments which is helping to equalize the situation. But the community work is also 
a possible alternative, instead of imprisonment, in the case, when the financial situation 
of the offender is unfavourable. 
The fine is not an appropriate punishment in the case of "criminality of poor people", 
when the cause of committing crime is basically to be found in the financially 
handicapped situation, the missing costs of living. It is an other question, that in this case 
the crime prevention is primarily does not constitute the task of the criminal law, which 
has not competence in solving social problems. 
The real danger of the alternative punishment is more dominant in that respect, that 
its content and conditions are not so precisely detailed and regulated, its practice is not 
quite clear and established. This has to be developed in the future. 
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The religious nature of Islamic Law (Shari'a), makes it difficult for Muslims to appear 
critical of that law. They tend to regard the specific jurisprudential interpretations and 
formulations of Shari'a as divine and heavenly as the sources of Islam itself, namely the 
Qur'an and Sünna} Whether in relation to the rights of women, or any other aspect of 
Shari'a, a Muslim cannot be comfortable in his or her criticism of the establishment 
formulations of Shari'a and, more importantly, expect other Muslims to accept and act 
upon such criticism, depends on whether, he or she can base the criticism on some 
provisions of the Qur'an and Sünna. 
For Muslims, the debate and controversy over the interpretation and implications of 
texts of Qur'an and Sünna are acceptable, if not expected, although the intolerance of 
1 The Qur'an is the Arabic text of what Muslims believe to be the literal and final word of God as revealed 
to the Prophet Muhammad between 610 and 632 A.D. 
Surma are the records of what the prophet is believed to have said and done in die interpretation and 
application of Islam. 
The Qur'an was recorded shortly after the Prophet's death and its Arabic text is accepted by all Muslimas 
audientic and beyond dispute. Sünna, however, was not collected and recorded until the second and third 
centuries of Islam, eight and ninth centuries A.D. Certain records of Sünna, such as those of Bukhari (died 869 
A.D.) and Muslim (died 874 A.D.) are accepted by Muslims in general as containing authentic (sahih) Sünna. 
Nevertheless, controversy continues among the Muslims as to the authenticity of some Sünna reports and the 
relationship between the Qur'an and Sünna. It is not settled, for example, to what extent Sünna may restrict 
or otherwise affect the interpretation of some of the verses of the Qur'an. These jurisprudential and 
methodological questions can be relevant to the reform of Shari'a in relation to the rights of women suggested 
in this article. 
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some Muslims may cause those holding unorthodox views to suffer for their opinions.2 
Complete secularism, however, is unacceptable to the majority of Muslims. Muslims 
believe that they have a very clear and definite obligation to conduct every aspect of their 
public, as well as private, life in accordance with principles of the Qur 'an and Sünna.3  
While subscribing to this sense of religious obligation as a matter of principle, and 
appreciating the political fact that this sense of obligation is shared by the vast majority 
of Muslims throughout the world, one may nevertheless question the appropriateness of 
the modern application of certain historical formulations of Shari'a. The obligation to 
maintain the religious law, I submit, does not necessarily mean the application of Shari'a 
in its historical formulations.4 
This article discusses some aspects of the relationship between Shari'a and current 
international standards on the rights of women. The article starts with a statement of the 
main relevant principles of Shari'a on the rights of women not only because of the 
historical role of Shari'a but also in view of the likely re-establishment of Shari'a in the 
public domain. This trend, however, is unlikely to have free field because of the impact 
of secularization in recent Muslim history. Following a brief assessment of the interaction 
between secularization and re-Islamization in the sense of the application of Shari'a, the 
article proceeds to consider the role of international law on the rights of women in the 
Muslim world. In conclusion, the article proposes an approach to the rights of Muslim 
women, combining traditional and modem forces in order to promote the rights of 
women in a coherent and realistic fashion. 
Although reference will be made to the need for reform of Shari'a on the rights of 
women, and to a specific proposal to achieve such reform, this subject will not be 
considered in detail for two reasons. First, this is an internal debate for the Muslims to 
conduct and settle among themselves. Second, such reform involves consideration of 
alternative approaches and technical matters which may not be of interest to the readers 
of this article. The need for such reform, and the existence of proposals to realize it in 
practice, must nevertheless be noted here. 
2 Although the Prophet is reported to have said that the differences of opinion among the Muslims is a 
blessing from God, and despite the existence of a wide range of schools of Islamic jurispmdence, often with 
differences of the opinion within the same school, proponents of unorthodox interpretations of the sources are 
sometimes charged with apostasy (heresy) punishable with death. For a discussion of the recent trial and 
execution of a Muslim scholar because of Iiis unorthodox views, including a call for the reform of Shari'a in 
relation to the rights of women, see AN-NA'IM, A: The Islamic Law of Apostasy and its Modern Applicability: 
A Case from the Sudan, 16 Religion 197 (1986). 
3 The Qur'an 5:44-47. 24:51 and many other verses require the Muslims to conduct all their public and 
private affairs in accordance with what was revealed by God and decreed by the Prophet. 
4 The religious obligations is to die sources, the Qur'an and Sünna, and not to their liistorical interpretation 
by Muslim jurists. The technique for reinterpretation of the Qur'an and Sünna in order reconcile Islamic law 
with the full range of human rights, including the rights of women. 
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The Theory of the Rights of Women in Shari 'a 
The Muslim world is a vast geographical area, extending from west and north Africa, 
through the Middle East and the southern of the former Soviet Union to Indonesia 
According to generally accepted estimates, there are approximately 837 million Muslims 
in the world today.5 As can be expected, the vast spread of Muslim lands and the 
tremendous diversity of their cultural and ethic composition have affected the 
interpretation and application of Islam.6 
Since its initial phenomenal expansion within the first few decades of its existence, 
Islam has tended to incorporate and assimilate the social customs and institutions of the 
various regions and communities which converted to Islam.7 As Shari'a was gradually 
developed as a comprehensive system of law and a way of life over the first three 
centuries of Islam, around the eighth to the ninth centuries A.D.,8 it was supposed to be 
used as the criterion for screening and admitting, or rejecting, local custom and social 
institutions.9 Although a purist may conceive of this process in terms of a preexisting 
and fully integrated body of Shari'a influencing and validating local customs and 
institutions, I would agree with the more realistic view which perceives the process as 
a dynamic process of interaction between Islamic principles and endogenous norms and 
practices. Local customs, attitudes and institutions have naturally influenced the 
interpretation and application of Shari 'a as law in the particular region, as well as being 
themselves influenced by Islam and its Shari'a law. 
Disentangling and distinguishing the "pure" Shari 'a from local custom may be a 
fascinating subject for some, while others may declare this to be an impossible task. 
Fortunately, we need not undertake this difficult, if not impossible, task for our present 
5 Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey, xxi (R. Weeks, Ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Weeks, 
Muslim Peoples]. See also GEERTZ, C.: Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia 
(1968). 
6 For current manifestations of the different cultural perspectives on the interpretation and application of 
Islam, see the articles on various Muslim peoples in Weeks, Muslim Peoples. 
7 On the expansion of Islam and assimilation and Islamization of various cultures, see generally 
BROCKELMAN, C.: History of the Islamic Peoples (J. Carmichael and M. Perlmann trans. 1960) and 
LEVY, R.: The Social Structure of Islam (1969). 
8 COULSON, N. J.: On the history and Development of Shari'a see generally. A History of Islamic Law 
(1964). The major jurists, and the schools of thought (Madhahb) they established, tended to be concentrated 
in the main urban centers of Arabia, southern Iraq, Syria and Egypt before spreading throughout the Muslim 
world in subsequent centuries. 
9 Coulson: in A History of Islamic Law, id. at 38, describes the process of Islamization as follows: 
"The starting point was the review of local practice, legal and popular, in the light of their principles of 
conduct enshrined in the Qur'an. Institutions and activities were individually considered, then approved or 
rejected according to whether they measured up or fell short of these criteria." 
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p i loses . 1 0 What needs to be emphasized here is that there is a body of general 
principles and detailed rules which the Muslims as a whole accept as the authoritative 
statement of Shari'a." (In particular, the prevailing conceptions of Shari'a are either the 
law of the land or at least very influential in the formulation and maintenance of certain 
attitudes and policies with regard to the rights of women.) It is for this reason that we 
have to take Shari'a into account as a very important consideration in assessing the 
current position and future prospects of the rights of women in the Muslim world. 
Although it is difficult to generalize, in view of the wide cultural diversity of the 
Muslim peoples and the extensive scope of Shari'a12 one can confidently assert that 
Shari'a has had, and for a very long time, a positive impact on the rights of women.13 
From its very beginning in the seventh century, Shari'a guaranteed all Muslim women 
an independent legal personality, including the capacity to hold and dispose of property 
in their own right, a specific share in inheritance, access to education (provided it is 
conducted in facilities separate from men) and some participation in public life.14 At the 
family law level, for example, Shari'a restricted polygamy and guaranteed a wife's right 
to maintenance and decent treatment.15 It also provides for the right to judicial divorce, 
on certain specific grounds.16 This level of achievement may not appear impressive by 
10 The difficulty or impossibility of this task is due to two problems. First, there is the problem of the lack 
of verifiable information on the pre-Islamic customs of die Islaniized peoples. Second, since Shari'a took two 
to three centuries to evolve as a comprehensive system of law, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine the precise point in time when Islamization took place. A people and their customs may have been 
influenced by Islamic norms for generations prior to the formulation of Shari'a as legal rules and principles or 
prior to its formal application in the particular region. 
11 Subject to some differences between the established schools of Islamic jurisprudence adhered to in the 
various regions of the Muslim world, Shari'a signifies an identifiable and generally agreed upon main principle 
of law and ethics accepted by all Muslims. 
12 Shari'a provides for codes of ethics, social interaction and a positive legal system. It regulates the full 
range of human activities, from religious rituals, social manners and political institutions and relationships, to 
positive legal rules in civil, commercial, criminal and family law matters. Generalizations on such a 
comprehensive scale for the extremely wide diversity of Muslim cultural traditions is obviously difficult. 
Reference to principles and rules relevant to the rights of women will therefore be confined to the most 
fundamental principles which are accepted as binding by the vast majority of Muslims. 
13 It is not suggested here that the position of women in pre-Islamic Arabia was uniform or necessarily bad 
in every respect. There is clear evidence of some recognition and relatively good status for some women prior 
to the coming of Islam. See, generally, SABAGH, L.: Al-Mar'a Fi Al-Tarikh A1-'Arabi (Women in Arab 
History—in Arabic) (1975). What is suggested, however, is that women in pre-Islamic Arabia generally had a 
status inferior to that of men. In particular, women suffered from a number of legal and social institutions which 
Islam sought to redress. See, for example, RAHMAN, F.: "Status of Women in the Qur'an" in Women and 
Revolution in Iran 37 (G. Nashat ed., 1983). The improvements introduced by Shari'a should therefore be seen 
in relation to the general status of women, and with reference to the specific problems addressed by Shari'a in 
that context 
14 See generally, ALI, A.: The Spirit of Islam, 222-57 (1922). 
15 ESPOSITO, J.: Women in Muslim Family Lav, chapter 3 (1982.) 
16 EL AROUSI, M. El.: Judicial Dissolution of Marriage, 7 Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law 13, 
(1977). 
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some modern standards, but it has meant very significant improvements in women's 
rights when viewed in historical perspective.17 Shari'a on the rights of women, I would 
suggest, compares very favourably with any other legal system until the nineteenth 
century. 
A historical perspective, however, is a poor excuse for the current inferior status 
of women under Shari'a when compared to other contemporary legal systems or when 
judged by the emerging international standards. Although the Muslim women's legal 
personality is complete in theory,18 their access to opportunities for making that 
personality meaningful are rather restricted. (Gender) segregation and requirements of 
the veil and confinement to the home, as a general rule, tend to diminish the practical 
value of Muslim women's theoretical entitlement to certain rights and limit their 
abilities to realize economic independence and educational and other public 
achievements.19 Although women are not prohibited by Shari 'a from expressing their 
opinions in public affairs, and may vote on those competing for public office, the 
above noted restrictions tended to inhibit their ability to exercise these rights in 
practice. They are also denied competence to hold general high-ranking public office 
themselves.20 
Although Shari'a guarantees members of the family of the deceased specific shares 
in his or her estate, a woman's guaranteed share in inheritance is generally half the 
share of a man of the same degree of relationship to the deceased.21 Restrictions on 
polygamy generally mean that it is lawful for a man to take up to four wives.22 In 
17 LEVY, The Social Structure of Islam, supra note 7 at 91-96; SMITH, R.: kinship and Marriage in Early 
Arabia, 92-94 (1939). 
18 Wltile all the major schools os Islamic jurisprudence accept the right of women to hold and dispose of 
property in their own right, the Maliki school, currently prevailing in West Africa, denies unmarried women 
capacity to conclude contracts and restricts the right of married women to dispose of their own property. See 
COULSON, N. J.: Commercial Law in the Gulf States, The Islamic Legal Tradition, 36-37 (1984). 
19 The complex and amorphous subject of the veil and gender segregation with clear cultural variations, does 
not permit a brief summary. See, generally, Separate Worlds: Studies of Purdah in Southeast Asia (H. Papanek 
and G. Minault Eds., 1982); Women and Revolution in Iran, supra note 13, chapter 7; M.U.H. Kah, Purdah and 
Polygamy (1983); and MERNISSI, F.: Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics In Modern Muslim Society 
(rev. ed. 1987). It is important to note, however, that the relevant principles and practices do have the very clear 
and definite sanction of the Qur'an as in 33:33 and 53. 
20 The disqualification of women to hold high-ranking public office is partly based on what is believed to 
be Qur'anic requirements of the veil and gender segregation noted above which restrict women's ability to seek 
and exercise the responsibilities of public office. The more important soures of disqualification, however, are 
Qur'anic, as in 2:282 and 4:34 and Surma statements which have been given this interpretation by the agreement 
of all schools of jurisprudence. Cf. RAHMAN, F. supra note 13. 
21 Qur'an 4:11 and 176. 
22 Qur'an 4:3 authorizes a man to take up to four wives provided that he maintain justice among them. This 
requirement, when read with verse 129 of the same chapter which rules that justice among co-wives is 
impossible to achieve, can be used to restrict polygamy. Although this interpretation has been adopted to justify 
such restrictions in some Muslim countries, the traditional view, which leaves compliance with the requirement 
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contrast to a woman's right to seek a judicial divorce (before a male judge and for 
specific grounds) man can divorce his wife at will by unilateral repudiation without 
having to explain his reasons to anyone.23 A woman's right to decent treatment is 
subject to the guardianship which a father, brother, husband, uncle or even a son may 
have on his women wards.24 
It must be emphasized here that this is Shari'a as accepted by the vast majority of 
Muslims. Space does not permit statement of slight variations among the various schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence. In any case, none of these established schools challenges the 
basic principles of these limitations on women. Moreover, the concern here is not with 
the justifications of these restrictions on the rights of women because such inquiry will 
not affect the content of the rules. In a religious legal system such as Shari'a, policy 
arguments are insufficient bases for challenging the rules and replacing them with an 
alternative set of rules unless one can also rely on scriptural authority. Although a few 
Muslims are prepared to challenge Shari'a on the rights of women today,25 they are a 
tiny minority while the vast majority of Muslims continue to subscribe to the validity of 
Shari'a restrictions on the rights of women. 
It is true, in my view, that the provisions of the Qur'an and Sunna on women's rights 
can be interpreted differently. In fact, I am suggesting that we should now rely on this 
alternative interpretation of the Qur'an and Sünna in the reformation of Shari'a on the 
rights of women. The possibility of an alternative interpretation, however, should not be 
confused with the current authoritative view of Shari'a as accepted by the vast majority 
of Muslims. We must state Shari'a for what it is, and deal with it in relation to the rights 
of women, until we are able to replace it with the proposed alternative interpretation. 
In general, Shari'a was concerned with guaranteeing certain minimum rights for 
women and not with achieving complete legal equality between men and women. It is 
obviously true that complete legal equality was never achieved anywhere in the world 
until very recently. Some would contend that it is yet to be achieved by even the most 
advanced and enlightened human societies. 1 do not believe however, that complete legal 
equality between men and women is achievable and must be our objective in the Muslim 
world today. Although much needs to be done under even the most progressive Iegtil and 
social systems, the ideal of substantive equality between men and women has found 
sufficient expression and concrete realization elsewhere to have had a profound impact 
on many Muslim women, and on some Muslim men. 
of justice to the discretion and subjective responsibility of the husband, continues to prevail among the vast 
majority of Muslims. For an example of progressive reform of Muslim family law see ANDERSON, N.: The 
Tunisian Law of Personal Status. 7 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 262 (1958). 
23 See generally TALAK in Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, 564-7 (H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers Eds. 
1953). 
24 Id. 633 et seq. under Wilaya, male guardianship over women. According to Qur'an 4:34, the main verse 
on male guardianship over women, a husband may discipline his wife in a number of ways, to the extent of 
beating her "lightly" in exercise of his guardianship. 
25 Such as Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. See his book "The second message of Islam" 1987. 
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Since the nineteenth century, the Muslim peoples have experienced the massive 
influence of external forces of increasing secularization and westernization.26 The main 
centers of Muslim civilization (in Turkey, Egypt, Persia and India) have experienced 
western cultural influences far greater and more profound than the experiences of military 
defeat and political subjugation. In due course, especially after the end of the First World 
War, nationalism and secular constitutions replaced pan-Islamism and the ideal of Shari 'a 
as the sole legitimate system.27 
During what may be called the liberal age, Muslims borrowed extensively from 
western ideas of equality and emancipation of women. Even in those Muslim countries 
which professed an Islamic ideology, many practices and policies incompatible with 
Shari'a were allowed, or maybe forced themselves into the consciousness and lifestyle 
of many Muslims. To a varying degree, Muslim women became increasingly successful 
in claiming equality in education, employment and access to public life.28 This process, 
I submit, cannot be expected to completely transform the rights of Muslim women for 
two reasons. 
First, secular movements towards equality and emancipation tend to be largely 
confined to the urban centers. The rights and actual living conditions of rural and 
nomadic women, who are the vast majority of Muslim women, are likely to remain 
substantially unaffected by western ideas and institutions.29 For the most part, the status 
and rights of the majority of Muslim women continue to be almost exclusively defined 
by traditional norms, including Shari'a. Shari'a principles, moreover, are easily used to 
resist the demands even of urban Muslim women. In particular, the strict application of 
26 LIEBESNY, H. J.: The Law of the Near & Middle East, Readings, Cases & Material, chapter 3 (1975). 
27 Id. Chapter 4; and LAYISH, A.: The Contribution of the Modernists to the Secularization of Islamic Law, 
14 Middle East Studies 263 (1978). 
28 See, for example, N. Al-Razaz, Musharakat Al-Mar'a a Fi Al-Hayah Al-'Ama Fi Suriya (Participation of 
Women in Public Life in Syria, in Arabic, 1975); INGRAMS, D.: The Awakened: Women in Iraq (1983); 
Women in Iran: The Conflict With Fundamentalism in Iran, 179 F. Azari, Ed. 1983); and SULLIVAN, E.: 
Women in Egyptian Public Life (1986). 
29 BAUER, J.: "Poor Women and Social Consciousness in Revolutionary Iran", in Women and Revolution 
in Iran, supra note 13; and MAHDI, A.: Women, Religion and the State: Legal Developments in Twentith 
Century Iran 7 (Michigan State University Working Paper #38, 1983). It is not suggested here that 
secularization and western cultural influences had no impact whatsoever on rural and nomadic women. Under 
some triclde-down theory, one can see some benefits reacliing rural and nomadic women from the social and 
legal reforms manifested primarily at the urban centers. What is suggested is that these benefits are so little and 
are so much successfully resisted and neutralized through traditional adjustment mechanisms in favour of 
maintaining the status quo for these "reforms" that they cannot have a significant and lasting effect on the rights 
of women in the countryside. This assertion is subject, however, to variations in the degree of penetration of 
reforms as affected by the clarity and determination of governmental policies targeting rural and nomadic 
populations and the socio-economic factors facilitating or obstructing such penetration. 
For an example of the interplay of reform and tradition in a Muslim context, see HIGGINS, P. J.: Women 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social and Ideological Changes, 20 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture 
and Society All (1985). 
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Shari'a law of personal status in marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance mean that 
women's rights in these crucial areas are not affected by thy secularization and westerni-
zation of the legal system as a whole.30 As a result, a fundamental tension exists 
between women's civil and political rights under the constitution and the general legal 
system on the one hand, and their private rights as determined by the Shari'a law of 
personal status on the other hand. 
The second related limitation is the resurgence of the so-called Islamic 
fundamentalism which challenges the basic premise of secularization of public life. The 
declared aim of these re-Islamization movements, known by various names in the 
different regions of the Muslim world, is to re-establish Shari'a as the sole source of all 
aspects of the law, both public and private.31 To some extent, these movements can be 
seen as a reaction to western secularization, which is blamed by many Muslims for the 
political frustration, economic deprivation and social disorganization of Muslim 
communities.32 A more fundamental cause of Islamic resurgence, in my view, is the 
inherent power of Islam as intellectual and spiritual forces. The forces of Islamization 
were merely suppressed and never neutralized or assimilated in the secularization 
processes of the liberal age. The forces are now coming to power in Iran, Pakistan and 
the Sudan, seeking to reverse changes introduced through secularization. In almost all 
other Muslim countries, the forces of re-Islamization are undermining recent reforms and 
resisting further changes that may be introduced through the secularization of 
constitutions and legal systems and progress in the realization of the rights of women, 
even in terms of civil and political action of the forces of re-Islamization.33 
30 MAHDI: id at 5. Even in the most secularized Muslim countries, family law and inheritance continue to 
be governed by Shari'a. SCHACHT, J.: Introduction to Islamic Law 76 (1964). 
31 See generally, Voices of Resurgent Islam (J. L. Esposito, Ed. 1983), and Islamic Resurgence in the Arab 
World (A.E.H. Dessouki, Ed. 1982). 
32 For an analysis of the causes underlying re-Islamization, or Islamic resurgence, see AHMAD, K.: "The 
Nature of the Islamic Resurgence" in Voices of Resurgent Islam, id. at 218. 
33 In relation to Iran, for example, the Khomeini regime has repealed legislation and reversed policies of the 
previous regime granting women rights in family and public life. See HIGGINS: Women in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran: Legal, Social and Ideological Changes, supra note 29 at 483; supra note 29 at 11; Women In Iran, 
supra note 28 at 217-21. 
According to sections 5 and 46 of the Retribution Act of 1981, diyah, compensation for unlawful homicide, 
for killing a woman is fixed as half that for killing a man. Section 33A of the same Act provides that the 
testimony of women in homicide cases is completely unacceptable. See IRFANI, S.: Iran's Islamic Revolution: 
Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship, 211 (1983). 
As reported by Omar Asgliar Kan, Political and Economic Aspects of Islamization in Islam, Politics and 
State: The Pakistan Experience 147 (M. A. Khan, Ed. 1985), when Pakistani women protested in February 1983 
against legislation aimed at making the evidence of two women equal to that of one man, they were brutally 
beaten. The author also reported that a section of the 'ularna' religious scholars, demanded the death penalty 
for these women whom they regarded as quilt of apostasy heresy for demonstrating against Qur'anic injunctions. 
It should be noted that the Qur'an 2:282 specifically requires two male witnesses or one male and two 
female witnesses for commercial transactions. To apply Shari'a is therefore to disqualify women as witnesses 
in homicide cases and hold a woman to be half a witness in commercial matters. 
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Such reversal and regression, however,34 are unlikely to be complete because the 
liberal age has already succeeded in changing the awareness of both women and men. 
Woman's movements, and liberal political forces in general, have taken root and are 
expected to struggle to maintain their achievements and resist regression under re-
Islamization.35 The best way for doing this, I suggest, is through what may be described 
as alternative Islamization through the reformation of Shari'a.36 Islam is too powerful 
a political and cultural force to abandon to the fundamentalists. As already demonstrated 
by their challenge to changes achieved through secularization, Islamic movements can 
easily mobilize mass support for their agenda by appealing to the religious sentiments and 
allegiance of the vast majority of Muslims. As evidenced by the vocal presence of 
educated, intelligent and well-organized fundamentalist women, Islam can motivate 
women themselves to challenge the achievements of the rights of women when conceived 
as alien western notions.37 The best way to challenge this, it would seem, is to show 
that the rights of women are Islamic and not alien western notions, albeit they may find 
expression in other cultural and religious traditions, both western and non-western. 
By alternative Islamization I therefore mean the assumption of an Islamic platform 
in advocating fundamental reform of Shari'a on the rights of women and the provision 
of Islamic foundations for these rights. This must be done internally through the adoption 
of imaginative reform techniques for the evolution and reformulation of Shari'a rules 
relative to women's rights. The two essential characteristics of an appropriate reform 
technique are, in my view, the ability to provide Islamic legitimacy and effectiveness in 
achieving the necessary degree of reform. Without legitimacy, on the one hand, the 
technique may be defeated as secularist and alien. On the other hand, the rights of 
women would not be served by an approach which does not change substantially the 
status and rights of women under Shari'a. The choice of an appropriate refonn technique 
is an internal debate for the Muslim advocates of the rights of women to conduct with 
other Muslims in the light of the suggested dual criteria of legitimacy and efficacy. It can 
34 A recent good example of organized women's action in support of their rights is the International 
Conference on the Challenges Facing Arab Women in the Coming Decades—held on September 1-3, 1986 at 
the Arab League Building, Cairo, Egypt, by the Organization of Arab Women Solidarity. For other evidence 
of action by women in support of their rights see sources cited in supra note 28; and In the Shadow of Islam: 
The Women's Movement in Iran (A. Tabari and N. Yeganeh, Eds. 1982). 
35 Added to balance with second 34 in text. 
36 The call for reform has so far been confined to efforts to seek favourable formulations of the rules of 
Shari'a applicable to women from within traditional jurisprudence. This process of selection from the various 
schools of jurisprudence and the opinions of individual jurists will not, I submit, achieve the necessary degree 
of reform. Fundamental reform of the basic principles of Shari'a in relation to the rights of women is 
unavoidable if Muslim women are to acltieve complete legal equality with men. 
37 "Muslim Feminists in Discord", N. Y. Times, July 25, 1985, 15-16. It should not be assumed, however, 
that women speaking from an Islamic platform express uniform views or accept all the restrictions imposed by 
the prevailing interpretation of Shari'a. For samples of differences in opinion among Muslim spokeswomen see 
In the Shadow of Islam, supra note 34 at 171-200. 
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neither be settled, nor should it be addressed, by the present paper.38 What is relevant 
and must be addressed here is the role of international law in the advocacy of women's 
rights in the Muslim world. 
As in the case of other aspects of human rights, customary international law has very 
little to say on the rights of women. Since individuals were traditionally regarded as 
objects rather than direct subjects of international law, custom did not address their rights 
as such.39 Therefore, the most significant developments in the rights of women have 
been achieved through treaties and conventions. This was accomplished by both the 
general human rights instruments and those specialized in the rights of women. Before 
offering a brief survey of the provisions of these binding treaties, it may be appropriate 
to refer to the relevance and force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(IJDHR) as a non-treaty document of special significance.40 
The provisions of the UDHR include the fundamental principles of equality and 
freedom from discrimination on grounds such as sex, in relation to any of the rights set 
forth in the Declaration.41 Are any of the provisions of the UDHR, and especially the 
equality and non-discrimination principles, binding on States as a matter of international 
law? The UDHR was the first major and most widely supported United Nations 
document giving an authoritative interpretation to the human rights provisions of the 
38 Die position of Usladh Mahmoud Mohamed Talia, supra note 4, is an example of a modern Islamic 
approach to achieving respect for the rights of women from within Islam. As indicated earlier, however, this 
is a minority position. It is up to the Muslim women themselves, with the support of some sympathetic Muslim 
men, to advance their cause within their own religious and cultural traditions through the work of the late 
Ustadh Mali moud or a similar approach. 
39 The abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century may be taken as an example of customary international 
law protection of a human right. It is hard to think of another example of a human right based on custom. 
Section 702 of the Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations, Law of the United States does not include 
gender discrimination, even as a matter of state policy, in its list of customary international law human rights. 
Nevertheless, International Law, Cases and Materials (L. Henkin, R.C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, Eds., 
2nd ed. 1987) (hereinafter cited as Henkin et al..) at 998 assert that "while gender-based discrimination is still 
practised in many states in varying degrees, freedom from gender discrimination as state policy, in many 
matters, may already have become a principle of customary international law." 
40 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. a/810, at 71 (1948). This document and all the instruments discussed or 
cited below may be found in International Human Rights Instruments (R. Lillich, Ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited 
as Lillich 1985]. For the Universal Declaration of Human Rights see id. 440. 1. 
41 Articles 1 and 2 of UDHR. These rights include the right to life, liberty and security of the person (Art 
3); freedom from slavery and servitude (Art. 4); guarantee against torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (Art 5); equality before the law (Art. 7); freedom of movement and residence (Art. 13). 
Obviously, any of these and the other rights set forth in the UDHR are, however, of special significance to 
women in die sense explained below, namely that women have traditionally been, and continue to be, the most 
frequent victims of gross and consistent violations of these rights. These especially significant rights under the 
UDHR include the right to marry and found a family upon free and full consent and with equality at all stages 
of marriage (Art. 16), the right to participate in government and have equal access to public service (Art. 21), 
and rights in relation to work (Art. 23). 
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United Nations Charter which is a binding treaty.42 As such, the UDIIR may have more 
persuasive authority than other resolutions of the General Assembly. Some would even 
argue that, when taken together with the United Nations Charter and other developments, 
the UDI IR has achieved the status of binding custom.43 Whether any of its principles, 
and if so which ones, have become international custom remains to be seen. In any case, 
the provisions of the UDHR enjoy special moral and political weight and can be used 
anywhere in the world to support claims to at least the underlying principles of its main 
provisions.44 
In the following brief survey of human rights instruments, the focus will be on rights 
and principles which are of special significance to women. This should not be taken as 
implying that women are not concerned with the full ranges of human rights. It simply 
means that besides being equally affected by and concerned with all the social, economic, 
cultural, civil and political human rights, women have traditionally been victims of 
certain types of oppression and discrimination which make certain rights specifically 
applicable to them. In view of space limitations and the subject of this essay, the 
following brief survey will focus on this second category of rights. 
The general human rights instruments, namely the International Covenant on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), generally give more precise treaty formulation for the principles 
of the UDHR, thereby making them legally binding on the States Parties.45 Both 
42 Article 55 of the United Nations Charter provides that the U.N. shall promote, inter alia, "c. universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion". The Preamble to the U.N. Charter and Articles 1(3), 13(l)(b), 62(2), 68 and 76(c) 
also refer to human rights in a variety of contexts. Nevertheless, the Charter neither defines nor enumerates 
human rights. 
Another difficulty with using the U.N. Charter as a treaty source of the rights of women is due to the fact 
that the Charter is unlikely to be treated as a self-executing treaty directly creating enforceable rights. See 
Henkin et al. at 984-85. 
43 As early as 1968, the Montreal Statement for the Assembly for Human Rights described the UDHR as "an 
authoritative interpretation of the (United Nations) Charter of the highest order, and has over the years become 
a part of customary international law". See 9 Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, 94 at 95 (June 
1968). In M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order, 274 (1980), the 
UDHR is also described as "now hailed as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights provision of the 
United Nations Charter and as established customary law, having the attributes of jus cogens and constituting 
the heart of a global bill of rights." See also LAUTERPACHT, H.: International Law and Human Rights, 
145-60 (1950, 1973), and SCHWELB, E.: The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Qau.se of 
the Charter, 66 A.J.I.L. 337 (1972). 
44 STARKE, J. G.: Human Rights and International Law in Human Rights, 113 at 122 (E. Kamenka & A.E.S. 
Tay, Eds. 1978). 
45 Internationa] Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 at 490 (1966); entered into force on January 3, (1976). International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, R.A. Res. 2200 (XXI ) 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.16) 52, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 at 52 (1966); entered into force on March 23 (1976). For the texts of both Covenants see Lillich 1985 
at 170 and 160, respectively. 
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Covenants embody the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on grounds such as 
sex, in relation to any of the rights enunciated, or recognized, in each Covenant.46 
Moreover, Article 3 of both Covenants specifically provides for the obligation undertaken 
by the States Parties to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
economic, social and cultural rights, or civil and political rights, set forth in the respective 
Covenant. 
The rights enunciated in the ICSECR which appear to be of special significance to 
women include the right to freely choose or accept work under just and favourable 
conditions, especially in relation to equal enumeration for work of equal value and equal 
opportunity to be promoted on no consideration other than seniority and competence.47 
Also especially significant to women is the recognition of the widest possible protection 
and assistance to the family. Marriage must be entered into with the f ree consent of the 
intending spouses.48 Moreover, the Covenant provides for special protection to mothers 
during a reasonable period before and after childbirth when working mothers should be 
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits.49 
Because of the special problems of implementing the full range of social, economic 
and cultural rights within the limited resources of many countries, Article 2(1) of 
ICSECR generally requires of each State Party steps with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in this Covenant 5 0 Compliance 
by the State Parties with their undertakings under the Covenant, in light of this 
consideration, is supposed to be monitored through State reports to die Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, with copies for the consideration of the Economic and Social 
Council.51 The Secretary-General must also transmit copies of the reports to the 
specialized agencies in so far as these reports relate to any matter which falls within the 
responsibilities of the particular agency.52 The Covenant also provides for arrangements 
between the Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies with respect to 
progress made in achieving observance of the provisions of the Covenant as well as the 
study of States' reports and general recommendations by the Commission on Human 
46 Articles 2(2) of the ICSECR and 2(1) of 1CCPR. The use of the terms "enunciated" in the ICSECR and 
"recognized" in the ICCPR may be due to the nature of the rights covered by the particular covenant. This has 
no bearing, however, on die principle of non-discrimination on tire grounds of sex being emphasized in the 
present context. 
47 Articles 6 and 7 of the ICSECR. The obligation under Article 7(c) to ensure equal opportunity to 
employment promotion "subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence" may create 
difficulties for adopting policies of affirmative action in favour of women, for example, to compensate for 
previous discrimination. Tliis, however, is a premature concern for Muslim women who are struggling to 
establish basic legal equality. 
48 Id. Article 10(1). 
49 Id. Article 10(2). 
50 Emphasis supplied. 
51 Id. Article 16(2)(a). 
52 Id. Article 16(2)(b). 
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Rights with opportunities for States and specialized agencies to comment on the general 
recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights.53 The Economic and Social 
Council may also submit occasional reports to the General Assembly reports with general 
recommendations on information received from the States Parties and specialized 
agencies on the measures taken and progress made in achieving general observance of 
the rights recognized in the Covenant.54 On the whole, it is clear that compliance with 
the obligations under the ICSECR is dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the 
States, prompted by any political pressure and persuasion through the Social and 
Economic Council, specialized agencies and the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
The ICCPR recognizes as legally binding treaty obligations several rights which may 
be especially significant to women, such as guarantees against torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment,55 freedom from slavery and servitude,56 and 
equality before the law.57 Of particular significance to Muslim women, however, are the 
provisions relating to marriage and participation in public affairs. Not only the right to 
marry freely and with full consent, but also a requirement on the States Parties to take 
appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.58 Every citizen (of a State Party), has 
the right and the opportunity, without any distinctions on grounds such as sex, to take 
part in the conduct of public affairs; this includes the right to vote and to be elected and 
to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his (or her) country.59 
It seems that general agreement among the States Parties on the feasibility of 
immediate implementation of the full range of the civil and political rights covered by 
the ICCPR, unlike those of the ICSECR, permits relatively stronger enforcement 
mechanisms. Thus, the ICCPR provides for the establishment of a Human Rights 
Committee which considers reports from the States Parties on the measures they have 
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant and on the progress 
made in the enjoyment of these rights.60 Furthermore, Article 41 of ICCPR provides for 
an optional feature whereby a State Party may lodge complaints that another State Party 
is not fulfilling its obligations under this Covenant, provided that the two States have 
both made declarations accepting this complaint procedure. The Article sets out a three-
stage process of direct settlement between the two states, mediation by (lie Human Rights 
53 Id. Articles 18 to 20. 
54 Id. Article 21. 
55 ICCPR Article 7. 
56 Id. Article 8. 
57 Id. Articles 14 and 26. 
58 Id. Article 23. 
59 Id. Article 25. 
60 Articles 28 to 39 of the ICCPR are devoted to the composition and regulation of the Human Rights 
Committee. Article 40 provides for the obligation of States Parties to submit reports, and the process of 
consideration of these reports and conununications with other organizations and specialized agencies of the U.N. 
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Committee (with a view towards a friendly solution) or through an ad hoc Conciliation 
Commission with the prior consent of the States Parties concerned. 
It is obvious from the great emphasis placed in this State complaint procedure on the 
consent of the States Parties, and the need for a friendly or amicable solution, that States 
are unwilling to surrender their national sovereignty over questions of human rights to 
independent international adjudication. Nevertheless, this optional procedure is a positive 
move towards greater international jurisdiction over human rights. 
A more positive move, however, is to be found in the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR which provides for a procedure whereby an individual may petition the Human 
Rights Committee when a violation of the rights set forth in ICCPR occurs by a state to 
whose jurisdiction the individual is subject.61 Such individual petition can be received 
only against states which recognize the competence of the committee in this regard,62 
and subject to several procedural requirements.63 The Optional Protocol provides for a 
timetable for communications, comments and consideration by the Committee in closed 
meetings, leading up to the formulation by the Committee of its views, which must then 
be forwarded to the State Party concerned and the individual.64 Further, the Committee 
must include a summary of its activities under the Optional Protocol in its annual 
report.65 Although ultimately dependent on the voluntary acceptance of its procedure by 
the States, and on the moral weight of the Committee and possibilities of political 
pressure on the States Parties to avoid negative publicity, the Protocol is significant in 
its provision of a treaty framework for individual petition.66 
Most of the rights of women covered by these general instruments are also provided 
for in specialized instruments of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and other 
international conventions. Besides the ILO, there are the 1951 Convention Concerning 
61 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.26), U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 59 (1966); entered into force on March 23, 1976. 
It should be noted, however, that as of January 1, 1986, this Optional Protocol was ratified by only 34 
states while the ICCPR was ratified by 82 states. Henkin et al. 990. 
62 Article 1 of tire Optional Protocol. 
63 Such as the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies under id. Article 2. Article 3 prescribes that 
communications or petitions which are anonymous or which the Human Rights Committee consider to be an 
abuse of the right of submission of such communication or to be incompatible with the provision of the 
Covenant are all inadmissible. 
While space does not permit a discussion of the merits of these procedural requirements, it may be noted 
that they are likely to inhibit or discourage individual communications, at least from certain countries. 
64 Id. Article 5. 
65 Id. Article 6. 
66 For a brief discussion of procedure for the consideration of private (individual) communications on human 
rights violations in the U.N. system, see Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, 384-92 
(T. Meron, Ed. 1984). 
Individual communications are lire general rule in the Inter-American system for the protection of human 
rights while they are only optional under the European convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. See id chapters 12 and 13, respectively. 
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Equal Renumeration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value,67 and the 
1958 Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation.68 Other specialized international conventions include the 1953 Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women,69 the 1958 Convention on the Nationality of Married 
Women,70 the 1960 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education,71 and 
the 1962 Convention on the Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriage.72 
The most comprehensive and important specialized instrument is the 1979 Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.73 This Convention 
defines discrimination against women as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction made 
on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.74 Other provisions of the 
Convention impose very specific obligations to eliminate all forms and types of 
discrimination against women. Besides general condemnation of inequality and 
requirement of specified types of action to achieve equality and to eliminate 
discrimination; whether official or private, collective or individual,75 the Convention 
follows up with more specific and precise provisions in the fields of political and public 
life, education, employment, health care, and other areas.76 
67 ILO No. 100. 165 U.N.T.S.32. For the text of this Convention see Lillich 1985 at 270. 
68 ILO No.l 11. 362 U.N.T.S.32. For the text see Lillich 1985 at 320. 
69 193 U.N.T.S. 135. For the text see Lillich 1985 at 60. 
70 309 U.N.T.S.65. For the text see Lillich 1985 at 310. 
71 429 U.N.T.S. 93. For the text see Lillich 1985 at 330. 
72 521 U.N.T.S. 231. For the text see Lillich 1985 at 150. 
73 G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/180 (1980); 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980); entered into force on September 
3, 1981. For the text of this Convention see Lillich 1985 at 220. 
74 Id. Article 1. 
75 Id. Article 2. The requirements of this Article include the embodiment of the principle of equality of men 
and women in national constitutional and other appropriate legislation, ensuring through the law and other 
appropriate means the practical realization of litis principle, and adopting legislative and other measures to 
prohibit all discrimination against women.Most significantly, this Article also requires States to take appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise. 
76 Id. Articles 3 to 16. It is interesting to note that Article 5 requires States Parties to take all appropriate 
measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving 
the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for men and women. This goes to the heart of the 
matter because no legal or other official and formal measures can possibly achieve the objectives of equality 
and human dignity for women without the necessary education and elimination of attitudes and social norms 
and practices which are antithetical to die rights of women. 
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Moreover, this Convention makes a serious attempt at monitoring progress made in 
the implementation of its provisions through the work of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.77 The Committee is required to receive 
reports from States Parties on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures 
which they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention, and on the 
progress made in this respect78 The report may indicate factors and difficulties affecting 
the degree of fulfillment of obligations under the present Convention.79 The Committee 
must also report annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations through the 
Economic and Social Council, with copies transmitted to the Commission on the Status 
of Women for its information.80 
In conclusion of this brief survey it may be observed that the relevant international 
instruments create an impressive body of international standards on the rights of women. 
Unfortunately, like other aspects of human rights, international law on the rights of 
women suffers from the inadequacy of enforcement or compliance mechanisms even in 
relation to the States Parties to the conventions. The reason for this deficiency is 
presumably the unwillingness of States to submit to international jurisdiction regarding 
their human rights practices. Since States are likely to continue to be the primary subjects 
of international law for the foreseeable future, the enforcement of international human 
rights standards will have to be pursued from within each State. Governments cannot be 
expected to submit voluntarily to independent international scrutiny without substantial 
and continuous pressure from their own population. It is with a view to assessing the 
existence and efficacy of a human rights constituency in the Muslim world, especially in 
relation to the rights of women, that consideration be given to the record of ratification 
of the relevant instruments by Muslim countries. It is also extremely important to reflect 
on possible inconsistencies between Shari'a and the international standards of the rights 
of women. This is true not only because of the current legal force of certain relevant 
aspects of Shari'a,81 but also because of its continuing strong influence on Muslim 
public opinion, even where it is not binding as law at the present time. 
77 Id. Article 17. 
78 Id. Article 18(1). 
79 Id. Article 18(2). According to Article 22 of this Convention, specialized agencies are not only entitled 
to be represented at the consideration of die implementation of such provisions of die Convendon as fall within 
the scope of their activities, but also to be invited by die Committee to submit reports on die implementation 
of the Convention in areas falling within the scope of their activides. 
80 Id. Ardcle 21. This annual report may include the Comnuttee's suggesdons and general recommendadons 
based on die examinaUon of die State reports and odier informadon received from the States Parties. 
81 As noted earlier, note 30, and accompanying text, Shari'a consdtutes fandly law and inheritance for 
Muslims diroughout the Muslim world. The rights of women is these areas, therefore, directly submit to die 
limitadons of Shari'a. Moreover, efforts to implement Shari'a in other spheres have already achieved some 
success in Iran, Pakistan and the Sudan. In diese and other "tradidonal" muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf States, Shari'a impact on die rights of women affect a wide range of social, civil and political 
rights such as access to public office and participation in public life. 
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Conventions on women 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
has been ratified or acceded to by the Islamic states of Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, 
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Jordan has signed but not yet ratified 
the Convention. More Islamic states ratified the earlier Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, and the Convention 
on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages. 
As early as 1984, Saudi delegates to the United Nations opposed provisions on 
women's rights, arguing that marriage, an area in which "Islamic law was explicit on the 
smallest details", ought not to be burdened by international requirements that wives be 
of full age and have equal rights. These concepts were said to reflect Western biases and 
to ignore the internal safeguards of Islam, which guarantee women property, inheritance, 
and compensation following divorce. Even the Pakistani delegate, prior to the passage of 
her country's Muslim Family Law Ordinance, argued that strict equality would put 
women at a disadvantage because of their "natural need for protection". As recently as 
1975, Saudi Ambassador al-Barudi acknowledged that he was "not denying that some of 
the demands of women's movements in the Western world were understandable and 
legitimate, but those movements were overzealous in their action and wrongly assumed 
that their values were suited to the entire world". 
More revealing are the substantive reservations interposed by Islamic states which 
have accommodated themselves to the international human rights movement and ratified 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. With 
the exception of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, each of the Islamic states 
that have signed, ratified, or acceded to the Convention have entered substantive 
reservations. 
Article 2 states the general policy of the Convention and includes a general 
condemnation of discrimination against women and seven specific measures to be 
undertaken. Egypt's reservations stated that it was "willing to comply with the content 
of (Article 2), provided that such compliance does not run counter to the Islamic 
Shariah". Bangladesh declared even more definitively that it did not consider Article 2 
and other articles binding, "as they conflict with Shari'a law based on Holy Quaran and 
Sunna". Iraq exempted itself from being bound to paragraphs (0 and (g) of Article 2, 
which state the commiünents "to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
modify or abolish existing Laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women," and "to repeal all national penal provisions which 
constitute discrimination against women". 
Article 9 of the Convention pertains to women's equal rights with men to acquire, 
change, or retain their own nationality and the nationality of their children. Egypt entered 
a reservation allowing for acquisition of the father's nationality in order to "prevent the 
child's acquisition of two nationalities where his parents are of different nationalities, 
since this may be prejudicial to his future". 
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Egypt claimed that it is customary for a woman to agree, upon marrying an alien, that 
her children shall be of the father's nationality. It is unclear whether, by this statement, 
Egypt is acknowledging repeal of the traditional Islamic rule that only Muslim men, not 
Muslim women, can marry non-Muslims. Iraq, Jordan, and Tunisia also entered general 
reservations to Article 9. 
Under Article 15(4), "States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights 
with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose 
their residence and domicile". Without explanation, Jordan entered a reservation to this 
paragraph, as did Tunisia, which later asserted that the paragraph "must not be interpreted 
in a manner which conflicts with the provisions of the (Tunisian) Personal Status Code 
on this subject". 
The most strenuous reservations have been entered by Egypt and Iran to Article 16, 
which provides for equality of men and women in eight specific categories relating to 
marriage and family relations. Iraq's reservation "shall be without prejudice to the 
provisions of the Islamic Shariah according women rights equivalent to the rights of their 
spouses so as to ensure a just balance between them". Egypt entered the same statement, 
adding: 
"This is out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which 
govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called into question and in 
view of the fact that one of the most important bases of these relations is an 
equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementarity which guarantees 
true equality between the spouses." 
Bangladesh, Jordan, and Tunisia also entered substantive reservations to several 
paragraphs of Article 16. 
The wording of these reservations evidences a defensiveness about traditional values 
and customs by some of the very countries that have undergone modernization. 
Reservation that reflect, for instance, a refusal to repeal discriminatory national laws, 
throw into question these countries' commitment to reform and suggest that ratification 
was only intended as an exercise in rhetoric and image-making. Moreover, Article 28(2) 
of the Convention prohibits reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of which 
Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia are parties, contains a similar restriction. 
Mexico, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany have objected to the 
reservations of Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, and Tunisia, as well as those of some non-
Islamic states, as being incompatible with the Convention. The statement of Sweden is 
directly on point: 
"In this context the Government of Sweden wishes to take this opportunity to make 
the observation that the reason why reservations incompatible with the object and 
purpose of treaty are not acceptable is precisely that otherwise they would render a 
basic international obligation of a contractual nature meaningless. Incompatible 
reservations, made in respect of the Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, do not only cast doubts on the commitments of the 
reserving States to the objects and purposes of this Convention, but moreover, 
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contribute to undermine (sic) the basis of international contractual law. It is in the 
common interest of states that treaties to which they have chosen to become parties 
also are respected, as to object and purpose, by other parties." 
In partial response to this reservation problem, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) asked the United Nations in 1987 "to promote 
or undertake studies on the status of women under Islamic laws and customs and in 
particular on the status and equality of women in the family on issues such as marriage, 
divorce, custody and property rights and their participation in public life of the society". 
This decision angered Islamic representatives in the General Assembly and in the 
Economic and Social Council, leading to attacks on CEDAW as ignorant of and hostile 
to islam. No action was taken on the request. 
Muslim reaction to international standards on the rights of women 
Ratification of international instruments by any government, whether of a Muslim or a 
non-Muslim country, is obviously not conclusive evidence of the actual practice of that 
country in terms of a given set of rights. What motivates governments to ratify, or fail 
to ratify, can be a complex phenomenon and may not be necessarily related to the real 
policies and concrete conditions of life in their countries. 
For one thing, a government may have failed to ratify these instruments simply 
because the issue was not raised at the appropriate levels of decision-making. 
Alternatively, the issue may have been raised at a politically inopportune moment or the 
case for ratification may have been made poorly and impersuasively. The mere fact of 
failure to ratify cannot, therefore, be taken as conclusive evidence of a conscious and 
deliberate policy rejecting a commitment to the content of the particular international 
instrument 
Ratification, on the other hand, may have been decided by an individual ruler or 
official, without sufficient political support from the country as a whole. The official or 
regime which effected the ratification, may change or be overthrown, with possible 
significant consequences to the country's commitment to the policy underlying 
ratification.82 Alternatively, the decision to ratify may be taken for ulterior motives other 
than a genuine commitment to the contents of the particular international instruments. On 
the one hand, ratification may have been effected, for example, to satisfy certain 
temporary political ends at home or abroad. On the other hand, the decision to ratify or 
not, may be motivated by some ideological or political considerations unrelated to the 
specific issue. It therefore may not be valid to assume, for example, that a Muslim 
82 In Iran, for example, secular reforms and ratification of international human rights documents by the Shah 
were effectively reversed after the Islamic revolution of 1979. See AMIN, S. H.: Middle East Legal Systems, 
chapter 3 (1985). It is assumed here that the Shah's motives in ratifying human rights conventions were 
genuine. The point being made here is that his policies, whatever their motives and effects may have been, were 
reversed after his overthrow. 
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country refused to ratify a convention on the rights of women specifically because of 
Shari'a considerations. Finally, ratification may be subject to reservations that 
substantially diminish its political value.83 
Thus, neither ratification nor failure to ratify can be taken as conclusive evidence of 
deliberate and effectively pursued policies. Nevertheless, the ratification or its absence 
may provide some evidence of policy. So long as one is aware of the complexity of 
motivation and the possible impact of the nature of the political process in the particular 
country at a given point in time, the ratification or non-ratification of an international 
instrument may be taken as a relevant consideration. It is in this light that the record of 
ratification by Muslim countries of the three main instruments relevant to the rights of 
women will be considered.84 
The ICSECR, has been ratified by twelve Muslim countries and the ICCPR, by 
eleven.85 Special care must be taken with regard to the significance of the ratification 
of these general human rights documents. Objection to ratification, to the extent that it 
was a conscious and deliberate decision, may be due to apprehension over some 
provisions or general implications of rights, other than those especially significant to 
women. In such cases, women would be affected with the policies which are negative to 
those other human rights, but there may still be some support in the country for the 
special rights of women in other areas. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women has so far received only five ratifications by Muslim 
countries.86 
83 The example of Egypt's reservation on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women is discussed below. 
84 The criteria for identifying Muslim countries can be problematic and may depend on the purpose of such 
identification. For the purposes of this article, all countries where the Muslims constitute over 70% of the total 
population are taken to be Muslim countries. According to the statistics quoted in Weeks, Muslim Peoples at 
882-911, the following 32 countries may be regarded as Muslim countries: Afghanistan 99%, Algeria 90%, 
Bahrain 99,3%, Bangladesh 82,9%, Comoros 99,5%, Djibouti 90%, Egypt 91,1% The Gambia 87%, Indonesia 
80%, Iran 98%, Iraq 96%, Jordan 93%, Kuwait 96%, Libya 98%, Maldive Islands 100%, Mali 80%, Mauritania 
99%, Morocco 99%, Niger 87,4% Oman 99%, Pakistan 97%, Qatar 95%, Saudia Arabia 99%, Senegal 91%, 
Somalia 99%, Sudan 72%, Syria 87%, Tunisia 99,4%, Turkey 99,2% United Arab Emirates 90%, Arab Republic 
of Yemen 99%, Peoples Republic of Yemen 99%. 
The vast majority of these countries are not constituted as Islamic states in accordance with Shari'a. 
Nevertheless, in all of them family law and inheritance for Muslims are governed by Shari'a. Moreover, the 
fact that Muslims constitute over 70% of the total population indicates, to the present author, that Shari'a 
considerations are likely to affect the rights of women in these countries. 
Since die rights of women provided for in the earlier specialized conventions are now covered by die three 
main instruments noted below, diere is no need to consider Muslim ratification of the earlier specialized 
conventions. 
85 Basic Documents Supplement to International law: Cases and Materials, 403 and 38 8, respectively (L. 
Henkin, R. C. Pugh, O. Schachter, H. Smit, Eds., 2nd ed. 1987). 
86 Id. 425. Part of the reason for the low ratification of this Convention may be due to its recent adoption, 
since it was adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1981. 
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What are the implications of the fact that the obligations undertaken by Muslim 
countries under these three main conventions cannot be reconciled with Shari'a rules on 
the rights of women? As noted above, Shari'a sought to guarantee certain minimum 
rights for women rather than strive for the complete equality with men. This may have 
been justified as the only realistic objective in the past, and I believe that it can be so 
justified, but the result remains that current efforts to achieve complete equality and 
remove all discrimination are bound to be viewed as contrary to Shari'a. 
Nevertheless, several Muslim countries have in fact ratified all the three main 
instruments. Egypt, Senegal and Turkey, for example, have ratified the extensive and 
advanced Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
Since these countries have undertaken international obligations inconsistent with the 
established Shari'a, as accepted by all Muslims, their position can only be explained in 
one of three ways: either they do not feel bound by Shari'a; they do not take their 
international obligations seriously; or they have taken a view of the relevant principles 
of Shari'a which is consistent with these international obligations. The last mentioned 
explanation is the one favored by the present author, for reasons explained in the last 
section of this article.87 The facts, unfortunately, do not seem to support this as the true 
explanation of the position of, for example, Egypt. 
Egypt has entered reservations with regard to only three Articles of the Convention 
on Discrimination Against Women, namely Articles 9, 16 and 29.88 The reservation with 
regard to Article 9, granting women equal rights to those of men, with regard to the 
nationality of their children, may raise serious objection as a matter of principle. The 
reasons for Egypt's position on this issue may well be due to national policy independent 
of Shari'a. Again, the reservation on Article 29, regarding submission to arbitration, does 
not seem to be based on Shari'a. It is Egypt's reservation on Article 16, concerning the 
equality of men and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during 
the marriage and upon its dissolution, which is clearly based on established Shari'a, as 
accepted by Muslims in general. In the text of this reservation, Egypt justifies its position 
by saying that its obligations "must be without prejudice to the Islamic Shari'a 
provisions... This is out of respect for the sanctity deriving from firm religious beliefs 
which govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question..."89 
The reservation cites principles of Shari'a whereby the husband is required to pay bridal 
money to the wife, maintain her fully out of his own funds and also to make a payment 
to her upon divorce. The wife retains full rights over her property and is not obliged to 
spend anything on her keep. The reservations concludes by saying: "The Shari'a therefore 
restricts the wife's rights to divorce by making it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas 
no such restriction is laid down in the case of the husband."90 
87 See text accompanying note 92 infra. 
88 For the full texts of these reservations see Lillich 1985 at 11. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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In light of the clear language of the reservation, it can neither be said that Egypt does 
not feel bound by Shari'a nor that it has developed an alternative view of Shari'a. 
Paradoxically, Egypt has undertaken other international obligations under the same 
Convention which are clearly inconsistent with Shari'a.91 Does this mean that Egypt 
does not take its international obligations seriously? I think no t Egypt would not have 
bothered to enter a reservation on Article 16 if it had no intention of attempting to 
comply. The explanation for this apparent inconsistency in Egypt's position seems to be 
due to the fact that while Shari'a is the law of personal status for Muslims in Egypt, 
which would make the country's obligation under Article 16 inconsistent with an 
unalterable aspect of its current law, other aspects of Egyptian law are not currently 
based on Shari'a. Therefore, the question is how would the adoption of Shari'a as the 
sole, or even the main, source of legislation affect the rights of women in Egypt or 
elsewhere in the Muslim world? If Shari'a is to be stricdy applied, no law, policy or 
practice will be allowed to stand if it is perceived to be in violation of Shari'a.92 Such 
is the probable impact of Shari'a on the international standards as applied to the Muslim 
world, unless a fundamental reformulation of the relevant rules of Shari'a is undertaken. 
An approach to the rights of women in islam 
When viewed in the Muslim context, the rights of women are the function of the 
interplay of two powerful forces. On the one hand, Muslims have a strong and enduring 
commitment to Shari'a, with its negative implications for the rights of women. On the 
other hand, secularization and external cultural influence have already transformed the 
consciousness of Muslim women and men and created an expectation of complete 
equality and full respect for the rights of women. More recently, emerging international 
standards on the rights of women have also provided strong support for equality and non-
discrimination for all women, including the Muslim women. The question now is how 
to sustain the emerging Muslim awareness of, and commitment to, the rights of women 
in the face of likely and powerful opposition by tire proponents of Shari'a? 
In view of the dominant role of Islam in this part of the world, I believe that the 
advocacy of the rights of women must come from within the Islamic tradition itself. As 
91 The Conventions's general prohibition of all discrimination against women, as defined in Article 1, and 
the specific obligations to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of employment, as defined in 
Article 11, are impossible to reconcile, for example, with Shari'a rules disqualifying women from holding 
general judicial office. 
92 This is not an unlikely possibility, even in a country like Egypt. Article 2 of die Egyptian Constitution of 
1971 used to provide Uiat "Islamic jurisprudence is a principle source of legislation." An amendment to the 
Constitution in 1980 changed that last part of the clause to make Shari'a "die" principle source of legislation. 
1985 Facts on File, Inc., August 2, 1985, at 578E1. See volume IV of Constitutions of die Countries of the 
World—Egypt (A. P. Blaustein, Ed. 1986). Even if die whole legal system was not transformed over time 
dirough diis constitutional mandate, it is not unlikely that die rights of women may suffer some regression to 
bring Egyptian law and practice intro greater conformity with Shari'a, international obligations notwidistanding. 
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indicated at the end of the introduction of this article,93 to maintain Islamic religious law 
does not necessarily mean the application of Shari'a in its historical formulations. 
Reference has also been made to the possibility of an alternative interpretation of Islamic 
sources. It is true that what has been described in this article as alternative Islamization, 
is an internal struggle for the adoption of imaginative reform techniques for the evolution 
and reformulation of Shari'a. The dual essential characteristics of this alternative 
Islamization are Islamic legitimacy and efficacy in achieving the necessary degree of 
reform to realize the full rights of equality and freedom from any shade or form of 
discrimination against women. This article can neither discuss in detail nor hope to win 
this internal struggle for the Muslim women. However, it may be helpful to reflect on the 
possible contribution of international advocates of the rights of women. In what ways can 
they be constructive or destructive in their efforts to promote the rights of Muslim 
women? How can international standards be most relevant and helpful to Muslim 
women? 
International standards are meaningless to Muslim women unless they are reflected 
in the concrete realities of the Muslim environment. Like members of other cultural 
traditions, Muslims tend to be suspicious and unreceptive towards what they perceive to 
be an attempt to impose alien standards. To obtain their cooperation in implementing 
international standards on the rights of women, we need to show the Muslims in general 
that these standards are not alien at all. They are, in fact, quite compatible with the 
fundamental values of Islam. In other words, we need to provide Islamic legitimacy for 
the international standards on the rights of women. 
The balance of universality and cultural relativity of human rights, especially the 
rights of women, is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain in practice. It requires 
giving each cultural tradition an opportunity to contribute in the standard formulation 
process without allowing any tradition to dictate to the others. The balance also requires 
recognition of the ethical standards and substantive norms of the cultural tradition while 
rejecting or disallowing archaic and oppressive norms. To avoid even the appearance of 
dictation by outsiders, which is likely only to be counterproductive, the classification of 
certain cultural (legal or religious) norms, as archaic and oppressive, must be done by the 
members of the cultural or religious group themselves. Yet, they cannot be left to 
themselves completely to do whatever they, or their elites, deem fit and appropriate. 
There must be room for external influence which is considerate and sensitive to 
cultural concents, while committed to enlightened ideals which can be shown to be the 
common wisdom of mankind. Sensitive and reflective regard to the totality of the human 
experience, not only to the dominate cultures or that of the rich and developed societies, 
can provide us with a core of fundamental rights which are either accepted or can be 
acceptable to all the cultural traditions of the world. We can then act immediately on 
these core fundamental rights while working progressively towards developing consensus 
on, and agreed formulations of, more rights. 
93 See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
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Both principle and pragmatism, I believe, would recommend this approach to the 
rights of women. Our commitment should not be to the rights of women in the abstract, 
or as contained in high-sounding international instruments signed by official delegations. 
It should be a commitment to the rights of women in practice; the rights of rural and 
nomadic African and Asian women to live in very "traditional" or tribal communities and 
practice Islam, or other religious beliefs, out of genuine conviction. These women cannot 
and should not be invited to subscribe to a supposedly "international" feminist vision 
without enabling them, at the same time, to live in harmony with their immediate 
environment. It is irresponsible and inhumane to encourage these women to move too 
fast, too soon and to repudiate many of the established norms of their culture or religious 
law, without due regard to the full implications of such action. It must be remembered 
that it is these women who will have to remain there to endure the full consequences of 
their actions. 
In conclusion, the wholeness of women as human beings must be emphasized. Efforts 
to promote the full range of human rights, social, economic and cultural, as well as civil 
and political, are as conducive to maintaining respect for the rights of women, as efforts 
to promote rights especially significant to women. What does equality with men and 
freedom from discrimination mean if both men and women are equally poor and hungry? 
Can women enjoy any rights when their children are starving, their countries ravaged by 
civil war or external aggression, or their communities denied their collective right to self-
determination? In the final analysis, the rights of women are an integral part of the 
individual and collective human rights of their men and children. 
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Duc V. TRANG The Historical Justice Debate: 
International Law 
and its Impact on Rights in Hungary 
I. Introduction 
The tortured path of how to deal with "retroactive justice" in Hungar>^punishing those 
acts committed during the 1956 uprising—ostensibly ended with the recent decision of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court (hereinafter "Case II").1 The Court in Case II established 
that those crimes whose statutes of limitations have expired may still be prosecuted should 
they 1) "qualify as a war crime or crime against humanity under international law" or 2) 
where Hungary is required by its international obligations proceed to prosecute those acts. 
This case follows a previous decision by the Court on retroactive justice. In the earlier 
case, a member of the Parliament drafted a bill that attempted to retrigger statutes of limita-
tions for crimes committed under the Communist regime, which have since lapsed, 
"provided that the state's failure to prosecute the said offenses was due to political reasons" 
(hereinafter "Case I").2 While couched in general terms, the bill clearly was designed to 
provide for the prosecutions of those crimes committed during and after the 1956 uprising 
in Hungary. The Court found the bill, by retroactively changing domestic law, unconstitu-
tional. The Court based the decision on various grounds—including that the act was un-
constitutionally vague and that it violated principles of the rule of law, particularly the 
guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege, the prohibition against retroactive criminal 
prosecution. 
1 Case 53/1993 (X. 13.). 
2 Case 11/1992 OH. 5.). 
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While scholars generally praised the Court's decision in Case I, the Court became the 
target of vicious attacks, particularly by members of the then centrist-right government, led 
by the Hungarian Democratic Forum party. These strong criticisms partially reflected the 
perception that this institution of ten men prevented a democratically-elected Parliament 
from carrying out their mandate. In Case I, the legitimacy of the Court itself and "the rule 
of law and judicial review of majoritarian decision-making" were compromised—at least in 
the government's view.3 
The Court's decision in Case I thus prompted the second draft, which was reviewed in 
Case II. The second draft relied on international law as the basis upon which to prosecute 
crimes whose statutes of limitations have lapsed. The draft law provided that those acts that 
qualify as war crimes or crimes against humanity under international treaties to which 
Hungary is a party would be subject to prosecution under domestic law, even retroactively. 
Those international treaties involved included the Geneva Conventions Relatively to the 
Treaunent of Civilians in the Time of War and Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
war of 1949 and the 1968 New York Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. The 1968 New York Convention 
declares that "no statutory limitation shall apply to several categories of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity irrespective of the date of their commission". The Court upheld a 
majority of the provisions in the draft law.4 
The decision of the Court in Case II invoked the general reaction that the Court finally 
was doing its job properly; public discussions of the Court were positive.5 The Court 
clearly faced substantial pressure, particularly public opinion, that something needed to be 
done with those egregious acts committed during 1956. Unfortunately, discussions about the 
Court's reasoning in Case II and its implications have been virtually nonexistent, due to 
both the relief that the retroactive issue has been banished from the political arena (into the 
prosecutor's office) and by the satisfaction that something will finally be done to punish 
those who committed grave crimes in 1956. The responses were focused mainly on the 
result itself, and not on how the Court reached its decision. 
I will not discuss the substantive issues behind the retroactive justice issue; it has been 
done elsewhere. What I will explore is how the Court further extended its already broad 
powers and, as a result, changed the constitutional and political landscape. What the Court 
3 MORV AI, К.: Retroactive Justice Based on International Law, East European Constitutional Review, 32, 
33 (Vol. 2, No. 4, Vol. 3, No. 1 1993-94). 
4 The Court found unconstitutional a clause in the draft law wltich listed a set of crimes which were not 
based on international law, particularly those based on a domestic law of 1945 wltich imposed criminal liability 
on those acts that might jeopardize the peace or the cooperation between peoples after the war or had the 
potential of causing international conflict. Prosecution under this law would impose crintinal sanctions on those 
who requested the entry of the Russian troops into Hungary during 1956. I will not address this part of the draft 
bill in any detail in this paper. 
5 Professor Morvái, for example, praised the Court for resisting activism by upholding a political decision 
and the legislature's will, thus proving its political "neutrality". She adds that the Court's decision provides a 
"clearer understanding of the notions of the rule of law and of judicial review as valuable safeguards in a 
democratic society." MORVÁI, К.: op. cit. 
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did in Case П was extraordinary and has broad implications—far beyond the retroactive 
justice problem—for Hungary's constitutional framework, raising serious issues about 
separation of powers and the hierarchy of legal norms. I argue further that the Court ' s 
jurisprudence in Case II has created broad opportunities for the development of substantive 
rights in Hungary, as well as enlarged individual access to invoke those rights. 
While this paper focuses on the Hungarian case, the discussion has obvious 
implications for all countries in East-Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union, 
particularly those who have newly-adopted constitutions and constitutional courts. In the 
early stages of state-building in this region, particularly in the constitutional draft ing 
process, not much thought appears to have been given to how to structure the relationship 
between international law and domestic law. It simply was not a "sexy" issue. Moreover, 
as with Germany and Italy after World War II, the strong desire among East-Central 
European countries to integrate into the international community is reflected in almost 
boiler-plate provisions that the respective country adheres to "generally recognized rules 
of international law" or something similar. As this discussion will show, there are 
complex issues, legal and political, underlying the interface between international and 
domestic law, issues that countries in this region will have to face sooner or later. 
II. Constitutional Structure: International Law and Domestic Institutions 
and Processes 
A. A Mere Jurisdictional Issue? 
The first hint of the Court's extension of its already broad powers came early in the 
opinion. The Court was confronted with the question of whether it is empowered to 
decide whether a draft law conforms with Hungary's treaty obligations.6 Under the Act 
on the Constitutional Court (ACC), there is no text which provides that the Court has the 
jurisdiction to scrutinize whether a draft law or other non-promulgated legal acts are 
consistent with a ratified international treaty. The ACC explicitly grants the Court the 
power to review only for a promulgated law's consistency with international agreements 
to which Hungary is a party.7 By implication, the Court does not have jurisdiction to 
review whether a bill or non-promulgated legal act is consistent with Hungary's treaty 
obligations. Indeed, the Court's power to exercise preliminary norm control appears to be 
6 The international treaties involved are Article 7(1) of tire European Convention of Human Rights and 
Article 8(1) of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. 
7 "If the Constitutional Court establishes that a legislative provision, equal in hierarchy or subordinate to the 
enactment promulgating the international agreement, or another act of State organs is in conflict with the inter-
national agreement in question, it shall annul, wholly or in part, the legislative provision or other acts of State 
organs contrary to the international agreement." Act on tire Constitutional Court, Act XXXII of 1989, Article 
44(1). 
A law or legal act takes effect, or is promulgated, when it is published in the official Gazette, the Magyar 
Közlöny. 
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limited to the review of a draft bill for its consistency only with constitutional 
provisions.8 I call this direct constitutional review. 
Despite the text of the ACC, the Court asserted its jurisdiction in Case II by adopting 
a seemingly straightforward interpretation of a crucial constitutional provision. The Court 
argued that, by virtue of Article 7 (1) of the Hungarian Constitution, it is compelled to 
review even a non-promulgated law for consistency with international treaties. Article 7 (1) 
of the Hungarian Constitution states: 
"The legal system of the Republic of Hungary adopts the universally accepted 
rules of international law, and shall continue to ensure the accord between 
Hungary's international legal obligations and her domestic laws." 
Court established that, through the second clause of Article 7 (1), the harmony 
between Hungarian domestic law and international commitments is a part of the "con-
stitutionality of the norms". Therefore, any petition to review a legal act—promulgated 
or non-promulgated—for its consistency with international treaties necessarily implicates 
the Constitution and, thus, the Court's jurisdiction. The scope of the Court's reasoning 
becomes clearer later in the case; the Cour t concluded that the "commitment 
undertaken" in the second clause of Article 7 (1) includes not only ratified treaties, but 
also customary international law.9 
The Cour t ' s reasoning is straightforward, yet unsupportable under the present 
legislative scheme. As noted above, the Court's interpretation finds no support in the text 
of the ACC. The Court's understanding of Article 7 (1), for example, is not consistent 
with the distinction made under the ACC between promulgated and non-promulgated 
laws. Moreover, Articles 44 47 of the ACC deal specifically with cases of conflict with 
international agreements. Nowhere in those articles does it provide or imply that the 
Court may review a non-promulgated legal act for its consistency with an international 
treaty. In its haste to establish jurisdiction, the Court apparently failed to heed the ACC's 
clear guidelines. 
B. The Relationship and Hierarchy of International Law to Domestic Law 
The Court's interpretation of Article 7 (1) raises additional questions and concerns. 
Immediately following the discussion on its jurisdiction, the Court went beyond treaties 
and examined the whole relationship between domestic and traditional international 
law—customary international law and, presumably, jus cogens laws.10 In doing so, the 
Court established some far-reaching principles which will have major implications for 
8 See ACC, supra n. 7, Article 1 (a), Article 33 (1). 
9 "Consequently, without any separate transformation or adaptation, the [generally recognized rules of 
international law] count among 'the undertaken international-law obligations,' the harmony of which with the 
national law is provided for in the second phrase of |Article 7 (1)]." 
10 Incidentally, at a conference in 1992, one of the justices stated that it was not appropriate for the Court 
to interpret Article 7 before the political branches have had a chance to legislate on it. 
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1) separation of powers, 2) the development of Hungarian domestic law, and, more 
specifically 3) the development of rights in Hungary. 
1. Incorporation in Hungary: Separation of Powers Concerns 
The Court first stated, without offering any reasoning, that under Article 7 (1), "generally 
recognized rules of international law" are "integral parts of Hungarian law without any 
further transformation." The Constitution, the Court asserted, itself transformed inter-
national law into domestic law." 
Does the language of Article 7 (1) compel a conclusion as that of the Court's? Not 
necessarily. The German Basic Law is much more precise about the status of inter-
national law. "The general rules of public international law shall be an integral part of 
federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights and 
duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory."12 The Greek Constitution is similarly 
precise.13 The Italian Constitution, on the other hand, is more similar to that of 
Hungary's. It states: "Italy's legal system conforms with the generally recognized 
principles of international law."14 The Italian Constitutional Court has ruled that 
international law is incorporated automatically into the international legal system and is 
supreme over conflicting domestic legislation. However, the Italian Court noted that no 
rules of customary international law may violate the highest and most basic constitutional 
principles and the Court, as the protector of the Constitution, has the authority (1) to 
determine what these principles are and (2) to determine when they conflict, and thus 
prevail, over international law. 
In Case II, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, similar to the Italian Court, 
established what the German and Greek Constitutions provide with explicit constitutional 
text—that "generally recognized rules of international law" is automatically transformed 
into the domestic legal system. On that basis, the legitimacy of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court's decision stands on less than unequivocal ground. 
I t Tlie monist/dualist dichotomy is not helpful here. It is well known that, whether you espouse one or the 
other ideology in the long-standing debate between monism or dualism, international law will not be operative 
on the domestic level unless it is so provided for by the national constitution or a basic rule of domestic law. 
Both a dualist and a monist may adhere to the principle of immediate application and supremacy of inter-
national law in the domestic sphere. The dualist, in this case, would maintain that the domestic law is 
independent of and is in no way subordinate to international law; instead, it is the will of domestic law itself 
that may elect, in some or in all cases, that international law is supreme and directly applicable on the domestic 
level. 
12 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 25. 
13 "The generally acknowledged rules of international law, as well as international conventions as of the time 
they are sanctioned by law and become operative according to the conditioned therein, shall be an integral part 
of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law." Constitution of Greece, Article 
28 (1). 
14 Constitution of Italy, Article 10. 
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Concededly, the Court is vested with the power to interpret the Constitution, 
including Article 7 (1). However, many constitutions contain similar provisions to 
Article 7 (1), but often merely to manifest its general intention to be part of the 
community of nations. The Court's interpretation of Article 7 (1), on the other hand, 
fundamentally changed Hungary's constitutional boundaries. Indeed, what the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has done, as with the Italian Constitutional Court, is to replace the 
legislature and/or the government with the constitution as the mediator between 
international and domestic law. Should treaties not have constitutional status, as the 
ACC strongly implies, then they may be modified by subsequent legislative or executive 
action. This, of course, would place Hungary in violation of its international obligations 
on the international level. Under the Court's reasoning in Case II, however, such 
legislative action by virtue of Article 7 (1) may be challenged and found un-
constitutional. The Court effectively has taken away the power of the political branches 
to decide, under some rare circumstances, to raise an objection to international practice 
or to violate international law. 
This certainly has appeal as a substantive matter as international norms, which 
presumably provide greater protections of human rights than domestic norms, auto-
matically becomes a part of domestic law. Nonetheless, as an institutional matter, it is 
disturbing to see this Court single-handedly relinquishing a part of Hungary's 
sovereignty, particularly when the constitutional text is not so compelling. By displacing 
the legislature with the Constitution as the gatekeeper between international and 
domestic law, the Court has placed severe, if not absolute, limitations on parliamentary 
or government initiatives to not give effect to certain sections of a treaty on the national 
level. While this type of problem in practice tends to be resolved by negotiations 
between States or by payment of compensation, the inability of a state to break its 
international treaty commitments on the domestic level deprives such state of a 
significant bargaining tool with other nations, particularly when there is a good faith 
disagreement about the respective State parties' obligations under the treaty. While few 
would challenge the Court's general power to interpret the Constitution, it has stretched 
that interpretive power perhaps too far by establishing principles that impose broad 
restraints on domestic political actors on the international level without input from the 
other branches of power. 
2. Rules of Interpretation and the Status of International Law 
Interpretive principles often serve to structure the legal relationship between 
international law and domestic law. The Court in Case II sets out a broad rule of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation. Despite declaring first that "the generally 
recognized rules of international law are not parts of the Constitution, but are 
'obligations undertaken,'" the Court proceeds to do the opposite, and with strong 
language. In the next paragraphs, it argues that Article 7 (1) requires that "the 
constitution and domestic law ... be interpreted in such a way that generally accepted 
rules of international shall be effective". At the very least, the Court establishes 
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Hungary's version—on a broader scale—of the United States In re Schooner Betsy rule, 
which states that federal statutes should be construed, "where fairly possible", in a 
manner consistent with international law." 
The Court in Case II goes further than in the Betsy case, however, and requires that 
not only Hungarian laws, but constitutional provisions, be interpreted consistently with 
international law. The obligatory language suggests that the Court has established the 
supremacy of international law over the Constitution by insisting that constitutional 
provisions be consistent with the dictates of international law. This was confirmed later 
at another crucial juncture in the case. The Court was considering the effects of a conflict 
between a constitutional provision and international law—a topic I will address below. The 
Court stated that the language of Article 7 (1) articulates a "condition of being a member 
of the commonwealth of nations", and that the "norms of another legal system, 
international law, are prevailing ... [In fact] a rejection of the international law would be 
unconstitutional, contrary to Article 7 (1) of the Constitution." 
This unequivocal language takes the Hungarian Court further than that of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, which has provided that while international law principles shall 
prevail as a general rule, they may not violate the most basic principles underlying the 
Italian Constitution. It is unclear whether the Hungarian Court will accept such a limiting 
principle on the effect of international law should it face the same issue in a different 
case. In this case, at least, the Hungarian Court painted the same theme with broader 
strokes by suggesting that all constitutional provisions are invalid if they contradict 
international law. 
3. "Generally Recognized Rules of International Law": Meanings <4 Institutions 
Most would agree that this phrase means something more than just those norms that are 
included in treaties endorsed by a majority of states and accepted as being of general 
application. Many would include customary rules of international law in the phrase—those 
that have the elements of (1) general practice and (2) its acceptance as law (opinio juris). 
Of course, much has been written on the difficulties of determining what constitutes 
adequate state practice and what are the manifestations of the moral obligation to obey 
a norm that would render it a customary law. Nonetheless, most scholars would place 
customary international law under the category of "generally recognized rules of 
international law." Should this be the case, hardly any scholars would object to the 
inclusion of jus cogens or peremptory norms—those to which derogation is not 
permitted-to the category itself. In any case, this phrase is interpreted to mean those rules 
as recognized by the country in question. 
15 Murray, v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Crunch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Restatement (Third) 
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 114 ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to 
be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United 
States."). 
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The Hungarian Constitutional Court seems to have made similar distinction about its 
treaty obligations, and those obligations derive from custom and general practice. At 
various places in the cases, in exploring the scope of Article 7 (1), the Court discussed 
how similar or different international treaties are to "generally recognized rules of inter-
national law". Nonetheless, the case was not particularly helpful in providing guidelines 
as to what the Court will consider as a "generally recognized rule". If international law 
is to play a more useful role, more precise guidelines would aid parliamentarians develop 
legislation that would fit more closely with international standards. 
Let me briefly raise a related, institutional question. Tasks such as interpreting or 
expounding the meaning of international law norms or reviewing for consistency between 
conflicting norms would seem appropriate to entrust to a judicial or quasi-judicial body, 
such as a constitutional court. Some of these tasks would include reviewing evidence as 
to questions of how much state practice is required, how much consistency is required, 
what evidence is required to establish opinio juris, or may treaties be invoked as evidence 
of customary law.16 Nonetheless, unless provided specifically, the interpretation of 
international law arguably may be carried out by other branches of government. One 
conceivably can envision the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs using different 
standards than those of the Court in determining which norm has achieved the status of 
a "generally recognized rule" of international law. Indeed, the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, for example, "does not consider itself competent to verify the computability of 
Polish domestic law with international law".17 In Poland then, the legislature maintains 
its role as a mediator in the interface between international and national law. 
To provide a more legitimate basis on which to entrust the review and interpretation 
of international law to a constitutional court, one alternative would be to adopt a constitu-
tional provision similar to that of the German Basic Law. "If, in the course of litigation, 
doubts arise as to whether a rule of public international law is an integral part of federal 
law and whether such a rule directly creates rights and duties for the individual, the court 
shall obtain a decision from the Federal Constitutional Court."18 
Such a provision would not only address the issue of jurisdiction over issues of 
incorporation or transformation of international law into domestic law, but also issues of 
whether international norms, once incorporated, provide individuals a claim upon which 
to invoke.19 Moreover, such a provision would minimize the possibilities of 
16 For additional examples of relevant questions, see HENKIN, et al., International Law 37—40 (2nd ed. 
1987). 
17 The Relationship between International and Domestic Law, Proceedings, p. 35 (Coun. of Eur. Press 1993). 
18 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Article 100, Clause 2. Although a fascinating jurisprudential problem, I will not 
discuss the epistemological problems of norms which remain valid and enforceable until declared otherwise. 
For an enjoyable bit of philosophical "freewheeling" on these issues, see NINO, C. A.: Philosophical 
Reconstruction of Judicial Review, 14 Cardozo Law Review, 799 (1993). 
19 The principles of "direct applicability" and "invocability" are distinct and separate, despite scholarly 
treatment which collapses Ute two into one. Invocability is somewhat related to the U.S. concept of "standing". 
Titus, the determination of whether a treaty is directly applicable on Ute domestic level does not necessarily 
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embarrassment should two or more branches of power disagree publicly about the status 
of a particular international norm on the national level. 
C. The Constitutionalization of International Law 
The Court, prior to Case II, was authorized by the ACC to review for the consistency of 
promulgated laws with international treaties. In order to justify its exercise of jurisdiction 
in Case II, the Court had to consider fully the relationship between international 
law—treaty and customary—and domestic law. In Case II, the Court established that it is 
required, under Article 7 (1) of the Constitution, to consider questions of international 
law when ruling on the constitutionality of a law. Its broad interpretation of Article 7 (1) 
ostensibly gave it power not only to judge whether a draft law is inconsistent with an 
international treaty, but that the law is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with 
either international treaties or customary international law. I call this indirect 
constitutional review, as the standards of constitutionality are not based directly on 
constitutional text. In expanding the limits of its constitutional review power, the Court 
effectively assigned constitutional status or rank to at least incorporated international law 
and, arguably to international treaties. 
1. Amendment of International Law on the National Level 
The constitutionalization of international law has other implications for Hungary's 
constitutional structure. Should customary international law be given constitutional status, 
as the Hungarian Court established, it automatically becomes valid on the domestic level 
without any legislative or executive action. By virtue of its constitutional rank, however, 
any amendment of such law would require going through the process of constitutional 
amendment, rather than that of amending a simple statute. 
Some have argued that this would be extremely undemocratic by requiring a much 
more difficult process to dictate how international law is to be applied on the national 
level.20 The argument concededly may have great force under a legal structure such as 
that of the United States where it is extremely difficult to amend the constitution. This 
is not the case in Hungary where the Constitution can be amended by a mere two-thirds 
vote in Parliament21 While the requirement of two-thirds is more difficult than that of 
establish, in a particular dispute, that certain parties may invoke treaty norms to resolve that dispute. See 
JACKSON, J.: Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 American Journal of Inter-
national Law, 310, 317 (1992). 
20 See, e.g., TRIMBLE, A.: Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 University of California 
Law Review, 665 (1986); OLIVER, С. T.: Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of 
Customary International Law of Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 4 Houston Journal of International Law, 59 
(1981). 
21 Hungarian Constitution, Chap. 2, § 24 (3). Should Parliament feel that a particular rule of international law 
is undesirable, it need not amend the text of article 7 itself. Parliament can amend the application of a 
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a majority vote, it is not such a high hurdle so as to deprive Hungarians of democratic 
expression. Instead, a two-thirds requirement is a sufficiently low threshold to permit 
democratic manifestations while acting as a check on the governing party or coalition 
from renouncing too quickly Hungary's commitments under customary international law. 
This not only should come as a comfort to those who believe that international law acts 
as a positive influence on the establishment of the rule of law in Hungary, but also to 
Hungary's neighbors who may see Hungary as increasingly threatening due to the 
presence of substantial Hungarian minorities in these countries, such as in Romania and 
Slovakia.22 
2. Increasing Monopolization of the Power of Constitutional Review 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Case II further expands the scope of its 
constitutional review power. As Hungary follows the model of centralized constitutional 
review, as a general rule, only the Constitutional Court may resolve a "constitutional" 
issue. For those legal disputes that implicate constitutional issues then, the Constitutional 
Court is the only court that has jurisdiction. 
By asserting its jurisdiction to review for indirect unconstitutionality—whether a law 
(either a draft law or a promulgated act) conflicts with an international law—die Court 
effectively assigned constitutional status or rank to customary international law. This 
jurisprudential move solidifies the allocation of the review power to the Court over 
legislation when international law is implicated. As international law is now a 
constitutional issue, and because the Constitutional Court is the only institution vested 
with the power of constitution review, the Court arguably has the sole power to determine 
both the existence of a "general rule of international law" and the content of such rule. 
To date, I know of no Hungarian law nor any legal act establishing such a principle. 
Under the Court's reasoning, however, the Court has virtually erected a monopoly over 
the power to not only declare the existence of certain customary international norms, but 
also to define the contours and scope of such norms. 
"generally recognized rule of international law" by passing an Act or statute that has "constitutional force", 
which requires a two-thirds vote in Parliament. By passing such legislation, the Parliament may alter an 
undesirable rule of international law from die domestic point of view, while preserving Hungary's commitment 
to remain a peaceful member of the international community through its obligation to ensure "the accord 
between the obligations assumed under international law and domestic law." Article 7 (1). 
22 "The Republic of Hungary recognizes its responsibilities towards the fate of Hungarians living outside the 
borders of the country and shall assist them in cultivating their relations will] Hungary." Article 6 (3). The fact 
that Hungary's relationship with and responsibility for its minorities has been raised to constitutional status has 
not been a comfort to its neighbors. 
The former Hungarian Minister of the Interior and later Prime Minister Peter Boross, stated that Hungary 
"can improve our security and the peace of the Hungarians outside the borders with a show and organization 
of force". HOOKER, J.: From Caterer to Nation's Leader, Budapest Week, p. 3 (Sept. 30-0ct . 6, 1993). 
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111. International Law, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and the 
Development of Rights in Hungary 
A. Individual Access to the Constitutional Court 
On a more practical basis, the constitutionalization of treaties arguably provides a 
mechanism for individuals to directly petition the Constitutional Court to vindicate their 
treaty-based rights, one that previously did not exist under Hungary's legal scheme. To 
understand how, I will briefly describe the structure prior to the decision in Case II. 
1. The Act on the Constitutional Court Scheme 
The ACC permits anyone, including individuals, to submit petitions for alleged violations 
of constitutional rights23 or to challenge the constitutionality of an existing legal rule.24 
However, when the claim is that a legal rule contradicts a treaty to which Hungary's a 
party, the list of those who are permitted under the ACC to petition the Court includes 
only of high government officials.25 Thus, while the ACC allows individuals to petition 
the Court to review for the constitutionality of a law that currently is in force, individuals 
are precluded from invoking the Court 's jurisdiction when governmental action is 
challenged for violating an "international treaty" to which Hungary is a party. 
Such exclusion is not necessarily arbitrary nor irrational. There may be several 
reasons for excluding individuals from invoking treaties to challenge governmental 
statutes, and thus policy, in front of the Constitutional Court. Much has been commented 
on the desirability of unnecessarily hampering the Government's ability to conduct 
foreign policy. In U.S. jurisprudence, for example, judges have noted that the executive 
should not be embarrassed by judicial intervention in "political" questions.26 Other 
prudential doctrines, such as the various elements of justiciability, are designed to provide 
the executive, and sometimes the legislature, the freedom and leverage necessary to 
conduct U.S. foreign relations effectively. In Hungary, in comparison, the structure of the 
ACC explicitly insulates the government's sphere of competence over foreign affairs by 
preventing individuals from challenging the government's actions, at least where it 
involves Hungary's meaty obligations. 
Similarly, a legislative act that implicates an international treaty is a sovereign act by 
the legislative body. Analogical arguments thus apply; namely, that individual citizens 
23 ACC, supra note 7, Chap. I, Article 1(d); Chap. Ill, Article 21 (4); Article 48 (1). 
24 Id., Chap. I, Article 1 (b); Chap. Ill, Article 21 (2). 
25 The Parliament, any of its standing committees, or any MP; the President of the Republic; the Council of 
Ministers or any of its members; the President of the State Audit Office; the President of the Supreme Court; 
and the Chief Prosecutor. ACC, Article 21 (3). See also ACC, Article 1 (c). 
26 The political question doctrine has been subject to much criticism. See, e.g., HENKIN, L.: Is There a 
"Political Question" Doctrine, 85 Yale Law Journal, 597 (1976). 
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should not be allowed to hamper the ability of the Parliament to conduct foreign relations 
allowed under its sphere of competence. Under the present text of the ACC, this is 
particularly true to the extent that it allows Parliament to take legislative decisions or acts 
that may place Hungary in violation of its treaty obligations. While these actions may 
subject Hungary to liability on the international plane, such legislative acts are perfectly 
legitimate and valid on the domestic level. 
2. The Development of Rights Under the Scheme 
However, by precluding individuals from challenging statutes by claiming that the statutes 
violate international treaties, the ACC does not offer a strong, structural framework for 
the protection of human rights in the Hungarian legal system. Where governmental 
actions, taken by either the Parliament or the Government, arguably infringe upon 
international human rights because they conflict with Hungarian treaty obligations, 
individuals cannot invoke the Court's jurisdiction to challenge such actions. Such rights 
would include those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 
Hungary's failure to provide an effective tribunal arguably violates both the 
Hungarian Constitution's mandate as well as that of the Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights, which Hungary has ratified and promulgated.27 First, Article 57 (5) of the 
Hungarian Constitution requires that "everyone shall have the right to legal recourse 
against a decision of a court, state administration, or other authority, which infringed his 
rights or lawful interests."™ Thus, the lack of any mechanism under which individuals 
may claim protection of "rights or lawful interests" that, while not derived from the 
Hungarian Constitution, but can be gleaned from international treaties to which Hungary 
is a party, may entitle a person to challenge this structural infirmity as a constitutional 
violation. The Constitutional Court in Case II gives full meaning to the Language of 
Article 7 (1), that the Constitution not only requires that the Republic of Hungary 
"respect the universally accepted rules of international law," Hungary must also "ensure 
the accord between the obligations assumed under international law and domestic law." 
Thus, if the application of the domestic rule violates Hungary's international obligations, 
treaty or otherwise, then the failure of Hungary to provide mechanisms to ensure the 
consistency between domestic laws and international law arguably violates of Article 57 
(5) of the Hungarian Constitution. Thus, if individuals are excluded from petitioning the 
Court on the basis that a government action violates a treaty, and the eligible parties29 
do not petition on behalf of these individuals, these persons effectively are left without 
a remedy. This arguably places the Hungarian government in violation of the 
Constitution's dictates. 
27 The CCPR liai been properly transformed into a domestic statute. Law-decree 8 of 1976. 
28 Hungarian Constitution, Chap. XII, Article 57 (5). 
29 See footnote 25 supra. 
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Second, the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights obliges parties to 
provide an effective domestic mechanism for individuals to invoke protection of rights, 
where applicable, under the Covenant. While it is generally agreed that it is up to the 
signatories to establish what kind of mechanism, judicial or otherwise, to fulfill their 
obligations under the Covenant, the failure to provide for an independent body to evaluate 
claims or for a remedy would arguably place the state in violation of its obligations under 
the CCPR. 
3. Case II and A New Mechanism of Access on Treaty-Based Rights 
How is this structure changed by the Court in Case II? I argue that the Court unwittingly 
has created an avenue through which individuals may petition the Court directly to 
vindicate their rights contained in treaties such as the International Covenants for Civil 
and Political Rights and Social Economic and Cultural Rights, and the European 
Convention for Human Rights. I've noted earlier that the ACC does not explicidy confer 
such a right to petition the Court.30 The Court's interpretation of the second clause of 
Article 7 (1) in Case II provides a convenient loophole. 
The argument an individual would make would be as follows: The Constitutional 
Court has jurisdiction over constitutional issues; the court has interpreted Article 7 (1) 
of the Constitution and concluded that properly transformed international agreements to 
which Hungary is a party is part of the Hungarian constitutional norms; the consistency 
between a domestic rule of law with an international treaty is a constitutional issue; 
individuals may petition the Court alledging that a provision of law is 
"unconstitutional";31 therefore, individuals may invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by 
claiming that the domestic rule of law is inconsistent with the international treaty. 
The ACC itself provides independent support for this conclusion. Article 48 of the 
ACC provides that anyone, through the application of an unconstitutional legal rule, and 
"who has exhausted all other legal remedies or has no other remedy available, may 
submit a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court because of the violation 
of his/her constitutional rights".32 Under the broad reading of Article 7 articulated by 
the Court in Case II, the failure to assure the consistency between domestic law and 
Hungary's international obligations is a constitutional violation. Article 48 of the ACC 
is thus implicated and individuals arguably may then invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
30 The analogous term in U.S. jurisprudence would be "standing." 
31 "The Constitutional Court shall be competent to decide constitutional complaints lodged in cases of viola-
tions of constitutional rights." ACC, supra n. 7, Article 1 (d). "Any person may lodge a constitutional complaint 
with the Constitutional Court alledging that he/she has been injured by the application of an unconstitutional 
provision of law in respect of his/her rights and that no other remedy is available or the remedy has been 
exhausted. ACC, Article 48 (1). See also id., Articles 1 (b) & 21 (2). 
32 ACC, supra note 7, Article 48 (emphasis added). 
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4. Vindication of Customary International Law-Based Rights 
What are the implications for the development of rights by the Court constitutionalizing 
customary international norms? As noted above, the ACC ostensibly precludes 
individuals from invoking the Court's jurisdiction to vindicate their treaty-based rights. 
The ACC, however, does not mention whether individuals have the right to petition the 
Court when their "rights or lawful interests" derived from other sources of international 
law—customary international law, general rules of international law, and peremptory 
norms. For example, there may be some rights in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights which, while not affirmed in binding treaties, may take on characteristics of 
customary international law. 
Individuals then can make the cogent argument that, through the constitutionalization 
of customary international law, and which is not excluded by the ACC, they should be 
allowed to petition the Court directly to protect their rights under customary 
international law. In other words, as international law has constitutional status, and as 
the Court has asserted the power to exercise indirect constitutionality review, and the 
Court is required to hear individual complaints of unconstitutionality, individuals 
arguably may rely upon customary international law to petition the Court. 
B. The Indirect Method of Incorporation: Interstitial Development of 
Fundamental Rights 
Case II also could have indirect, but extraordinary, impact on the Court's jurisprudence 
in the area of fundamental rights. Constitutional courts in this region are vested with the 
general power of abstract norm control, which involves construing "open-ended" 
provisions of a constitution, those from which fundamental rights may be based or 
derived.33 Courts often have not only the opportunity to declare the existence, but also 
establish the scope of those rights. Some of the established constitutional courts often 
refer to a country's customs, history, or certain documents to assist them to interpret 
these broad provisions. The Conseil Constitutionelle, for example, has used the 1789 
Declaration on the rights of Man (also mentioned in its preamble) to help it shape the 
development of rights in France. Given the broad language of the Court in Case II 
concerning Hungary's obligation to insure the accord of domestic law and international, 
one can easily make the argument that, in reviewing the constitutionality of a law, the 
33 Professor Ely defines "open-ended" provisions as those phrases in the Constitution "that are difficult to 
read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the constitutional decision 
making process considerations that will not be found in the language of the amendment or the debates that 
led up to it". ELY, J.: Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 14 (1980). Prominent examples 
of such provisions are in the first, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Of course, 
the import of considerations outside the explicit text does not necessarily render the decision making process 
illegitimate. 
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Court should refer to, or incorporate by reference, the norms in international treaties 
or customary rules. 
This "indirect" or "weak" method of incorporation of international law involves the 
domestic tribunal using such norms to guide its jurisprudence, particularly in grappling 
with the concept of deriving unenumerated rights from "open-ended" provisions.34 This 
method considers the international norms as only one facet in the task of constitutional 
interpretation. One possible use of international law under this proposed method is to 
fashion a remedy not explicitly granted under the Constitution from a violation of 
international law. In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,35 for example, the U.S. District Court 
granted relief to aliens from arbitrary detention under international human rights 
norms.36 Aside from using international norms to fill in the cracks or gaps of 
constitutional protection, such norms may also be used to assist in the interpretation of 
constitutional text, particularly the inherently ambiguous "open-ended" provisions. In the 
subsequent appeal of Fernandez, for example, the 10th Circuit did not adopt the District 
Court's approach of using international law to create a remedy. Instead, the Circuit 
Court relied on identical positive sources of customary international law to interpret and 
expand the notion of due process to extend the same protection to aliens from arbitrary 
detention. 
What is significant about the two cases is that neither the District Court nor the 
Circuit Court relied upon "natural law" to provide protection to the aliens. Rather, both 
courts used positive sources (evidence of state practice, conventions and covenants) of 
international law, either to fill in the gaps among, or help inform the interpretation of 
constitutional "open-ended" provisions. Under these approaches, international law does 
not provide an independent or binding source of law or rule of decision; rather, 
international law supplements and enriches the context to define the contours of rights 
rooted in the constitutional text itself.37 
34 The problem of unenumerated rights has been formulated as follows: "Short of a natural law theory of how 
'to find' and give protection to those unenumerated rights, however, we are left with only textually enumerated 
rights as positive limits on power." CHRISTENSON, G.: Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and 
Equal Protection Analysis, 52 Cincinnati Law Review, 3, 7-8 (1983). In the case of the United States, the latter 
approach, of course, contradicts the plain meaning of the ninth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
35 505 F. Supp. at 790. 
36 "Even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the United States 
Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially remediable as a violation of international law." Id. at 790. 
37 The civil rights movement in the United States also relied upon international law in its efforts to eliminate 
discrimination in various spheres, including education, housing, property ownership and employment. See 
generally TOLLEY, H.: Interest Group Litigation to Enforce Human Rights: Confronting Judicial Restraint, 
in World Justice? U.S. Courts and International Human Rights (M. Gibney, Ed. 1991); LOCKWOOD, В. В.: 
The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 Iowa Law Review, 901 
(1984). 
For some recent developments in the region, the International Human Rights Law Group has submitted 
an amicus brief to the Romanian Constitutional Court, urging the application of international human rights 
standards to review the constitutionality of legislation criminalizing homosexual acts. 
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This method has several advantages. First, by allowing domestic tribunals to infuse 
the Constitution with standards adopted by the international community, the approach 
may enhance domestic protection of human rights as international norms generally 
provide broader protection of human rights than national law. This line of argument has 
special significance in this region. Historically and culturally, the protection of rights in 
East-Central Europe cannot be framed merely behind the philosophy of limited state 
power to intrude on individual liberty. Instead, expectations of entitlements from the state 
may well be as important, if not more, in the perception of rights. Human rights can no 
longer be defined by negative restraints on state power, one must also consider the 
"entitlements of human need that are ultimately guaranteed by the state" in order for 
individuals to be "judicially autonomous" entities.38 As international norms contain much 
more "positive rights" than in the United States Constitution, for example, their relevance 
and effect on the constitutional development of rights in the countries of this region are 
significant. 
Second, the proposed method of "indirect" incorporation of international law allows 
us to step out of the theoretical debate between monism and dualism which, 
fundamentally, attempts to resolve the question of when and where does international law 
provide the rule of decision in domestic courts. Some argue that the use of international 
norms is illegitimate. Customary international nonns, for example is established by a 
subjective determination of opinio juris?9 rather than representative politics.40 With 
regard to treaties, while the participation of governments subjects them to weaker claims 
of illegitimacy, a court's very act of interpretation "gives rise to law, a quasi-legislative 
function..."41 Others, however, argue that the level of participation of the elected, 
political branches are sufficient for both treaty and customary international law to counter 
countermajoritarian charges. 
The proposed method of using international law by domestic tribunals—the "weak" 
theory of incorporation—offers a judicial tool that sidesteps perhaps unresolvable 
theoretical conflicts. This approach does not address the issue of using international law 
as the rule of decision or to "define respective spheres for the dominant operation of 
international and domestic law".42 Instead, using international norms as guidelines 
provides an accommodating interpretative tool by which ambiguous or "open-ended" 
38 CHRtSTENSON, supra note 34, at 10. 
39 Two elements constitute customary international law: opinio juris sive necessitatis—a "sense of 
obligation"—and reasonably consistent state practice. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 4. See also 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (2) (1986). 
40 See, e.g., TRIMBLE, W.R.: A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 University of 
Calofornia Law Review, 665 (1986); OLIVER, С. T.: Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying 
Norms of Customary international Law of Human Rights in U.S. Courts, 4 Houston Journal of International 
Law, 59 (1981). 
41 STEINHARDT, R.: The Role of Domestic Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1103, 1108 (1990). 
42 STEINHARDT, id., at 1109. Indeed, "useful as that debate may be, it is a pathology". Id. 
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constitutional text is infused with norms and aspirations arising from transnational 
consensus.43 Thus, unlike the direct incorporation method of international norms,44 the 
recommended indirect incorporation approach is one that is rooted in the constitutional 
text, but gains additional depth through a context that is universally recognized. 
The "weak" or "indirect" method of incorporation, which has taken on more force 
following the decision in Case II, also augments the Hungarian Constitutional Court's 
position in the Hungarian constitutional scheme. A constitutional court does not employ 
force to enforce its decisions. Its power depends on the goodwill of the other political 
branches, which in turn is dependent upon the perception of whether the court is 
exercising its tasks legitimately. An often-noted example is that of the Russian 
Constitutional Court in the last civil conflict. 
Using different sources from which customary law is derived—such as concrete state 
practices, treaties and conventions, judicial opinions and work of jurists45—to assist 
constitutional courts in interpreting the national constitution provides an additional 
43 The U.S. jurisprudence has developed similarly. United States courts to date have not hesitated to refer 
and rely upon informal sources or standards that do not qualify as the "law of nations," which would transform 
such norms into federal common law analogues. Much of this use of external sources have occurred in cases 
dealing with human rights issues. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 
1981) (citing the American Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as 
support for customary principle prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention); Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 
883-85 (2d. Cir. 1980) (referring to the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, among others, to determine the customary prohibition on torture); Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F.Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal 1987) (noting the Universal Declaration, American Convention, and 
the Civil and Political Covenant as evidence of a customary norm against summary execution), right granted 
in part and denied in part, 694 F. supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
U.S. courts have thus relied on principles in treaties the U.S. has never ratified to determine the content 
of international law. 
44 Such an approach has been advocated for international human rights law in the United States domestic 
legal system. 1 The Law Group Docket [published by the International Human Rights Law Group (Spring 
1981)]. 
45 Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F. 2d at 884. Sources of customary law may also include general expectations 
created by democratic states, domestic laws common to all civilized nations, decisions of both domestic and 
international tribunals, states' foreign relations practices, the writings of distinguished jurists, and the practices 
of international organizations. 
The fact that judges use extra-constitutional sources, especially universal norms, to guide their decision 
process is not necessarily illegitimate. Even Hans Kelsen, a strong proponent of positivism, conceded that 
judges should have the power and discretion to apply universal principles as one element in their decision when 
gaps are present in pasitive law. KELSEN, H.: Principles of International Law 553-54 (W. Tucker, Ed. 1966). 
See also KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and State 145^19 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961). 
Moreover, an overemphasis on positivism, warns Bodenheimer, may lead to "interpretive nihilism." 
Because the positive system as established today by the state is "inescapably incomplete, fragmentary, and full 
of ambiguities ... [t]he defects must be overcome by resorting to ideas, principles, and standards which are 
presumably not as well articulated as a formalized sources of the law, but which nevertheless give some degree 
or normative discretion to the findings of the courts. In the absence of a theory of non-formal source, nothing 
remains outside the boundaries of fixed, positive precepts but the arbitrariness of the individual judge." 
BODENHEIMER, E.: Jurisprudence 295 (1962). 
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layer of legitimacy to the courts' work-product. The approach grounds the judge's 
exercise of constitutional review to specific sources while minimizing the tendency to 
rely on the individual judge's subjectivity, thus countering some countermajoritarian 
objections. 
While the "indirect" method of incorporation is essentially non-interpretive and is not 
explicitly grounded in the constitutional text, it is more objective and offers more judicial 
accountability than "evolving standards", the Hungarian Constitutional Court's concept 
of the "invisible Constitution",46 or the jump into the often muddled realm of "natural 
law".47 Under this approach, judges rely on objective sources rather than individual 
values to guide the conflict resolution process, especially when dealing with 
unenumerated rights.48 This jurisprudential technique also provides constitutional courts 
with a mechanism to be sensitive to separation of powers concerns; it offers a palatable 
middle ground between the two polar choices of applying, or completely disregarding, 
international norms. 
By being more transparent, the approach thus reduces the possibility of public or 
political backlash from the perception of judicial "activism". The reference to norms 
formed in a universally recognized context to shape the substantive content of open-ended 
provisions in the Hungarian Constitution allows the Court to preserve its legitimacy, 
while strengthening its role in resolving constitutional disputes, either in separation of 
powers or fundamental rights cases. This method of "interstitial growth in constitutional 
interpretation"49 through international norms thus fosters greater protection of human 
rights by safeguarding the Court's legitimacy as the Court, case by case, continues to 
define the contours of those rights that arguably belong in the Hungarian constitutional 
scheme, but are not enumerated explicitly. 
46 In Iiis concurrence in the Death Penalty Case, 89/b/l 990/7, Chief Justice Sólyom, one of the most influen-
tial judges on the Hungarian Constitutional Court, urged the Court to give content to constitutional provisions 
according to a "a reliable standard of constitutionalism—an 'invisible Constitution'—beyond the written Consti-
tution, wliich often is amended presently by current political interests; and, because tliis 'invisible Constitution' 
will not conflict with die new Constitutional to be established or sith future Constitution". The Court indeed 
has particularly been aggressive in deriving unenumerated rights, particularly from the clause "human dignity." 
The right to "human dignity" "is a 'maternal right'—i.e., the source of still unnamed fundamental freedoms." 
Id. at 15 (Chief Justice Sólyom, concurring). 
47 Notions of natural law in international law, as embodied in the the principle of opinio juris, differs from 
natural law exercised by judges. The former signifies die establishment, through international consensus, of 
"principles about die morally proper conduct of human affairs which are either self-evident or discoverable by 
die exercise of practical reason. HARTMAN, G.: "Unusual " Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International 
Norms restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 5 2 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW, 655 , 6 7 4 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . The 
latter, however, merely are disassociated or isolated instances of "natural reason"—rather than evolving, mutual 
moral consciousness—exercised by one or a group of judges. 
48 See supra n. 35. 
49 CHRISTENSON, G.: The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 Houston 
Journal of International Law, 39, 55 (1981). 
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IV. Conflicts Between International Norms and Rights 
A. Conflict of Customary International Norms and Constitutional 
Rights 
In Case II, the Court faced for the first the issue of how to resolve the inconsistency 
between a rule of customary international law and a specific constitutional right. The 
Court faced a clear conflict: Article 57 (4) of the Hungarian Constitution contained an 
absolute prohibition against retroactive punishment. "No one may be pronounced guilty 
of, or sentenced for, any act that was not considered a criminal offense under Hungarian 
law at the time it was committed." On the other hand, it was clear, at least in the Court's 
mind, that the international criminal principles on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity imposed the obligation on nation states to punish, even retroactively, these 
crimes. As these customary norms are among the undertaken "international law 
obligations" under the second clause of Article 7 (1), there is direct conflict with Article 
57 (4) on the domestic legal level. 
The Court argued in unequivocal language that the strength of Article 7 (1) compels 
the conclusion that international law, while belonging to another legal system, should 
prevail generally. Indeed, the Court stated that domestic law must be implemented and 
harmonized with international law as that is a "condition of being a member of the 
commonwealth of nations." Despite this initial broad statement, the Court hesitated 
momentarily before going over the brink. It noted that if a country fails to bring its 
domestic law in line with international law, it would be subject to liability on the inter-
national level. This is the classic dualist formulation, where a country may consciously 
decide to violate its international obligations by passing a valid, domestic law or by failing 
to hannonize domestic Law with its international treaty obligations. The Court, however, 
immediately thereafter took the fateful step and declared that any such "rejection of the 
international law would be unconstitutional, contrary to Article 7 (1) of the Constitution". 
Thus even a decision by the legislature to violate international law would be found 
unconstitutional. Moreover, a country's failure to hannonize the norms in both legal 
systems could arguably be challenged as unconstitutional. It appears then that, at least 
with respect to customary international law, the Court has characterized Hungary as a 
variant of a monist model where international law is automatically superior even to 
constitutional values; in this case, the protection from retroactive criminal punishment. 
Until WWII, this theoretical problem had few practical effects in other jurisdictions 
as international law rarely conflicted with constitutional principles. Also, customary inter-
national law inconsistent with constitutional value was unlikely to relate to a national law, 
particularly one that related to rights of individuals.50 The rapid development in the field 
50 In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to consider the question of whether the Constitution is 
supreme over the law of nations or principles of customary law. Although there is no case on point on this 
issue, there is dictum suggesting that the U.S. Constitution would prevail domestically over law of nations. See 
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of international human rights over the last few decades, however, has increased the 
importance of the debate. The human rights "revolution" after WWII has rendered the 
individual a subject of international law. The explosion of statutory law in all areas of 
life, even in a common law country like the United States, has increased the possibilities 
of conflicts between domestic legislation, the constitution and international law. This 
trend only will increase as countries in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union 
are passing a large amount of statutory law. 
There is one slight possibility where the Court can bring the country back in some 
variant form of a dualist model. The approach mentioned above is the one adopted by 
the Italian Constitutional Court, which established that basic constitutional values 
underlying the Italian Constitution scheme, which may or may not be enumerated in the 
Constitution, should prevail over those of international law. The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court may well adopt that strategy should it be faced with the same issue 
in a different case. It may, for example, distinguish Case II by noting that the norms 
embodied in Article 57 (4) does not constitute a basic constitutional value of the 
Hungarian Constitution. This appears unlikely, however, as the prohibition against 
retroactive criminal punishment would seem to be as basic as any other values in 
preserving a democratic state where citizens are not arbitrarily punished. If this norm 
is not assigned the status of a basic constitutional right, it would be difficult to imagine 
what would be. 
B. Conflict Between Treaty-based Norms and the Constitutional Rights 
The Court in Case II creates a legal incoherence between the status of treaties in 
Hungary, the ACC, and the Constitution. Hungary maintains strict adherence to the 
dualist model for treaties by requiring that a treaty be transformed into the domestic legal 
system, either through a statute or some other legal act, before it acquires legal force. 
These "transformation" statutes render norms in treaties into norms of a domestic legal 
act, either a parliamentary statute or an executive order. The "transformation" statute can 
be applied as other statutes. The ACC provides that treaties generally would prevail over 
inconsistent domestic laws, unless the legal act that promulgated the treaty is lower in the 
hierarchy than that of the inconsistent domestic law.51 Although not expressly provided, 
In re Dillon, 7 F. Cas. 710, 712 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1854) (No. 3,914) (involving the domestic invalidity of treaty 
granting immunity from subpoena in the face of U.S. Constitution's sixth amendment). 
51 "The Constitutional Court shall decide whether a legislative provision or other act of State organs is 
in conflict with an international agreement. If die Constitution Court establishes that a legislative provision, 
equal in hierarchy or subordinate to the enactment promulgating tire international agreement, or another act of 
State organs is in conflict with the international agreement in question, it shall annul, wholly or in part, the 
legislative provision or other acts of State organs to the international agreement. ACC, Article 45 (1). 
Many countries, such as Italy, adopt the principle that treaties are of the same rank as ordinary national 
laws. As such, an incorporated treaty prevails over inconsistent prior law while treaties are subject to sub-
sequently enacted legislative acts. There are some special treaties which prevail over all domestic law, such as 
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given the possibility that a legal act may be higher in rank than a treaty, it would be 
reasonable to deduce that constitutional rights and norms would prevail over inconsistent 
treaty norms. 
Case II appears to vitiate this scheme, at least partially, by effectively constitu-
tionalizing treaties, thus suggesting that treaties are superior to all legal acts, even where 
the challenged act is higher in rank than the statute promulgating the treaty. As such, 
Court's treatment of international treaties is seemingly irreconcilable with that of the Act 
on Constitutional Court. 
The Court in Case II thus provides the first glimpse at how it would reconcile a 
conflict between a treaty-based norm and a constitutional provision. The Court considered 
the effects of the international documents relating to war crime and crimes against 
humanity, including the 1968 New York Convention52 and the European Convention of 
1974 on the non-application of the statutory limitation on such crimes. The Court noted 
that these international covenants "cannot be deemed as integral parts of the international 
customary law or as the generally recognized rules of international law."53 The Court 
thus had to deal with the conflict between Article 57 (4)'s strict prohibition against 
retroactive criminal liability and the obligation under the two treaties to prosecute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, retroactively if necessary; in other words, the Court 
had to consider whether to treat the conflict between the Constitution and international 
treaties in the same manner as it resolved the conflict between the general rules of 
international law and the Constitution. 
The Court held that the obligations of the two relevant international conventions 
override the absolute protection afforded under Article 57 (4) of the Hungarian 
Constitution. It noted that the two conventions bind the parties to prosecute war crimes 
or crimes against humanity regardless of their statutes of limitations and that this 
obligation reflects a "clar trend" in the development of customary international law. 
Whereas international law does not have a clear rule on statutes of limitations on war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, the norms in the two treaties, including those on 
statutes of limitations, reflect and supplement the customary international law that states 
have the obligation to prosecute such crimes. 
the Italian Lateran Pacts and the European Communities. The United States's "last-in-time" rule also allows 
federal laws to modify treaties, although the federal system assures that treaties, like federal laws, are supreme 
over state laws. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1988). 
There are other countries that provide for the supremacy of treaties over even subsequently promulgated 
laws. These countries include Spain (Spanish Const., Article 96), France (French Const, of 1958, Article 55) 
and Greece (Greek Const., Article 28). 
52 The New York Convention, for example, stated that the war crimes and crimes against humanity listed in 
the Convention "shall not be subject to statutory limitation, regardless of die date of their commission". 
53 I will not address in tliis paper the Court's approach in determining which norms have reached the status 
of customary international law or "generally recognized rules". I will say, however, that the Court has not been 
particular thorough in delineating the elements that it considers relevant and persuasive in determining whether 
a rule has reached this status. 
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The Court's here piggybacked on its broad interpretation of Article 7 (1) of the 
Hungarian Constitution to trump the domestic, absolute guarantee of nullum crimen sine 
lege. Nonetheless, The Court's language suggests that it would not find in every case that 
a treaty norm would prevail over a Constitutional provision. The Court here bootstrapped 
its reasoning on the strength it assigned to a particular international norm—the obligation 
to prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity. This is unlikely to happen in every 
conflict between a treaty provision and a constitutional right, particularly when many 
treaties protect and supplement, rather than conflict with, domestic fundamental rights. 
Nonetheless, the Court's approach potentially affects a broader scheme for the 
development of rights in Hungary. If treaty norms prevail over constitutional norms under 
some circumstances, one could envision the Court declaring that the national government 
has violated Article 7 (1) of the Hungarian Constitution because some constitutional 
provisions do not conform, for example, to what often are the more expansive rights in 
the Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 
One other related point. The Court's decision failed to give effect to other sources of 
international law, including the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
[Article 15 (1)], the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights [Article 
7 (1)]. As with the Hungarian Constitution, these also provide for the unconditional 
prohibition of retroactive criminal punishment Most scholars of international law would 
also claim that the guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege also has reached the status of 
customary international law. Indeed, in Case I concerning retroactive justice, the Court 
reviewed the practice of many countries and the Court itself suggested forcefully that 
such a rule is internationally recognized as fundamental to a state whose basis is the rule 
of law.54 In this respect, the Court did not provide an explanation why, in this case, one 
norm of customary international law (obligation to prosecute war crimes/crimes against 
humanity) should prevail over another (no retroactive criminal liability). 
V. Conclusion 
A full understanding of how international norms operate or affect the national legal 
systems requires the examination of those institutions where "the claims of the inter-
national and national legal orders frequently converge"55—generally, domestic tribunals, 
particularly the newly-created constitutional courts in East-Central Europe. In an inter-
national order where transnational relations and effects are more fluid, like that of today, 
transnational norms have increasingly greater relevance for domestic courts. Yet, there 
is inherent tension in courts examining international issues, as courts may act as 
"unofficial agents of the international legal order," but concurrently are subject to the 
national legal order from which these courts receive their jurisdictional competence. This 
54 Case 11/1992 (III. 5.) 
55 LILLICH, R.: The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 Vanderbilt Journal 
of International Law, 9, 12 (1970). 
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tension is enhanced as the "history of international law in the twentieth century" has seen 
an "incremental exclusion of issues and behaviors from the protective ambit of exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction ... "56 
Domestic tribunals often function as crucial intermediaries in the relationship between 
the international and domestic legal systems, particularly in the decades following WWII. 
With the rapid development of international human rights law after WWII, the state 
sovereignty paradigm of international relations established by the Peace of Westphalia57 
ineluctably changed. International law no longer was perceived only as a horizontal 
system of norms between sovereign states. Instead, international law increasingly was 
created and enforced vertically, with the individual occupying a more prominent role, 
including that of a rightsholder.58 With the ebb in the legal and political importance of 
the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, there has been not only more consensus about 
desired practices, but also more codification of these norms. The change in 
paradigms—from one of strong state sovereignty to one where fundamental rights place 
limits on such sovereignty—has pressured domestic courts to change the scope of their 
traditional roles, to become more active even where international elements are involved. 
This is no different with the new constitutional courts in the region. Thus, at least in the 
context of human rights, the lack of "appropriate centralized international judicial 
tribunals, domestic courts, ..., may bridge the waning Westphalian model and the 
evolving human rights paradigm."59 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court and its decision in Case II provides a clear 
example of the significant issues and dangers involved in the clarification (or non-clarifi-
cation) of the exact relationship between international and domestic law. These dangers 
are magnified as these issues often were not given much thought or attention in the recent 
and numerous attempts at constitutional drafting in the region, either by the countries 
themselves or by the foreign lawyers providing "expert" advice. Beyond its immediate 
effect of sanctioning the prosecution of a few egregious acts in 1956 in Hungary, the 
second retroactive justice decision handed down by the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
has both optimistic and troubling implications. As discussed above, the case has and may 
have enormous impact on 1) the allocation of powers between the Court, the Parliament 
and the Government and 2) the development of substantive rights in Hungary and 
individual access to vindicate those rights. 
56 STEINHARDT, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1103, 1177 (1990). 
57 See generally GROSS, L.: The Peace of Westphalia, 1648, 1948, 32 American Journal of International 
Law, 20 (1948). 
58 See generally JANIS, M.: An Introduction to International Law (1988); SOHN, L. В.: The New Inter-
national Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 American University Law Review, 
1 (1982); HIGGINS, R.: Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law, 24 New York 
University Law Review, 11 (1978). 
59 RANDALL, К. C.: Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 Minnesota Law Review, 349, 
421-22 (1988). 
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The Court, in delineating its vision of the relationship between international and 
domestic law, imposed broad rules and constraints on the other branches of government 
These constraints, I argued, are not necessarily compelled by the constitutional or other 
legal texts, or even necessarily desirable. The Court in this case single-handedly changed 
some constitutional boundaries and opened gaps in others. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether these constraints will be implicated and, if so, what the reactions will be from 
the other political branches. 
Aside from the perhaps esoteric theoretical debate between monism and dualism the 
case provokes, the case also has practical impacts on the development of rights in 
Hungary. The Court, I argued, established a mechanism for individuals to petition the 
Court directly to vindicate their treaty-based rights. Even if international law is 
determined not to be applicable, the court has opened up the door to individuals to 
participate in the interplay between international and domestic law. Even if Hungarian 
citizens do not prevail on their claims, they thus have opportunities to "provoke ... [the] 
articulation of a norm of transnational law, with an eye toward using that declaration to 
promote a political settlement in which both governmental and non-governmental entities 
will participate."60 
The ability to force a pronouncement that a transnational61 norm has been violated 
has at least two implications for the countries in East-Central Europe. First, transnational 
law could offer citizens a source of law or standard from which they may challenge or 
review state action in a particular case. Transnational law thus is an additional, and 
potentially powerful, tool with which citizens can assure that the rights granted in newly-
written or revised constitutions will be more than merely aspirational. 
Second, how the relationship between international and domestic law is structured 
affects both the nature and shape of political debates and the development of the polity. 
A successful transition requires not only the creation and maintenance of appropriate 
structures and institutions, but also the development of a polity that is willing to engage 
in formalized processes to resolve disputes. This task is particularly difficult in East-
Central Europe where a lack of civil society spheres and formal barriers to political 
participation erected by the Communist Party over the last few decades have fostered a 
mentality of helplessness towards a republican style of dispute settlement. Should 
international law provide an additional mechanism that allows citizens to engage formal 
institutions in these debates, perhaps in a forum such as a constitutional court, the polity 
will slowly be socialized into patterns of behavior towards republican debate—behavior 
that will legitimize the newly created democratic institutions over time. 
60 KOH, H.: Transnational Public Litigation, 100 Yale Law Journal. 2347, 2349 (1991). 
61 "Transnational law" conceptually is broader than "international law". Judge Jessup defined transnational 
law as "all law wliicli regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers" and includes "both public 
and private international law ... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories". 
JESSUP, P.: Transnational Law 2 (1956). 
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Finally, in adopting a broad and straight-forward interpretation of Article 7 (1), the 
Court opened the door for further use of international law to fill the gaps of the Consti-
tution. Case II arguably imposes a strong suggestion, if not obligation, on the Court to 
refer to international norms to assure that domestic norms are consistent with those of the 
international legal system. I argue further that this not only would have a positive effect 
for the development and protection of rights in Hungary, it would also aid the assertive 
and fiercely independent Hungarian Constitutional Court to maintain and augment its 
legitimacy in the Hungarian constitutional scheme. 
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Some Issues of the Compensation and 
Restitution for Crime Victims 
Introduction 
The different models of reparation for crime victims have become to the centre of interest 
recently. Most initiatives concern either compensation by the State or restitution by the 
offender. The spreading of the idea of restitution can be approached from different aspects 
of criminal policy like the efforts of victimology which keep the victims interests in view, 
reservations about imprisonment and the consideration of punishments which do not involve 
imprisonment or tendencies towards alternative sanctions, or the question of efficiency 
of criminal justice and reconciliation between the offender and the victim or the idea of 
diversion from criminal law.1 
Although restitution is a key-factor in reconciliation or mediation within this article 
we shall concentrate on the conception of compensation in criminal law as we have no 
experience concerning mediation in Hungary. In the first part we are going to pay attention 
to the different aspects of compensation and restitution and the contradictory and ambiguous 
usage of the terms. In the second part we are going to write about restitution in criminal 
substantive law, paying attention to the Hungarian regulations and the characteristics of 
1 WEIGEND, Th.: "Restitution" in den USA. In: Albin Eser, Günther Kaiser and Kurt Madiener (Eds.): Neue 
Wege der Wiedergutmachung im Strafrecht, Freiburg i.Br. 1990, p. 111; MÜLLER-DIETZ, H.: Compensation 
as a Criminal Penalty? in: G. Kaiser-H. Kury—H. J. Albrecht (Eds.) with the assistance of H. Arnold: Victim 
and Criminal Justice Criminological Research Report by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Penal Law, Volume 51, pp. 197-198; NAGY, F.: Intézkedések a büntetőjog szankciórendszerében (Measures 
in the Sanction System of Penal Law), Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1986, pp. 85-88; NAGY, 
F.—TOKAJI, G.: A magyar büntetőjog általános része (The General Part of the Hungarian Criminal Law), JATE 
Kiadó, Szeged, 1990, Volume II, p. 7; VIGH, J.: Vita az igazságszolgáltatás jövőjéről az Európa Tanácsban (Debate 
on the Future of Criminal Justice in the Council of Europe), Magyar Jog No. 3, 1991, p. 173. 
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adhesive process of civil law claim in the criminal procedure. In the end we shall refer 
to the connection between restitution by the offender and criminal substantive law. 
1. The professional literature pays special attention to the compensation of victims. 
To label compensation there are, however, several legal terms or the same terms are used 
with different meanings. It makes the clarification even more difficult that we can speak 
of rules and ideas of compensation in criminal law which fall on the offender and, on the 
other hand, compensation by the State or from public funds. The present article concentrates 
on the first part of the above statement. 
In England compensation as a term of criminal law is used to denote the material 
compensation paid by the offender to the victim to compensate the material loss or personal 
injuries caused by a crime (compensation order). Restitution as a means of other legal 
consequence of criminal law assuring natural reparation is understood in a narrower sense 
and, in integrum restitutio, the restitution of material goods to the person from whom they 
have been taken away illegally.2 
Many have, however, a different opinion. According to most considerations in the 
professional literature restitution denotes the responsibility that falls on the offender towards 
the victim and compensation is the duty of government offices or third parties (insurance 
companies). Restitution and compensation are alternative methods of repaying losses.3 
The definition which says that compensation is the repaying of losses to the victims of 
crimes by the state organizations and restitution is that of by the offender seems more clear-
cut.4 S. Schafer also says that "restitution in criminal-victim relationships concerns the 
reparation of the victims loss or, letter, restoration of his position and rights that were 
damaged or destroyed by and during the criminal attack... Compensation, in criminal-victim 
relationships, concerns the counterbalancing of the victims loss that results from the criminal 
attack... It is an indication of the responsibility of the society; it is a claim for compensating 
action by the society".5 
2 JOUTSEN, M.: The Role of the Victims of Crime in European Criminal Justice Systems. A Crossnational 
Study of the Role of the Victim. HEUNI Publication Series No. 11, Helsinki 1987, 221 pp.; JOUTSEN, M.: 
Research on Victims and Criminal Policy in Europe. In: Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe. Proceedings of 
a European Colloquium. Ed.: Roger Hood, Centre for Criminological Research, University of Oxford, 1988, 
p. 67; WALSH, D.-POOLE, A.: A Dictionary of Criminology. London, 1983, pp. 40 and 199; LÉVAI, M.: A 
büntetőjogi jogkövetkezmények rendszere Angliában és Walesben; kriminálpolitikai tanulságok. "Az alternatív 
büntetési formák és a pártfogó felügyelet Angliában és Walesben" c. kötet (Criminal Sanction System in England 
and Wales; Lessons of Crime Policy. In: The Forms of Alternative Sanctions and Probation Service in England 
and Wales) Ed.: Gönczöl, Katalin. Kriminológiai Közlemények No. 42, Magyar Kriminológiai Társaság 1991, 
pp. 47^48, 55; KÖVÉR, Á.: A börtönnépesség csökkentésére irányuló angol büntetőpolitika eszközei és beavat-
kozási szintjei (Instruments and Levels of the Intervention of English Crime Policy for Reduction in the Prison 
Population), Magyar Jog, No. 11, 1991, p. 681. 
3 KARMEN, A.: Crime Victims. An Introduction to Victimology, Wadsworth 1984, 176 pp. 
4 EREZ, E.: Victim Participation in Sentencing: Rhetoric adn Reality. Journal of Criminal Justice Vol. 18, 
pp. 19-31 (1990), p. 20; GALAWAY, В.: Use of Restitution as а Репа I Measure in the United States. The Howard 
Journal, Volume XXII. 1983, p. 9. 
5 SCHAFER, S.: The Victim and his Criminal. A study in functional responsibility, Random House, New 
York, 1968., pp. 112-113. 
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Similarly the United Nations6 makes such a difference between restitution and 
compensation that the former is provided by the offenders or third parties e.g. the offenders 
employer or the person who, with his carelessness opened the door to crime, and the latter 
is taken care of by the state or other fund founded for this special purpose. Comparing 
the meaning of compensation and restitution as it is understood in the terminology of the 
UN and their meaning understood by the English we find that the terminology of the UN 
uses restitution to denote both partial reparation by the offender and return of material 
goods. The "Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse 
of Power" adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1985, describes what we 
understand by restitution and compensation. According to point 8 "offenders or third parties 
responsible for the behaviour should, where appropriate, make fair restitution to victims, 
their families or dependants. Such restitution should include the return of property or 
payment for the harm or loss suffered, reimbursement of expenses incurred as a result 
of the victimization, the provision of services and restoration of rights". 
According to point 12 "when compensation is not fully available from the offender 
or other sources, States should endeavour to provide financial compensation to 
a) Victims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical or 
mental health as a result of serious crimes; 
b) The family, in particular dependants of persons who have died or become physically 
or mentally incapacitated as a result of such victimization." 
In documents of the Council of Europe we can read about restitution or compensation 
(or both) by the offender on the one hand and about compensation by the State. In 
connection with the above the Council of Europe stated that the compensation paid by 
the offender to the victim includes everything that is meant by restitution in the American 
terminology. The recommendation, which was accepted by the Committee of Ministers 
of Member States of the Council of Europe on 28 June 1985, on the position of the victim 
in the framework of criminal law and procedure contains some instructions which are worth 
following. Resolution No. 77 (27) was formed to provide compensation to victims of crimes, 
mainly intentional assault, and the dependants of persons who have died as a result of 
victimization and altering and supplementing the European Convention on the Compensation 
of Victims of Violent Crimes was brought in 1983. Both comprise regulations on 
compensation by the State. The twofold character of the difference in meaning of the terms 
above is significant. On the one hand who is the obligant—the offender, a third party, or 
the State—and who is the recipient of the compensation or restitution and, on the other 
hand, what is the sphere of authority of the legal title? The contradictory usage of the 
terminology in other countries has not resulted in a unified Hungarian translation. Further 
on we wish to stick to the terminology used by the UN, see above. 
6 A Titkárság A/CONF. 121/6. sz. munkaokmánya — Az Egyesült Nemzetek hetedik bűnmegelőzési 
kongresszusa, Milánó, 1985. (Report of the United Nations Secretary No. A/CONF. 121/6—the Seventh Congress, 
Milan 1985) Ed.: Szük, László, Igazságügyi Minisztérium 18. sz. tanulmánykötete, 1986, p. 125. 
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2. There are different methods for restitution of the losses caused by an offender of 
a crime in different countries. Concerning the enforcement of the victims rights for civil 
law claim in the criminal procedure two terms are frequently used: "partie civile" and 
the adhesive procedure. The former one is significant in France and countries under French 
influence. The latter one is known in Germany and in countries under German influence, 
i.e. in Hungary.7 
2.1. Before drawing up the general characteristics of the adhesive procedure in criminal 
procedural law in Hungary we wish to mention that there are different possibilities for 
restitution of the losses caused by an offender in criminal substantive law: 
— The returns of losses can be a mitigating factor in judicial practice when imposing 
punishment for committing crime against property. The returns of the major part of the 
losses can also be a mitigating factor. 
— Active repentance is also a familiar term concerning crime against property. It 
means that the punishment may be unrestrictedly mitigated, in a case deserving special 
consideration it may even be waived, where the perpetrator of theft, embezzlement, 
fraud, malversation, wilful damaging, receiving goods unlawfully acquired, unlawful 
appropriation or arbitrary taking away of a vehicle, reports the act before it is discovered 
to the authority or to the injured person and compensates for the damage or does his 
best that can be expected from him in order to repair the prejudice (Criminal Code 
332 §). 
— In case of rape and indecent assault where the perpetrator and the injured person 
contract marriage prior to the pass ing of the sentence of first instance, the punishment 
may be mitigated without restriction (Criminal Code 197 § and 198 §). 
— In the case of exoneration by court decision special attention is paid to the 
offenders meritoriousness which means that it is taken into consideration if the convicted 
has, in accordance with his means , repaired the prejudice (Criminal Code 103 §). 
2.2. In Hungary the criminal procedural law includes the rules of enforcement of 
civil law claims in criminal procedure (the rules of adhesive procedure). In connection 
with this we wish to write about the person entit led to and the obligee of the civil law 
claims first and the idea of civil law claim second. W e wish to emphasize in connection 
with the person entitled to civil law claim that in the criminal procedure in Hungary 
the injured party can be the plaintiff , the private prosecutor, the private party in a 
criminal procedure and can be examined as a witness as well. The private party shall 
be the injured party who wants to enforce a civil law claim in criminal procedure 
[Criminal Procedural Code 55 § (1)]. Besides the enforcement right of civil law claim 
the private party can, of course, exercise the r ights which are due to the injured. 
Although a pr ivate party is always an injured party as well the circle of private parties 
is narrower than that of the injured so not every injured is a private party. The injured 
7 KILLIAS, M.: Victim-Related Alternatives to the Criminal Justice System: Compensation Restitution, and 
Mediation. In: Günther Kaiser and Hans-Jörg Albrecht: Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe. Proceedings of 
the II. European Colloquium, pp. 249-251. 
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is a natural person or legal entity whose rights or lawful interests have been violated 
or jeopardized by the criminal offence [Criminal Procedural Code 53 § (1)]. 
Without such violation of rights or l awfu l interests no enforcement of civil law 
claim can be spoken of. This does not, however , mean that any possibility of violation 
can be repaired by a case of civil law claim. It is only poss ible to enforce a civil law 
claim "which has arisen owing to the criminal offence or the petty of fence adjudged 
by the court" [Criminal Procedural Code 55 § (2)]. In the event of the decease of the 
injured party, his heir may appear as private party [Criminal Procedural Code 55 § 
(5)]. According to the criminal procedural law the procurator has the right, independently 
from the injured, to enforce the civil law claim of the injured [Criminal Procedural 
Code 55 § (4)]. 
In relation to the persons obliged to pay civil law claim, in the criminal procedure 
civil law claim can be enforced only against the offender [Criminal Procedural Code 
55 § (2)]. The fact that civil law claim is being enforced against the o f fende r in the 
criminal procedure may not restrict the offenders legal rights. 
The offender when there is a civil law claim enforced against him in the criminal 
procedure is in the situation of the defendant in a civil procedure but he has less rights 
than the defendant in a civil case. 
In criminal procedures civil law claims are usually enforced against the offender 
of crimes causing damage (the offender, a party to the crime, the instigator or the 
accomplice) but the enforcement of civil law claims is not impossible against the offender 
of incidental crime concerning the basic crime causing damage like abetment or receiving 
unlawfully acquired goods. In case of more than one offenders if they caused the damage 
together the rules of responsibility of civil law must be administered, i.e. their respon-
sibility towards the injured is corporate and it is proportional to the attributability of 
their behaviour among them [Civil Code 344 § (1)]. 
What refers to the notion of civil law claim "the private party may enforce the civil 
law claim against the accused which has arisen owing to the criminal offence or the petty 
offence adjudged by the court" [Criminal Procedural Code 55 § (2)]. 
This legal conception raises several questions. First the question of connexion and 
this claim should be enforced by law. Civil law claims may not be restricted to civil law 
only as they may issue from other legal area. (E.g. labour law claim for repairing the 
prejudice caused by crime concerning employment.) Civil law claims are generally contract-
law claims namely claims for indemnification (compensation) as crimes usually involve 
damages (injuries). In legal practice adhesive cases are cases in the course of which claims 
for indemnification (compensation) are enforced. 
As in the adhesive procedure both criminal law claims and civil law claims are decided 
by the court in the same procedure. The administration of the two different rules of law 
proves difficult because criminal substantive law and civil material law differ from each 
other basically: 
— criminal responsibility is based on culpability while in civil law the guiltless 
responsibility for damage is also known, 
— criminal law is dominated by culpability and civil law is dominated by guiltiness, and 
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— it also makes the decision difficult that the sum of the indemnification (compensation) 
received in the enforcement of civil law claim in the adhesive procedure is often not 
equivalent to the value of the goods (theft, embezzlement) to the damage caused (fraud, 
wilful damaging) or the criminal concept of the pecuniary loss caused by the a i m e 
(malversation). 
This latter problem is based on the fact that the meaning of damage in criminal law 
is narrower than that of in civil law because it only includes the loss of value of property 
produced by the offence and not the lucrum cessans. Furthermore value and prejudice are 
also terms known in criminal law. 
It makes the judgement of adhesive claims even more complicated that not only two 
different rules of material law but two different rules of procedural law compete with each 
other so it is quite natural that the elements of criminal and civil law, material and 
procedural law mix. 
There is no denying that adhesive procedures have their advantages in aspects of 
economically and practicability of cases and also the interest of law that the injuries caused 
by crime be repaired as soon as possible. In the practice in Hungary this legal institution 
however, is not administered efficiently enough. Furthermore in case of a civil law claim 
the criminal court will pass a decision only if it has been applied for, a civil law claim 
cannot be judged automatically and the injured is never automatically asked to make a 
statement about a civil law claim. 
The provision of the Hungarian criminal law below may well illustrate the situation: 
if the determination of the civil law claim "would considerably delay the termination of 
the procedure the court shall in its decision determining the case, refer the enforcement 
of the civil law claim to settlement by other legal procedure" [Criminal Procedural Code 
215 § (1)]. 
3. The claim for the enforcement of compensation in the course of the criminal 
procedure remains a possibility in theory only for most of the victims of crime in Hungary. 
While the demand for compensation for damages caused by crime is increasing.8 This 
8 KAISER, G.: Kriminologie. Heidelberg 1988, 10. Kapitel: Verbrechensopfer, pp. 465^495; EXNER, Franz. 
Für den Verletzen. Festschrift für Karl Stoos. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 1929, pages 19-36; citea 
by KIRCHHOFF, G. F.: A viktimológia, emberi jogok és a büntető eljárás. In: Az emberi jogok és a büntető 
igazságszolgáltatás. XLIII. Nemzetközi Kriminológiai Konferencia, Miskolc 1991. augusztus 21-25; Miskolc 
1991 (Victimology, Human Rights and Criminal Procedure. In: XLIII. International Criminological Course on 
Human Rights and Criminal Justice, Miskolc, 21-25 August 1991; Miskolc 1991), p. 254; ARNOLD, 
H.—KÖRINEK, L.: Victimization, Attitudes towards Crime and Related Issues: Comparative Research Results 
from Hungary, in: Victims and Criminal Justice, edited by G. Kaiser, H. Kury, H.-J. Albrecht with the assistance 
o f H . Arnold, Volume 51, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Penal Law, Freiburg 1991, p. 114; 
KRATOCHWILL, F.: A bűncselekmények áldozatainak kártalanítása (Compensation for Crime Victims), 
Kriminológiai Közlemények, No. 38-39, p. 65; IRK, F.: A ma kriminológiájának aktuális kérdései (Current 
Questions of Criminology), Magyar Jog, No. 5, 1992, p. 262; RASKÓ, G .: A III. nemzetközi viktimológiai 
szimpozion (The III. Internationa] Victimological Symposium), Belügyi Szemle No. 2, 1980, p. 45; VÂG, A.: 
Rendőri-sértetti interakciók az átmeneti korszakban. (Police-Victim Interactions in the Interim Period), 
Kriminológiai Közlemények, No. 38-39, pp. 98-119. 
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deserves special attention during the criminal justice because significant changes can be 
experienced in the field of criminal policy (see above in the introduction). In many countries 
the transformation of the system of penal sanction is a frequent question on the agenda. 
The system based on fine and imprisonment could be improved by restitution enforcing 
the interests of victims.' 
Point 9 of the UN Declaration referred to above urges that "Governments should review 
their practices, regulations and laws to consider restitution as an available sentencing option 
in criminal cases in addition to other criminal sanctions". 
According to the Council of Europe "Legislation should provide that compensation 
may either be a penal sanction or a substitute for a penal sanction or be awarded in addition 
to a penal sanction". 
It may be worth mentioning here that criminal law of XLXth century in Hungary had 
a similar legal institution (V. of 1878.) as in cases of murder or homicide compensation 
for the dependants of the victim was automatically adjudged either in form of a capital 
or annuity. In cases of bodily assault it was possible, in accordance with the wish of the 
injured, to get reasonable compensation. The name of this was "Fine due to the injured".10 
In many countries the precondition of suspension of criminal procedure, probation and 
suspended sentence is the restitution for the injuries caused by the offender to the victim. 
Restitution by the offender is considered at the infliction of punishment, waiving of 
punishment, exoneration or when exercising the right of granting pardon. Its administration 
as a supplementary or rather as an independent sanction raises several questions concerning 
restitution and criminal law and system of criminal sanctions, and their connection with 
theories of punishment which seem to be the most important questions of international 
criminal policy today. 
Ilona Görgényi 
9 ESER, A.: A német büntetőjog százesztendős reformtörténete. Visszapillantás és a jövő útjai. A Legfelsőbb 
Bíróságon 1990. április 10-én tartott előadás. (The Hundred Year Reform History in the German Criminal Law. 
Review and the Way of Future. Paper presented in the Hungarian Supreme Court on 10. April 1990), Translated 
by Györgyi, К. Magyar Jog No. 9, 1990, p. 788. 
10 ANGYAL, P.: Az ember élete elleni bűncselekmények és a párviadal. A magyar büntetőjog kézikönyve 
(Crimes Against Human Life. Handbook of Hungarian Criminal Law), Volume II, Budapest 1928, pp. 30-31, 
46; KAUTZ, G.: A magyar büntetőjog tankönyve (Text-book of the Hungarian Criminal Law) Budapest 1881. 
p. 336. 
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István Werbőczy and his Work 
István Werbőczy was one of the outstanding jurists and key figurers of the political life 
in Hungary during the 16th century. His work and activity were presented at the Conference 
organised by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University and the 
Hungarian Jurists Association held in the Aula Magna of the University on the 26th of 
April 1993. 
The main aim the symposium was to illustrate the divergent Werbőczy image through 
the interpretations of prominent scholars. The Tripartitum, a draft bill by Werbőczy was 
the embodiment of the Hungarian Holy Crown doctrine and this work was one of the best-
sellers of the Hungarian intellectuals between the 17th and the 19th centuries. 
The first lecturer at the conference was Professor András Kubinyi, who depicted 
Werbőczy's political career. Lacking the sources, it is very difficult to show and judge 
the historic facts—that is why scholars studying Werbőczy's political life-work before 1526 
have to face many obstacles. 
István Werbőczy studied at the University of Cracow in 1492, and in this year he 
became a clerk of the King's Court, then he was Prothonotary and Chief Justice, representing 
the King in the Highest Court Werbőczy was adopted by Mihály Szobi, the political leader 
of the lesser nobility who helped his adoptive son. Werbőczy, who was pushed into the 
political background, achieved a fairly good reputation, for while he was doing his official 
duty the Hungarian nobility from all over the country got to know him. After Mihály Szobi's 
retirement Werbőczy became one of the leaders of the nobility in 1526. Unfortunately after 
his election as Palatine he could not cope with this position and it meant his defeat. 
The next lecturer was Chief Archivist Géza Érszegi, who spoke about the operation 
of the Office of the Chief Justice. The nobility demanded qualified persons for the position 
of Personalis. Although this status was often fulfilled by bishops, the nobility appointed 
secular jurists to carry out the task of representing the king in the Highest Court. 
István Werbőczy was personalis praesentiae locum tenens between 1516 and 1525. 
Two prothonotaries and several clerks assisted him in this office. The prothonotaries dealt 
with the easy everyday issues, therefore Werbőczy had the time and the opportunity to 
take part in political and international diplomatic life. Werbőczy's important political work 
did not leave him much time to carry out his official duty as Chief Justice. 
Professor Gábor Barta gave a lecture on Werbőczy's activity after 1526. He spoke 
about the political situation in Hungary after the defeat at Mohács and we could follow 
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the career of a member of the lower nobility from its beginning to its fall. Werbőczy could 
get hold of his illustrious positions through his important supporters; he became a Personalis 
with Szobi's help and János Szapolyai, Transylvanian voivode, helped him to become a 
Palatine. He became a Chancellor after Szapolyai had been elected King. 
Werbőczy coped very well with the problems deriving from his position, in fact, using 
his diplomatic fits he served his country well. Unfortunately as a politician he did not always 
manage to make the best decisions. This led to his failure when the Turks occupied Buda 
in 1541. 
Professor Gábor Hamza analysed the Tripartitum as a source of law. He evaluated 
and analysed Werbóczy's oeuvre from a legal aspect We may say that the Tripartitum 
cannot be called lex, as it was not sanctioned due to political fights, nor was it promulgated. 
On the other hand it was of extreme significance. Several Hungarian jurists, like Imre 
Kelemen, Sándor Kövy, Pál Szlemenics regarded it as law. Professor Gábor Hamza 
emphasised that the Tripartitum was considered as a source of law according to A c t XLI 
of 1518. It can be placed on the field of unwritten law and as consuetudo it was obligatory 
for the judicial practice. Beyond doubt the Tripartitum was not a formal act, still its 
significance stood on the same level with acts in the hierarchy of sources of law. 
György Székely, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, dealt with the legal 
position of the town Buda. In this presentation he mentioned the antagonism deriving from 
the composition of the population such as the legal evaluation of strifes arising between 
noble men and citizens on the one hand and Christians and Jews on the other. Professor 
Székely expounded that citizens were judged as noble people from many aspects such as 
their homage, but the equal treatment did not spread over all fields of life. 
Ferenc Szakdly, head of the department of the Historical Institute of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences dealt with the position of Hungarian lawmaking after the defeat at 
Mohács. As the.country had fallen into three parts, the integrity of Hungarian law seemed 
to fall into pieces because of political conditions, but this was averted as the Tripartitum 
was a general source of law accepted in each part of the country. 
Until the end of the 17th century the Diet, both in Hungary and in Transylvania made 
efforts to restrict the Turks' freedom in lawmaking. The purpose of the Diet was to let 
Turks make legal rules only in cases that could not be averted or were irrelevant to 
Hungarians. 
Professor Szakály pointed out that among the tasks regulated by the Transylvanian 
and Hungarian Diet, the regulation of the territories under enemy rule was not special 
because the legal norms made by legislators could be effective. 
Professor Péter Erdő, canonist, studied the extend wording of the diocese synods, thus 
defining the genre of the synodial book. In his lecture he expounded that the resolutions 
of the diocesan council of Esztergom in 1382 corresponded to the new resolutions of liber 
synodalis worked out by Spanish researchers. Talking about the liber synodalis of Esztergom 
he mentioned that a synodial book of southern France served as its primary source. The 
fact that the author of the book of Esztergom used indirect sources as a base for writing 
could explain it. On the other hand Professor Erdő emphasized that the original French 
wording can be found in mediaeval Spanish synodial books. 
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The next lecturer, Professor Wilhelm Brauneder of the University of Vienna, dealt 
with the effects of Werbőczy's activity in Austria. 
It is well known that the Tripartitum was published in Austria and that the Habsburg 
rulers were interested in Hungary. This is why studying Hungarian law was of great 
importance in Austria. At that time the Tripartitum was the most important part of the 
Hungarian law. The Tripartitum is based on Roman law—that is why it is an important 
step in the devèlopment of European law, and explains the interest of Austrian legal scholars. 
Brauneder emphasised that the research of the Tripartitum did not serve then current political 
interests since the Habsburg rulers did not want to expand the Austrian legal system to 
Hungary. 
Assistant Professor Andrea Lengyel studied the influence of Roman law on the 
Tripartitum, especially on procedure and property law. In her lecture she described parts 
that were received word for word or by their contents. She pointed out that the Institutes 
of Justinian were used as a basis for the source of the compilation of Tripartitum, which 
is proved by the verbal and abstract transcription. The literal quotations can be found mostly 
in the Prologus where Werbőczy summarised the significant sources and interpreted them 
in his own composition by the model of glossators. 
The divergent features of the legal practice restricted the effects of Roman law in the 
Tripartitum, therefore, where they were inconsistent, Werbőczy complied the Tripartitum 
in compliance with the interests of the nobility. 
Associate Professor András Földi gave a lecture on the impact of Roman law on the 
Tripartitum in the fields of personal and family law. He emphasised that one of the main 
reasons for reception of some Roman law elements was to fill the gaps of the customary 
Hungarian law. 
The lecturer showed a number of notions and institutions of Roman law which can 
be found in the Tripartitum, referring to the modifications and transformations as well. 
We find in the Tripartitum, for example the notions of persona sui juris and that of 
agnatio, but Werbőczy's conceptions are not entirely in accordance with Roman law. 
Speaking about the women's position, András Földi stated that the rules of the 
Tripartitum were more disadvantageous than those of ancient Roman Law and even the 
moral aspect was more unfavourable at that time in Hungary. 
Furthermore he compared the regulation of patria potestas and adoption stating that 
there are many similarities in this respect with the Roman law. 
Assistant Professor Adam Tóth in connection with tutela studied the tutelage of minors 
in a comparative way. The lecturer established that Werbőczy preferred the regulation of 
Roman law to European regulation of the Middle Ages that can be noticed in connection 
with the matter of official guardianship. Using the rules of the lex Plaetoria in connection 
with the persons deceiving minors in the Tripartitum shows even more similarities. 
Ádám Tóth concluded his lecture by emphasing the powerful effects of Roman law on 
the Tripartitum that was utilized by intermediate sources such as Summa Legum Raymundi. 
Professor János Zlinszky expounded István Werbőczy's thesis about sources of law. 
The law in force, ius commune, derived from sources enforced by the ordinary courts of 
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Hungary. The consuetude consisted of three elements: royal permissions sanctioned by 
the feudal assembly; general royal privileges; and judicial custom. Consequently, judicial 
custom was one of the most important determinative factors of the law in force because 
it had to be in conformity with the acts and orders, but tacidy it could set aside in certain 
decrees so that judicial custom was not consistently used. Regarding the privileges we 
may talk about a particular law that was effective only in some certain places. Only the 
Diet was empowered to repeal privileges based upon local law. 
Professor Zlinszky emphasised that Werbőczy took only the laws in force in Hungary 
into consideration during the compilation of his work, and therefore Werbőczy left the 
ius commune adopted by courts out of consideration. 
The Tripartitum was primarily a bill that came to the jurists in an informal way and 
became the only general work on domestic law that defended the interests of the nobility 
against the influence of ius commune. 
Professor Pál Horváth dealt with Werbőczy's work from the viewpoint of historiography. 
It is an unfortunate fact that the first scientific study about Werbőczy was written by Kadlec 
because of the political influence on national science. 
By the influence of the liberal political tendency Werbőczy became a negative 
propagandist of the medieval law and the value of his work was examined from this aspect. 
But Ferenc Eckhart studied the Tripartitum in an objective way and emphasised its 
scientific and educational significance. He found it important that this work was a guide 
not only for the national jurists but that it had a significant role in the unity of Hungarian 
law as well. Werbőczy's Tripartitum was a founder of the Holy Crown doctrine and 
therefore it had influence not only on the field of legal history but on the field of politics 
as well, which predestined the evaluation of Werbőczy's work. 
The conference raised many new questions about the understanding of Werbőczy's 
image from an objective aspect. The questions expounded by the lecturers of the symposium 
gave new perspectives to the interdisciplinary research of Werbőczy's life and works. 
István SÁNDOR 
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From the end of the eighties profound 
and comprehensive changes took place in 
the fields of arms control and disarmament. 
In the course of the last years virtually 
more significant changes happened than 
since the Second World War, in the last 
three decades. In 1987 the two super powers 
agreed on the dismantling of short and 
middle-range missiles in Europe, then agreed 
on the reduction of conventional weapons in 
Europe (1990), there is an agreement about 
the comprehensive ban of chemical weapons 
altogether (1993). 
Despite all these achievements the 
disarmament until today did not produce a 
real breakthrough. Nowadays the super 
powers possess thousands of lethal nuclear 
arms, although these weapons are not directed 
against each other any more. However, the 
nuclear arsenal of China grows rapidly, the 
expansive politics of the fundamentalist 
Islamic states becomes more and more 
threatening, in their "arsenal" appears more 
and more the black mail with different 
weapons. The workout of international law 
norms aiming the control of mass destruction 
weapons happen in a rather slow pace indeed 
despite all those promising signs, which mean 
the prevalence of peaceful debates, dis-
cussions in the international politics against 
the violence and the aggression promoted by 
the arguments of arms. This volume contains 
the essays of outstanding international law 
experts in three main parts, namely the part 
dealing with the mode of control and compe-
tence, the part containing the settlement of 
disputes and the settlement of arms control 
disputes, moreover the part dealing with the 
subjects of arms' control debates. 
Already the Introduction emphasizes that 
the international law is one of the most 
interactive and universal intellectual achieve-
ments, which can create the conditions for 
the further evolution in this field. Considering 
all these facts it is understandable that the last 
decade of this century is declared to be the 
Decade of International Disarmament, in the 
same time the Decade of International Law 
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too. Furthermore it can be understood that 
the UN which was condemned to failure in 
this aspect too for decades, although its 
Charter referred to this duty already before 
50 years, now finally became suitable for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
promoting the agreements. 
The first essay presents the diverse 
aspects of the application of control on the 
spot. It mentions that the two super powers 
already agreed on the technical means and 
apparatus of the arms control in 1972 and 
promised not to hinder in any way the 
continuation of this supervision, the change 
of data concerning the numbers, localities and 
technical characteristics. The comprehensive 
and detailed analysis of these data requires 
the contribution of an extensive expert staff 
in this control activity. The paper shortly 
deals with the early forms of on-the-spot 
control and the contemporary models of 
control, mentioning those possibilities too, 
which can be available in the future for the 
international on-the-spot control. It especially 
deals with the ad hoc agreements, which in 
line with the norms of international law 
frequently led to the significant betterment 
of international relations. First of all it men-
tions the ad hoc visits of the American and 
Soviet parties to each others' installations in 
order to clear out such situations, which can 
be misunderstood. For example they have 
visited radar stations, submarine bases at the 
end of the eighties on the soil of each other. 
Although the on-the-spot control cannot be 
taken as a universal panacea for all troubles, 
it proved to be an effective tool of controlling 
the adherence to the complex agreements 
during the last years. The next paper deals 
with the diverse aspects of weapon export 
within the countries of the European Com-
munity. It stresses that due to the technical 
progress in the chemical and electronic field 
it is very difficult to make distinction 
between the usage of military and civil 
application of technologies, which makes the 
supervision almost impossible. Today it could 
be achieved, however, in the framework of 
Europen political cooperation the "necessity 
of the more close cooperation of the parties" 
is recognized. In December 1990 the repre-
sentatives of the EU member states declared 
that the role of the European Union should 
be extended to the different fields of common 
security, namely regarding those questions, 
which are disputed in the international fori, 
as the arms control, the economic and 
technical cooperation in the field of arms 
industry. Considering the basic principles 
hardly any counterargument appeared, but in 
the achievement and practical implementation 
of the aims the cooperation is much more 
difficult The essay mentions that the first 
consequence of the fully harmonized Com-
munity arms export policy would be the 
constant highest level control of every 
member state. As the concerned concrete 
solutions will wait until the distant future as 
the European system of any export control 
for the dual use goods and military equipment 
requires the strengthening and harmonisation 
of the domestic implementation of supervi-
sion. The European integration process is 
clearly not yet reached this phase. Such 
European legal regulation is not accepted yet, 
which would harmonize the domestic law 
concerning the sanctions. Recently the gravity 
and nature of sanctions is very different in 
the European Community states. The workout 
and acceptance of a universal sanction system 
would transform the illegal export unecon-
omic and fruitless altogether. The essay 
presents the judgements of the European 
Court regarding the export of dual use goods 
and weapons. The paper closes with the final 
pessimistic conclusion that due to the lack 
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of the necessary legislative steps the pressure 
of the market is too strong for anything to 
block the export of arms. 
An outstanding Japanese scholar wrote the 
following essay on the role of transparency 
in the arms control disputes. He examines the 
results of several post-war disarmament talks. 
He quotes from the American-Soviet nuclear 
test ban agreement of 1963: 
"Each Party shall in exercising its national 
sovereignty have the right to withdrawal from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests 
of its country." 
The term "extraordinary events" in the 
clause in question can include the breach of 
treaty obligations by other parties as well as 
actions of non-parties which are contrary to 
the provisions of the treaty. In those cases 
the withdrawal from the treaty is regarded 
as a countermeasure. 
Almost three decades later Boutros-
Boutros Gali, the recent Secretary General 
of the UN presented his report under the 
title "An Agenda for Peace", which contains 
the action program of the peaceful era closing 
the times of world-wide confrontation. It is 
a series of such actions, which aim the pre-
sentation and promotion of structures which 
strengthen and solidify the peace and avoid 
the relapse into conflicts. The report by the 
Secretary General emphasizes: "Preventive 
diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before 
violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-
keeping are required to halt conflicts and 
preserve peace once it is attained." The dis-
armament initiatives, the development of 
international law obviously contributed to Lay 
the foundations of a peaceful world. Con-
sidering the annaments the UN makes efforts 
to receive objective infonnations on miliLary 
matters as they are prerequisites of avoiding 
disputes on military control or the solution 
of such disputes. The essay emphasizes the 
importance of openness, transparency, despite 
the fact that some countries are doing their 
utmost to reach the opposite goal. The so-
called Helsinki process, which made sig-
nificant steps for the confidence-building 
measures, including the change of relevant 
informations on military matters/military 
allocations, the placement of main weapon 
systems, naval manoeuvres, budgets. Even-
tually due to the tragic experiences in Bosnia 
the world organisation stresses more than 
ever the control of traffic of conventional 
weapons. The author of the paper emphasizes 
that several arms control agreement lacks the 
effective enforcement measures and tools, 
therefore applying the traditional means the 
agreement cannot be enforced and imposed 
at all. 
The next paper is also very interesting, 
it deals with the comparative analysis of 
arms reduction disputes. According to 
Raymond Aron, the outstanding scholar and 
analyst the armed intervention is a character-
istic feature of international relations even 
today. It is no doubt about that the objective 
matter of facts shows exactly this point 
However, in the last decades several coun-
tries have renounced the armed intervention 
as a tool of imposing its own intentions. The 
general definition of the International Court 
on the dispute can be accepted: "A dispute 
is a disagreement on the point of law or fact 
a conflict of legal views or interests between 
two persons." 
The paper analyses the recent state of 
acceptance and implementation of obligations 
viewing several important international agree-
ments on disarmament and arms control. It 
presents some agreements, which, however, 
for a limited geographic area implements the 
ban of certain weapons: e.g. the agreement 
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on placement of weapons in outer space, the 
demilitarisation of sea-bed treaty, the Antarc-
tica Treaty, etc. There is an agreement on the 
procedure of disarmament disputes, which 
eventually facilitates the substantial progress 
in the debate. In the same time it does not 
miss to mention that several, newly estab-
lished states—due to their lack of political 
stability and reliability-may create such a 
situation, where the respect of disarmament 
agreements could be pushed aside. By all 
means the solution of disputes should be tried 
by both diplomatic and legal means. 
The paper dealing with the control 
mechanisms and the solution of disputes is 
worth of attention by all means. It presents 
in details the problem of verification of arms 
limitation and arms control agreements, the 
possibilities and results of international 
supervision. It points out that until the pre-
war years the question of control of the 
implementation did not raise too much 
attention. By the intensification of interna-
tional relations in the diverse spheres of 
political, economic, technological, social and 
cultural life this control became a substantial 
element during the past decades. Among such 
circumstances the control function became 
such a specific task that it could be hardly 
combined with the general diplomatic activ-
ities. Meanwhile in these days the regulation 
of arms limitation became very dynamic 
matter too. It is not possible to place the 
international arms control themes to a legal 
system without the extensive and practical 
interpretation of the doctrine of international 
control, the plans for construction and 
development of control mechanisms. The 
essay surveys the modes of control related 
to several concrete arms limitation agreement. 
It mentions the notion that eventually the 
economic models can give an example to 
follow in the field of arms control too. 
The paper of Felix C. Calderon is about 
avoiding the applications of arms in the 
international conflicts. It points out that the 
collapse of communism and the latest changes 
of the European political theatre created 
special conditions for the further reduction of 
armament, the reliable arms control. By the 
elimination of ideological confrontation and 
rivalry the super powers also see a chance to 
eliminate significant part of their "overkill" 
capacity, in order to accomplish security at 
the possible lowest level of armament. 
The last essay of the volume is written 
by two Japanese experts about the problems 
of nuclear arms at the countries which were 
established on the soil of the former Soviet 
Union. They mention that recently the 
number one danger source of the world is 
the lack of control of those nuclear weapons 
which are spread around the land area of the 
vast spaces of the former empire. The atomic 
arsenal of the Soviet armed forces can be 
found mainly in the area of three countries: 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In these 
countries the danger of "instant proliferation" 
exists, namely hundreds of these lethal 
weapons capable to destroy millions can fall 
in the hands of politically irresponsible 
elements. Actually these new states do not 
even belong to the competence of the world-
wide international agreements blocking the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, it depends 
entirely on them whether they accept the 
regulations of these agreements or they 
transform these weapons to be the tools of 
their armed expansion somewhere. It is 
obvious that the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union increased the number of de facto 
nuclear powers and indirectly encourage 
such countries which not yet possess nuclear 
arms to produce such weapons as soon as 
possible (eventually this is the case in Iran 
too, which intends to build nuclear plant 
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with the help of Russian technology). How-
ever, after the collapse of the empire talks 
started among the successor states to keep 
these mass destruction weapons under one 
command and control. Ukraine obliged her-
self to destroy the nuclear weapons in her 
possession, but the other successor states did 
not take at the beginning such obligation. 
Finally even these countries agreed that in 
the framework of the START Treaty they 
renounce their nuclear weapons, although 
they did not mention explicitly when this 
will take place. Due to the encouragement 
of the Western powers at the end of 1992 
the European Community, the United States 
and Russian Federation, and Japan accepted 
such an agreement, which aims to establish 
an international scientific and technological 
centre, which will coordinate the nuclear 
research programmes of the former Soviet 
empire. 
This interesting and significant volume 
is supplemented by the short curriculum 
vitae of the authors. Every such researcher 
can use well this volume, who deals with 
international public law matters, particularly 
the problems of arms control and arms 
reduction problems. 
Miklós UDVAROS 
Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai Évkönyv 1994 
The National Institute for Criminology 
and Criminalistics publishes an annual 
volume of studies which contains reports on 
completed research projects or the results 
of researches in progress. The 31st volume 
of these annuals was published in 1994 
(Kriminológiai és Kriminalisztikai Év-
könyv, 1994—Yearbook of Criminology and 
Criminalistics, 1994—Ikva, Budapest, 1994. 
256 pages). Corresponding with the Insti-
tute's field of research it contains studies 
in the field of criminal justice, criminal 
procedure, criminology and criminalistics. 
Short summaries of the studies: 
Géza Gosztonyi—Dr. Klára Kerezsi: 
Crime Preventive Role of the Family Assis-
tance Centres and the Probation Services. 
The study describes the activity of the Family 
Assistance Centres and the Probation Services 
within the theoretical framework of primary, 
secondary and tertiary prevention system. It 
analyses the helping process and the ade-
quacy of these two types of services. The 
authors clarify the competency barrier 
between "multiplied care" and "inter agency 
co-operation". The survey is based on a 
questionnaire filled in at 21 Family Assis-
tance Centres. The findings show that these 
two types of services are not prepared to cope 
with criminal behaviour in a non-authoritarian 
way. According to the authors'view the co-
operation between these two types of services 
would become more intensive, if the special 
tasks became the responsibility of the proba-
tion officers and the generic tasks became the 
responsibility of the generic social workers 
at the Family Assistance Centres. The study 
analyses the recent and a possible share of 
roles represented by these services with the 
help of the following three dimensions: Time, 
Resource, Keyworker. According to the 
statement of the study the nonauthoritarian 
serving and helping type of activity is present 
only the very least degree in the present 
practice of dealing with the problems con-
cerning delinquency. 
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Dr. Mária Herczog: Correctional School 
and the Family. Based on a research, the 
author describes the structural and pro-
fessional contradictions which endanger the 
effectiveness of the institutionalised care for 
young offenders. She investigated in two 
special institution for young offenders the 
lack of information and connection of the 
family background and environment. 
Dr. Ilona Lévai: Criminal Procedure 
and the Prosecution—The "French Model" 
from the Hungarian point of view. Describ-
ing the new French Code of Criminal 
Procedure passed in 1992 this article 
reviews the role of the Prosecution in the 
criminal procedure as well as the position 
of the Prosecution in the system of the 
government organs. Writing about the rights 
and liabilities in the procedure the author 
compares the French Code with the prevail-
ing Hungarian law, analyses the advantages 
and disadvantages of the different regula-
tions and describes their theoretical and 
historical background, too. 
Dr. Anna Kiss: Reflections on the Role 
and Future of the Preliminary Procedure 
(In the mirror of the reformative proposals 
in Hungary, Germany and Austria). This 
article deals with the theoretical problems 
which determine the probable development 
of the first stage of the criminal procedure 
(the investigation as preliminary procedure). 
The author describes the role of the investi-
gation and the reaction of the two stages of 
the procedure to each other. 
Dr. László Tibor Nagy: Contributions 
to the Legal History of the Crimes Against 
Property in Hungary. This article gives a 
review on the legal history of the crimes 
against property which is the most signifi-
cant category in numbers. It describes from 
the age of the early feudalism the character-
istic ways of regulation of the royal edicts, 
the role of the unwritten law, the influence 
of István Werbőczy's Tripartitum, and the 
attempts of codification during the age of 
enlightenment. It gives an analysis of the 
system of the Code Csemegi, the first 
Hungarian penal code, and also of the 
socialist legislation with special respect to 
its most typical manifestation, the preference 
of the collective property. Writing about the 
prevailing law at the end it describes the 
role of the Constitutional Court after the 
political changes. 
József Kó—Dr. Iván Münnich: Analysis 
of the Effect of Violence Transmitted by 
Television, Tested in Two Criminologically 
Differently Infected Districts. The research 
tested the reactions of the inhabitants of 
Budapest's two criminologically differendy 
endangered (infected) districts living in the 
same microsocial environment, after watch-
ing a TV film containing violent scenes. 
Those living in the criminologically more 
infected part were not that sensitive to the 
shown violence, some of them identified 
themselves with one of the negative figures. 
It might be a warning signal that those 
living in this district are more likely to 
adopt the behaviour patterns of the films and 
use it in their everyday life. 
Dr. György Virág: Sex, Reality, Media 
(Sexual Violence in the Mass Media at the 
End of 1993). The paper describes the 
presentation of sexual violence in the media 
on the base of a three month survey includ-
ing all publications of the period about the 
subject. Its aim is to show how does the 
mass media reflect the problem at the end 
of 1993 in Hungary—what kind of images 
and beliefs it cultivates on it. After the 
analysis of the different indicators (resources 
of the new, information about the perpetra-
tor and the victim, the relation between the 
two, the effects of the crime, the titles, etc.) 
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the article summarizes the characteristics 
and consequences of the two typical way 
of presentation: the "sensationalism" and the 
"bagatellisation". 
Dr. Ágnes Kövér: Work in the Prison 
System. Historical Experiences and their 
International Comparison in the Mirror of 
the Present Hungarian Reformatory Efforts. 
The first pari of the paper reviews some 
important stages of the history of work in the 
prison in Hungary. The second part deals 
with the relating international rules and the 
practice of Austria, Germany, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, England and Wales, the 
United States, and Canada, respectively. At 
the end the author considers the historical and 
international experiences from the point of 
view of the reform of work in prison in 
Hungary. 
László Kristort—Klára Kriston: Contribu-
tions to the System of Soil Examination in the 
Police Science. II. The authors deal with the 
microscopic methods in this second part of 
the study. The paper discusses the exami-
nation of soil components and their character-
istics by stereomicroscopic and polarisation-
microscopic methods and the special forensic 
questions of examination and evaluation. 
László PUSZTAI 
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Akadémiai Kiadó, 
Budapest 
H U N G A R I A N L E G A L 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
1992. 2nd PART 
Edited by Katalin BALÁZS-VEREDY 
This bibliography contains legal works of Hungarian authors issued as monographs in Hungary 
between the 1st of January and the 30th of June 1992, material of periodicals (articles) and studies 
published in collective works. 
The material for the period 1945-1980 is resumed in the fol lowing publication: Bibliography of 
Hungarian legal literature, 1945-1980. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988. 429 p. 
The material published f r o m the 1st of January, 1981 is currently processed half-yearly in the Acta 
Juridica, beginning with Tomus 23, 1981. Nos 3 - 4 . 
Abbreviations of periodicals and other abbrevations see in the Acta Juridica Nos 1 - 2 of 1989. 
Periodicals processed in this bibliography: 
Acta Humana 6-9. sz. 1991. [1992.]; ÁJ 1 - Í . sz. 1991. [1992.]; AJurid. 1-2. sz. 1991. [1992.]; JK 
7-12/1992. ; MJ 7-12/1992.; MKözigazg. 7-12/1992. ; MTud. 7 -12 /1992 . ; TSZ 7-12/1992. ; Valóság 
7-12/992. 
Collective works processed in this bibliography and their abbreviations: 
Annales Bp. Tomus 32. 1991. = Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiniensis de Rolando 
Eötvös nominatae. Sectio iuridica. Tomus 32. 1991. Bp. ELTE [mimeogr.] 1991. [1992.] 206, [2] p. 
Cséka-emlékkönyv. 1992. = Emlékkönyv Cséka Ervin egyetemi tanár születésének 70. és oktatói 
munkásságának 25. évfordulójára. Szerk. Tóth Károly. [Memorial volume commemorating the 70th 
birthday and the 25th anniversary of teaching activity of Prof. Ervin Cséka.] Szeged, JATEPress, 1992. 
643, [2] p. /Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nominatae. Acta juridica et politica. Tomus 
41. Fasc. 1 - 4 0 . / 
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Jogászgyűlés. 1992. = Magyar jogászgyűlés. Siófok. 1992. ápr. 24-26. Szerk. Máthé Gábor. 
[Közzéteszi a] Magyar Jogász Egylet. [Meeting of Hungarian Lawyers at Siófok, April 24 to 26, 1992.) 
Bp. Bv Kei ny. 1992. 319 p. 
Kriminológiai közlem. 43. sz. 1992. = Ünnepi ülés Gödöny József professzor tiszteletére. 
Szerk. Kerezsi Klára. [Közzéteszi az] MTA Magyar Kriminológiai Társaság. [Memorial session 
honoring Professor József Gödöny.] Bp. Bv Kei ny. [mimeogr.] 1992. 69 p. /Kriminológiai közle-
mények 43./ 
Public administration in Hungary. 1991. = The reform of Hungarian administration. Collection of 
studies. — La réforme de l'administration publique en Hongrie. Collection des études. Ed. Takács Klára. 
[Puhl.] Hungarian Institute of Public Administration. Bp. s. p. 1991. [1992.] 226, [2] p. 
Public administration in Hungary. 1992. = Public administration in Hungary. Collection of studies. 
- Administration publique en Hongrie. Collection des études. Ed. Takács Klára. [Publ.] Hungarian 
Institute of Public Administration. Bp. s. p. 1992. 216 p. 
COLLECTED LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
A Magyar Országgyűlés jogalkotása. [Törvények, országgyűlési határozatok, országgyűlési ál-
lásfoglalások. Szöveg.] 2. [köt.] 1991. Szerk. biz. ein. Szabad György. Szerk. biz. Bánki 
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STUDIES 
Zoltán PÉTERI Constitution-Making in Hungary 
/ 
1. Constitution-making is an exceptional event in the history of a nation. It is usually 
resorted to whenever a sudden historical change occurs or, as has been aptly tenned in 
Hungary, at rare "moments of grace". It is therefore fully understandable that the 
adoption of a new constitution should attract high interest both within and beyond the 
national boundaries. In the case of Hungary such a spill-over of interest appears to be 
absolutely justified. As an after-effect not least of the revolution of 1956, Hungary 
succeeded, as early as the last years of the Kádár regime, in advancing considerably 
along the path of social and economic reforms, and in carrying out some reforms 
affecting the organization and functioning of the state. By the end of the 1980s, those 
gradual reforms had opened up real possibilities for a comprehensive and radical 
transformation of the entire political system as well. Both the ascendancy of the reformist 
wing within the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the activity of dissident forces 
partly within legal frameworks, contributed substantially to the success of this process. 
As far as foreign politics is concerned by opening its western frontiers and then initiating 
the abolition of the Warsaw pact, Hungary also made a significant contribution to the 
erosion and the final crumbling of the communist bloc in East-Central Europe. 
Continuing on its course of reform, Hungary virtually effected, within the frameworks 
of a bloodless revolution, a really revolutionary change, by thoroughly revising its 
constitutional order, instituting political pluralism and parliamentary democracy, and 
creating the frameworks of a law-governed state (Rechtsstaat). Among the plans of the 
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reformers the adoption of a new constitution played an important role from the very 
beginning of the new developments. In this respect, however, Hungary, like Poland, opted 
for slower progress. Although the first plans for enacting a new constitution had been 
devised already in the last years of the Kádár regime, and even the first text had been 
drafted, the course of events prevented the carrying out of these initiatives. This is why 
Hungary's preexisting constitution from the year 1949 is, at least formally, still in effect, 
albeit with essential amendments, whereas in the great majority of the neighbouring 
countries the fundamental political and social changes were rapidly followed by the 
adoption of new constitutions. 
Now it seems that constitution-making in Hungary has quickened its pace. The 
political forces that won the elections of 1994 and the new coalition government formed 
by them gave considerable weight in their programmes to adoption of a new constitution, 
and have taken concrete measures for its preparation. The Government has adopted a 
timetable for constitution-making, has taken steps for setting up the necessary institutional 
frameworks, and has requested the Institute for Legal and Administrative Sciences of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences to take care of the professional coordination of the 
efforts to lay the scientific foundation for a new constitution. According to preliminary 
plans, the adoption of the Constitution by the Parliament and its approval by a people's 
referendum may take place a not too distant future and possjbly in 1966. 
2. As is known, Hungary had no written constitution before the decisive changes in 1945, 
although the core of such a constitution, the endeavour to pose definite limitations on the 
exercise of power, was a centuries-old tradition in Hungarian public law. As a modem 
manifestation of related demands, Hungarian literature on public law gave expression 
already in the early decades of the 17th century, almost at the same time that the idea of 
the written constitution appeared in Western Europe, to the conviction that the king's 
power should be limited by basic laws. In the form of "essential rights, liberties and 
immunities", this same idea reappeared during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa of 
Hapsburg (1740-80) as a guarantee for national independence vis-à-vis the foreign 
monarch, and as a justification for the feudal privileges of the nobility (primarily the 
exemption from payment of taxes). 
The first appearance in Hungary of the modem concept of the constitution is usually 
dated from statutes passed by the Diet of 1790-91. Declaring Hungary as an independent 
country existing as a separate state inside the empire of the Hapsburgs with a constitution 
of its own, these statutes made cautious attempts to achieve fulfilment of the 
requirements connected with a constitutional State. In regulating the relationship between 
the legislative and the executive power (de legislativae et executivae potestatis exercitio), 
they reflected the traditional Hungarian convictions on the right of legislation. 
Consequently, this right was assigned jointly to the king crowned in accordance with the 
law of the country as well as in the feudal Diet, whereas the executive power should only 
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be exercised under the terms of the laws, and its decrees should concern only "matters 
covered by the law". The guarantees for the independence of judges were also provided 
for by the Diet of 1790-91. 
Under the concept of feudal constitutionalism thus evolved and enacted, Hungary was 
a monarchy which, limited by the rights of the Estates, rested on a whole series of so-
called basic laws. The Hungarian literature of public law kept in mind among them 
— the mythic Compact Sealed with Blood, allegedly made at the time of the 
Hungarian conquest (A.D. 896), vesting supreme power in Prince Álmos and his 
descendants, as a forerunner of the pact of union (pactum unionis) and the pact of 
subjection (pactum subiectionisf, 
— the Golden Bull of King Andreas II (1222), like the English Magna Carta of 
barely 7 years before, essentially summarizing the privileges of nobility; 
— István Werbőczy's enormous work Tripartitum (Tripartitum Opus Iuris Con-
suetudinarii lnclyti Regni Hungáriáé), a compilation of Hungary's medieval customary 
law (1517) laying principal emphasis on the "essential" rights and privileges of the 
nobility, conceived as a whole (una eademque nobilitas)-, 
— the Peace Treaties of Vienna (1606) and Linz (1645) recognizing the freedom of 
religion for Protestants; 
— the statute relinquishing the freedom to elect a king and recognizing the right of 
the Hapsburg dynasty to succeed to the throne (1682), 
— the Pragmatica Sanctio (1723) extending succession to the female line of the 
Hapsburgs in Hungary; 
— the diplomas issued by the kings of Hungary at their coronation and recognizing 
the privileges of the Estates. 
Associated with the basic laws as the framework of the country's constitutional order 
was the Doctrine of the Holy Crown. As a specific tradition of Hungarian public law 
originating in the Middle Ages, a force independent of the person of the monarch and 
mythical in many respects, was attributed to the crown of St. Stephen (1000-1038), the 
first king of the country. Accordingly the Holy Crown is not only a coronation jewel or 
a more symbol of royal power, but also an expression of the fullness of national 
sovereignty. It establishes an organic unity (Corpus Sacrae Regni Coronae) between the 
duly crowned monarch and the privileged Estates, and as such constitutes the source of 
all laws of the land. 
3. The revolution of March 1848 destroyed the organization of the feudal state and 
started a series of constitutional reforms in Hungary that clearly pointed to a bourgeois 
democratic transformation. The resulting Statutes of March declared above all the 
freedom of religion and the press, as well as the equality of citizens before the law, 
which was underpinned by the abolition of serfdom and by the introduction of general 
and equal sharing in taxation. A National Assembly based on the principle of people's 
representation was elected with a new, Hungarian government responsible to it and 
independent of the imperial government in Vienna. Moreover, the National Assembly's 
decision of 4 April 1848, with the dethroning of the Hapsburg dynasty and with the 
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election of Lajos Kossuth as governing President of the country, anticipated the 
introduction of a republican form of government. However, with the fall of the revolution 
and the struggle for independence (1849), these ideas as well as the initiatives for the 
preparation of a new, written constitution, came to be stricken from the agenda. 
The most important achievements of bourgeois transformation materialized within the 
framework of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy established by the Act of Compromise of 
1867. Although the Compromise was based on the revolutionary enactments of 1848, its 
imperfections and gaps left room for the survival of numerous feudal institutions under 
the changed conditions. That was manifest in the emergence, around the turn of the 
century, of the concept of the Thousand Years' Constitution which served as a point of 
reference mainly for those who wanted to slow down the country's bourgeois democratic 
transformation by maintaining the institutions of feudal origin. Their complete abolition 
was announced practically at once by the bourgeois democratic revolution in the fall of 
1918 and the "people's republic" emerging in its wake. Subsequently the Hungarian 
Councils' Republic, established on the Soviet model in March 1919, wanted to place 
Hungary's constitutional development on an entirely new basis. In the first days of its 
existence the Councils's Republic initiated the establishment of a new state organization 
of the Soviet type and the adoption of a written constitution. Those initiatives were the 
result of an official decision of the General Meeting of the Councils passed on 23 June 
1919, adopting for the first time in national history a written constitution or charter. The 
defeat of the Councils' Republic shortly afterwards prevented the new constitution from 
becoming a reality of state life, and the subsequent counter-revolutionary government 
repealed all enactments of the Councils' Republic, including the constitution. 
The new National Assembly, deciding "on the restoration of constitutionality and on 
the provisional regulation of the exercise of supreme state power", pronounced itself in 
favour of legal continuity. The Assembly proceeded on the assumption that in his 
declaration of Eckartsau (13 November 1918), Charles IV, the last Hapsburg monarch, 
did not relinquish the throne, but merely retired from dealing with state affairs. As a 
consequence, the Assembly elected Admiral Miklós Horthy, one-time aide-de-camp of 
Emperor and King Franz Joseph, to be Regent of Hungary on a provisional basis, thereby 
leaving the door open to the return of the king. That fact was not altered by the National 
Assembly's decision repealing the earlier enactments on the succession to the throne of 
the Hapsburg dynasty. This decision spelled out the reversion to the nation of the right 
to elect a king, thus maintaining constitutional monarchy as a form of government 
("kingdom without king"). That "provisional" regulation ultimately survived for nearly 
a quarter of a century, until the collapse of the Horthy regime shortly before the close 
of World War II. 
4. The provisional devices of the postwar period were replaced by the Act on the 
Republic (Act I of 1946), which was adopted by the new National Assembly and, 
proceeding from the fact that "the exercise of royal power had discontinued in Hungary 
as of 13 November 1918" and that "the nation has regained its right to self-
determination", also legislatively terminated the provisional constitutional arrangement 
prevailing between the two world wars. On the analogy of the institution of presidency 
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as known to parliamentary republics, the Act emulated the legal status of the President 
of the Republic of Hungary, while clearly concentrating the totality of power in the 
National Assembly. 
In the elections of 1947, which were of questionable purity, the majority of votes was 
obtained by the National Independence Front led by the Hungarian Communist Party. The 
process of revamping the political system on the Soviet model, began at that time and 
the left-wing majority of Parliament allowed the programme of the Communist Party to 
be implemented by legislative means. Efforts were successfully undertaken to bring about 
the fusion of the two workers' parties, the Communist Party and the Social Democratic 
Party, under the name of the Hungarian Working People's Party on the basis of the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology (1948) as well as to oust from power and to destroy the 
opposition parties. Standing for national election in May 1949 were only candidates of 
the reorganized National Independence Front under the name of Patriotic Popular Front, 
who obtained the support of 91% of voters. On 5 August 1949 the Government 
published the draft of a new constitution, which was considered and unanimously adopted 
by the National Assembly at its session of 17-18 August. The new Constitution was 
promulgated as Act XX of 1949 in the official journal on 20 August of that year, i.e. on 
the day of St. Stephen, the first king of Hungary. 
Contrary to the practice of other countries in East-Central Europe, this constitution 
remained Hungary's basic law for decades. 'Hie reason for that was, according to 
contemporary Hungarian literature on constitutional law, that "whereas in the European 
people's democracies the fact on laying down foundations of socialism in a particular 
country was generally documented by the adoption of a new constitution, in Hungary 
there was no need for such enactment precisely because our Constitution of 1949 had 
been consciously adopted as a socialist one and therefore it was sufficient to insert 
general amendments in it in order to adjust certain of its provisions to the needs of 
development in socialist construction". There were several such "adjustments", of which 
the amendment by Act I of 1972 affected the entire text of the Constitution, while other 
amendments modified but a few provisions. Considering the fact that an entirely new 
constitution was envisaged already prior to the tum-over in 1989, they may be regarded 
as representing, in a certain sense, a "preliminary constitutional regulation" on some 
questions. In 1989 the Government, more responsive to the need for constitutional 
reforms, published a comprehensive text entitled "Regulatory Principles of Hungary's 
Constitution", which was later confirmed by the National Assembly. It was on that basis 
that the draft of a new written constitution was prepared, but its consideration and 
adoption by Parliament was caused by the quickening pace of events to lose relevancy. 
The rounds of negotiations which had started between the Govenunent and its Opposition 
in June 1989 ("National Round Table") came to a successful conclusion in September of 
that year. On the basis of the agreement reached, the National Assembly adopted by a 
large majority of votes the amendment to the Constitution as envisaged. 
Act XXXI of 1989, which entered into force on 23 October 1989, the anniversary 
day of the defeated revolution of 1956, is formally not more than an enactment amend-
ing the Constitution because it follows the structure of the Constitution of 1949. 
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Nevertheless, in terms of substance it may be seen as a virtually new constitution 
declaring as it does, by introducing a system of western democratic institutions, a state 
governed by the rule of law and a parliamentary form of government. In like manner, 
the basic laws regarding the Constitutional Court, political parties and elections were 
passed by Parliament on the basis of the agreement reached during the National Round 
Table-negotiations. 
All this was achieved within the framework of the current legal regulations relating 
to amendment both of the Constitution and of the so-called "two-thirds laws", enact-
ments subject to adoption by a qualified majority of votes, in observance of the 
procedural guarantees as laid down in the Constitution and other laws. So, there appears 
to be a ground for stating that in 1989 Hungary consummated a "constitutional 
revolution", i.e. the transformations which may be deemed to be revolutionary in 
substantive terms took place within the frameworks of the law in force. Like other 
"velvet revolutions" in East-Central Europe, that revolution could be held my many 
observers as a "contradictio in adiecto". Practically speaking, the revolutionary road 
usually rules out legality, as is evidenced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
revolutions known in history have attained their goals by rejecting the existing legality 
and counterposing a revolutionary legality to it. 
Ill 
5. The need for stability as a requirement placed upon comprehensive legislations, which 
has been accepted by democratic countries since the Napoleonic codification, applies to 
a greater extent to the constitution as a basic law. To cite Rousseau's conviction, a 
constitution "is carved, not in marble or ore, but in the hearts of citizens. This means 
the genuine constitution of a state and gains new strength from day to day. When laws 
become obsolete or outdated, they are revived or replaced by this general feeling 
upholding the spirit of constitutionalism in the people and imperceptibly putting the 
force of habit in the place of public power". For this very reason, a statement of this 
order is always a highly responsible enterprise usually undertaken in times of great turns 
in the history of a nation. 
As started above, the development of Hungarian constitutionalism can likewise be 
associated with such turning points in our history. The valid Constitution of the country 
which came into being after the decisive political tum of 1947^18, is no exception to 
this general rule. This Constitution, as was clearly stated in contemporary literature, 
followed the example of the Soviet Union's Constitution of 1936 connected with die 
name of Stalin. Accordingly, "it is virtually the first document of the new Hungarian 
public law, which diverges even formally from the "historical" constitution and 
introduces into the Hungarian legal system the idea and practice of a charter, i.e. a 
written basic law. In addition, it creates, in terms of substance, an entirely new system 
of constitutionalism. By breaking with the previous concepts and practices of the public 
law and rejecting bourgeois constitutionalism based on the separation of powers, it 
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creates new constitutional frameworks for the people's democratic state, i.e. the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The new Constitution of the Hungarian People's 
Republic... has a bearing not only on public law, but also on our entire legal system, on 
our entire legal life. The constitutions of the people's democratic countries, including 
Hungary,... determine the basic principles of our economic and social systems as well 
as their basic institutions. Consequently,... the different branches of our legal system 
will be governed by the basic principles as determined by the Constitution... Thus the 
Constitution will become a real basic law in the material sense of the term as well". 
Consequently, Hungary's constitution of 1949 made a radical break with the past in 
both substantive and fonnál aspects: on the one hand, it destroyed the earlier 
organization of the state burdened with feudal elements and, on the other, it dismissed 
finally the idea of "historical constitution". By comparison, the turn of 1989 produced 
radical changes only in substance: it effected constitutional reforms providing for the 
return to the path of Western European development, but it remained faithful to the idea 
and practice of a written constitution (charter), refusing the return to the ancient 
historical constitution of the country. In all fairness, however, one may assume that such 
an endeavour could not have counted on the support of the population either. The idea 
of a written constitution had struck deep roots in Hungarian public opinion over the past 
period of nearly 50 years and, for that matter, taking into account Hungary's present 
aspirations to become a member of a unified Europe, there is no raison d'être for 
emphasizing our national peculiarities as distinct from the constitutional model of 
Western Europe. 
6. Still, in setting about the task of drafting a new constitution one could hear 
repeatedly also the slogans of traditionalism in Hungary. Suggestions of this kind were 
made in support of a conservative-minded attitude as a sine qua non for a broad consensus, 
indispensable for constitution-making and for the legitimacy of a new constitution. This 
requirement, as an organic development of the constitutional regulation currently in force, 
may doubtless count on wide support. The postulate of "progress with reflection" has been 
a national tradition in Hungary since the time of Count István Széchenyi, a prominent 
reformer of the last century, known as the "greatest Hungarian". The new institutions 
representing a break with the previous political establishment have, for the most part, 
evolved gradually so that the new initiatives set in motion over the recent years for the 
sake of constitution-making could consistently be followed and strengthened after the 
turnover of 1989. In this sense it is really justified to speak of continuous evolution or 
of an organic development of the existing Constitution, to insist on continuity as the only 
reasonable path, and even to demand some sort of conservatism in this effort. The role 
and significance of traditions and continuity could be denied only by those who look 
upon our recent history as a symptom of discontinuity resulting from the tragic destiny 
of most East-Central European countries. They have been inclined to reject wholly or in 
majority of cases the issues of past history and, consequently, the very mention of 
continuity could be held by them as conceptual absurdity (contradictio in adiecto). 
At any rate, it would be difficult to question the continuity of evolution unfolding in 
recent years; moreover, one can speak of continuity of Hungarian traditions of public law 
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on a much broader horizon. In this meaning continuity can be dated from the years long 
before the turnover of 1989. In point of fact, the path taken in 1989 only rc-affirmed the 
demand for following the Western way of development opted for already in the years of 
the Hungarian State foundation but forcibly interrupted at later times. To this extent, the 
traditions of the country's public law framed on the Western model had their roots in a 
past of many centuries. In the words of István Bibó, Hungarian political scientist of this 
century, these traditions, even if "in a simpler texture and with a rustic character", 
followed the mainstream of Western European development, forming an integral part 
thereof, and this link was severed by unfortunate turns in our history, only transitorily. 
European democratic traditions can consistently be traced to the world of ideas 
governing Hungary's social progress, going on under often adverse circumstances. 
Following the Western development model and catching up with the West has been a 
leading idea recurring in Hungarian political and legal thought since the 1820s (the so-
called reform era), so much so that, as was stated, "it is no longer possible to take any 
course, to give it credit and to hold it without meeting European criteria". Considering 
the road Hungary is taking today to joining a unified Europe, these "European criteria" 
mean not only adopting certain time-honoured institutions in Western democracies, but 
also accepting a comprehensive set of values and a new attitude of mind as pre-requisites 
for a successful transplant of any institution adopted from foreign countries in order to 
function in a new environment. It has been a general experience that the political and 
legal institutions transplanted from one country to another do not live up to expectations 
without taking into consideration their appropriate social and ideological background. It 
can be stated, therefore, without any exaggeration that the new developments in our 
constitutional system, following the Western model, call for a comprehensive reform of 
our entire political and legal culture. 
7. The set of values and the institutions characteristic of advanced democracies in the 
West are clearly associated today with the concept of "State of law" (Rechtsstaat). This 
is the "Archimedean point" from which the political and legal realities of our day and the 
new developments can be evaluated. The Hungarian Constitution as amended has 
explicitly undertaken to meet the Western requirements by defining the Republic of 
Hungary as an independent, democratic "State of law" (Rechtsstaat). Nevertheless, as is 
evidenced by history, the meaning of this concept can in no way be regarded as being 
"objectively" established or a priori valid; on the contrary, it was and from time to time 
is in need of further interpretation. The concept of the "Rechtsstaat" falsely identified 
with order or an orderly state in general would, as has been pointed out by one of its 
ingenious critics, ultimately conjure up the order and repose of the cemetery insuring to 
the fullest the security of order, or, at the most, would mean a blank sheet of paper which 
may be used by anyone in pursuance of any goal. Behind the general acceptance, at least 
in words, of a law-govemed state as a great achievement in the development of a 
democratic society, one can find sometimes rather different and even diametrically 
opposed interpretations of it, moreover, the notion of the Rechtsstaat can serve as a cover 
for rather dubious political theories and practices (e.g. the concept of the "socialist 
Rechtsstaat"). Therefore, the clearing up the present-day meaning of the word 
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"Rechtsstaat" seems to be one of the pre-requisites for the success of the constitution-
making process under way in Hungary. 
Of course, such clarification serving to promote consensus concerning basic concepts 
cannot imply full coverage, in all their aspects, of scientific and practical approaches and 
also occasional abuses connected with the word "Rechtsstaat". The investigations in this 
field may be aiming at the elaboration, in Max Weber's footsteps, of a concept of an 
"ideal type" which, as an "ideal picture" of social phenomena and processes, can integrate 
"certain aspects and processes of historical life into a cosmos of conceived contexts that 
is free from contradictions in itself'. This "ideal type", which is based on a multitude of 
individual phenomena and implies a generalization thereof, is not to be encountered 
empirically in its notional purity anywhere in real life and, to this extent, is nothing more 
than a Utopia. Nevertheless, it may be of help to constitution-makers in taking a clearer 
view and making a more realistic assessment of the present and future tasks presented 
by the development of Hungarian society and state. 
IV 
8. Almost from the moment of its commencement in recent years, constitution-making 
in Hungary was faced with a number of problems to be solved. Some of these issues 
were of a political nature and required broad political consensus indispensable for 
framing a constitution. Other questions focused attention on apparently procedural and 
technical aspects related to legal arrangements for the adoption of a constitution. At the 
same time it was equally obvious that, in the last analysis, the answers to the latter 
questions were themselves dependent on political decisions, with particular emphasis on 
the fact that the government coalition has an assured majority of 72% in the National 
Assembly. This enables the coalition to bring decisive influence to bear not only on the 
substance of a new constitution, but also on the constitution-making process and the 
procedural rules governing it. On the other hand, it is a responsibility of the coalition 
parties, as is also reflected in pronouncements published in both the professional and the 
daily press, to bring about mutual trust among the participants in political life and, 
thereby achieving consensus between them on the major issues, to remove the very 
semblance of an eventually "imposed" constitution. 
The first question still in dispute has arisen in connection with the necessity of "hie 
et nunc" in constitution-making. There is more or less full agreement to the effect that 
a new constitution would complete the process started in recent years and would serve 
to stabilize the new political system. That is why the case for adoption of a new 
constitution was pressed, already in the period immediately following the turnover in 
1989, particularly by some political groups in and outside Hungary. These groups, afraid 
of a Communist re-establishment argued in favour of the enactment of an entirely new 
Constitution. This would definitely silence the voices of dissent against the old 
Constitution which, despite the amendments made in recent years, has had its origin in 
the "Stalinist" period. 
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Another argument in favour of constitution-making is based on the fact that the 
fulfilment of the conditions specified in the recently modified preamble to the 
Constitution in force—namely the transition to a Rechtsstaat characterized by a multi-
party system, parliamentary democracy and a social market economy—has laid the foun-
dation for further progress, toward adopting a new, stable constitution. Consequently, 
it is high time to pass a new, comprehensive regulation which could reconcile the 
provisions of the current Constitution adopted at different periods of time, integrating 
them into a coherent system. This is all the more necessary since the practice of the past 
decades as manifested in repeated amendments of the Constitution has produced 
ambiguous or inconsistent results: on the one hand, the text of the basic law was 
adjusted to the new requirements raised by historical changes, but, on the other, the 
amendments cut across the logical system of the constitution and sometimes resulted in 
controversies. Some of the new regulations need further interpretation or lack 
consistency with the full text of the Constitution; occasionally, by annulling former 
rules, they result in substantia] gaps and consequently, destabilization. There is no doubt 
that these considerations justify the broad political expectations for the early adoption 
of a new constitution. 
If, on the other hand, we proceed from the fact that the adoption of a new consti-
tution calls for a broad consensus, precisely in the interest of ensuring stability, there 
is a strong case against jumping into conclusions concerning a new constitution. It was 
rightly argued that the substantial changes in the country's political regime have been 
duly expressed in the amended text of the current Constitution, containing stipulations 
relating the democratic institutions known in the West, thus laying the constitutional 
foundations for the development of a Rechtsstaat meeting European standards. More-
over, it was argued that the new substance of a constitution is not dependent on formal 
factors, since a qualitative change—both regarding its basic concept and the institutional 
arrangements radically breaking with the earlier ones—can also be introduced by 
amendments to the existing constitution. 
A further argument against an early constitution-making is that there is no doubt 
about the legitimacy, viewed either normatively or, under Max Weber's approach 
sociologically, of the present constitutional order as established by previous enactments. 
The country has had the peaceful character of the transition, there is no constitutional 
crisis or emergency, nor any threat thereof, calling for immediate intervention, so there 
is no urgent pressure that could only be removed by speedy constitution-making. 
Therefore, should the question of constitution-making still be taken up, there is no, nor 
can there be any, obstacle of appropriate preparatory work within the framework of a 
politically and professionally well-considered and planned process. This has to take past 
experience into account in order to establish a proper balance between historical traditions 
and the country's present and future possibilities. This is naturally a time-consuming task, 
which could hardly be tackled to satisfaction within the time-frame set in the course of 
preliminary planning. It follows, therefore, that, once the need for a new constitution is 
generally accepted, it will be advisable for the constitution to be adopted as the result of 
a longer process of "maturing". 
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9. Reaching the consensus required for the adoption of a new constitution is, in point 
of fact, a crucial question of constitution-making, one on which there is no difference of 
opinion either. The new constitution should be drafted on the basis of a broad publicity 
and citizens' involvement, thus securing its legitimacy and, for the future, its stability. 
Such a consensus should ultimately be arrived at by the decision-makers, whether they 
be the National Assembly as the supreme organ of people's representation or a 
constituent assembly convened only for this purpose or the citizens themselves consulted 
by way of referendum. Of course, there may be and, indeed, there are differences in 
views concerning the chances of arriving at such a consensus. It is obvious to both inside 
and outside observers that a search for a full consensus on all questions of detail belongs 
to the realm of illusions rather than of political realities. Yet it is far from being a matter 
of indifference to the stability and future fate of the constitution in the making whether 
it is possible at all—and if it is, on how wide a social basis—to arrive at a "minimum" of 
consensus as a common denominator on at least the fundamental principles and value-
preferences of the socio-political system. 
As far as this "minimum" is concerned, some conceive of such consensus as one of 
the "whole people" placed on the widest footing. Others deem it necessary to obtain the 
agreement of all political forces playing a determinant role in national life. Still others 
insist on the need for the agreement of the political parties represented in Parliament 
There is also the view that a solid basis for a well-functioning constitutional order can 
only be laid by a consensus reached in the professional circles of a country, and that 
therefore the disputed issues concerning the constitution, inclusive of the conceptions 
about its fundamental principles and the different institutions should be agreed upon 
beforehand with competent jurists, political scientists and other experts in professional 
debates. Taking such a position may be supported by the argument that only 
representatives of a relatively narrow professional circle are able to grasp and appraise 
a constitutional model in its entirety, so Ihat the assumption that large masses of citizens 
can make a well-considered, independent decision on this issue must be held as a 
dangerous illusion, kept alive by mass media. Under such circumstances one can hardly 
believe that a political decision manifested in the adoption of a constitution will be truly 
reflective of the majority will. 
On the other hand, however, it is highly questionable whether an agreement obtained 
in professional circles would be really a decisive component of the consensus required 
for adoption of the constitution. Even if we disregard the numerical factor, namely the 
fact that representatives of the "profession" are themselves but a narrow group of the 
voters entitled to make a decision, the chances of their reaching a full consensus of 
opinion can at least be called into question. As history provides for conclusive evidence 
on a diversity of approaches and views existing in professional circles, full consensus—in 
the form of accepted scientific paradigms—cannot be imagined except with respect to 
certain points of departure or scientific terms at best. So what remains for experts to do 
is to offer options, which does not, of course, rule out the possibility of their active 
participation in elaborating both a preliminary and then a final concept of regulation 
reflecting a majority view on the constitution. 
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A broad social consensus about a new constitution is likely to be reached mainly 
with respect to such fundamental principles of the political system, as democracy, 
pluralism, Rechtsstaat, basic rights, etc., although there may arise several kinds of 
diversities even in their interpretation. The differences in views are still greater on 
institutional arrangements designed to ensure the implementation of these principles. To 
bridge them is made difficult, furthermore, by the need for the constitution-maker to 
devise the functioning of public-law institutions within the framework of a comprehensive 
social, economic and political system. The mechanical adoption of arrangements that have 
proved their worth in other countries does not always produce the result expected and 
intended. So there is much doubt about the extent to which constitutional institutions 
imported from abroad (e.g. ombudsman) will become elements of a Hungarian constitu-
tion in action. At any rate, a comprehensive approach, a broader view and a comparative 
analysis are prerequisites for the success of the work to frame a constitution. 
10. In seeking consensus, the question of validity of decisions previously handed 
down by the Hungarian Constitutional Court prompted sharp debates. The reason for this 
can be found in understanding that the adoption of a new constitution will give rise in 
Hungary to a special situation, not frequently found in history, in which the existence and 
functioning of the Constitutional Court has preceded the adoption of the constitution 
which would form the basis of its activity. If on this score we start from the assumption 
that, as has also been covered by the press, the activity of the Constitutional Court was 
based on a constitution framed originally in the communist past, the question arises 
whether or not the survival of these decisions would be inconsistent with the new 
constitution. One can easily draw the conclusion that by enacting a new constitution not 
only the previous basic law but also all the earlier decisions of the Constitutional Court 
will become obsolete as only records of legal history. The logic of this reasoning would 
also imply the termination, by the adoption of the new constitution, of the mandate of the 
constitutional judges in office. 
Another argument against retaining the former decisions of the Constitutional Court 
in force is concerned with the characteristic "continental" Romano-Germanic attitude 
towards judge-made law. 
There is undoubtedly some basis for this line of reasoning, taking into account the 
fact that the current text of the Hungarian Constitution contains a good number of 
obscure provisions that are in need of interpretation, and even gaps in the law, as a 
logical consequence of the numerous amendments during the intervening period. To 
eliminate such imperfections became the responsibility of the Constitutional Court, which, 
likewise established by an amendment of the Constitution in 1989, acted freely on the 
mandate conferred on it by a subsequent statute (Act XXXII of 1989) regulating its 
status, organization and functions. The Constitutional Court took on the task in a great 
many cases to interpret the current text of the Constitution and even to develop it further 
under the sign of the idea of an "invisible constitution". Such decisions now make up 
several volumes and include judgments, binding on all, about several components of 
Hungary's constitutional order and legal system. The keeping of previous decisions in 
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effect would amount to open admission of the fact that the Constitutional Court had taken 
over a part of the legislative, moreover constitution-making power. 
To these arguments containing an implicit criticism of the functioning of the 
Constitutional Court was apposed that the invalidity of Constitutional Court decisions 
does not automatically follow from the formal recognition of the maxim of lex posterior 
derogat priori, but also other substantive criteria (contradiction, impossibility of 
interpretation, superfluity, etc.) are needed for that to happen. In the case of inconsistency 
between the old and the new constitution, it is up to the constitution-maker to decide 
whether the Constitutional Court decisions based on the old constitution should lose effect 
or no t It is highly improbable, however, that this conflict may arise in practice as 
Hungary has already undergone a decisive constitutional change. The new constitution 
will in all certainty bring no radical changes, but further progress on the road upon which 
this country has embarked. Under such circumstances there is little likelihood that the 
earlier decisions of the Constitutional Court will be in conflict with the constitution-
maker's intention as expressed in the new constitution. Thus, unless a decision to the 
contrary would be adopted in the course of the constitution-making process, there will 
be no bar to regarding the earlier Constitutional Court decisions as continuing in force. 
This is all the more justified or else the laws and regulations which have been abrogated 
by the Constitutional Court should, in lack of new statutory regulation be considered as 
operative again, which would naturally give rise to additional complicated problems. 
V 
11. According to the constitutional provisions in force, adoption by the National 
Assembly of a new constitution must be subject to a qualified (two-thirds) majority of 
votes. Under the relevant Act (Act XVII of 1989), a new constitution must be approved 
by referendum, and in case of non-approval a new referendum must be held within a 
year. The proof of the pudding being in its eating; only the future will tell us to what 
extent the new constitution thus adopted and approved will stand against time. 
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Marian KALLAS Projects to Adopt a New Polish 
Constitution (1991-1994) 
Substituting the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic of 22 VII 1952 r. with a 
new one was one of the most significant demands of the Civic Committee of "Solida-
rity" in 1989. Nevertheless, the interim constitution based on the Constitutional Act of 
17th October, 1992 on the mutual relations between the legislative and executive 
institutions of the Republic of Poland and on local self-government, widely known as 
the "Small Constitution", is still in force. One of the most crucial tasks of the parliament 
elected on September 19, 1993 should be to adopt the Constitution of the Third 
Republic of Poland. 
1. Shortly after preparatory work on the new constitution had started, establishing 
the procedure of its adoption began. Various legal and political debates were evoked by 
the legislative work (started in 1991) connected with the matter. Drafts specifying the 
procedure of preparing and adopting the new constitution had already existed before. 
The drafts of June 6, 1991 (the Sejm Bulletin No. 16) and December 21, 1991 (the 
Sejm Bulletin No. 42) were a starting point for work on the procedure of adopting the 
new constitution for the first term Sejm (1991-1993). Both drafts elaborated by 
parliamentary bodies (parliamentary drafts) were to be considered by the Legislative 
Committee, which aimed at presenting a compromise regulation concerning the 
procedure of adopting the new constitution. The debate concentrated on which body is 
entitled to adopt a constitution: the National Assembly (NA) or the Nation in a 
referendum? The text of the constitutional act presented by the Legislative Committee 
(LC) on February 15 (the Sejm Bulletin No. 180) said that the Constitutional Committee 
(CC) is the only body to have the right to introduce legislation in presenting drafts of 
the new constitution. The President's letter (February 20, 1992) to the Speaker of the 
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Sejm revealed his reservations and soon the President submitted his own draft of the 
constitutional act (March 9, 1992), which suggested including not only deputies and 
senators in the CC but also representatives from outside the parliament. After 
reconsidering all the texts the LC worked out (March 31, 1992) a compromise draft of 
the constitutional act (the Sejm Bulletin No. 198). After an animated debate during the 
13th sitting, the Sejm passed (April 23, 1992) the Constitutional Act on the procedure of 
preparing and adopting the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It soon became the 
subject of a heated political debate. 
After the President had signed it, the constitutional act of April 23 was promulgated 
on September 1, 1992 (Law Gazette of 1992, No. 67, para. 336). The act came into effect 
on November 29, 1992 and thus formal obstacles in preparatory work on adopting the 
new constitution were removed. According to the act of April 23 "The Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland, adopted by the Sejm and the Senate joined in the National 
Assembly, is approved of by the Nation in a constitutional referendum" (Art. 2, para. 1). 
The act decided that the President (and not the NA) orders a referendum (Art. 9), in 
which all citizens holding a full electoral franchise are entitled to participate. According 
to the constitutional act of April 23, 1992: "In a referendum the Citizens by means of 
voting, ..., accept or reject the constitution, subject to referendum" (Art. 10, para. 2). The 
President is obliged to sign the constitution adopted in a referendum. 
The CC, a group of 56 members of the NA and the President are entitled to submit 
a draft of the new constitution to the NA (government-forming initiative). Government 
is not entitled to do so. It was decided that drafts should be submitted within 6 months 
after the CC is set up, that is by April 30, 1993. The drafts constitute the basis on which 
the CC is entitled to work out its own draft of the new constitution. 46 deputies and 10 
senators make up the CC. Its sessions are supervised by the chairman and the vice-
chairman, of which one is a deputy and the other a senator. Representatives of the 
President, the Council of Ministers and the Constitutional Court have the right to attend 
the CC sessions. The course of the CC's work is regulated by the rules adopted by it on 
January 13, 1993. 
2. After the deputies (October 17, 1992) and the senators (October 29, 1992) had been 
elected, the first CC plenary session was held (October 30, 1992). Walerian Piotrowski 
(from the National and Christian Union) was elected Chairman and Jerzy Ciemniewski (the 
Democratic Union) vice-Chairman. After the CC had been constituted (consisting of 56 
MPs), its procedure was established. It was not finished until mid-January 1993. The CC 
regulations established permanent subcommittees: (1) the editorial subcommittee of general 
rules and regulations introducing a constitution; (2) the subcommittee on the basis of the 
political, social and economic system; (3) the subcommittee of issues related to the system 
of the sources of law; (4) the subcommittee of the organs of legislative and executive 
power and local government; (5) the subcommittee of the institutions of law protection 
and organs of Jurisdiction; (6) the subcommittee of rights and obligations of citizens (Art 
4). It is significant that the act of January 13, 1993 did not establish a permanent sub-
committee for the CC to work out its own draft of the new constitution. Many party 
leaders and chairmen of parliamentary clubs entered the CC and thus it became one of 
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the most politically representative parliamentary assemblies. Not until the 7th CC plenary 
session (March 24, 1993), five months after the Committee had been established, the 
permanent subcommittees' chairmen were chosen. The CC's lack of concrete activity 
provoked severe criticism. More and more often it was perceived as a lack of political 
will to adopt the new constitution quickly. 
Within a few months (January-March 1993) the activity of the CC was closely 
examined. Most of its members opted for starting with a review of the existing 11 drafts 
of the constitution (including two parliamentary drafts). They were published in 1992 by 
"Wydawnictwo Sejmowe": "Drafts of the constitution 1989-1991" (prepared by M. 
Kallas). The CC members decided that a review of the drafts would be an introduction 
to a debate in the Sejm on selected constitutional issues. After an animated discussion it 
was decided that the next few CC sessions would be devoted to a presentation (legal 
comparison) of the structure of government in the drafts. This plan was not executed 
because the time of submitting drafts was due soon afterwards. 
3. Working out the procedure of dealing with the drafts dominated two months (April 
and May 1993) of the CC's activity. It was decided that the drafts meeting the 
requirements specified in the act of April 23, 1992 would be presented on plenary 
sessions of the CC by the projectors' representatives. 
Seven drafts meeting the requirements specified in the act of April 23, 1992 were 
submitted to the Secretariat of the CC by April 30, 1993. A draft was accepted (as a 
separate protocol) provided it was signed by at least 56 deputies and senators. A different 
procedure was applied to the President's draft. Between April 24 and April 26 the 
following drafts of a constitution were submitted: (1) the draft adopted by the CC of the 
first term Senate signed mainly by National and Christian Union MPs; (2) the draft 
signed by members of the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left Alliance; (3) the 
draft signed by members of the parliamentary Club of the Democratic Union; (4) the 
draft signed by Polish Peasant Party MPs and, among others, members of the 
Parliamentary Club of the Union of Labour and the Parliamentary Group of the German 
Minority; (5) the draft signed by the President of the Republic of Poland; (6) the draft 
signed by the Confederation for an Independent Poland MPs; (7) the draft signed mainly 
by members of the Parliamentary Club of the "Centrum" Civic Alliance. The texts of 
these drafts were published in a special issue of the Bulletin edited by the CC of the 
National Assembly. 
Five more drafts (not meeting the requirements specified in the act of April 23, 1992) 
were submitted to the Secretariat of the CC (between April 29 and May 12, 1993): (1) 
the draft of the General Headquarters of the National Democratic Party; (2) the draft of 
the Democratic Party; (3) the draft of the Wielkopolans' Union Group in Warsaw; (4) the 
draft by Slawomir Sitkiewicz from Rumia; (5) the draft of the Union of Real Politics. 
The texts were published in several issues of the CC Bulletin. 
The last plenary session (9) of the CC was held on May 19, 1993. The CC was in 
the process of working out theses of government to submit them to the Speaker of the 
Sejm, on June 25, 1993. It was connected with the debate in the Sejm planned for July 
10, 1993. The debate was to concentrate on basic issues of government suggested by the 
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CC. The President's executive order from May 29, 1993 ("Monitor Polski" form 1993, 
No. 27, para. 285) dissolving the Sejm (and thus the Senate) caused a few months' 
interval in the work on the new constitution. 
4. The parliamentary election of September 19, 1993 resulted in a new political 
configuration with a dominant, strong coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (DLA) 
and the Polish Peasant Party (PPP). At the same time the parliament became less 
representative as a constituent assembly. The party representatives present in the Sejm 
and the Senate declared, however, that adopting the new constitution would be one of the 
chief aims of the parliament. 
The resolutions of the Sejm (October 21) and the Senate (October 22, 1993) formed 
a new CC with the deputy Aleksander Kwa<nirewski (from the Parliamentary Club of 
the DLA) as chairman and the senator Stefan Pastuszka (from the Parliamentary Club 
of the PPP) as vice-chairman. Soon the procedure of the CC was established. The issue 
of limiting the time to submit drafts provoked the CC to consider amending the act of 
April 23. The matter of whether the CC should work with the drafts already submitted 
(in April 1993) or whether the procedure of submitting drafts should start anew ("zero" 
option) evoked a very animated debate. During the CC session (December 12, 1993) 
deputy Jerzy Jaskiernia (DLA) stressed that: "The new political configuration means 
new constitutional content". Work to introduce new regulations of the CC started. 
Some people voiced the opinion that the parliament is not enough of a representative 
body to adopt the new constitution of the Republic of Poland. The importance of a 
preliminary constitutional referendum was indicated (and it was to be ordered together 
with the local government election in June 1994). The views voiced in the second CC 
session (December 8, 1993) soon changed significantly. 
The discussion on the draft of the CC rules dominated the next two sessions. The 
appropriate resolution was passed in the 4th CC session (January 18, 1994). The CC 
rules were published in "Monitor Polski" from 1994, No. 6, para. 62. The postulate (by 
Ryszard Buga from the Parliamentary Club of the Union of Labour) that represen-
tatives of both various political organisations and non-parliamentary institutions should 
take part in CC work provoked an extremely animated debate. The postulate received 
support from 12 CC members while 11 were against (7 abstained). Unlike in the 
parliament of the previous term, the CC established the 6 standing subcommittees and 
elected its chairmen in the session on January 18, 1994. The agenda for the monthly 
CC sessions in the first half of 1994 was also drawn up on the same day. In the event 
only some of the planned sessions were held. Establishing the lawful procedure of the 
CC work took 3 months and only then did concrete work start. The main issue was 
naturally working out a draft of the constitution, but the CC has not managed to do it 
so far. However, the pace of work visibly slowed down (until May 1994) and only few 
subcommittees engaged in some activity (especially the subcommittees of the organs 
of legislative and executive power and of local government). 
5. As early as December, 1993 the deputies' drafts suggesting amendments to the 
constitutional act of April 23, 1992 appeared. According to the draft of the Confederation 
for an Independent Poland of December 16, 1993 (the Sejm Bulletin No. 221) the drafts 
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of the constitution already submitted (in April 1993) would be considered by the NA. 
According to the draft of the Union of Labour (of December 17, 1993): "The referendum 
will be held on the basic issues of government since the constitution is supposed to be 
based on them". The results would be binding for the parliament if over 50% of those 
holding a full electoral franchise participated in the referendum. 
At the turn of 1993 and 1994 several constitutional committees outside of the 
parliament were established. In January 1994 an opening session of the Constitutional 
Committee of the coalition of right-wing parties, coordinated by Walerian Piotrowski, 
was held. It was agreed that the coalition's draft would be an alternative to the draft 
worked out by the CC of the NA. The next Constitutional Committee was set up by the 
Headquarters of the Independent Self-Goveming Trades Union "Solidarity" (situated at 
the Senate Faction of "Solidarity"). Marian Krzaklewski was the formal coordinator of 
its work and a civic draft of the new constitution was to be the result of its activity. The 
two committees did not unite in the National Constitutional Council, however, this being 
the initiative of the "Centrum" Civic Alliance. 
The 10th session of the Sejm (January 20-21, 1994) revealed many reservations as 
to the type of referendum suggested by the Union of Labour. Nevertheless both the 
submitted drafts were referred to the Special Committee. Soon the President manifested 
legislative initiative (January 31, 1994). The President's draft (the Sejm Bulletin No. 252) 
granted a group of 100,000 citizens the right to submit a draft of the constitution to the 
NA. This issue was further developed in the draft of the resolution on the procedure of 
submitting a civic draft of the Constitution of the RP (the Sejm Bulletin No. 253). To 
everybody's surprise, the Sejm rejected the President's draft after the first reading during 
its 12th session (February 17-18, 1994). To a large degree it was a reaction to the 
statement: "In case of the Constitution being rejected in a constitutional referendum, the 
Sejm and the Senate will be dissolved by law". 
One of the results of the consequent political conflict was the withdrawal of the 
President's constitutional draft and of his representative from the CC. A motion to stop 
the CC work was defeated in the session held on February 23, 1994 and then the 
procedure of work of the standing subcommittees were established. The next sessions of 
the CC, to be held in March and April, were cancelled. 
At the same time the Special Committee worked intensively to consider the drafts 
suggesting amendments to the constitutional act of April 23, 1992. In the session of this 
Committee (March 8, 1994) the deputy Jaskiernia (DLA) unexpectedly made a motion to 
grant 500,000 citizens the right to submit a draft of the new constitution. The Committee 
rejected the "zero" option in the next session. Its rejection was finally accepted in the 
report (March 17, 1994) of the Special Committee. At the second reading of the draft 
(16th session of the Sejm, March 25, 1994) the Sejm passed an amendment to the 
constitutional act of April 23, 1992. After considering the Senate's amendments to the text, 
the Sejm (18th session, April 22, 1994) passed changes in the constitutional act of April 
23, 1994 ("The Journal of Laws" of 1994, No. 61, para. 251). The resolution came into 
force on May 5, 1994. Within three months (that is by September 5, 1994) the possibility 
of submitting drafts of the constitution by at least 500,000 citizens was accepted. 
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The resolution of April 22, 1994 (apart from the people's constitutional initiative) 
allows for an optional partial referendum. 
On May 18, 1994 the CC announced that the already submitted drafts would be 
reviewed during the next session (June 21-23, 1994). Three out of seven drafts were 
submitted once again (with some changes introduced): the drafts of the Club of the Union 
of Freedom, the Club of the DLA and that of the President. Soon the Civic "Centrum" 
Alliance withdrew its draft of the constitution (submitted to the parliament of the 
previous term) and thus six drafts were reviewed by the CC on June 21-22, 1994. 
6. After a few months of drafting work the Headquarters of "Solidarity" accepted 
(June 22, 1994) the final civic draft of "Solidarity": the Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland. Meeting the formal requirements, the draft was submitted by the President of 
"Solidarity" to the Speaker of the Sejm, Józef Oleksy (September 5, 1994). On August 
22, 1993 the coalition of right-wing parties announced that their draft would not be 
submitted to the CC of die NA. The draft of an ecological constitution did not get the 
support of the required number of citizens. The preparatory work of the CC became 
animated after the presentation of the civic draft of the constitution. It was announced 
that seven drafts would be presented to the NA on September 22-23, 1994. 
It is expected that the review will be a comparative analysis of the drafts submitted 
to the CC. The starting point will most probably be a report of a group of experts 
(February 1994) on the seven drafts of 1993 ordered by the President of the Polish 
Academy of Science. The text of the experts' report entitled: "Which Constitution?" was 
published by "Wydawnictwo Sejmowe" in 1994. 
Soon after presenting the civic draft, the next session of the CC was held (September 
8, 1994). It was agreed that the civic draft of "Solidarity" would be treated as other drafts 
meeting the requirements of the constitutional act of April 23, 1992 on the procedure of 
adopting the new constitution. 
The first session of the NA of this term was held on September 21-23, 1994, as had 
been announced before. The first reading of the already presented drafts was preceded 
by adopting the order of debates (September 22). After the debate in the NA, all the 
drafts (7) were sent to the CC so that it could work out one draft of the future 
constitution. The next session (October 11, 1994) of the CC resulted in the resolution that 
three constitutional issues would be the subject of the Sejm debate. The first is related 
to the problem of the political system (including the matters connected with the division 
and balance of power and die question of whether parliament should consist of one or 
two chambers). The second issue is related to the specification of the position and 
character of rules concerning social laws. The third issue comprises the matters concerned 
with the sources of law. 
The CC has announced the intensification of drafting work. It has been agreed that 
on October 21, 1994 the Sejm debate on basic issues of government will be held. It is 
planned that a draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland will be adopted by the 
end of November. 
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Csaba VARGA The Judicial Process 
A Contribution to its Philosophical Understanding 
Presuppositions 
In the legal cultures based on the institutional-ideological set-up of modem formal law, 
the institutional framework and the tools of the judicial establishment of facts—including 
the overall concept of the process—are built on definite presuppositions. 
According to these: (1) Judicial decision-making is a two-tier process. The two compo-
nents—although built upon one another-can be clearly demarcated. The demarcation is not 
only a practical possibility but also an inevitable necessity, since within the decision-
making two processes of different natures are to be found: the fact has to be established, 
while the law has to be applied. Consequently, the judicial decision-making process is 
nothing else than (2) the application of a normative value-standard to the reality, as it has 
been reconstructed on the basis of cognition. That is, in fact, a complex process, in which 
a normative pattern is being applied in practice to the outcome of theoretical cognition. 
Accordingly, the process is composed of cognitive and volitive acts, relying on each other. 
It follows from this that (3) the theoretical moment will major the entire process. As it is, 
the fact—in itself—is objectively given. Thus, the fact has to be taken cognisance of; and 
the outcome of the cognition will determine the entire process. In fact, it is the cognition 
of the fact that starts the process, and the quality of the fact will determine the character 
of the procedure as well as the decision to be made in the procedure. Thus that which 
happens with the facts during the judicial process, will replace their cognition in any other 
way. Accordingly, the outcome of the judicial cognition is characterised by the latter's 
objective trutli—that being the criterion. As usual in the domain of cognition, the outcome 
will be expressed in a precept which is necessarily capable of being verified or falsified. 
170 Csaba Varga 
All the more so because (4) the judicial cognition, essentially, cannot be limited. Its 
regulation—if any—has an auxiliary character only: it merely assists in fulfilling its role. 
Namely, it may support keeping the cognition within the desired channel, further it helps 
to conclude the cognition within a reasonable time. 
Consequently, judicial cognition is, by itself, non-specific. Its particularity consists 
of its being non-recurrent, its being oriented on a single past event (which shows an 
affinity with historical cognition), and of its eventual dramatic effect. 
These presuppositions do not stand alone; nor did they develop by chance. They derive 
from the ideological environment which regards the judicial decision as a syllogism, 
consisting of a rule and of a statement of fact subsumed under the said rule, and of the 
logical consequence derived from their premises. 
In continental Europe, the recognition of customary law was linked with the judicial 
acceptance of socially-approved practice even at an early stage of development, while 
subsequently it limited and reduced the law to so-called positive law, elaborated through 
definite processes and enacted in formal, written texts. In the cultures of Common Law, 
the judge, availing himself of the art of distinguishing and the possibility of overruling, 
may insert certain intermediate steps into the decision-making process, nevertheless, he 
will always refer to some kind of a general rule, and confirm, by his decision, a custom 
of the realm existing from time immemorial. 
Well, whichever the system, in western legal cultures the syllogistic form (whether 
conceived as the logical reconstruction of the operation or only as its brief, indicative 
form) will suggest such situations and conditions, in which there is a pre-existent norm, 
serving as praemissa maior, as well as the statement of facts (fully accidental from the 
aspect of the norm), serving as praemissa minor.; the application of the former on the 
latter will yield the judicial decision as a logical necessity. 
Thus, the syllogistic formula projects for us a situation (with an enhanced imagery 
and suggesting the inevitability of the process) which expresses the rule of the general. 
It should be known that he who possesses the general also possesses the inherent 
particular. For the general becomes realised as individual in ihat which is a case of the 
former. Here the general is everything, the only palpable, tangible factor. It is all that is 
capable of action, that is active, that is capable of moving things. 
As against this, the individual will solely and exclusively exist as a case of the 
general, a mere example, which would be—otherwise—purely accidental. Still, however 
dependent the individual may be, yet—when it exists—it will be perceived. When that 
happens it becomes liable to apply on itself, to realise on itself, the general. In other 
words, the individual provides an opportunity for the general to manifest itself in it. 
All this will generate, inevitably, the idea of safety, of inevitability, of an almost 
automatic mechanism. In fact, we learn about the general that it becomes realised. And 
of the individual, we learn how its realisation has come about by its subsuming under the 
general. 
At the same time, the above presuppositions will trigger further ones. Every 
presupposition needs a certain environment So also the syllogistic form (whether 
conceived as a means of reconstruction or just as a genuine medium) can only be 
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imagined in a definite intellectual atmosphere. Ultimately, we have to make a choice: the 
logical formula is either the true mental reproduction of some process, or just a game 
played with the help of symbols. 
Well, the said formula cannot provide the essential characteristics of the process in 
question, unless (1) it is backed by a language in which the meaning is encoded, and so 
the relation of the signs and the concepts represented by them is unequivocal, and their 
linkage is fixed; further if (2) the nature and structure of the cognition is such as can 
ensure the linguistic expression of the subject of cognition by way of concepts and as the 
combination of concepts, in a sufficiently exact manner. 
These presuppositions have been self-evident throughout the centuries and did not 
have to be proven. That fact is shown by the circumstance that, for a long time, the 
problem of presuppositions, or the specific problem of the judicial process, did not even 
arise. Simply, scholars did not perceive any specific treat in it which would differ from 
any other domain of human perception. 
In exceptional cases which were—seemingly—contrary to the above trend, i.e. when 
the problem of law-application was treated in an epistemological context, it will become 
apparent that that was due to the special nature of the approach (e.g. a conception defined 
by the Leninist theory of reflection). Accordingly, in such cases the doctrine did not 
intend either to support or to criticise the presuppositions (whether admitted as self-
evident or merely laid down as ideological tenets).1 
I should add that even the classic fundamental works of this century, having engaged 
in a sweeping criticism and having helped to destroy the existing myths and founding a 
more realistic juristic world-concept, even they have left these notional traditions and 
ideological Weltanschauung essentially intact—despite their seemingly all-embracing and 
annihilating criticism. 
Notably in the American movement formed at the end of the 19th century that had 
argued the obsolete clichés of the juristic outlook, considered the law as a social engage-
ment and putting the judge's action into focus instead of the rigid textbooks—Jerome 
Frank played an outstanding role. Frank saw our human claim for legal certainty merely 
as an archetype, a subconscious extension of man's yearning after a paternal authority. 
In his eyes, legal certainty was nothing but wishful thinking—unsupported by theory and 
therefore indefensible. 
In his view the judicial event (individual, irreproducible and unforeseeable) was the 
moment where and in which the law became defined and identified as law. He was the 
pioneer, maybe the greatest and unsurpassed one, among those scholars that developed 
their deep scepticism into a theory. He was also among those who doubted that the facts 
1 E.g., by PESCHKA, V.: "Az esetnorma, avagy a jogszabály és a jogeset kapcsolatának problémája" [The 
case-norm, or the problem of the relationship between the legal rule and a legal case] Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
28 (1985), pp. 217 et seq., as grounded by his Jogforrás és jogalkotás [Source and making of the law] 
(Budapest 1965), eh. III, par. 2, and Die Theorie der Rechtsnormen (Budapest 1979), ch. I, par. IV and ch. II, 
par. 1, all representing the adaptation of the theory of reflection on the problems of law-application. 
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and the norms constituted some kind of concrete and determining factors of our 
environment, and that each played a decisive role in legal proceedings.2 Himself a 
practising lawyer, judge of the Federal Appeals Court, he nourished a particularly 
devastating opinion on the judicial system and especially on the jury system, as well as 
on the judge's role in establishing the facts of the case. He found that the said process 
depended on essential points on the judge's subjective judgement and was therefore both 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable.3 His standpoint was both sharp and clear: "For court 
purposes, what the court thinks about the facts is all that matters. For actual events [...] 
happened in the past. They do not walk into the court.'"1 As it is, "the 'facts' [...] are not 
objective. They are what the judge thinks they are".5 
And yet: from his work, from its emphases and context, it becomes apparent that, 
through all this, Frank did not want to deny the facts themselves, nor their being 
approachable through cognitive means and, eventually, their actual cognition. Just the 
opposite. As a practising judge, he considered that the stake of the entire judicial process 
lay in the facts, in the fight centring around the allegation and proof of the facts; in the 
dramatic fight of the two opposing parties in the closure of the fight by obtaining the 
court's conviction. (Let us not forget: his everyday experience in the appellate courts of 
the US must have borne this out.) Accordingly, his critique relies exactly on those presup-
positions we have outlined above. It seems as if his entire work, his bitter recriminations, 
had been aimed at the full and undisturbed realisation of these presuppositions. Thus, the 
said presuppositions not only provide the framework of his line of thought but they also 
fill it with content. The myth-destroyer, praised all over the world, himself nurtures a 
myth. The ideal he expresses, and by which he would measure the uncertainty, the 
accidental nature, and essential subjectivism of judicial fact-finding, is not excluded in 
principle. Nevertheless, he did not realise the difference in category by which the judicial 
establishment of facts deviates from the everyday or scientific cognition. Instead, he sought 
the reasons by which the "finding" of the "true facts" could be replaced by the "fight" 
waged for them, in the institutional set-up of the procedure, more precisely, in the role 
assigned to the judges of fact. And finally, this is what prompted him to criticise, with an 
unprecedented sharpness, the "unpredictability" of the judicial system. While he does not 
say so expressly, what he means is that the system, in a different, corrected set-up, i.e. 
under a changed principle of operation, could function in another way.6 
Parallel with American realism, on the European continent another trend was develop-
ing: one that perhaps led to less spectacular but tighter theoretical results. I am referring 
2 Such were the impacts (oil the basis of psycho-analysis) by, e.g., SZABÓ, J.: A jogászi gondolkodás 
bölcselete [The philosophy of juristic thought] (Szeged 1941) and (in the wake of the treatment of 'situation' 
in the existentialist philosophy) by Cohn, G.: Existentialismus und Rechtswissenschaft (Basel 1955). 
3 FRANK, J.: "Say it with Music" Harvard Law Review, 61 (1948), pp. 924-925. 
4 FRANK, J.: Courts on Trial (Princeton 1949), p. 15. 
5 FRANK, J.: Law and the Modern Mind [1930] (Garden City 1963), p. xviii. 
6 Cf. RUMBLE, W. E.: American Legal Realism (Ithaca 1968), pp. 116-136. 
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to the neo-Kantian approach anchored in the German classic philosophical traditions. The 
scholars of this line made an effort at a methodological consistency and purity. In other 
words, they tried to avoid the short-circuiting of the realms of Sein and Sollen, i.e. the 
blending of these two aspects. While the realism forged a theory from the individual and 
accidental components of judicial activity, neo-Kantianism (starting from its own 
philosophical and methodological assumptions) erected an impressive theoretical edifice 
on the pattern of the law, its functioning and principles. Frank had identified as law that 
which according to him was the only reality while being, in his view, merely accidental 
in the process; more closely: the outcome of merely accidental elements. As opposed to 
this, Kelsen would start just from that point, i.e. from the formal enactment of law. 
Now, while it is true that the enactment defines the ideal operation of the law, yet it 
does so in a way that in the absence of any other possibility (viz. any possible limitation), 
any actual function could become ideal. In fact, any kind of actual operation may lead to 
final judgement and force of law. (As it is, by a purely accidental practical factor, namely 
by the mere fact that the given judicial process remained unassailed or was unassailable.) 
On the other hand, according to the said formal enactment, force of law is nothing but the 
declaration of the legal finality. Exactly, the declaration that the result in question is situated 
'within' the valid precepts of the law, since it 'corresponds' with the said precepts.7 
This amounts to the assertion that each step in the decision-making process has a 
normative character and significance. Each step, therefore, is a constitutive contribution 
to the decision to be taken as an element which is the product of the very process. Thus, 
not a single element or moment of the process is, in itself or by itself, given.8 
Kelsen stresses that this constitutive construction is a creative and not a cognitive 
process.9 Nevertheless, this creation is not quite alien to cognition. The legal facts that 
constitute a case are derived from the "natural" set of facts. Consequently, the said process 
shows "a certain parallelism" with the cognition.10 
Well, while in Frank's oeuvre it becomes apparent that behind the criticism of the 
apparently non-cognitive outcome of the judicial process there hides the possibility—even 
outright postulate—of cognition, in the case of Kelsen the philosophical-textual context 
suggests that, for him, the non-cognitive feature and the parallelism with cognition are not 
important individually, but only in their joint statement 
In Kelsen's opinion, both the "self-existent" and the "procedurally created" facts" 
are essential in their heterogeneity and concomitantly in their parallelism. It seems that 
that was the only possible way for him to transfer the non-law into the law. In other 
words, that enabled him to create the possibility of transition from the domain of Sein 
into that of Sollen, without infringing methodological purity. For this purpose, to conserve 
7 KELSEN, H.: General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, Mass. 1946), pp. 154-156. 
8 KELSEN, H.: Reine Rechtslehre (Wien 1960), ch. 35, par. g/a. 
9 Ibid., p. 240. 
10 Ibid., pp. 245 and 247. 
11 Ibid., p. 246. 
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all that had been given in the Sein by transcending (i.e. negating by retaining) them in 
the Sollen to the necessary extent and manner. This is what he meant by sublation. 
Fact and Value 
Attempting to describe what is distinctively human through the analysis of mind, 
philosophy has concluded that it cannot be characterised as a "machine" with a "ghost" 
built into it. It has no part whatever which, when the whole machinery is set to motion, 
is to start working according to own laws and regularities.12 In its existence, the human 
being is a whole having its imprint on each and every segment and moment of its 
existence. This is what Marx meant too when stating that both social nature and historical 
character were inherent in human kind. 
This is also established in psychology: pure perception is nothing else but mere 
theoretical abstraction. What will come to mind as perception is already evaluated at 
some level, i.e. processed through the psychological structure individually characteristic 
of our personality. 6'e.vía/í-psychology discovered several decades ago that fields of 
perception showed qualities that could not be determined by single sensory stimuli, but 
expressed attributes of more or less extended areas (of space or time).13 Upon this 
recognition, a totality concept was methodologically defined, proposing not only that parts 
were at any given instance determined by the whole and that, accordingly, investigation 
had at any time to depart from this whole, but also that parts could not even in 
themselves be neutral static components, either, as it was just their configuration in one 
structured organisation that at any time made up the whole.'4 In consequence, no 
intellectual construction reduced to elements can be turned into something meaningful. 
For even in an elementary situation (with elementary conditions in an elementary 
isolation, etc.), human response always embodies a relative unity. 
Human attachment to events and matters is necessarily discrete: we appropriate what 
we encounter as mediated by our psychological reactions from the start, and not directly 
in their own materiality. Of course, this builds into our perception processes an 
abstractive-transformative filter from the very beginning, which makes fact and value 
seen as a unity. "Even, however, when the 'facts' in question are not infused with 
empirically intractable value-elements, they still represent patterns more or less severely 
abstracted from any concrete events."15 Strictly speaking, patterns referred to are by far 
not pure facts any longer; they are fact-value complexes. They are the only factors that 
really exist in our human world.16 
12 Cf. RYLE, G.: The Concept of Mind (London 1949). 
13 Cf., e.g., WERTHEIMER, M.: Productive Thinking (New York 1959). 
14 Cf. STROMBACH, W.: "Wholeness, Gestalt, System" International Journal of General Systems, 9 (1983), 
p. 68. 
15 STONE, J.: Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (London 1966), p. 738. 
16 Cf. STONE, J.: Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (London 1964), ch. 7. 
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The fact-value complex in itself is, however, not a subject of communication. Once 
we name or communicate on an event by asserting it as a 'fact', it will also be filtered 
through linguistic mediation. And as known, language preconditions and expresses, while 
creating and reproducing, a given form of life.17 This is so because of the ontological fact 
of social embeddedness (that is, at the same time being conditioned and conditioning),18 
and also by virtue of the particular features and instrumental definition of the given 
medium. Language is able to communicate by making ideas "speakable" as "'projected' into 
discursive form".19 Its semantics and syntax are equally built on "a linear, discrete, 
successive order" structure.20 In other words, both the elements of linguistic expression 
and its complex structures are built on an endless series of operations establishing relations 
(analogies and distinctions), which are from the start to wedge an evaluative moment into 
the fact-value complex in respect to the particularity of the linguistic medium too. It has 
two aspects. As already seen, any transformation into linguistic expression is in itself a 
kind of institutionalisation which assumes evaluation. At the same time, the understanding 
of what has been linguistically communicated also preconditions transformation, i.e., 
further evaluation. Since communication is only conceivable through generalising 
classification,21 it is justifiable to say that "every word is to some extent a word of 
degree",22 made and interpreted via non-equivalent transformation. And what is not 
equivalent is constitutive. 
All this is to say that the road from individual perception through generalising 
linguistic expression to a concretising interpretation as reflected in a given situation 
displays the same dialectic of the individual and the general that has been used to describe 
law-making as projecting the general and judicial application of the law conceived of as 
its individuation.23 
The statement according to which "even indisputable facts need interpretation"24 
seems to be corroborated. "It is commonly known that the facts of a case are not 'brute' 
facts, but interpreted facts."25 What are called facts are at the same time product of 
evaluation as well. Or, the social nature of facts is also mediated by evaluation inherent 
in the fact-value complex. As one of the classics of American legal realism said, "to one 
brought up in [a given culture], varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, 
17 E.g. WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations [ 19451 (Oxford 
1953). 
18 LUKÁCS, Gy.: A társadalmi lét ontológiájáról |Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, 1971), II 
(Budapest 1976), cf. VARGA, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács ' World Concept (Budapest 1985). 
19 LANGER, S. К.: Philosophy in a New Key [1942] (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), p. 93. 
20 Ibid., p. 80. 
21 LUKÁCS: p. 195. 
22 WILLIAMS, G.: "Law and Fact" The Criminal Law Review, 1976, p. 535. 
23 E.g. PESCHKA (1965): ch. 3. For a theoretical criticism, see Cs. VARGA: "Law-application and Its 
Theoretical Conception" Archiv fúr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 67 (1981), and "Logic of Law and Judicial 
Activity" in Z. Péteri, V. Lamm (eds.): Legal Development and Comparative Law (Budapest 1981). 
24 AARNIO, A.: On Legal Reasoning (Turku 1977), p. 70. 
25 KLAMI, H .T.: Anti-legalism (Vammala 1980), pp. 69 and 73. 
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a thousand influences gained only from life, may give to the different parts wholly new 
values that logic and grammar never could have got from the books".26 
Fact and value are, in consequence, co-related to one another. They themselves are 
analytical concepts; they can only be stated in unity. Their complex stands for the 
understanding that fact is only conceivable as evaluated and, evaluation, as being attached 
to fact. As parts of a totality,27 they gain meaning from the whole. Both their existence 
and their meaning can only evolve in the process of a ceaseless interaction between these 
two components. In consequence, (1) the whole construction breaks down if any of its 
components is extracted therefrom; (2) the whole construction becomes re-posited if any 
of its components is re-posited; (3) the whole construction gets modified if any of its 
components is modified. 
Fact and Law 
In point of principle, reality is one and undivided. It is a totality at any given time of the 
motions actually taking place in iL Reality as a subject of human praxis, notwithstanding, 
cannot be separated from the communicative practice of human kind and from human 
evaluations and normative expectations. As seen in another contexL the establishment of 
facts is an intellectual appropriation with human evaluative involvement in it28 In the 
social construction of reality, neither facts nor factual operations can meaningfully be 
considered as abstracted from social praxis. 
If normative expectations appear repeatedly in a way pointing to the desirability of 
a legal solution and to the attempt at having an inquiry into its conceivability, in human 
perception and evaluation a search for relevancy is to gain ground as a prime factor of 
selection and ordering, a search which, if initially reconfirmed, will turn out to be almost 
exclusive in order to lead to a genuine act of law-application. 
To be sure, the law is far from being a panacea with universal application 
omnipresent and omnipotent. Nevertheless, if there is any point in having a mediation 
through the law, law turns out to be co-related to something else (in the course and for 
the sake of this mediation). Certainly, no exclusivity in this attempt is needed. Human 
perception and evaluation of facts can at the same time have several conceptual webs, 
operational functions, attempts at being reflected in more than one direction. 
"The organisation of facts that allows the application of a rule is supported by a prior 
interpretation, without which these facts have no sense whatever. This prior interpretation 
is supplied by the legal rule itself, and is in no way an objective datum, a pure reflection 
26 HOLMES: in Diaz v. Gonzales, 261 U.S. 102 (1923), 67 L. Ed. 550, 552, as qucxed by KENDAL, G.H.: 
Facts (Toronto 1980), p. 61. 
27 Cf. NERHOT, P.: "The Fact of Law" in G. Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic Law (Berlin and New York 1988), 
p. 20. 
28 VARGA, Cs.: "Fact and Its Approach in Philosophy and in Law" in R. Kevelson (ed.): Law and Semiotics, 
3 (New York and London), pp. 357 et seq. 
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of reality." For "the law is in no way attached to the 'materiality' of the facts, acts, and 
various events that it considers, but to the meaning they have within the legal system 
itself. This meaning is in no way bound up with the elementary events, taken in isolation, 
that constitute them; it results from the whole of them as a construct under the rules."29 
This is why "the factual situation brought before the court is already a 'legally filtered' 
situation defining at least in outlines also the applicable rules".30 
For facts themselves have no meaning at all; they have no names, either. "Fact 
situations do not await us neatly labelled, creased, and folded; nor is their legal 
classification written on them to be simply read off by the judge. Instead, in applying 
legal rules, someone must take the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not 
cover some case in hand, with all the practical consequences involved in this 
decision."31 And giving a name is at the same time qualifying what has been named. 
"Qualification [...] establishes a relation between a concept and an element which is told 
to fall or not to fall within the extension of the concept"32 For qualifying, we are also 
expected to interpret in order that the extension of the concept to be qualified can be 
defined. That is, the meaning of the word involved in naming is to be established. "Or, 
the question is not to have a search for any true meaning of the words as Socrates 
believed, as if there were any external world or world of ideas offering one single 
solution that can be exclusively conform to reality; it is rather a practical job to find and 
work out the meaning which may fit the most to a concrete solution proposed by some 
consideration."33 Consequently, 'having a meaning' and 'giving a meaning' become 
differentiated in argumentation, albeit their notional extension may be the same in 
ontological reconstruction.34 
In other words, they are synonyms indeed, with the former dysanthropomorphizing 
what is, both apparently and as to its actual functioning, only anthropomorphous. Even 
logical schools of thought reducing legal processes to merely cognitive ones consider the 
act of giving a name a complex operation of searching for, while establishing, meaning, 
in which "problems [...] are fundamentally semantic, since the main difficulty lies in 
identifying the property referred to by the expressions found in legal discourse".35 Are 
problems semantic? It means that even apparently elementary operations we are inclined 
to regard as purely factual are already embedded in the social context of formulating 
29 NERHOT: pp. 321 and 322. 
30 LAGNEAU-DEVILLE, A.: "Questions sociologiques à propos de l'interprétation du droit" in M. van de 
Kerchove (ed.): L'interprétation en droit (Bruxelles 1978), p. 528. 
31 HART, H. L. A.: "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" [1958] in his Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy (Oxford 1983), pp. 63-64. 
32 PERELMAN, Ch.: "La distinction du fait et du droit" in Ch. Perelman (ed.): Le fait et le droit (Bruxelles 
1961), p. 275. 
33 PERELMAN, Ch.: Logique juridique (Paris 1976), p. 121. 
34 Cf., first of all, PERELMAN, Ch.: "Avoir un sens et donner un sens" Logique et Analyse (1962), No. 5. 
35 ALCHOURRÓN C. E. and BULYGIN, E.: Normative Systems (Wien and New York 1971), p. 147, 
quotation at 153. 
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them as a question, embedded from the very start in the evaluations that are inherent in 
both perceiving facts and making use of legal relevancy to serve as a criterion in their 
selection and ordering. This is why the statement, even if simplistic, can be justified, 
according to which "the qualification of facts is implied by their conceptualisation".36 
It is a classical paradox of philosophy of law that legal consequence can only be 
consumed as related to the judicial establishment of facts that constitute a case and, vice 
versa, the question whether facts constituting a case are judicially establishable is only 
answered alongside the realisation whether exacting legal consequences is desirable or 
not.37 Abstractly speaking, no operation can withstand becoming normative in a 
normative context. 
* 
(Questio facti et questio juris) The debate about the separation of 'questions of fact' 
and 'questions of law' is expressive of the basic structural and paradigmatic features of 
the arrangement and ideology of modern formal law, even if positive stipulations may 
temporarily put it aside.38 A fundamental procedural institution in both Common Law 
and Civil Law cultures,39 a deeply traditionalised division of the ideals and directions 
of juristic thinking, it has already fully permeated Roman law as a kind of false ideology. 
As a conceptual distinction, it has already been accepted by contrasting factum to jus 
as achieved in the series of res facti and res juris, as well as actio in factum and actio 
in jus. As it may be seen in classical texts clearly,40 'law' is what exists in terms of jus 
commune, that is, what is being considered valid, or what one concludes therefrom as 
valid (or, as we could say now, what is present for a deductive breaking down), in 
opposition to 'fact', what exists exclusively to the extent and with a degree of validity that 
it has been proven or sanctioned (or, as we could express now, what can be added 
inductively and posteriorly to what is already present). That is to say that, both in the 
classical age and in the Roman law redivivus of the Middle Ages, 'law' conceived of as 
fundamental, primary, and unchangedly standing, will be contrasted to legal projections 
as 'fact', which is subordinated, secondary, unknown, not inferable therefrom, or which, 
even if regarded as valid, is unable to invalidate the former. In other words, the 
conceptual distinction is a means of internal structuration; at the same time, it shapes 
legal thinking as well. 
(As opposed to the intuition of everyday thinking, owing, on the basis of the 
everyday routine and scientific experience, priority, and also cognitive significance, to the 
36 HÉBRAUD, P .: "Rapport introductif" in La logique judiciaire (Paris 1969), p. 31. 
37 E.g. RADBRUCH, G.: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosohie (Leipzig 1914), p. 199. 
38 For an attempt at overcoming it, see, e.g., NAGY, L.: ítélet a büntetőperben [Judgment in criminal process) 
(Budapest 1974), pp. 266-267. 
39 Surveyed by ROTOND1, M.: "Considerations en 'fait' et en 'droit'" Revue trimestrielle de Droit civil 
[Extrait] 1977/1, p. 12, note 18. 
40 Ibid.. pp. 7-8. 
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operations with facts, it is worth noting that both the differentiation of fact and law and 
the understanding of fact as reality are, in Latin and in the languages derived therefrom 
as well, stemmed not from everyday routine and scientific experience, but precisely from 
law, precisely from this distinction, and spread over to many other fields.41 Or, in Latin 
and German, the primitive and first meaning of 'true' is '[procedurally] right', which in 
its tum transforms into 'reality' as opposed to the merely assumed or presumed,42 
differing from the English, where the original meaning of 'true' is 'plighted faith'.43 
(Accordingly, the concept of both the fact and the true is basically procedurally 
conceived, as opposed to, e.g., the Greek, in which talethes [true] is that which is 
revealed44 without tradition continued.) 
In procedural systems having developed from modem times, the differentiation 
between 'question of fact' and 'question of law' is of fundamental importance. By the very 
fact of having a strict distinction (e.g. of the competencies of non-professional jury and 
professional judge in complementing one another; of the procedural phases of a given 
procedure; of subjects that can be appealed against), it suggests diverging approaches, 
paths of thought, terminologies, and references for decision. Moreover, it puts its stamp 
on the limitations of the preparatory stages of a trial process, of drafting documents, of 
evidencing, witnessing and expertising as well, in order that they cannot be prejudiced 
in questions of law; what is even more, it can even define how the judge is expected to 
understand a norm, notably by separating the normative message of a norm to be 
accepted by the judge as a fact from the one to be interpreted as a law. 
The significance attributed to this distinction45 is based upon the definability of the 
conceptual sphere of the questions of fact, to be separated from what is law. Accordingly, 
definitions are mostly simplistic, knowing no reservation. "A question of fact [...] is one 
which has not been thus [in accordance with established principles] predetermined."46 
"The questions of fact [...] are those questions which may be determined without 
reference to any rule or standard prescribed by the state."47 "When one of two different 
versions of events must be accepted, a question of fact is raised."48 As can be seen, the 
ideological stand (i.e. the de-juridifying dysanthropomorphization of the fact, 
distinguished from the law) is revealed by commonly having as a touchstone the fact as 
41 Cf. MAUTHNER, F.: Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Leipzig 1924), p. 303, quoted by H. Silving, "Law and 
Fact in the Light of the Pure Theory of Law" in P. Sayre (ed.): Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies 
(New York 1947), pp. 644 and 656, notes 13-14. 
42 Cf. MAUTHNER: p. 349, by Silving, pp. 644 and 656, notes 15-16. 
43 KENDAL: p. 21. 
44 Ibidem. 
45 "Ad questionem facti non respondent judices; ad questionem juris non respondent juratores." hack v. 
Clarke, 1 Rolle, 125, 132 (1613) and Coke Co. Lit. (1628) 155b as quoted by R. POUND: Jurisprudence V 
(St. Paul, Minn. 1959), p. 547. 
46 SALMOND, J.W.: Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (London 1902), p. 15. 
47 BROWN, R. A.: "Fact and Law in Judicial Review" Harvard Law Review, 56 (1943), p. 901. 
48 MORRIS, C : "Law and Fact" Harvard Law Review, 55 (1942), p. 1314. 
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given self-evidently in itself. But what criterion is adopted to substantiate such a claim 
for distinction? 
To be sure, there is a logic proper to this institutional differentiation and there are 
formal arguments to support it According to one of them, "[t]he issuable facts [...] should 
be alleged as they actually existed or occurred [...]. Every attempt to combine fact and 
law, to give the facts a legal colouring and aspect, to present them in their legal bearing 
upon the issues rather than in their actual naked simplicity, is so far forth an averment 
of law instead of fact, and is a direct violation of the principle upon which the codes 
have constructed their system of pleading. [...] [T]he allegation must be dry, naked, actual 
facts, while the rules of law applicable thereto, and the legal rights and duties arising 
therefrom, must be left entirely to the courts".49 However, the basic idea unfounded as 
"naked fact" is itself an abstraction that actually does not exist What do exist are 
situations that are lived through exclusively, from the endless potentialities of fact (and 
aspects of potentialities of fact) of which only the evaluation of the user can provide a 
selection, which is obviously a function of the use the user has in mind; and in order to 
communicate the result of the selection, the user also has to name it, i.e. also to interpret 
it, which again is a function of the intended use.50 This is to say that fact exists 
exclusively in concrete context, and not in abstract generality. Accordingly, to formulate 
a question about it is only meaningful if it involves the considerations leading to it, that 
is, its whole context51 
Notwithstanding, there is a common stand according to which these are "distinct 
categories, involving real differences for the lawyer and judge. And the difference is one 
of kind, and not merely one of degree [...]. The difference between the two kinds of 
questions is qualitative, not relative; but the discrimination can be made only after the 
position of the disputants is fully known".52 Or, the attempt at making a distinction is 
doomed to failure from the start because what renders them differentiated lies outside 
them. At the same time it is clear that, no matter whether they can be distinguished or 
not, their differentiation (as expressed, e.g., in their channelling into differing paths or 
procedure) will be realised in practice. For the distinction of questions of fact and law 
involves not only differing arena and procedure, and differing normative definitions and 
expectations in them, but also differing context, reference and, consequently, differing 
argumentation as well,53 whilst the interdependency of the two sides, as well as the 
constitutive character of the whole process, are unchanged. "But I can find no reason for 
49 POMEROY: Code Remedies (1904), pp. 560-561, quoted by COOK, W. W.: "•Facts' and 'Statements 
of Fact'" The University of Chicago Law Review, 4 (1936), pp. 236-237, note 7. 
50 Ibid., p. 238. 
51 E.g. JACKSON, J.: "Questions of Fact and Questions of Law" in W. Twining (ed.): Facts in Law 
(Wiesbaden 1983), p. 87. 
52 MORRIS: p. 1306. 
53 E.g. JACKSON: p. 94. 
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supposing that the nature of the judicial process is different when the question is said to 
be one of fact from what it is when the question is said to be one of law."54 
How can the apparent paradox be solved? 
The solution is to be found in the reversal of the way of raising the question and, 
thereby, in the explanation why the question has been raised at all. That is to say, it is 
not the ideologically dysanthropomorphized evidence of the fact that is the basis upon 
which the evaluation of law is based, but it is the praxis, in the course of which, in order 
to standardise practical activity, humankind builds a system of normative expectations and 
references, in which, as differentiated from the purely normative mental operations with 
the conceptual components of the normative sphere, it is also humankind in practice that 
posits the normative appropriation of reality and its processing in the normative sphere 
as a kind of quasi-reality. This is an appropriation of reality too, albeit posited by, and 
in the interests of, law. Actually they differ, but only in a procedural sense. Their 
differentiation can only be made in a given procedural context. That is, it is a given 
procedure as an aggregate of normative projections defining a normative practical process 
that serves as a basis for the whole enterprise, at the same time determining the criteria 
of the differentiation itself, thereby deciding upon its final issue as well. 
Or, the methodological dilemma is unchanged: in order to appropriate reality 
(practically or theoretically), we are expected to create concepts and to classify them, 
pretending as if the existence of our concepts as well as the discreteness were the mere 
transposition (i.e., pure consequence) of the existence of reality reflected by these 
concepts. Although we are aware of the fact that reality is not discrete but continuous; 
and in the interest, and within the context, of its appropriation it is we who make it 
conceptually discrete. In respect of law, what we have in mind is, however, not directly 
reality but a conventionalising conceptual network and referential practice, established 
artificially in order to exert an influence on reality. It is within this context that the 
question of the differentiation between 'questions of fact' and 'questions of law' is 
formulated. At the same time, I have no other choice than to formulate this in the 
medium of the same language which is also the object of the question. In point of 
principle, the question itself and its object can be distinguished on the abstract conceptual 
level of analysis; in practice, however, there is no label on the words I use and on the 
notions I refer to, which could signal this distinction in a clearly unambiguous way. Once 
I leave the field of abstract conceptual analysis, I am to cope with the chances of notional 
confusion and ambiguous connotation. 
In sum, the duality and confrontation of the 'questions of fact' and 'questions of law' 
simply do not exist beyond the reach of the humanly-made legal reality. All this can only 
be interpreted as an institutional question, in the function of a system of norms laying the 
foundations of, and defining, a given system of procedure. As has been seen, (1) the 
differentiation has nothing but a merely law-posited foundation; (2) as relational 
54 Lord REID, in Griffiths v. J. P. Harrison. Ltd. (1962) 909 at p. 916, quoCed by WILSON, W. A.: "A Note 
on Fact and Law" The Modem Law Review, 26 (1963), p. 621, note 84. 
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categories, any of them has a meaning only vis-à-vis the other; in consequence, (3) their 
definition is reflexive, one being the negation of the other; while the answer to the 
question of (4) which is what can only be done exclusively in function of the position, 
i.e. in the course of the procedure, through the interpretation of the place, as related to 
one another, of the acts in succession to one another within the conceptual network and 
context of the procedure. It is like a move in the game, which cannot be defined beyond 
its scope as a merely physical or mental event, and which cannot define its own 
normative meaning and significance exclusively in itself within the game either, as it only 
becomes defined through the individual moves in succession of one another, strictly 
speaking, through their interpretation within the reach of the game. On the other hand, 
once it becomes defined, in addition to its channelling into a given procedural contexture 
(i.e., into a given procedural path and phase and availability of appeal, etc.), it may lay 
the foundations of an argumentation of a differing character and direction and of a 
reference of a differing nature in argumentation. 
In sum, the institutional differentiation of questions of fact and law is imputatively 
defined, and not cognitively. The primary message it mediates is the idea according to 
which there are 'questions of fact' as distinct from 'questions of law'. This means that 
epistemological assumptions at the very foundations of legal ideology and institutional 
set-up are present here too, and, as principles of organisation and professional ideology 
defining the particularity and distinctiveness of law as a specific complcx of mediation, 
they assert themselves even when it is not preconditioned, or posited, by any specific law 
of procedure. It is something more than merely a function, and concrete individual 
institutionalisation, of its positing by any given law. It bears testimony to our basic 
professional assumptions and to the distinctively legal thought, and at the same time to 
the common grounds of Common Law and Civil Law in Roman Law. 
* 
('Ordinary' Words) The question itself is of the particular domain of the high 
technical complexity of the organisation of procedure and of the selective role of the 
differentiation between questions of fact and law, for there is no rule, practice or tradition 
to define which words qualify 'ordinary' ones, and it cannot be concluded from the nature 
of words by the force of any logic or consideration. From an external viewpoint, it is 
purely by chance what will qualify as 'ordinary word' in any culture of law, in any 
system of law, moreover, in any particular field or any given act thereof. There is no 
unambiguous criterion for defining it within the law, either. 
To be sure, what has been defined by the law-maker (and, accordingly, what has to 
be interpreted by the agency applying it) cannot qualify as 'ordinary'. To put it in the 
reverse sense, every word that must not be interpreted by the agency applying the law 
(by force of the argument that it would have been defined by the law-maker if it were 
intended to do so) will qualify as 'ordinary'. All this does not imply, however, that the 
word not defined is eo ipso 'ordinary'; what is implied is only this: what is 'ordinary' 
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qualifies as a 'question of fact' and, vice versa, the word qualified as a 'question of fact' 
has to be treated as 'ordinary'. 
That what stands behind this façade is a complex or confused practice,55 with the 
basic task to free legal action—by classifying the terms of normative texts into questions 
of fact and law and, thereby, differentiating the ways and paths and agencies of their 
treatment—from the accumulation of the endless series of definitions and interpretations 
which would otherwise be an unmanageable burden on iL56 
It is to be noted, however, that no matter how strong an effort has been made to 
qualify only words as 'ordinary' in respect of which both the establishment of relevant 
facts and their qualification as a case of the class defined by the words in question are 
presented as "question of degree",57 to qualify a word as being 'ordinary' presupposes, 
in the absence of unambiguous criteria, a procedural decision. As to the jurisprudence of 
the English Road Traffic Acts, for instance, it is to be decided according to the everyday 
use of the word as a 'question of degree' whether driving has been "dangerous" to the 
community or not, but the question whether the same driving has actually led to what is 
called an "accident" by the law is a pure 'question of law', to be decided according to 
legal definitions. Notwithstanding, the same jurisprudence proves that not even the 
meaning of 'ordinary' words can be established in isolation, either, that is, it can only be 
established as a 'question of fact' differentiated from 'questions of law', i.e., in function 
of normative provisions institutionalising such a differentiation. And the other way round, 
'questions of law' can qualify questions of non-degree only according to their own legal 
ideal.58 
Fuzziness of Language 
All what we have said till now about the problem of the establishment of facts has 
assumed a basic situation, namely that the facts to be established are being defined in a 
"simple, descriptive way" by the law. But we know that no matter of how many artificial 
components are displayed by law due to its internal definitions and normative linkages, 
law shares the attributes of natural language.59 Albeit the normative usage may try to 
55 For a survey, see WILSON, W. W.: "Questions of Degree" The Modem Law Review, 32 (1969), pp. 
361-362; WILLIAMS: in particular pp. 477-479 and 536-537 and OCKELTON, M.: "Comments on Jackson" 
in Facts in Law, pp. 103-104. 
56 Cf., e.g., JACKSON: p. 93. 
57 Cf., e.g., WILLIAMS, G.: "Language and the Law" The Law Quarterly Review, 61 (1945), pp. 179 et seq. 
58 According to R. v. Morris [1972] I. All R.E. 384, 386 as quoted by JACKSON: p. 92, no matter how much 
the definition of "accident" as "an unintended occurrence which has an adverse physical result" is applicable 
in a criterion-like way to some situations, there are other situations (e.g. to what extent and in which seriousness 
of the case can an emotional shock or nervous breakdown be considered an accident) when it can only be 
decided as a 'question of degree'. 
59 Cf. WRÓBLEWSK1, J.: "Zagadnienia jezyka prawnego prawniczego" in OPALEK, K. i WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: 
Zagadnienia teorii prawa (Warszawa 1971), ch. II and ZIEMBINSKI, Z.: "Le langage du droit et le langage 
juridique" in Archives de Philosophie du Droit [Le langage du Droit] XIX (Paris 1974). 
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differentiate it and the presence of specific semantics and syntax can be discerned 
through linguistic reconstruction, all this is not enough to lift it out of its embeddedness 
in the medium of natural language or to transcend its fuzziness and vagueness, 
fundamental characteristic of natural language.60 
This makes it theoretically possible to reformulate the problem of the normative 
linguistic definition of the facts as the one of indefinability and indeterminacy inherent 
in language.61 For, as a limit of linguistic-logical approach, it has already been 
formulated: the certainty of any conclusion, connection or proposition can be guaranteed 
only if a "a meaning precise enough" is assured.62 That is, only in the extreme, ideal 
(hence not realistic) case when there is no longer any interpretation; consequently any 
evaluative choice (or any alternative) is excluded from the start. 
However, at this point we are bound to ask: What kind of definition of facts is this 
when it is not a "simple, descriptive" one? Well, it may be either composite or relational 
or axiological.63 However, any other possibility will differ from the "simple, descriptive" 
one only in the character, depth, and justification of indeterminacy. 
As to the evaluative terms just as in the other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, it 
will be obvious that they include a dual uncertainty. Notably, both the definition of the 
term and the determination of the set of facts—to be evaluated from the aspect of the 
term—are absent.64 This is why we have to state that their reference is illusory,65 since 
their uncertainty is embedded in the substance itself. 
Accordingly, it must be clear for us that, while we may lessen the uncertainty to 
some degree by way of directives of interpretation, we cannot eliminate it completely,66 
for the very reason that it is impossible to cancel completely the inherent indeterminacy 
of the linguistic medium and, on the other hand, not even the interpretation directive is 
devoid of uncertainty. 
As it is, in the case when the indeterminacy lies in the graduality of the term (e.g. 
'young' and 'old', or 'grevious' and 'light' bodily harm), the insertion of intermediate terms 
will not lessen the uncertainty, but merely increase the number of borderline cases.67 In 
other uncertainties, where a given semantic field tallies entirely with a given area through 
concepts whose extension is interchangeable (e.g. the denomination of kinships in the 
60 E.g. PECZENIK, A. and WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Fuzziness and Transformation" Theoria, 51 (1985), pp. 
24-26 and 32-34. 
61 Cf.. e.g., SCHOLZ, К.: A normatív tényálladéki elemek problémája (The problem of normative facts 
constituting a case] (Budapest 1940), pp. 58 and 62 as an early formuládon. 
62 WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Statement on the Relation of Conduct and Norm" Logique et Analyse (1970) Nos. 
49-50, p. 167. 
63 E.g. WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Facts in Law" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 59 (1973), p. 175. 
64 Cf., e.g., TARUFFO, M.: "Value Judgements in the Judgement of Fact" Archívum luridicum Cracoviense, 
(1985) No. 18, p. 50. 
65 STONE, J.: Precedent and Law (Sydney, etc. 1985), term used in ch. 4. 
66 Cf., e.g., GIZBERT-STUDNICK1, T.: "Vagueness, Open Texture and Law" Archívum luridicum 
Cracoviense, (1983) No. 16, p. 27. 
67 E.g. ibid., p. 18. 
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natural language; or the grade of the participation in the crime in the legal language), the 
basic indeterminacy cannot be eliminated, yet whatever our interpretation of whichever 
element, the interpretation will merely start a chain reaction that will eventually influence 
all the other components.68 
So, there arises an unavoidable dilemma: either one must avoid the specifying 
definitions (even the unification of the usage of the terminology), lest the judicial 
evaluation be infringed or made impossible and thus the entire construction be rendered 
useless.69 Or - in the opposite case—one must try to eliminate the uncertainty by way of 
definition. The letter, however, has the defect that it can never be complete or devoid of 
discrepancies. (For instance, if we define drunkenness as "absence of control over own 
actions", then we have coupled the cause with only one of the concomitant effects, while 
drunkenness is only one of the possible causes that may result in the loss of self-control. 
When, on the other side, one tries to define drunkenness in a measurable and 
demonstrable way, i.e. by the concentration of alcohol in the blood, then one becomes 
involved in the web of various reasons that may generate the alcohol-concentration; 
however, the limits of proof may exclude a number of directions. For instance, in the 
event when the taking of blood, or its valuation as the definition of drunkenness, are 
made impossible by forensic considerations.70 
Accordingly, it is especially in the cases of deliberate uncertainties (i.e. in the case of 
the use of evaluative terms) that the claim of quantification will arise (i.e., their reduction 
to quantitative detenninations). In the literature that appears as the condition of a guaran-
teed statutory regulation, i.e., nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege ft At the 
same time, it is known from practice that any such reduction will remain a desideratum 
since it cannot eliminate the uncertainty, at most it may lessen it partially and in certain 
directions. In other words, it will transfer the source of indeterminacy onto the quantifying 
term, yet at the cost of leaving the uncertainty intact in the non-quantified directions.72 
The analytical theory of law summarises the position as follows: whilst our insight, 
our experience and our routine may suggest an identity; nevertheless, as soon as it 
becomes debated or questionable that the facts of a given case are, in effect, the facts of 
a normative definition, then we are forced to adopt the following reasoning: the former 
"resembles [the latter] 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects". However, this reasoning lacks 
two basic definitions. To wit: it is not unequivocal, what we mean by "relevant respects", 
68 E.g., ibid., pp. 20-21. 
69 BOLAND, G.: "La notion d'urgence dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etal de Belgique" in Le fait et le 
droit (Bruxelles 1961), pp. 175 et seq. 
70 Cf., e.g., MOTTE, M. Th.: "L'évolution de la notion d'état d'ivresse dans la répression de l'ivresse au 
volant" in Le fait et le droit, pp. 245 et seq. 
71 Cf. WOLTER, W.: "Sadowe zastepowanie ilosciowych znamion ocennych przez znamiona okreslone 
liczbowo" Panstwo i Prawo 32 (1977) 1, p. 4 and Gizbert-Studnicki, p. 26. 
72 Cf. GIZBERT-STUDNICKI, pp. 25-26. 
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secondly, what will qualify (and under what conditions) as being ascertainable as 
'"sufficiently' resembling".73 
Thus, on the one hand, "certainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use 
of general classifying terms". On the other hand, this is not simply an abandonment of 
something. In point of fact, it is an inevitable condition that the continued adaptation to 
the varying circumstances should be assured (while leaving the normative web intact), 
that is that, even in the medium of constancy, the desired—and still supportable-degree 
of change will be made possible.74 
Formerly, we had considered the apparently differing sides of fact and law in a unity; 
now, in a similar manner, the question "What is?" and the question "What we want to 
do or to achieve?" will also be intertwined. Thus the sources of uncertainty are twofold 
while at die same time being strictly interrelated. So we might say that these two 
connected handicaps can be expressed by the "relative ignorance of fact" and the "relative 
indeterminacy of aim".75 
As to the place of facts in this duality, they are characterised—as seen before—partly 
by indeterminacies, partly by the impossibility of determination. We might say that: "If 
the world in which we live were characterised only by a finite number of features, and 
these together with all the modes in which they could combine were known to us, the 
provision could be made in advance for every possibility."76 But that is sheer Utopia. It 
is not merely an Utopia which cannot be realised accidentally; it is one that is 
conceptually excluded. For fact is a relational concept, standing for the actual possession 
of the outside world in our changing pracdce. 
It may appear paradoxical ihat not even Leibniz had reckoned with this. Although he 
had aimed at the linguistic denomination of every possible concept in his Characteristica 
universalis, in creating the Calculus rationator, he aimed at the logical projection of their 
every possible mode.77 Meanwhile, the question is not just whether these facts are 
discrete and whether they exist in an objective manner (i.e., independently of their 
cognisance), further whether it is possible to compile their complete catalogue. Instead, 
the question is also, what is the role of the language in these cognitive operations, and 
what are the instrumental consequences of the circumstances in which the use of 
language cannot be avoided. 
73 Terms by HART, H. L. A.: The Concept of Law (Oxford 1961), p. 124. 
74 Cf., e.g., ibid.. p. 125 and WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Fuzziness of Legal System" in A. Peczenik et al. (eds.) 
Essays in Legal Theory (Dordrecht 1983), p. 328. 
75 HART, p. 125. 
76 Ibidem. 
77 Cf. VARGA, Cs.: "On the Socially Determined Nature of Legal Reasoning" in Ch. Perelman (ed.) Etudes 
de logique juridique, V (Bruxelles 1973), p. 602 and RÖD, W.: Geometrischer Geist und Naturrecht (München 
1970), ch. IV. Only in WITTGENSTEIN, L.: Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), section 4.26, p. 137, can 
we read the productive ambiguity on that the total number of Elementarsätze describes reality exhaustively. At 
the same time this formulation, as a principle of explanation, applies exclusively to the given reconstruction, 
and not to reality. 
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At this juncture I refer to the relation of language and reality, more precisely, to the 
appropriation of reality through language, for in the said relation language shows a 
multiple linkage inducing a structural particularity; an almost inevitable discrepancy. The 
mentioned discrepancy is truly expressed in the paradoxical statement "particularly in 
respect of the law", according to which "the more precise its concepts are, the less they 
represent reality".78 
The answer is found in what language philosophy designates as the open texture of 
natural language. The following is at issue here: "We introduce a concept and limit it in 
some directions!...]. This suffices for our present needs [...]. We tend to overlook the fact 
that there are always other directions in which the concept has not been defined." Thus, 
the "open texture" is an objectively present, inextricable limitation (due to the inherent 
indeterminacy of any linguistic communication) with the result that "it is not possible to 
define a concept [...] with absolute precision", for "the extension of the concept is not 
closed by a frontier [...]. It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules". Pis we know, this 
situation cannot be changed by any subsequent effort at limitation.79 
While the open texture of language may constitute a problem in everyday 
communication, or in science, nowhere does it appear as such an unavoidable limitation 
and a criterion as in legal reasoning. In the latter, namely, the subject matter of 
communication is not some kind of external reality (expressed, indicated or merely 
referred to by linguistic means), but a conceptual construction within the frame of an 
authoritative text, where the construction is inextricably intertwined with its linguistic 
form. Here we are faced with a fact determined in a normative context as an individual 
occurrence, which has to be subsumed under facts that, according to their generalised 
abstract linguistic definition, constitute a legal case.80 
When the concrete is subjected to the abstract, one has to deal, exclusively, with the 
normative correspondence of the former to the externally recognisable signs of these facts 
that constitute a case in law. So much so that the said signs or the underlying conceptual 
construction may be irrecognisably detached from the teleological projection that had, 
originally, served as a basis of the legislation in the given matter. All that need not 
change even slighdy the functional importance of the given normative regulation. For the 
advantages derived from this instrumental transformation, we merely have to pay with 
the possibility of certain specific discrepancies.81 
In the said linguistic medium, there is always the possibility of an alternative solution (in 
the sense of approximate definitions); there is always another path, solution or leeway. Of 
course, this secondary solution can, ultimately, be only justified by an evaluative choice.82 
78 PARAIN-V1AL, A.: "La nature du concept juridique et la logique" in Archives de Philosohie du Droit [La 
logique du droit] XI (Paris 1961), p. 49. 
79 WAISMANN, F.: "Verifiability" in A. Flew (ed.) Essays on Logic and Language (Oxford: 1961), p. 49. 
80 WILLIAMS (1945): p. 191, presenting it as a common feature of law and theology. 
81 Cf., e.g., VARGA, Cs. and SZÁJER, J.: "Presumption and Fiction" Archiv für Rechts- und Sozial-
philosophie, 48 (1988) 2, pp. 168 et seq. 
82 E.g. WRÓBLEWSKI (1983), p. 323. 
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That explains the fact that, in order to replace the logic of norms, there was already 
introduced, at an early stage, the logic of choice as a seemingly all-redeeming answer. The 
underlying consideration hold that while logic was present in legal reasoning, yet it was 
not as a means of the identification of already made premises, and the conclusions derived 
from the latter, but rather as the means of controlling the selection and the definition of 
these very premises. 
According to its doctrine, "rules are understood to be tools for guiding inferences 
leading to action".83 In other words, the logic of choice is called to see to it that "the 
interpretation of laws be consistent with the policy of legal rules" in a rationally justifiable 
way;84 moreover, its conceptual framework should be such where the "policy" is 
synonymous with the term "purpose".85 
Consequently, the question, "Is there always a right answer?"86 may be extended, as 
it is warranted even if applied to facts. In the process which culminates in the decision,87 
any other consideration regarding the facts can solely be expressed in that what is called 
"finn detennination".88 
As a result, all that can be of a cognitive character for the decision-maker faced with 
the facts and their conceptual classification, will be dissolved by the normative sub-
ordination—i.e., when the decision classifying the concrete-individual is justified in the 
nonnative context. For centuries, some classical judicial dicta have relied on this 
perception. One of such outbursts says: "Courts of Justice ought not to be puzzled by such 
old scholastic questions as to where the horse's tail begins and where it ceases. You are 
obliged to say, This is a horse's tail', at some time."89 
Nothing more should be said in this respect. It is not our language that has to be 
blamed but our false expectations. The uncertainty lies not in linguistic deficiency. "It is 
a vague rule [...], it is something like having to draw a line between night and day; there 
is a great duration of twilight when it is neither night nor day, but on the question now 
before the Court, though you cannot draw the precise line, you can say on which side of 
the line the case is."90 
83 GOTTLIEB, G.: The Logic of Choice (London 1968), p. 157. 
84 Ibid., p. 128. 
85 WRÓBLEWSKI, J.: "Comments" Logique el Analyse, (1970) No. 51, p. 382. 
86 Cf. PECZENIK, A.: "Is There Always a Right Answer to a Legal Question?" in Essays in Legal Theory, 
pp. 239 et seq. 
87 GUEST, A. G.: "Logic in the Law" in A. G. Guest (ed.): Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford 1961) 
stresses this on p. 188. 
88 Thus, e.g., OCKELTON: p. 107. 
89 CHITTY, J.: in Lavery v. Pursell 39 Ch. D. 508 (1888), p. 517; see WILLIAMS: (1945), p. 184. 
90 Hobbs v. L and S. W. Ry. (1875) L. R. 10 Q. B. I l l at 121, quoted by WILLIAMS (1945): p. 184. 
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Economic analysis of law plays a central role in American legal education.1 
Several contemporary journals are devoted to the topic, and most major law 
schools have allocated at least one full-time faculty position to a professional 
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1 By economic analysis of law we refer to that body of work usually traced to Ronald Coase's seminal essay 
and currently expounded by Judge Richard A. Posner. See, COASE, R.: "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 Journal 
of Law <t Economics, 1 (1960); POSNER, R. A.: Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986). Economics has long 
been used to critique various areas of administrative law such as utility regulation and antitrust. The new 
scholarship extends economic analysis to the common law—property, tort, contracts—and to the laws of crimes 
and civil procedure. See e.g., CALABRESI, G: "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts", 70 
Yale Law Journal, 499 (1961) (a seminal application of economics to the law of tort); BECKER, G. S.: The 
Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976) (economic analysis of marriage and crime). For a discussion of 
tire central tenets of law and economics see infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text. 
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economist.2 Interest in law and economics research is growing overseas as well. In a 
recent issue of the International Review of Law and Economics, scholars from seven 
Western European nations and Japan report an expanding influence of economic analysis 
of law in their respective countries.3 Conspicuously absent from this symposium issue 
is any representative from the emerging democracies of East-Central Europe. Yet, it is 
in these emerging democracies that the insights of law and economics research are most 
needed. This article demonstrates that the economic approach to law can be particularly 
useful as East-Central Europeans seek to implement legal reforms. 
Hungarian contract law provides our paradigm. A commission of legal experts has 
recently been impaneled to suggest reforms to the contract provisions of the Hungarian 
Civil Code. Although panel members agree on the ultimate goal of the reforms—a contract 
system attuned to a modern market economy—there is some debate on how this is best 
achieved. We advance this debate by providing an economic analysis of selected provi-
sions of the Hungarian Civil Code. We argue that similar economic analyses would prove 
useful in other areas of Hungarian law and in other East-Central European nations as 
well. 
Part I of this article provides a brief history of Hungarian contract law so as to place 
current reform issues in historical context. Part II identifies and discusses three 
fundamental tenets of contemporary economic analysis of law as it has developed in the 
United States. In Part III, we use these tenets to critique three provisions of the 
Hungarian Civil Code. We compare each Hungarian provision to analogous provisions 
in various Western nations and then provide an economic critique. These critiques 
illustrate the power of economic analysis to guide the legal reform process now 
underway throughout East-Central Europe. We conclude by raising and addressing four 
potential obstacles to the implementation of economic jurisprudence in the post-
communist world. 
I. Twentieth Century Evolution of Hungarian Contract Law 
In the past fifty years Hungarians have transformed their economy from market 
capitalism to central planning to market socialism. With the advent of each economic 
regime, the rules of business, including contract law, changed. Once again, reform is 
in the offing. In this section, we place current contract reform issues in historical 
context. 
2 See LANDES, W. M. and POSNER, R. A.: "The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study", 
36 Journal of Law & Economics 385 (1993) (chronicling the growing influence of law & economics in legal 
citations); Symposium, "The Place of Economics in Legal Education", 33 Journal of Legal Education, 183 
(1983). 
3 Symposium, "Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future", 11 International Review 
of Law and Economics, 261 (1991). 
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Contract Law under Central Planning: 1949-1968 
Hungary emerged as an independent nation with the fall of the Hapsburg dynasty at the 
end of World War I.4 During the interwar period much of Hungarian law was codified. 
Contract law was noL5 Hungarians relied on their courts to develop a set of contract 
precedents reflecting market principles.6 These precedents, often borrowed from German 
experience, established a contract law regime largely indistinguishable from regimes 
found in other market economies during the 1930's.7 
Communism was ushered in with the 1949 Hungarian Constitution. The new 
economic orthodoxy argued that markets polarized wealth, underproduced public goods, 
overproduced externalities, and generally led to the exploitation of working people.8 
Central planning would be the answer to these social ills. To implement planning, 
property was divided into three types: social property held by state organs and 
cooperatives; personal property such as flats and clothing held by individuals; and 
private property such as the work tools of small artisans.9 
Planning necessitated changes in contract law as well.10 These changes, initially 
implemented through governmental decrees, were codified in the Hungarian Civil Code 
of 1959." Under the new system, contract law was bifurcated.12 Contracts involving 
personal or private property continued to be regulated under the traditional doctrines of 
the 1930's. Hungarian interwar precedents were not erased, they were codified. Hence, 
in the area of petty trade, Hungarian courts, even at the height of central planning, 
continued to gain experience with traditional contract doctrines. Contracts involving social 
4 See KOVÁCS, I.: "Hungary", in 1 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 13 (1978) (chronicling 
the early twentieth century history of Hungarian law). 
5 See LONTAI, E.: "Codification of the Law of Contracts", in Questions of Civil Law Codification 111, 
111-117 (A. Harmathy & Á. Németh eds., 1990). 
6 Id. at 113. 
7 KOVÁCS, supra note 4, at 15. 
8 See generally BERGSON, A.: "Socialist Economics", in 1 A Survey of Contemporary Economics 412 
(E. Howard ed., 1948) (summarizing the debate between market advocates and leading socialist economists). 
9 This property scheme was reflected in Act XX of 1949 the Hungarian Constitution and codified in the 
Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 (hereinafter PTK (1959)). 
10 For a general discussion of contract law under central planning see: FARNS WORTH, E. A. & MOZOLIN, 
V. P.: Contract Law in the U.S.S.R. (1987). 
11 An English translation of the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 complete with amendments was published by 
the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce in 1990. This translation is particularly useful because it collects the 
original 1959 language in bold face type and presents amendments in standard typeface. Hereinafter, references 
to the Hungarian Code rely on that translation. 
12 This bifurcation between contracts involving personal or private property and contracts involving state 
property was common to all socialist countries. See KISHIN, A.: "Economic Reform and Contract Law in the 
U.S.S.R.", 28 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 253 (1990) (describing a similar dichotomy in the Soviet 
contract system); CLOS, G. G.: "The Czechoslovak Civil Code of 1964 and its 1982 Amendment Within the 
Framework of Czechoslovak Civil Law", 6 New YoHc Law School Journal of International and Comparative 
IMW, 215 (1986) (identifying the same dichotomy in Czechoslovak contract law). 
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property, by contrast, were administered under special rules designed to support 
planning.13 Of course, since most property was state owned, these so called "planned" 
contracts were dominant. 
From a legalistic viewpoint, a planned contract looked much like any other.14 
There was an offer and acceptance, damages for breach, and other legal issues common 
to all contracts. The key distinction lay in the scope of the "free will" of the parties.15 
State enterprises entered into planned contracts pursuant to directive. Offers and 
acceptances were compulsory, not voluntary.16 In the event of breach, the parties were 
compelled to sue so as to activate the jurisdiction of the Central Economic Arbitration 
Committee.17 These arbiters had wide discretion to rework the contract to account for 
changing economic conditions.18 The language of the parties, if relevant at all, was 
secondary to the needs of the plan.19 In short, planned contracts were public matters, not 
private. There was no change of ownership because both parties to the contract were 
owned by the state. Planned contracts simply served as means of administering the state 
plan. 
Contract Law Under Market Socialism: 1968-1989 
By 1968 Hungarians had become disenchanted with the economic theory of central 
planning. Socialism had largely succeeded in evening the distribution of wealth and was 
not seen as the culprit. The problem was central planning. Planners simply did not have 
sufficient information to effectively coordinate a national economy.20 Hungarians 
responded by turning to the theory of market socialism.21 Coined the "New Economic 
13 The distinctively socialistic elements of Hungarian contract law appeared most notably in a chapter on 
"planned contracts". That chapter was repealed in 1978. 
14 For a fuller development of this argument see OSTAS, D. T.: "Institutional Reform in East-Central Europe: 
Hungarian and Polish Contract Law", 26 Journal of Economic Issues, 513 (1992). 
15 See EÖRSI, Gy.: "Contracts in Socialist Economy", 7 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
3 (1981) (providing a similar observation). 
16 See, e.g., PTK, para. 206 (1959) (compulsory contracts). 
17 See, e.g., PTK, para. 3 1 6, 318 (1959) (compulsory law suit). The Central Economic Arbitration Committee 
was formally abolished in 1972. 
18 EÖRSI, supra note 15, at 5. 
19 Id. 
20 The most severe criticisms of central planning came from Austrian economists. See HAYEK, F. A.: 
Socialist Calculation: The Competitive Solution, 7 Economica 125 (1940) (a seminal critique identifying 
information problems as the source of planning failures); MISES, L. von: Economic Calculation in Socialism 
(1922), reprinted in BORNSTEIN, M.: Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Cases (1969) (complexities 
of modern economies doom planning to failure). 
21 The theory of market socialism was initially designed to answer the criticisms of Hayek and Mises. See 
LANGE, О.: "On the Economic Theory of Socialism", 4 Review of Economic Studies, 60 (1936) (a seminal 
work on the economic theory of market socialism); LEARNER, A. P.: The Economics of Control (1944) (the 
first formal model of decentralized socialism). See also MURRELL, P.: "Did the Theory of Market Socialism 
Answer the Challenge of Ludwig von Mises? A Reinterpretation of the Socialist Controversy", 15 History 
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Mechanism", the new theory called for decentralizing the decision making process.22 
The government would continue to plan, but the plans would no longer be implemented 
through compulsory contracts.23 National goals were to be achieved through indirect 
means: wage and price controls, subsidies, credits, taxes, and assorted regulations. The 
idea was to place the various state enterprises in a regulatory environment where their 
independent contractual choices would implement the plan.24 Whereas central planning 
had combined state property with state contracting, market socialism linked state property 
with the principle of freedom of contract.25 
The contract provisions of the Civil Code were amended in 1978 to reflect the new 
economic system.26 The chapter on planned contracts was repealed and the formal 
distinction between planned contracts and private contracts was abolished.27 
Henceforth, all contractual disputes would be resolved in the civil courts.28 The 
provisions designed to support compulsory contracts remained on the books but fell into 
disuse. Enterprise autonomy and the primacy of contractual relations were formally 
recognized.2 ' By 1978, the contract provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code looked 
distinctively western.30 
of Political Economy, 92 (1983) (discussing the debate between the market socialists and their Austrian 
critics). 
22 See IZDEBSKI, H.: "Legal Aspects of Economic Reform in Socialist Countries", 37 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 455 (1989) (comparing the Hungarian experiment with market socialism to similar efforts 
in other centrally planned economies). 
23 Direct planning officially ended with Act VIII of 1972 on Economic Planning (plan from above not 
binding on stale enterprises). 
24 The legal foundations of the New Economic Mechanism were reflected in the Hungarian Constitution as 
amended by Act I of 1972 amending Act XX of 1949. These essential points were: (1) social ownership of the 
means of production; (2) state planning; (3) enterprise autonomy; and (4) the exercise of private property rights 
must not be prejudicial to the interests of the state. See HARMATHY, A.: "Building Contracts and Variations 
in Hungarian Law", 31 Acta Juridica 307, 308 (1989). 
25 Additional legislation provided a host of institutions designed to support market activity: joint venture law 
(1980); antitrust law (1984); bankruptcy law (1986); commercial banks (1987); value added tax (1988); income 
tax (1988); and joint stock companies (1988). For a taxonomy and discussion of these laws see IZDEBSKI, H.: 
"Legal Aspects of Economic Reform in Socialist Countries", 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 703 
(1989). Of course, all of this was achieved without abandoning socialist principles. The state remained the 
residual owner of most Hungarian wealth. 
26 See SZILBEREKY, J.: "The Civil Code Amended and Restated", 20 Acta Juridica, 5 (1978) (discussing 
the key 1978 amendments). 
27 See EÖRSI, Gy.: "Contracts in Hungary after the Economic Reform", 11 Acta Juridica, 25 (1969) 
(analyzing the changes in contract law needed to implement market socialism). 
28 Act IV of 1972 abolished the Central Economic Arbitration Committee. 
29 Autonomy is recognized in PTK, para. 57-61 and para 170-171. The primacy of contractual relations is 
codified in PTK, para. 31-36 and para. 43-56. 
30 Of course, there are some differences from contemporary American contract law. For example, reflecting 
a civil law tradition, the Hungarian Code does not require an exchange of consideration. Promises to give gifts 
are fully enforceable. PTK, para. 579-582 (1959). Reflecting a shortage economy, there is also a presumption 
in favor of specific performance over damages. PTK, para. 295-311 (1959). 
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Notwithstanding its theoretical virtues, the twenty year experiment with market 
socialism is now regarded as a dismal failure." Empirical evidence suggests that 
Hungarian economic performance was actually worse under the New Economic 
Mechanism than it would have been under central planning.32 Several explanations 
have been offered. Some argue that market socialism was never given a fair chance 
because interest groups forced the government to reverse many reforms.33 Others argue 
that planners intervened so much in the decision making process that enterprise 
managers did not enjoy true autonomy.34 Any market efficiency gains were drowned 
in a sea of wage and price controls, government regulations, subsidies, and credits.35 
At least one commentator has identified monopoly power as a central culprit.36 Each 
of these criticisms could be answered with further reforms. Theoretically, Hungarians 
could retain market socialism and reform it by controlling interest groups, removing 
price controls, and providing effective antitrust enforcement. 
The more radical criticisms come from those who resurrect the arguments of Hayek 
and Mises.37 From an Austrian perspective, there is no room for mere reform; a radical 
change to market capitalism provides the only means of effectively organizing the 
Hungarian economy. Any system that retains state ownership will be hopelessly 
inefficient.38 In Hungary, these more radical voices have carried the day. There is 
31 Eastern Europeans who once championed market socialism are now completely disillusioned with the 
theory. See, e.g., BRUS, W.: "The Eastern European Reforms: What Happened to Them?", 31 Soviel Studies, 
257 (1979); KORNAI, J.: "The Hungarian Reform Process", 24 J. Economic Literature, 1687 (1986); 
SÁRKÖZY, T.: "Legal Problems of the Improvement of the Hungarian Economic Management System", 28 
Acta Juridica, 29 (1986). 
32 See RICHET, X.: The Hungarian Model: Markets and Planning in a Socialist Economy (1985); 
WHITESELL, R. S.: "Estimates of the Output Loss from Allocative Inefficiency: A Comparison of Hungary 
and West Germany", 16 Eastern European Economy, 89 (1989). 
33 See, e.g., BEREND, I. T.: "The Crisis of Hungarian Reform in the 1970's", 40 Acta Oeconomica 105 
(1989); SIPOS, A. & TARDOS, M.: "Economic Control and the Structural Interdependence of Organizations 
in Hungary at the End of the Second Reform Decade", 16 Eastern European Economy, 153 (1989). 
34 See, e.g., KORNAI, supra note 31. 
35 See ERICSON, R.: "The Gassical Soviet Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for 
Reform", 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (1991) (market socialism failures due to price controls). 
36 See HARE, P. G.: "From Central Planning to Market Economy: Some Microeconomic Issues", 100 
Economic Journal, 581 (1990). 
37 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
38 The inefficiencies associated with market socialism derive from two primary factors. First, state ownership 
generates a host of "agency costs". No single individual or group of individuals bears the risk of loss or has 
claim to residual profits of enteqrri.se activity. Without a residual owner, there is no one to restrain enterprise 
managers from using the firm's assets for their own purposes or to control managerial shirking. See SAJÓ, A.: 
"Diffuse Rights in Search of an Agent: A Property Rights Analysis of the Firm in the Socialist Market 
Economy", 10 International Review of Law and Economics, 41 (1990). The second inefficiency derives from 
imperfect information. The success or failure of a state enterprise is determined with reference to the state plan. 
The problem, of course, is that planners must rely on information supplied by enterprise managers. This creates 
an incentive to supply false information. See generally KORNAI, J.: Economics of Shortage (1980). Even 
assuming that planners had true information and that planners were loyal fiduciaries to state interests, one would 
Economic Analysis of Post-Communist Legal Reforms 195 
virtually no constituency advocating the mere reform of market socialism. The question 
is how best to privatize.39 
Current Issues in Hungarian Contract Law Reform 
The Hungarian Civil Code divides into six parts.40 Part Four arranges the rules of 
"obligation" under three titles.41 Title One contains rules common to any type of con-
tract. Here one finds rules of offer and acceptance,42 modification,43 performance,44 
breach,45 assignment,46 and the like. Title Three provides standard terms and regu-
lations for about twenty-five specific types of transactions. For example, the Code 
provides rules on sale contracts,47 delivery contracts,48 leases,49 bank loans,50 and 
insurance contracts.51 
The Hungarian reform commission is currently focussing on three issues. First, there 
is a general feeling among panel members that the rules contained in Title One may 
need to be updated. These rules initially codified the contract precedents of the 1930's; 
most have not been modified since. Second, there may be a need to add some modern 
"transaction-types" to Title Three. For example, the Hungarian Code does not provide 
standard terms governing franchise agreements. If one were to draft standard franchise 
still be left with the insurmountable problems of coordinating a national economy See HAYEK: supra note 21 ; 
MISES supra note 20. 
39 During the current transition, changes in property law and issues involving the distribution of property 
rights must take center stage. The vast majority of Hungarian wealth is still in state hands and transferring this 
wealth to private owners is no small task. Western scholars have responded with a virtual avalanche of advise 
on how to privatize state assets. For a sampling of this literature see DANIELS, R. & HOWSE, R.: "Reforming 
the Reform Process: A Critique of Proposals for Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe", 25 New York 
University Journal of International Law A Politics, 27 (1992); GÁBOR, F. A.: "The Quest for Transformation 
to a Market Economy: Privatization and Foreign Investment in Hungary", 24 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 269 (1991). 
40 The six parts are: (I) Introduction; (II) Persons; (III) Ownership; (TV) Obligations; (V) Inheritance; and (VI) 
Closing. The parts are divided into titles, chapters, and paragraphs. The chapters and paragraphs are numbered 
consecutively throughout the Code. Citation is to paragraph number. See PTK, (1959). The structure of the 
Code has remained intact since 1959. The contract provisions have not been significantly amended since 1978. 
A few "cosmetic" changes intended to remove socialist rhetoric from the Code were enacted in 1990, 1991, and 
1993. 
41 The three titles are: Contracts, Torts, and Individual Contracts. PTK (1959). 
42 PTK, para. 205-218 (1959). 
43 PTK, para. 240-246 (1959). 
44 PTK, para. 277-297 (1959). 
45 PTK, para. 298-318 (1959). 
46 PTK, para. 328-333 (1959). 
47 PTK, para. 365-378 (1959). 
48 PTK, para. 379-388 (1959). 
49 PTK, para. 423-451 (1959). 
50 PTK, para. 522-535 (1959). 
51 PTK, para. 536-567 (1959). 
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terms, what should these terms be?52 The commission's third concern is more general. 
Some panel members fear an over-reaction to the laissez faire rhetoric of free-market 
advocates. Although Western nations vary on the judicial intervention allowed in private 
contracting, no Western nation follows a completely laissez faire policy. Yet, balancing 
government intervention in a society seeking to deregulate is tricky business. 
These reform issues are not unique to Hungary. In fact, they are not even unique 
to post-communist societies. Similar contract issues are present in every market 
economy. For example, Professor Allan Farnsworth provides a list of ten contemporary 
American contract issues." This list would provide a useful agenda for Hungarian 
reforms as well. What makes Hungary and other post-communist societies unique is the 
current reform atmosphere which encourages reconsideration of fundamental legal 
preconceptions. 
II. Economic Analysis of Contract Law: Three Central Tenets 
Over the past twenty years Western scholars have produced an unprecedented array of 
contract theories. Some have seen contract in retreat from tort law with the growth of 
government crowding out the market.54 Others have sought to denigrate traditional 
freedom of contract principles as outdated "neoclassicism" and to replace the doctrine 
with sociologically based relational concepts.55 Others have sought to unify contract 
doctrine based on moral philosophy or cultural history.56 Still others have found an 
52 This is no easy matter; a review of American franchise law reveals a host of contentious issues with no 
clear judicial consensus on many. See EMERSON, R. W.: "Franchise Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent 
Agents: An Empirical and Policy Analysis of 'Common Knowledge' about Franchising", 20 Hofstra Law 
Review, 609 (1992) (exploring some vagaries of American franchise law); STADFELD, L. S.: "Comment on 
Proposed U.S. Franchise Legislation: A Search for Balance", 97 Com. L J. 540 (1992). 
53 FARNSWORTH, E. A.: "Developments in Contract Law during the 1980's: The Top Ten", 41 Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, 203 (1990). The list includes: (1) "bad faith breach" and the role of punitive 
damages in contract law; (2) erosion of the "employment at will" doctrine and expansion of contractual liability 
for wrongful discharge; (3) liability based on precontractual negotiations; (4) interpreting "long-term contracts" 
in the light of relational factors such as trust; (5) public policy limitations on "intimate" contracts; (6) the role 
of reliance and/or formalities in contract formation; (7) the relationship between contract and tort; (8) the role 
of "unconscionability" and related doctrines; (9) the impact of various abstract theories on legal practice; and 
(10) the role of international and comparative law in shaping domestic policy. 
54 See, e.g., GILMORE, G.: The Death of Contract (1974) (tort law has all but replaced contract as a source 
of civil liability); ATIYAH, P. S.: The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) (waning of contract a direct 
result of government growth). 
55 See, e.g., MACNEIL, I. R.: "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, 
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law", 72 Northwestern University Law Review, 854 (1978). For an even 
more biting critique of free contracting see UNGER, R. M.: The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983) 
(market systems based on oppression). 
56 See, e.g., FRIED, С.: Contract as Promise (1981) (contract law best understood with reference to 
libertarian moral philosophy); HORWITZ, M. J.: The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1974) 
(explaining the logic of contract law in a historical context). 
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underlying economic logic to contract law.57 In this section, we identify and explore 
three central tenets associated with this economic approach to contract law: "deferring 
to individual autonomy;" "reducing transaction costs;" and "providing stability." We 
argue that strict adherence to these tenets provides the best means of updating the 
Hungarian Code to reflect the needs of a modern market economy.58 
Tenet 1: Deferring to Individual Autonomy 
The economic approach to contract law begins with the premise that private agreements 
should be enforced in accordance with their terms. A party does not agree to an 
exchange unless he or she believes it is in his or her interest to do so, and a voluntary 
exchange, duly consummated, makes both parties better off. This potential for mutual 
advantage through private contracting has been the principal lesson of economic theory 
since the time of Adam Smith.59 Institutionalized in the principle of freedom of 
contract, this lesson continues to guide the economic approach to contract law. 
A general regime of freedom of contract can be justified on either libertarian or 
utilitarian grounds.60 Economic analysis of law tends to emphasize the utilitarian, or 
consequentialist, base.61 In other words, freedom of contract is justified not as a moral 
right, but as a pragmatic institution designed to solve economic and social problems. 
No one has been more articulate in explaining the economic consequences of a 
general regime of freedom of contract than the Austrian economist, Friedrich von 
57 See, e.g., KRONMAN, A. T. & POSNER, R. A.: The Economics of Contract Law (1979); Readings in the 
Economics of Contract Law (Victor P. Goldberg ed., 1989) (a collection of works illustrating a variety of 
approaches to the law and economics interface). 
58 Economic analysis of law can be either positive, demonstrating that the law has an internal economic logic, 
or normative, proposing that law should conform to external economic criteria. Both forms of analysis have 
their supporters and critics. See POSNER, R. A.: The Problems of Jurisprudence 353-392 (1990) (discussing 
the normative/positive dichotomy and identifying the chief criticisms and central virtues of each approach). 
Since we argue that Hungarian law should respond to economic criteria, our analysis is distinctively normative. 
59 See SCHUMPETER, J.: History of Economic Analysis 187 (1954) (observing that for Adam Smith, 
specialization and the resulting gains from trade are "practically the only factors in economic progress"); 
BUCHANAN, J.: Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy 26-29 (1987) (arguing that 
the potential gains from voluntary exchange is virtually the sole lesson of economic theory). 
60 See EPSTEIN, R. A.: "Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal", 18 Journal of Law & Economics, 293, 
293-295 (1975). The libertarian approach places contracting within a broader scheme of moral entitlements that 
specifies how resources may be acquired (property law), used (tort law), and transferred (contract law). See 
EPSTEIN, R. A.: "The Static Conception of the Common Law", 9 Journal of Legal Studies, 253, 255 (1980). 
In a liberal conception of justice, property rights carve out zones of individual authority with which others may 
not interfere. For property rights to have meaning, the parties must be free to transfer their entitlements as they 
see fit and free from non-voluntary confiscation of their rights by others. See NOZICK, R.: Anarchy State and 
Utopia (1974) (specifying the moral underpinnings of a libertarian entitlement theory). 
61 See POS N ER, supra note 58, at 353-392 (linking economic jurisprudence to a mature form of prag-
matism). 
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Hayek.62 Hayek was concerned with the inherent problems created by the dispersal of 
knowledge in society.63 Human beings confront myriad ways of using physical resources, 
including their own labor. Knowledge of the uses to which resources may be put and of 
individual preferences is widely dispersed throughout society. Much of this knowledge is 
difficult, if not impossible, to communicate. To complicate matters, individual preferences 
change over time. For an economic system to operate efficiently, it must account for this 
dispersal of knowledge and for the temporal quality of individual preferences. Hayek saw 
two options—central planning or decentralized markets. For a centralized system to work, 
someone would have to (1) collect information on a grand scale, (2) process that 
information into a coherent plan, and (3) administer the plan by controlling and directing 
all relevant actions.64 Information problems frustrate each step in this process. In this 
light, the failure of central planning derives not from the impossibility of central planning 
per se, but from the impossibility of using central controls to handle dispersed knowledge. 
The principle of freedom of contract provides a means of addressing information 
problems. The principle encompasses two distinct subparts: freedom to contract and 
freedom from contract.65 Freedom to contract means that parties are free to transfer their 
rights in any way they deem fit. This enables individuals to take advantage of their own 
idiosyncratic preferences and personal knowledge of closely held resources. Freedom 
from contract ensures that rights will not be transferred without prior consent. By 
insisting that each party secure the consent of the other, each must take into account the 
idiosyncratic information of the other. Such a requirement enables the evolution of a 
powerful institution that allows information to be "encoded" and communicated. In short, 
an unencumbered principle of freedom of contract generates resource prices. Both non-
consensual transfers (e.g., required contract terms) and prohibited transfers (e.g., terms 
that are prohibited by public policy) short-circuit the price system and make it impossible 
for individuals to take the knowledge of others into account.66 
62 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. See also HAYEK, F. A.: Individualism and Economic 
Order (1948). 
63 See HAYEK, F. A.: "The Use of Knowledge in Society", 35 American Economic Review, 519 (1945). 
64 Hierarchies exist outside of centrally planned economies. The bureaucratic organization of corporate life 
also involves hierarchical control and is consequently plagued with informational problems. Hierarchies intro-
duce agency costs as those in control seek self gain at the cast of the collective. They also introduce incentive 
problems because each participant suffers the full costs of her inputs, but shares the benefits of the collective 
output. Hence, each has an incentive to shirk his or her duties. See WILLIAMSON, O. E.: Markets and 
Hierarchies (1975) (analyzing the systematic inefficiencies found in large organizations). 
65 See SPEIDEL, R. E.: "The New Spirit of Contract", 2 Journal of law and Commmerce, 193 (1982) 
(employing the same dichotomy). 
66 Not every resource is alienable. For example, public policies in most Western nations prohibit child labor 
contracts. Slavery has been abolished virtually worldwide, and most nations either prohibit or strictly regulate 
prostitution. Properly conceived, such limitations are not matters of contract law, but reside more deeply within 
a general theory of entitlements. See KRONMAN, A.: "Paternalism and the l a w of Contracts", 92 Yale Law 
Journal, 763 (1983) (discussing the contract law implications of the distinction between alienable and 
inalienable rights). 
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In summary, the first tenet of economic jurisprudence dictates a strong presumption 
against governmental intervention into the substance of private contractual matters. 
Contractual language that reflects a subjective agreement between the parties should be 
summarily enforced. 
Tenet 2: Reducing Transaction Costs 
The second tenet of law and economics provides that the law should do more than 
passively enforce private transfers, it should be proactive, seeking to make transfers less 
costly for the parties. This tenet is embodied in the economist's notion of "allocative 
efficiency". Economists define an efficient allocation of resources as that allocation 
which would result, in the absence of transaction costs, from the exhaustion of all 
mutually advantageous exchanges.67 Transaction costs include the costs of negotiating, 
performing, and enforcing the transfer of entitlements. High transaction costs frustrate 
private exchanges, impede the flow of resources, and distort prices. If contract law 
follows an economic logic, it should seek to reduce the costs of conducting private 
transfers. 
Contract law reduces transaction costs in three ways: (1) it encourages the 
performance of voluntary agreements by providing a sanction for breach; (2) it reduces 
negotiation costs by providing standard, or customary, terms for various types of 
transactions; and (3) it discourages misleading conduct in contract negotiations.68 We 
address each function in turn. 
The first function of contract law is to determine which transfers will be enforced and 
which will not. Our first tenet, deference to individual autonomy, suggests that the courts 
should enforce every transfer that reflects the free will of the entitlement holder, and 
refuse to enforce all nonconsensual transfers. Only subjectively understood transfers give 
true signals of individual preferences and knowledge. Given information problems, 
however, it is often difficult for parties to reach a true meeting-of-the-minds ex ante and 
for the courts to resolve subjective claims ex post.69 If a party were free to argue that 
he or she did not subjectively understand the promise he or she made, a serious erosion 
in the security of contracting would ensue. Hence, the law, by necessity, must rely on 
objective evidence of subjective consent.10 
67 POSNER, supra note 1, at 11-15. 
68 KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 57, at 4-5. 
69 See BARNETT, R. E.: "A Consent Theory of Contract", 86 Columbia Law Review, 269, 272-274 (1986). 
"It has long been recognized that a system of contractual enforcement would be unworkable if it adhered to will 
theory requiring a subjective inquiry into the putative promisor's intent." Id. at 272 (emphasis added). See also 
COHEN, F.: "The Basis of Contract", 46 Harvard Law Review, 533 (1933) (discussing the interplay between 
objective and subjective inquiries into contractual consent). 
70 Anthony Kronman and Richard Posner address the old dispute in contract law over whether the basis of 
contractual enforcement is objective or subjective. They write: Only a contract that involves an actual meeting 
of minds satisfies the economist's definition of a value-maximizing exchange; but the economist allows a place 
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Most contract doctrines serve this evidentiary function. For example, doctrines that 
require congruence between an offer and an acceptance, inquire into the reliance by the 
promisee, demand an exchange of consideration, require a writing, inquire into the 
presence of fraud or duress, or demand evidence of other bargaining formality all attend 
this evidentiary function. Each seeks to "objectify" an inherently subjective inquiry. The 
inevitable slippage in these evidentiary surrogates leads to problems of both over-
enforcement and under-enforcement of contractual language. Under-enforcement results 
when subjectively intended exchanges are not legally recognized. Over-enforcement 
occurs when a court forces a transfer that was not subjectively assented to by the affected 
party. The second tenet of economic jurisprudence suggests that the courts should resolve 
evidentiary disputes with an eye toward minimizing the sum of over-enforcement and 
under-enforcement costs.71 
Contract law also reduces costs by providing standard terms. Every contract involves 
both express and implied terms. It is not cost effective, or even possible, for parties to 
contemplate and account ex ante for every contingency that may arise in a contractual 
exchange. Contract law responds by providing standard terms, or "default rules," that fill 
in the gaps left in express language.72 Such rules reduce negotiation costs. Ideally, default 
rules reflect the terms the party would have drafted for themselves. This is achieved by 
enacting default rules ihat reflect the customs associated with various transaction types. So 
long as both parties to a transaction are familiar with these customs, their failure to ex-
pressly modify the default term gives presumptive evidence of their consent to iL73 Trou-
bles arise when parties to a contract do not share similar conventions.74 In such scenarios, 
judicial enforcement of the default term threatens to violate the first tenet of economic 
jurisprudence. In such a case, economic analysis suggests an enforcement of the default 
rule so as to provide an incentive for each party to master the language of the trade.75 
Economic reasoning also provides insights into the substance of customary terms. 
Many customs involve the allocation of risk. For example, an implied warranty in the 
sale of goods assigns the risk of faulty workmanship to the seller rather than to the buyer. 
Liability for goods damaged during shipping is customarily assigned to the common 
carrier. The purchase of real property customarily involves an equitable conversion which 
shifts the risk of fire damage to the buyer upon the signing of a contingent land sales 
for rules designed to prevent people from misleading others into thinking they have a contract with them; hence 
both the subjective and objective theories have a place in contract law. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 
57, at 5. 
71 For an application of this principle see OSTAS, D. T.: "Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An 
Economic Model and an Empirical Test", 29 American Business IMW Journal, 535 (providing evidence that 
American courts follow an economic logic in deciding unconscionability controversies). 
72 For a thorough and provocative analysis of the gap-filling function of contract law see BARNETT, R. E.: 
"The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent", 78 Virginia Law Review, 821 (1992). 
73 Id. at 885-897. 
74 Id. 
75 See POSNER, supra note 1, at 84. 
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contract In each case, it is in the interest of all parties that contractual risks be allocated 
to the party who can absorb them most efficiently.76 Typically, the seller is in the best 
position to assure quality in the production process; the shipper is in the best position to 
take precautions; and the home buyer is more efficient in buying insurance against fire. 
Default rules reduce transaction costs by reflecting these efficient allocations. 
Finally, contract law reduces transaction costs by assuring propriety in the contract 
negotiation process. Doctrines of fraud, undue influence, and unconscionability provide 
the paradigms. In a typical case, one party will assert that a contract reflects a voluntary 
agreement worthy of judicial enforcement, and the other party will seek to be excused 
from performing. The court must be alert to two forms of opportunism.77 Perhaps the 
first party has misled the second into signing a contract the second did not fully 
understand. On the other hand, the second party may simply be trying to excuse itself 
from its own bad bargain. Either type of opportunism increases the costs of conducting 
exchanges. A court following an economic logic will decide such cases so as to minimize 
the potential for these two types of costly opportunism, and thereby provide an incentive 
structure that encourages future parties to bargain more effectively.78 
In summary, the second tenet of law and economics provides a logic which unifies 
virtually all of the diverse doctrines that comprise contract law. It addresses the long-
standing debate over whether the law requires an objective or subjective manifestation 
of intent, the substance of gap-filling terms, and the rules that discourage impropriety in 
contract negotiations. Every rule seeks to reduce the costs of conducting private 
exchanges. 
Tenet 3: Providing Stability 
Contract rules cannot have their instrumental effects unless they are communicated to the 
relevant actors and consistently and impartially enforced. In a well known passage, Lon 
Fuller identified potential miscarriages in any liberal system of justice: 
[Tjhe attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at 
least eight ways; there are in this enterprise, if you will, eight distinct routes to 
disaster. The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that 
every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a 
failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules 
he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only 
cannot guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, 
since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make 
rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules; (6) rules that 
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such 
76 id. 
77 See OSTAS, supra note 71, at 550. 
78 Id. at 551-552. 
202 Daniel T. Ostas and Burt A. Leete 
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his actions by them; 
and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and 
their actual administration.79 
These caveats ring with added fervor in the transforming nations. The communist 
heritage was linked to an almost total disregard for respect for the rule of law.80 The 
recent pace and scope of legal reforms continues to introduce uncertainty. Post-
communist societies need to develop stable legal institutions which enable people to order 
their affairs. 
Strict adherence to the central tenets of economic theory provides a means of 
attaining legal stability. Taken collectively, the tenets provide a central logic that unifies 
contract doctrine in a predictable and communicable fashion. The first and third tenets 
provide a jurisprudential tone or attitude. The first admonishes against governmental 
intervention into the substance of private contracts; the third insists that legal rules be 
consistent and coherent. The details of individual doctrine are then determined with 
reference to the second tenet. Tenet 2 provides a powerful heuristic—cost reduction. 
Virtually every contract provision can be understood as a means of reducing transaction 
costs with due respect paid to individual autonomy and the need for legal stability. 
III. An Economic Analysis of the Hungarian Civil Code 
We now use the above tenets to analyze three selected provisions of the Hungarian Civil 
Code. The first provision, "socialist coexistence", provides an opportunity to analyze the 
economic approach to contractual ethics. The second, the "battle of the forms", applies 
an economic analysis to problems raised by the use of standardized form contracts. The 
final provision, "commercial impracticability", raises the economic issues associated with 
contract performance. We compare each Hungarian provision with its Western 
counterparts and provide an economic critique. The three critiques illustrate the power 
of economic reasoning to provide a coherent and stable approach to civil law doctrine. 
An Economic Analysis of Contractual Ethics: The "Norms of Socialist Coexistence" 
Every nation has contract provisions that specifically address the ethics of contractual 
behavior.81 In the West, the doctrines of good faith and unconscionability provide the 
79 FULLER, L. L.: The Morality of Law 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
80 For an often cited analysis of the rule of law under communist regimes, see HAZARD, J. N.: Communists 
and Their Law (1969). 
81 Contracting occurs within a context of social customs and shared ethical norms. Although these customs 
and norms ultimately derive from the individuals who make up a society, the law can play a role in reinforcing 
and promoting ethical conduct. See MacNEIL, I. R.: The New Social Contract (1980) (analyzing the social 
norms that support contractual behavior). Perhaps the most fundamental problem facing all post-communist 
societies is the lack of social consensus regarding the norms that support modern capitalism. The 
institutionalization of ethical norms takes time. 
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paradigms.82 Parties generally are free to seek self gain, but they are also expected to deal 
honestly with one another and to not take undue advantage of disparities in bargaining 
power. The 1959 version of the Hungarian Code did not use the word unconscionable, it 
did, however, employ an ethically charged concept—"the norms of socialist coexistence." 
The Code provided: "A contract shall also be null and void if it evidently injures the 
interests of society or disregards the norms of socialist coexistence. "83 The doctrine of 
socialist coexistence, like unconscionability, provided a flexible tool that could be used 
to instill an ethical baseline to private contractual activity.84 
Hungarians have recently removed much of the socialistic rhetoric from their Civil 
Code. In 1991, the phrase "norms of socialist coexistence" was deleted in favor of the 
term "good morals".85 The question, of course, is what does good morals, or alter-
natively, "unconscionable conduct" mean in a capitalist setting. This is no simple matter. 
Unconscionability means different things in different Western nations, and its use in any 
given nation is a matter of some controversy.86 In short, reinterpretation of the doctrine 
of socialist coexistence will require difficult policy choices. 
The economic tenets developed in Part II provide a useful guide to the reform 
process. Taken collectively, the tenets address the notion of contractual "fair play" in a 
reasoned and coherent fashion. In other words, they provide a means of replacing the 
"norms of socialist coexistence" with the "norms of market capitalism". 
The notion of contractual "fairness" has two components. One may argue that the 
substance of a contract is overly one-sided and hence unfair. Or one may argue that there 
82 Although every rule of contract law can been seen as resting on an ethical base, the notions of good faith 
and unconscionability are directly phrased in ethical terms. Section 2-103(l)(b) of Uniform Commercial Code 
defines good faith as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." 
The Legislative Comments to Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code refer to unconscionable conduct 
as an "abuse of bargaining power." 
83 PTK, para. 200(2) (1959). 
84 The doctrine of socialist coexistence was (is) common to all East-Central European civil codes. See 
ZIEL.1NSK1, A.: "Civil Law", in General Principles of Law of the Polish People's Republic 161, 171 (L. 
Kurowski ed., 1984) (citing the use of socialist coexistence to protect long-term tenants from the harshness of 
eviction and to shield debtors against the demands to pay interest accumulated over long periods of time). 
85 The term socialist coexistence appeared in two other paragraphs of the Hungarian Civil Code. Paragraph 
206(4) provided: "If the agreement of the parties does not extend to some unessential question, ... the contract 
may be supplemented by (lie court—with attention paid to the aim and contents of the contract—on the basis of 
standard customs and of the norms of socialist coexistence." PTK, para. 206(4) (1959) (emphasis added). 
Paragraph 237(4) stated that "the court may award to the State the service that would have to be returned to 
the party who has concluded a forbidden contract or one violating the interests of society or offending against 
the norms of socialist coexistence." PTK, para. 237(4) (1959) (emphasis added). References to socialist norms 
were deleted from the Code in 1991. 
86 See Symposium, "Unconscionability Around the World", 14 Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Journal, 455 (1992) (comparing the role played by unconscionability in Germany, France, 
England, United States, Italy, and South Africa). For an economic analyses of unconscionability see 
TREBILCOCK, M. J.: "An Economic Approach to the Doctrine of Unconscionability", in Studies in Contract 
Law 381 (B. J. Reiter & J. Swan eds., 1980). 
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is unfairness in the contract negotiations. Economic analysis finds a limited role for the 
substantive inquiry.87 The first tenet of law and economics demands respect for 
individual autonomy.88 Any contract that involves a voluntary meeting of the minds 
between competent individuals is presumptively fair. This is true even if contractual 
language appears to be very one-sided to an outside observer. The Hungarian Civil Code 
directly violates this economic tenet. It states: "If there is a remarkably great difference 
between the value of a service and that of the return service at the date of the conclusion 
of the contract, although neither of the parties has the intention of donation, the injured 
party shall be allowed to avoid the contract."89 This provision requires the Hungarian 
courts to measure every exchange with reference to criteria external to the wills of the 
contracting parties. By doing so it seems to draw upon a paternalistic ethic. Although the 
saine requirement once guided American common law, it has long been discarded.90 
From an economic perspective, there simply is no external referent to fairness outside the 
will of the parties.91 
Claims of contractual unfairness stand on an economic footing only when the 
complaining party can allege some sort of impropriety in the contract negotiations.92 The 
doctrines of duress and misrepresentation are illustrative. We consider each in turn. 
John R. Commons, a founding father of law and economics, provided an early 
economic critique of duress.93 Defining duress as an abuse of bargaining power, he 
identified three types of power in contractual negotiations: political, personal, and 
economic.94 Political power, held uniquely by the sovereign, is the right to compel by 
force. Personal power involves the use of superior mental faculties to persuade one's 
trading partner. Economic power resides in the right to withhold property from others. 
Economic theory clearly condemns the threat of physical force in contractual 
87 See EPSTEIN, R. A.: "Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal", 18 Journal of Law <4 Economics, 293 
(1975) (analyzing unconscionability with reference to its substantive and procedural components and suggesting 
abandonment of the substantive inquiry). 
88 Supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text. 
89 PTK, para 201(2) (1959). 
90 The reference here is to the common law doctrine of laesio enormois which was largely abandoned in the 
early nineteenth century. See HORWITZ, M. J.: The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860 at 160-180 
(1978). 
91 The notion of economic efficiency can be used to fill in the gaps in contractual language. The law assumes 
that the parties would have agreed to assign the contractual risks in an efficient manner. Thus, efficiency can 
be seen as an external referent to fairness. See supra text accompanying note 76. However, if the parties 
expressly agree to vary from these efficient terms, the express language controls. 
92 Here we are speaking of unfairness at the time of contractual agreement. Fairness issues also arise at the 
time of performance. We analyze performance issues later in the article. See infra notes 134-171 and 
accompanying text. 
93 COMMONS, J. R.: Legal Foundations of Capitalism 34-59 (1924). 
94 Id. at 34, 56-58. 
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negotiations; it also clearly permits the use of personal persuasion.95 The difficult cases 
of fairness involve the exercise of Commons' third form of power, economic power. 
Contract negotiations always involve the exercise of economic power. If I agree to 
pay a dollar for a loaf of bread, I do so because the baker will withhold the bread if I do 
not. The baker is exercising his economic power over me. The question is whether 
contract law should recognize a moral duty on the part of the baker to share his bread. 
The first tenet of law and economic answers with an emphatic no.96 Respect for 
individual autonomy encompasses both freedom to contract and freedom from contract.91 
Hence, the baker is free to seek his or her best price. This is true even if I am in great 
need of the bread and do not have a dollar.98 It is also true if the baker somehow had 
a monopoly on the production of bread.99 
The Hungarian Code seems to expresses a contrary norm. It states: "If a contracting 
party has stipulated a remarkably disproportionate advantage at the conclusion of the 
contract by making use of the situation of the other party, the contract shall be null and 
void."100 Not only does this provision again call for a substantive inquiry, it also 
introduces intractable problems of interpretation. Every contract involves "making use of 
the situation of the other party", and it is difficult to see how the line between 
permissible and impermissible advantage taking is to be drawn.101 In short, it violates 
the third tenet of economic analysis: the need for predictability. 
Economic analysis is much more receptive to fairness claims based on misleading 
conduct.102 Consider a contract for the sale of a house. The house recently has been 
95 Commons wrote: "(I]t is perfectly lawful ... to exercise either superior economic power or superior mental 
and managerial faculties over others, provided advantage is not taken of recognized special personal relations 
of confidence, trust, dependence, or the like, which are deemed peculiarly liable to abuse." Id. at 59. The 
equitable doctrine of undue influence guards against abuses of personal persuasion in fiduciary settings. For 
an economic analysis of fiduciary relationships see EASTERBROOK, F. H. A FISCHEL, R. D.: "Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty", 36 Journal of Law & Economics, 385 (1993). 
96 Economic analysis does suggest one exception. Sometimes called economic duress, it involves situations 
were the necessitous condition of the complaining party was initially caused by the wrongful act of the stronger. 
In such situations the stronger party would have no right to withhold his or her property. See, e.g., Thompson 
Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P. 2d 1043 (1954) (a classic case illustrating the 
doctrine of economic duress). 
97 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
98 See LANDES, W. M. & POSNER, R. A.: "Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An 
Economic Study of Law and Altruism", 7 Journal of Legal Studies, 83 (1978) (finding that the necessitous 
condition of the aggrieved party does not per se generate an affirmative duty of altruism). 
99 See OSTAS, supra note 71, at 581-583 (arguing that monopoly power is largely irrelevant to issues of 
duress). 
100 PTK, para. 202 (1959) (emphasis added). 
101 In a private correspondence Professor Harmathy pointed out that in court practice and in the general 
understanding of Hungarian lawyers paragraph 202 only addresses usury contracts. Such an understanding 
would provide a much needed prophylatic to the breadth of the provision. 
102 See STIGLER, G. J.: "The Economics of Information", 69 Journal of Political Economics, 213 (1961) (a 
seminal work on the economics of information asymmetries). 
206 Daniel T. Ostas and Burt A. Leete 
reappraised for tax purposes, and the house has a hidden defect—termites. The seller is 
aware of both facts; the buyer is aware of neither. Clearly, if the seller lies about either, 
the seller has committed fraud, and the buyer can rescind the contract.103 The difficult 
ethical question is whether the seller has an affirmative duty to inform the buyer of either 
fact. The answer derives from the second tenet of law and economics—reducing 
transaction costs.'04 A court following an economic logic will inquire into how costly 
it would be for the buyer to discover the material facts.105 It is easy for the buyer to 
check the appraised value, he or she needs only call the tax assessor's office. Failure to 
do so is mere carelessness, and consequently, the seller has no duty to speak. Termites, 
on the other hand, are costly to detect. Since the seller has reason to know that the 
presence of termites would be material to the buyer, the seller's failure to speak would 
be unfair, and would give the buyer grounds to rescind.106 
The Hungarian Civil Code addresses the parties' respective duties to speak in 
paragraph 205(3). It provides: "The parties are obliged to co-operate at the conclusion of 
a contract and they shall observe each other's rightful interests. They shall inform each 
other on all essential circumstances affecting the contract to be concluded even prior to 
the conclusion of the contract."107 Applying this language to the sale of the house, the 
seller would be expected to inform the buyer of both the termites and the appraisal. There 
is no reference to transaction costs. The Hungarian Code seems to once again call for 
greater degree of altruism and cooperation than that called for by economic theory. 
An Economic Analysis of Standardized Form Contracts: The "Battle of the Forms" 
The doctrine of freedom of contract was born in an era in which most contracts were 
individually negotiated by the parties. Much of modem contracting is to the contrary. 
Industrialization, mass marketing, and the creation of large and sometimes market-
dominating firms has led to prevalence of contracting through standardized forms. 
Standardized forms reduce transaction costs by relieving parties of the burden of 
individually negotiating and drafting contract provisions that regulate relatively routine 
exchanges. Standard forms also reduce agency costs by limiting the contractual discretion 
of subordinates within a corporate hierarchy, and facilitate centralized control by 
103 For a useful introduction to the economic analysis of fraud see POSNER, supra note 1, at 96-101. 
104 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
105 "[L]iability for nondisclosure should turn on which of the parties to the transaction, seller or consumer, 
can produce or obtain information at lower cost. If the relevant characteristic is one that the purchaser can 
determine by casual inspection ... then it would be redundant to require the seller to disclose." POSNER, supra 
note 1, at 99. 
106 A similar analysis can be used to address surprising and uncustomary provisions found in consumer 
contracts. If it would be too costly for the consumer to ferret out such provisions ex ante, the courts may require 
the seller to take affirmative steps to inform the buyer of the surprising language. See BARNETT, supra note 
72, at 888-890. 
107 PTK. para. 205(3) (1959). 
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harmonizing contracts throughout a firm's national or international business activities. 
Yet standard forms also introduce problems. By deleting the necessity to negotiate, form 
contracting creates the possibility that the standardized language was not fully understood 
by the parties.108 In such a scenario, the first economic tenet—deferring to individual 
autonomy—does not suffice to answer enforceability questions. It is simply unclear 
whether the contract represents a subjective meeting of the minds between the 
parties.109 In such cases, the courts must turn to the second tenet and determine whether 
transactions-costs will be reduced by strictly enforcing the express terms, or by refusing 
to enforce such language so as to encourage future parties to bargain more fully. Of 
course, our third tenet reminds us that any such judicial intervention must be done in a 
predictable and stable manner. 
A clear example of the problems posed by standard form contracting arises in the 
context of an offer and an acceptance of a sale of goods between businesses. The issue 
arises so commonly, it has been given a name—the "battle of forms".110 The extensive 
use of standardized forms in ordering and invoicing products gives rise to the problem. 
Typically the buyer will order goods from the seller using its own purchase order which 
has a number of provisions printed on it concerning such subjects as warranty require-
ments, jurisdiction, and so on. The seller will then acknowledge the order with its own 
form that may have additional terms such as limitations of liability and terms that may 
contradict the terms of the buyer's purchase order. In most cases the goods are shipped, 
108 To complicate matters, the terms contained in these forms typically are slanted to favor the drafting party, 
restricting, if not removing, the rights granted by other areas of the law to the non-drafting party. For example, 
a standard form may restrict a warranty, excuse the seller for liability caused by its own negligence, provide for 
a penalty, or alter the burden of proof rules. Such clauses become troublesome in consumer contracts where the 
consumer may be unaware of the presence and effect of such clauses. See SLAWSON, W. D.: "Mass Contracts: 
lawful Fraud in California", 48 Southern California Law Review, 1 (1974) (finding a dangerous proclivity to use 
fine print in consumer contracts to introduce surprising and oppressive language); KESSLER, F.: "Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract", 43 Columbia Law Review, 629 (1943) (discussing the 
use of standardized forms to surprise unwary consumers with uncustomary terms). Nations vary on their treatment 
of consumer contracts. In the U.S., courts address allegedly oppressive terms on a case by case basis under the 
rubric of unconscionability. See OSTAS: supra note 71. Legislative provisions in Germany and in the United 
Kingdom forbid the use of certain troublesome clauses. See ROLLAND, W.: "The Role of the Law of 
Obligations in the Legal System of a Free Industrial Society", in Questions of Civil Law Codification 142, 
147-148 (A. Harmathy A Á. Németh eds., 1990) (citing German legislation that regulates standard business 
terms). 
109 See MACAULAY, S.: "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study", 28 American Society 
Review, 55 (1963) (providing evidence that most business people do not known the contents of their own form 
contracts, never reading the fine print). 
110 See, e.g., MEHREN, von A.: "The 'Battle of Forms': A Comparative View", 38 Amererican Journal of 
Comparative Law, 265 (1990); MOCCIA, C.: "The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
Internationa] Sale of Goods and the 'Battle of the Forms'", 13 Fordham International Law Journal, 649 
(1989-90); VERGNE, F.: "The 'Battle of the Forms' under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods", 33 American Journal of Comparative Law, 233 (1985); BAIRD, D. C. 
& WEISBERG, R.: "Rules, Standards, and the Battle of Forms: A Reassessment of 2-207", 68 Virginia Law 
Review, 1217 (1982). 
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accepted and paid for without difficulty and so the issue of contract formation does not 
arise. However, on occasion a problem arises with contractual performance or there is a 
significant change in market conditions that will lead one party to seek ways to escape 
any potential contract liability for non-performance. The question then arises as to 
whether a contract is concluded and if so, what are the terms of the contract. 
The solutions to these questions vary depending upon what legal system is 
involved.1" The more formalistic approach to contract formation, the so-called "mirror 
image" approach, is found in common law of countries such as Great Britain112 and the 
United States,113 as well as a number of civil law countries such as France."4 His-
torically, centrally planned countries, including Hungary, took an approach similar to the 
"mirror image" rule."5 The alternative "reliance" approach is exemplified by the Uniform 
Commercial Code of the United States and in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
We will address each approach in turn. 
Most nations follow the mirror image rule. The rule requires that there be no material 
variance in the acceptance when given in response to an offer."6 If there is a material 
variance, then no contract is formed and the acceptance constitutes a counter offer 
terminating the offer."7 The Hungarian Civil Code currently reflects this rule. 
Paragraph 213(2) states: "An acceptance deviating from the offer shall be considered a 
111 The fact that there is no uniform method for resolving these questions complicates the matter when 
international sales are involved. See HONNOLD, J.: Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 
United Nations Com'ention 165 (1982). 
112 VERGNE, supra note 110, at 241. 
113 Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). Section 57 states: "Where notification is essential to acceptance 
by promise, the offeror is not bound by an acceptance in equivocal terms unless he reasonably understands it 
as an acceptance." Section 59 provides: "A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on 
the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-
offer." 
114 VERGNE, supra note 110, at 247. 
115 Hungary joined other eastern bloc nations in forming the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA). The organization adopted a mandatory set of rules called the "General Conditions for the Delivery 
of Goods" that regulated contracts between individuals of differing member nations. Chapter 1, Section 1(2) 
provided: "If the offeror receives a notification of acceptance that is other than unconditional acceptance... The 
notification shall be considered to be a counteroffer." The CMEA has been dissolved, and the CMEA General 
Conditions are no longer in force. 
116 Some have also called this the "rule" approach. See BA1RD & WEISBERG, supra note 110, at 1228 
(defining a rule as "a very specifically framed guide to conduct that is detailed in its normative content and 
that the lawmaker believes will directly implement his social or economic goals"). 
117 Recently, the mirror image rule has been relaxed somewhat. An example would be France. If the variance 
is on an essential element of the contract, then no contract is concluded. See VERGNE, supra note 110, at 249. 
But a contract may be concluded if the variance concerns a matter that is subsidiary to the contract. Id. Under 
French law the essential elements of a contract concern price and subject matter, and some variation in the 
acceptance is permitted so long as it does not concern the essential elements of price and subject matter. Id. 
(citing the French Code Civil, Article 1583). This trend toward relaxation of the inflexible application of the rule 
can also be found in the court decisions under the common law in both England and the United States. However, 
in all these countries, if the acceptance varies from the offer in any material way, a contract is not concluded. 
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new offer."118 This language is not surprising considering that prior to break up of the 
Soviet bloc, the socialist countries took a rules oriented approach to the problem of 
acceptances that deviated from the offer. In fact because of the requirements of a planned 
economy the socialist legal systems took the strict view that a contract could not be 
concluded even if the acceptance deviates in unimportant ways from the offer."9 
According to Professor Eörsi, the reason for this approach to contracting is that in 
planned economies the "emphasis is on security without surprises—even at the expense 
of an otherwise desirable contract not coming into being".120 
In light of our economic tenets, the mirror image rule has clear virtues. It responds 
to the first economic tenet by providing a safeguard against court imposed contract terms. 
Deference to individual autonomy guarantees both freedom to contract and freedom from 
contract.121 Since the parties have not reached a meeting of the minds ex ante, no 
contract is imposed upon them. In addition, the rule seems to constrain judicial discretion 
and hence lends a degree of legal stability and predictability—the third tenet. 
Unfortunately, these virtues are not without costs. In particular, the rule provides an 
incentive for business actors to carefully read and discuss all contract terms. Such an 
incentive may not be practical given the production like contracting process that modern 
commerce demands.122 Perhaps more importantly, the mirror image rule makes it too 
easy for one party to escape a contract when it is clear that a contract between the parties 
was intended. This, so called, "welsher" problem arises from opportunistic behavior and 
increases the costs of conducting exchanges.123 And finally, note that declaring that no 
contract exist, does not end the court's involvement in the dispute. If there has been part 
performance, the court must still order restitution or fashion some sort or quasi-
contractual adjustment. Hence, the gains to legal predictability may not be as great as 
would first appear. 
Section 2-207 of the U.C.C. provides an interesting and much discussed alternative 
to the mirror image rule. In essence, the section states that in some circumstances where 
a purported acceptance deviates from the offer, the court will still find that a contract was 
concluded.124 So long as the deviation does not concern central issues such as price and 
118 PTK, para. 213(2) (1959). 
119 See EÖRSI, Gy.: "A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", 
31 American Journal of Comparative Law, 333, 341-342 (1983). 
120 Id. at 342. 
121 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
122 See, e.g., MEHREN, supra note 110, at 270. 
123 Id. 
124 In particular, U.C.C. Section 2-207 provides: 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written conformation which is sent within a 
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those 
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different 
terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants 
such terms become part of the contract unless: 
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quantity, a contract will arise and the court is to follow a precise, if somewhat 
complicated, set of rules to determine whether the terms contained in the offer or the in 
acceptance will control. While there has been a substantial amount of criticism of Section 
2-207,125 it represents one of the major attempts to reduce the costs created by the 
welsher problem, while simultaneously protecting the efficiency gains generated by form 
contracting. 
When one examines the approach taken by the various legal systems to this 
problem, one is struck by the notion that few have taken a reliance approach similar to 
that of Section 2-207. Germany, through judicial interpretation of its Civil Code, 
appears to be an exception. Although the German Civil Code takes the position that a 
purported acceptance that deviates from the offer does not conclude a contract, judicial 
interpretation of the Code has resulted in an approach that is more reliance oriented.126 
Addressing German law, Professor Von Mehren writes: 
Failure to agree on the form terms that will govern in the event of dissonant 
forms does not, however, render the contract as a whole ineffective. To the extent 
the parties ' terms are in agreement, these terms are accepted; for the rest, the 
court will draw the needed terms from the background law.127 
Like Section 2-207 of the G.C.C., the German model would treat a conflicting form 
as generating a contract so long as the central terms provided by the parties are in 
agreement. The German model departs from the U.C.C., however, with reference to the 
treatment of the conflicting terms. In the U.S., either the terms reflected on the offeror 's 
form or on the acceptor's form will control.128 Under the German model, "business 
customs" will supply the contract terms when standardized forms conflict. 
The international community has also recently addressed the battle of the forms 
during its negotiations concerning the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (CISC).129 At first blush, the final version of the CISG 
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) They materially alter it; or 
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after 
notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties wltich recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract 
for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such a case the terms of 
the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act. 
125 See, e.g., WHITE, 1.1. & SUMMERS, R. S.: Uniform Commercial Code 28-M9 (3rd ed. 1988) (observing 
that the section was originally drafted to deal with the "welsher" problem, but has been inappropriately applied 
to determine the terms of the contract); MURRAY, J. E.: "The Chaos of the 'Battle of the Forms': Solutions", 
39 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1307 (1986). 
126 See MEHREN, supra note 110, at 290. 
127 Id. (citations omitted). 
128 See supra note 124. 
129 See LEETE, B. A.: "Contract Formation under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary", 6 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal, 193 (1993). 
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provision appears to be a compromise between Section 2-207 and the mirror image 
approach. Article 19 of the CISG states: 
(2) [A] reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains 
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer 
constitutes an acceptance.... 
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, 
payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of 
one party's liability to the other or the settlement of disputes are considered to 
alter the terms of the offer materially. 
A close reading of the latter subsection indicates that the drafters clearly rejected the 
flexible philosophy to contract formation exemplified by Section 2 -207 of the U.C.C. It 
defines "additional or different terms" so broadly, covering all of the essentials of any 
contract for the sale of goods, that it is hard to imagine a term that would not materially 
alter the terms of the offer with the result is that not contract is concluded. Hence, in 
essence, the CISG follows the mirror image rule. 
Hungarian policy makers, like policy makers throughout the post-communist world, 
face an historic opportunity to implement fundamental legal reforms. One piece of the 
reform puzzle involves the legal treatment of standardized forms. Should Hungarians 
retain the mirror image rule, or should they modify their civil code to reflect a more 
reliance based approach? Although the mirror image rule has merit,130 we believe that 
the more flexible approach to contract formation, particularly the German variant, is best 
suited to addresses economic concerns. 
Recall that the battle of the forms arises in a context in which the parties initially 
believe that they have a contract. The buyer receives a non-conforming invoice, notices 
that the invoice matches the central terms contained in his or her purchase form, ignores 
the fine print, staples the two forms together, and then tosses both forms in a file cabinet. 
If the goods are shipped and received without incident, the forms remain uninspected. In 
the event that a problem arises, however, one party may seize upon the non-conforming 
forms as an excuse to renege on the agreement. The problem with the mirror image rule 
is that it creates two perverse incentives. First, it encourages parties to closely read their 
forms and to individually negotiate terms that do not match. This seriously erodes the 
cost savings associated with form contracts. Second, the mirror image rule rewards 
opportunistic behavior by allowing a party to repudiate a bone fide agreement that has 
subsequently turned sour. 
The preferred approach is to find that a contract does indeed exist. The question, 
then, is to determine the terms of that contract. Two possibilities present themselves. 
130 Most of the parties that Hungarians contract with internationally operate under a legal system that employs 
the mirror image rule. This is particularly true of contracts covered under the CISG. In addition, the Hungarian 
system historically has taken a strict formalistic approach to the question; hence, the mirror image rule would 
call for less legal change. Finally, a rules oriented approach to contract formation may be easier to administer. 
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Section 2-207 provides that in certain circumstances the terms in the offer will control, 
and in other circumstances the acceptance will control.'31 The German approach 
focusses on business customs, suggesting that customary terms should be followed when 
the parties' forms conflict.132 Comparing the two, the German variant appears to be 
more efficient. The problem with 2-207 is that it does not economize on transaction 
costs. Under 2-207, either party that ignores the fine print faces the possibility that the 
other party will introduce surprising and uncustomary terms into the exchange. Each 
ignores the fine print at his or her own peril. By contrast, under German law the parties 
can rely on court provided terms to at least assure that the ultimate contract will be 
customary and presumably not overly harsh or oppressive. 
The German variant also provides the parties with a strong incentive to master 
business customs. The mastery of business customs is essential to all market economies, 
and is particularly important in the transforming nations. Shared customs facilitate 
communications, forestall misunderstandings between the parties, and generally promote 
contractual endeavors. In addition, most, if not all, business customs reflect an economic 
logic, assigning the various contractual duties and risks to the party who can address such 
concerns in the most efficient manner.133 
In short, the German model best adheres to the dictates of our three economic tenets. 
Reflecting the first tenet—deference to autonomy—the model allows the parties to deviate 
from customary practices, if they wish to do so. The parties need only provide evidence 
to the court that such a negotiation has occurred. If parties choose to not negotiate, then 
business custom guides the transaction where the standard forms conflict. Party silence 
is taken as evidence of consent to customary language. Reflecting the second 
tenet—reducing transaction costs—the substance of these customary terms will be driven 
by an economic logic, allocating transactions costs in an efficient manner. Finally, the 
German approach should prove easy to administer. The court will simply follow custom 
when fine print conflicts. Ease of administration should lend stability and predictability 
to the law—the third tenet. 
An Economic Analysis of Contractual Discharge: Excusing Performance on the Basis of 
Unforeseen Events 
Parties do not enter contracts with perfect knowledge of the future. They make 
assumptions as to what events may or may not occur and attempt to account for these 
contingencies in the negotiation of the contract. But, lacking a crystal ball, the parties 
may find themselves subject to certain events that were not foreseen at the time the 
contract was formed. One issue to be resolved by any legal system concerns the 
circumstances under which a contract should be discharged based on the happening of 
131 See supra note 124. 
132 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
133 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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an unforeseen event. Not surprisingly, the answer differs from one legal system to 
another,'34 and the search for the proper answer to this problem has been the subject 
of a substantial number of articles in the literature.135 
To illustrate the issue, we offer three examples. In the first, a fa rmer contracts to sell 
his or her crop; the crop is subsequently destroyed by flood and the fanner seeks a 
discharge. In the second, a builder agrees to construct a building for a specific sum. The 
builder later discovers the remains of an old school house immediately under the 
construction site. Excavating the remains is extremely expensive and the builder seeks 
to be excused from the contract. In the final example, a hotel contracts to rent its rooms 
at five times its normal rate. The increase reflects the fact that the hotel is strategically 
placed for viewing an upcoming parade. The parade is canceled, and the hotel customers 
seek to avoid their contracts.136 
The central question in all three examples is the same: should the courts excuse 
performance due to the unforeseen event? Two corollary questions are also present. First, 
if the court grants an excuse, should it simply rescind the contract, ordering restitution 
where appropriate, or should it rewrite the contract for the parties? And secondly, if the 
parties agree to modify their agreement, should the courts enforce that modification? Note 
that this latter question is intertwined with the first; the likelihood of an excuse being 
granted will determine the relative bargaining power involved in negotiating the 
modification. The remainder of this section will address these three questions in turn. For 
each question, we use our economic tenets to suggest efficient policies, and then analyze 
Hungarian law in light of these economic prescriptions. 
134 For a brief, but useful, comparative law perspective see TALLON, D.: "Imprevision Revisited: Some 
Remarks on the Consequences of a Change of Circumstances on Contracts", In: Binding Force of Contract 
107-112 (A. Harmathy ed., 1991). 
135 E.g., POSNER, R. A. & ROSENFIELD, A. M.: "Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis", 6 Journal of Legal Studies, 83 (1977); HALSON, R.: "Opportunism, Economic Duress 
and Contractual Modifications", 107 The Law Quarterly Review, 649 (1991); MURRAY, J. E.: "The 
Modification Mystery; Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code", 32 Villanova Law Review, 1 (1987); 
EISLER, B. A.: "Modification of Sales Contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code: Section 2-209 
Reconsidered", 57 Tennessee Law Review, 401 (1990); TRIMARCHI, P.: "Commercial Impracticability in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis", 11 International Review of Law and Economics, 63 (1991). 
136 In all three hypothetical, the obligor seeks a discharge due to the occurrence of an unforseen event. 
Although the central issue is similar in all three cases, a common law court probably would address the three 
cases under different rubrics. The farmer case raises the issue of "impossibility of performance"; the farmer 
argues that it is "impossible" for him to deliver his crop. See, e.g., Matousek v Galligan, 178 N.W. 510 (Neb. 
1920); Pearce-Young-Angel Co. v. Charles R. Allen, Inc., 50 S.E. 2d 698 (S.C. 1948). The builder case 
would probably be classified under the doctrine of "commercial impracticability". It is not impossible to 
remove the debris, but impractical to do so given the contract price. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
Section 261 (1981). The hotel case raises the issue of "frustration of purpose." The motivating purpose for 
the contract no longer exists. See, e.g., Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (1903); Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P. 2d 47 
(Cal. 1944). 
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Question 1: When Should an Excuse be Granted? 
We turn first to the question of when an excuse should be granted. The first economic 
tenet, respect for individual autonomy, dictates that an excuse is not to be granted in 
cases where the parties have expressly accounted for the contingency. In other words, if 
the parties addressed the event and allocated its risks ex ante, the courts should enforce 
that allocation. Of course, in the typical case the troublesome event has not been 
addressed ex ante. In such cases, the courts face the danger of forcing a party to perform 
a contract to which he or she never consented. For example, the builder will argue that 
he or she never agreed to clear away the unforseen debris. This argument is a direct 
appeal to the first economic tenet—the right to be free from court imposed transfers, or 
freedom from contract. Yet, if the courts make it too easy to avoid contractual 
obligations, the cost allocation functions of contracting will erode, and transaction costs 
will rise. Hence, an economically minded court will strike a balance, allowing an excuse 
only in appropriate circumstances.137 
In an often-cited article, Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield use law and 
economics insights to suggest a rational basis for determining when an excuse should 
be granted.138 They argue that an excuse should be granted when die obligee is the 
"superior risk bearer" and denied when the obligor is the superior risk bearer.139 
According to Posner and Rosenfield, a party is a superior risk bearer if he or she is 
relatively more efficient in preventing the event form occurring or in insuring against 
the risk.140 For example, in the builder case, the builder would presumptively be in 
a better position to prevent the construction problems ex ante. A reasonable core sample 
of the subsurface soil would likely have revealed the unforseen debris. Such precautions 
are customary in building contexts, and failure to take such a precaution is tantamount 
to negligence.141 By refusing to grant a contractual excuse in such cases, the courts 
provide an incentive for the relatively more efficient party to ferret out unforseen, but 
foreseeable difficulties. In the long run, such an incentive reduces transaction 
costs—Tenet 2. 
In most cases neither party can prevent the unforseen event. If prevention is not 
feasible, Posner and Rosenfield would ask whether one of the two parties is more 
137 More particularly, the courts face three options: (1) they could routinely grant an excuse based on 
unforseen events; (2) they could never grant excuse on this ground; or (3) they could seek to strike a balance. 
See A1VAZIAN, V. A. et al., "The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a Benchmark of 
Enforceability", 22 Osgood Hall Law Journal, 173 (1984). The authors argue that neither a rule "that enforces 
all contract modifications nor one that invalidates all modifications is efficient, apart from the savings in 
adjudication costs associated with a clear legal policy favoring one polarity over the other". Id. at 175. 
138 POSNER & ROSENFIELD, supra note 135. 
139 Id. at 90. 
140 For a critical view of this approach, see AIVAZIAN et al., supra note 137. 
141 Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighteni, 405 A.2d 72 (Conn. 1978) (customary for excavators to run test 
borings). 
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efficient in insuring against the unforeseen, but foreseeable, contingency.142 Here, the 
relevant costs include the costs of risk-appraisal and the transaction-costs of taking 
insurance. This factor lends insights in the farmer case. The commercial buyer of grain 
can insure against natural disasters by diversifying its portfolio of grain contracts, 
contracting to buy grain from geographically disperse farms. To the commercial buyer, 
failure of any one crop is not a disaster. By contrast, the farmer enjoys no such ability 
to diversify. Since the obligor farmer cannot prevent the flood nor efficiently insure 
against its effects, the farmer's performance should be excused. 
Of course, in some cases neither of the above two criteria will provide a guide. For 
example, in the hotel case, neither party could prevent the parade f rom being canceled, 
nor could either party effectively insure against the event. Neither party was at fault. In 
addition, since the parties did not address the contingency in their contract, it was 
presumptively outside the scope of their agreement. In such cases, the first economic 
tenet, guarantee to be free from court imposed transfers, would dictate in favor of 
discharge. 
Turning to the Hungarian Civil Code, one finds several provisions addressing excuse 
for unforeseen events.143 Of particular relevance is paragraph 312. It provides: 
(1) If fulfillment has become impossible out of a reason for which neither 
of the parities shall be liable, the contract shall be terminated.... 
(2) If fulfillment has become impossible out of a reason for which the 
obligor is liable, the obligee may claim indemnification for failure of ful-
fillment. 
(3) If fulfillment has become impossible out of a reason for which the 
obligee is liable, the obligor shall be relieved from his obligation and may claim 
compensation for his damages.144 
This language provides an excellent foundation upon which to build an economi-
cally sound approach to contractual excuse based on unforseen events. It avoids 
semantic distinctions such as the difference between "unforeseen" and "unforeseeable" 
events, and focusses on fault. If the event was no one ' s fault, or the fault rests on the 
obligee then excuse is granted. If fault lies with the obligor, then no excuse is 
permitted. Of course, the courts must determine the inquiries appropriate in determining 
fault.145 Economic theory suggests that such an inquiry focus on efficiency in risk 
142 Supra note 135, at 93-94. 
143 Para, 226 addresses the need for contractual modification due to unforeseen changes in the slate's central 
economic plan. PTK. para. 226 (1959). Due to economic reforms, this section is of reduced importance today. 
See HARMATHY, A.: "The Binding Force of Contract in Hungarian Law", in Binding Force of Contract 35 
(A. Harmathy ed., 1991). More generally, para. 227(2) provides: "A contract aimed at an impossible 
performance shall be null and void." PTK, para. 227(2) (1959). 
144 PTK, para. 312 (1959). 
145 Although many Hungarian statutes and codes have been translated to English, the same is not true of 
Hungarian judicial opinions. Fortunately, Professor Harmathy has provided a very useful analysis of Hungarian 
court opinions on contractual modifications for unforseen events. See HARMATHY, supra note 143. His 
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bearing. If the obligor could have prevented or insured against the contingency in an 
efficient manner, then discharge should not be forthcoming. On the other hand, if the 
obligor was not at fault and there is no contractual language or strong business custom 
to the contrary, then excuse is appropriate. 
Question 2: What is the Appropriate Remedy? 
Once the court has decided to excuse performance, it must determine the appropriate 
remedy. Mos t nations favor rescission and restitution, allowing no judicial authority to 
modify contractual language.'46 Other nations grant their courts the discretion to reform 
the contract.147 Both the U.C.C. and the Restatement of Contracts are in the former 
camp. One commentator has noted: "The remedy contemplated by the U.C.C. and the 
Restatement clearly is the traditional remedy of Anglo-American law for impossibility 
of performance—discharge of both parties f rom any duty of further performance with 
restitution, if needed, of any performance already rendered.'"48 Section 2 -615 of the 
U.C.C. liberalizes the common law in some ways by allowing the seller to delay delivery 
when unforseen circumstances render timely delivery "impracticable," provided that the 
seller complies with sections (b) and (c) of 2 - 6 1 5 regarding allocation and notification 
to the buyer. However, the provisions do not give the court the power to fashion an 
independent remedy.149 
German law is perhaps the best example of a system that allows the courts to revise 
a contract based upon impossibility of performance of the existing contract.150 The 
origins of the current willingness of the German courts to revise contracts for the parties 
are found in the economic dislocation caused by World War I and the tremendous 
inflation that resulted. Initially, the contract revisions were limited to situations where 
parties were simply unable to perform their monetary obligations because of the inflation 
in the German currency. Using the German concept of "good faith" found in the civil 
analysis indicates that Hungarian judicial opinion is largely in accord with the efficiency analysis suggested 
here. 
146 Denis Talion cites France, Poland and Czechoslovakia as examples. See supra note 134, at 108. 
147 Examples include the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Greece, and Algeria. Id. at 109. 
148 DAWSON, J. P.: "Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: The United States", 64 Boston University Law 
Review. 1, 3 (1984). 
149 The case of Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.Pa. 1980) is a well known 
exception. It has been subjected to heavy criticism. For example, Professor Dawson observes that the case is 
"the only instance in which an American judge has tried to dictate entirely different substantive terms in a 
contract that was still being actively performed". Id. at 35. Professors WHITE and SUMMERS are equally 
critical. They write: "It is one thing for the court to say the parties should be freed from the contract, or that 
there should be allocation under 2-615 and 2-616; ... it is something else to redraft a contract that still has 
seven years to run." Supra note 125, at 168. 
150 For a discussion of the experience of the German courts with court ordered adjustment or revision of 
contracts where unforeseen events destroyed the purpose or balance of the contract see DAWSON, J. P.: 
"Judicial Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany", 63 Boston University Law Review, 1039 (1983). 
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code151 and examination of gerschaftsgrundlage, "foundation of the transaction," 
German law has evolved today to the point where courts now will revise many types of 
contracts.152 Today, the standard doctrine of the German courts is to revise by court 
order those contracts "whose foundations have been destroyed by unexpected events or 
discoveries" rather than to rescind them.153 
The German approach has been widely criticized, at least as a model that would be 
applied to law in the United States. It is not necessary to examine these criticisms in 
detail, but the central ideas are that judges have insufficient knowledge of contractual 
subject matter to fashion an intelligent revisions, and ihat judicial willingness to reform 
contracts introduces too much uncertainty.154 In essence, third economic tenet—the need 
for predictability^is the guide. 
Turning to the Hungarian Code, one finds two paragraphs addressing remedies. 
Paragraph 312 applies in cases in which performance has become literally im-
possible.155 An example would be the farmer case; the flood makes it impossible for 
the farmer to deliver grain. In such a case, the Hungarian Code follows both economic 
theory and American common law by admitting no room for judicial redrafting. Either 
the obligor fully indemnifies the obligee, or the obligor is discharged.156 
Paragraph 241 seems to allow for more judicial discretion. It provides: "A court may 
modify a contract if the contract injures an essential legal interest of one of the parties 
as a result of a condition that occurs in the permanent legal relationship of the parties 
following the conclusion of the contract."157 Apparently this section of the Code has 
been interpreted to apply to a broad set of circumstances in which performance is not 
literally impossible, but has somehow changed in character, like the parade case, or has 
become commercially impractical, like the building case.158 
Judicial efforts to redraft contract terms on the basis of unforseen events should be 
resisted on three grounds. First, redrafting of contractual terms threatens to violate the 
principle of respect for private autonomy. Redrafting subjects the parties to contractual 
terms to which they did not consent. Secondly, if either strict enforcement of contractual 
language or excuse coupled with rescission and restitution does not suit the parties needs, 
the parties themselves can agree to redraft the contract along equitable grounds. In fact, 
151 BGB § 242. 
152 The German concept of gerschaftsgrundlage is akin to the English word used in the doctrine of "frustration 
of purpose" but has a much broader meaning. It would include the concepts of impossibility and impracticality 
as well as mistake. See DAWSON, supra note 150, at 1040. 
153 Id. at 1087. 
154 See DAWSON, supra note 148, at 37. 
155 See supra text accompanying note 144. 
156 HARMATHY, supra note 145, at 39. 
157 PTK, para. 241 (1959) (emphasis added). 
158 HARMATHY, supra note 145, at 35. Professor Harmathy notes that although the courts have discretion 
to redraft contract provisions, the tendency in the courts is to resist such actions. Id. at 35-38. More particularly, 
he writes: "The only published decision, 1 found, modifying the contract because of price changes concerned 
a contract having a public utility service character." Id. at 36. 
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party redrafting, or settlement, is the preferred solution. It allows for the parties to use 
idiosyncratic information not available to the courts. It also saves administration costs. 
In a perverse way, judicial willingness to redraft may introduce uncertainties into the 
private negotiations of the parties, making it more difficult for them to settle. This would 
increase transaction costs—Tenet 2. Finally, a proclivity for judicial redrafting will muddle 
the law, violating the third economic tenet, the need for predictability. 
Question 3: Should Private Agreements to Modify be Enforced? 
Facing an unforseen event, the parties may attempt to modify their contract. As discussed 
above, there are good reasons to encourage them to do so. Party settlement saves 
transaction costs and economizes on idiosyncratic knowledge. But party modifications can 
also be fraught with difficulties. Note that there are really two types of modifications. In 
the first, an excuse based on the doctrines of "impossibility" or "frustration" is in the 
offing, and if the parties do not modify their contract, the courts will order rescission and 
restitution.159 Preferring the modification to rescission, the parties fashion a settlement. 
There is an exchange of consideration, both parties having agreed to something they were 
not required to do, and both parties are made better off. 
The second type of modification occurs in a setting in which the courts will not grant 
an excuse, the obligor's duties being strictly enforceable. Nonetheless, the obligor refuses 
to perform, and seeks to negotiate a settlement. If the obligee cannot afford to wait for 
a court order enforcing the obl igor 's original commitment the obligee may consent to 
the modification. Here, the settlement is one-sided; the obligee receives a worse deal than 
originally negotiated, and the obligor a better one. In short modifications of contractual 
language open the door to costly opportunism.'60 
The common law requirement of consideration addresses the above distinction. 
Modifications of the first type which are mutually supported by consideration and are 
enforced. Those of the latter type are not enforced.161 The rule of consideration allows 
159 In the United States the term "impracticability of performance" is often used. Thus the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981) provides: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the 
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, 
his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary. 
160 Professor HALSON defines "opportunism" as "the practice of bilateral monopolists, i.e. parties who have 
no practical alternative but to deal with each other, of using that strategic position to their advantage". Supra 
note 135. at 650. See MURIS, T. J.: "Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts", 65 Minnesota Law 
Review, 521 (1981). 
161 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981) states with regard to executory contracts: 
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding 
(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when 
the contract was made; or 
(b) to the extent provided by statute; or 
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s o m e m o d i f i c a t i o n s , w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p r o v i d i n g a s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t o p p o r -
t u n i s m . 1 6 2 
T h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e s e e k s the s a m e goa l , b u t e m p l o y s d i f f e r e n t m e a n s . 
F i r s t , S e c t i o n 2 - 2 0 9 e l i m i n a t e s the r e q u i r e m e n t of c o n s i d e r a t i o n wi th r e g a r d to the 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s of c o n t r a c t s fo r the sa le o f goods . 1 6 3 T h e p u r p o s e of t h i s p r o v i s i o n , 
a c c o r d i n g to the d r a f t e r s , is t o m a k e e n f o r c e a b l e "a l l n e c e s s a r y a n d de s i r ab l e 
m o d i f i c a t i o n s of sa l e s c o n t r a c t s w i t h o u t r e g a r d to the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s w h i c h h a m p e r such 
a d j u s t m e n t s [under the c o m m o n law]". 1 6 4 T h e U . C . C . a p p r o a c h is a b l a n k e t o n e , n o t 
r e l y i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e u n f o r s e e n e v e n t w o u l d r ende r a n e x c u s e or no t . If the par t i es 
a g r e e t o the m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e n it is e n f o r c e a b l e w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
B y e l i m i n a t i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t , h o w e v e r , the C o d e t h r e a t e n s to 
e n c o u r a g e cos t ly o p p o r t u n i s m . 1 6 5 A s n o t e d a b o v e , t h e r e a r e those w h o w o u l d take 
a d v a n t a g e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s that w o u l d a l l o w them to e x t o r t m o d i f i c a t i o n s f r o m o ther 
p a r t i e s to t he con t r ac t . T h e C o d e a n s w e r s th i s c o n c e r n w i t h r e f e r e n c e to t he c o n c e p t of 
" g o o d f a i th" . T h e c o m m e n t s to S e c t i o n 2 - 2 0 9 s u g g e s t a f o o d fa i th l im i t a t i on to 
c o n t r a c t u a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s . 1 6 6 Its a p p l i c a t i o n p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d resul t in m o d i f i c a t i o n s 
b e i n g u n e n f o r c e a b l e w h e n they are o b t a i n e d th rough c o s t l y o p p o r t u n i s m . 
(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material change of position in reliance on the 
promise. 
162 The safeguard provided by consideration is not air tight. For example, an opportunistic obligor could insist 
that a nominal consideration be added to the exchange, rendering the agreement mutual under the common law, 
and enforceable. Traditionally, consideration provides a symbolic function evidencing the consent of the parties 
and providing a warning to each party that their agreement has legal effect, rather than serving as a safeguard 
against opportunism. See FULLER, L. E.: "Consideration and Form", 41 Columbia Law Review, 799, 820 
(1941) (justifying nominal consideration as an indicator of consent). 
163 U.C.C. Section 2-209 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding. 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or recision except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by 
the merchant must be separately signed by the other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article ... must be satisfied if the contract as 
modified is within its provisions. 
164 U.C.C. Section 2-209, comment 1. 
165 HALSON, supra note 135 (making the same argument). 
166 U.C.C. Section 2-209, comment 2 states, in part: 
However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act. The 
effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract terms is barred, and the extortion of 
a "modification" without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. 
Nor can a mere technical consideration support a modification made in bad faith. 
The test of "good faith" between merchants or as against merchants includes "observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" (Section 2-103), and may in some situations require an 
objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. But such matters as a market shift which makes 
performance come to involve a loss may provide such a reason even though there is no such unforeseen 
difficulty as would make out a legal excuse from performance under Sections 2-615 and 2-616. 
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The 2-209 references to good faith, however, are troublesome.167 Suppose a 
contract is made for the purchase of a product by a wholesaler and the market price for 
the product begins to decline substantially. The wholesale purchaser determines that it 
will not be able to resell the product at cost and thus demands a reduced price from the 
seller. The seller agrees to the modification because he cannot sell the goods elsewhere. 
In effect the buyer has extorted the modification from the seller. Such behavior, however, 
is beyond the reach of the Code's good faith limitation. Comment 2 to Section 2-209 
specifically states that modifications in response to a "market shift" are presumptively 
done in good faith.168 This is true even if the market shift was fully anticipated by the 
parties, and the risk of a changing market allocated ex ante. Put another way, there is no 
requirement that the shift in market conditions be of the character that the parties would 
have assumed they would not occur. This seems to be unusually broad safe harbor for 
opportunistic behavior.169 
The Hungarian Code addresses agreements to modify in paragraph 240. It provides: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the parties may modify the content 
of a contract by consent.... 
(2) The part of a contract with a changed content or legal title which was 
not affected by modification shall remain unchanged.... 
(3) A contract may be modified by agreement. In the case of an agreement 
the parties settle disputed or uncertain questions originating from the contract by 
consent, making mutual concessions.170 
The Hungarian approach is similar to that found in the U.C.C. No consideration is 
required, but agreements to modify are subject to a good faith limitation.171 Again this 
calls for judicial interpretations informed by economic reasoning. 
In summary, the Hungarian Code provides an efficient framework for addressing 
excuses based on unforeseen events. Paragraph 312 correctly focuses on the fault of the 
parties, enabling the courts to develop excuse doctrines with reference to the transaction-
costs faced by the parties.172 Obligors who can prevent or insure against an unforseen 
event would not be excused. Although paragraph 241 grants the courts the power to 
redraft contracts for the parties, the tendency in the courts has been to use the power 
sparingly.173 Paragraph 240 respects the parties rights to modify their agreements.174 
167 For a thorough discussion of this problem see EISLER, supra note 135, at 410. 
168 See supra note 166. 
169 See HILLMAN, R. A.: "Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of 
Economic Duress", 64 Iowa Law Review, 849 (1979) (offering a similar criticism); POSNER, R. A.: "Gratuitous 
Promises in Economics and Law", 6 Journal of Legal Studies, 411, 422 (1977) (addressing a similar concern). 
170 PTK, para. 240 (1959). 
171 Although the Hungarian Code does not contain a general provision requiring good faith, it does require 
party respect for the "norms of socialist coexistence", an analogous concept. See supra notes 81-105 and 
accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 144-145 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra note 158. 
174 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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Efficiency reasoning suggests that this right be subject to a good faith limitation on 
opportunism. Here, as elsewhere, the process of judicial interpretation will play a critical 
role. Awareness of economic principles will aid that process. 
IV. Conclusion 
The above applications demonstrate the power of economic reasoning to guide Hungarian 
contract law reforms. Similar analyses could be used to reform other areas of Hungarian 
law and to reform the laws of other post-communist societies. Of course, for economic 
analysis of law to have an impact, its central ideas must first be disseminated among 
policy makers and these policy makers must see value in the approach. We conclude our 
analysis by raising and addressing four potential obstacles to the implementation of 
economic jurisprudence in the post-communist world. 
First, some policy makers may associate economic analysis with a common law 
tradition. Economic analysis of law originated in the United States and is generally 
perceived to be an American product.175 Reflecting a c o m m o n law orientation, 
American analysts tend to emphasize the role of the courts, with relatively less attention 
paid to legislation.176 Hungary, like all East-Central European nations, works within a 
civil law tradition that tends to view judging as an administrative function, with little 
room for judicial discretion. Under a centralized civil law model , judges are seen as 
quasi-administrators following the dictates of parliament.177 Given the policy orientation 
of the economic approach, one may wonder whether the insights can be transferred to a 
civil law culture. 
Our analysis demonstrates that the differences between common and civil law 
systems are less important than may first appear.178 Common law countries increasingly 
employ statutes and codes, and civil law countries rely on judicial interpretation to 
implement legislation. More importantly, the economics tenets prove equally adept at 
critiqueing legislation as judicial decisions. For example, our discussion of the "battle of 
175 The origins of modern economic analysis of law is generally traced to scholars at the University of 
Chicago. For a discussion of the early Chicago movement see COASE, R.: "Law and Economics at Chicago", 
36 Journal of Law & Economics 239 (1993). 
176 A survey of leading American texts on law and economic reveals that common law topics of contracts, 
tort, and property predominate. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1 (the seminal text); HIRSCH, W. Z.: Law and 
Economics: An Introductory Analysis (2nd ed. 1988) (discussing the common law in seven of ten substantive 
chapters); POLINSKY, A, M.: An Introduction to Law and Economics (1983) (focussing almost exclusively 
on common law topics). 
177 Modern comparative law began in earnest in the 1950's with early scholarship tending to emphasize the 
distinctions between civil and common law systems. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, R. В. et al . Comparative Law 
(5th ed. 1988); DAVID, R. & BRIERLEY, J.: Major Legal Systems in the World Today (2nd ed. 1978). 
178 Modern comparative law scholars are beginning to emphasize the similarities between legal systems. See 
MATTÉI, U. & PARDOLESI, R.: "Law and Economics in Comparative Law Countries: A Comparative 
Approach", 11 International Review of Law and Economics, 265, 266-267 (1991). See, e.g., WATSON, A.: 
Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (1974). 
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the fonns" focussed on a provision of the Uniform Commercial C o d e that has displaced 
the common law of contracts for the sale of goods. The analysis essentially compared 
American, German, and Hungarian codes, with a policy recommendation for legislative 
drafting and judicial interpretation. Such an approach applies equally in all legal systems. 
The second potential obstacle centers on legal philosophy. T h e economic approach 
to law is unabashedly instrumental and pragmatic.179 It is instrumental in the sense that 
legislation and judicial opinions are critiqued on the basis of the incentives they create 
for future business actions. Judges are encouraged to formulate decisions with references 
to comparative costs, openly admitting a policy orientation. Economic analysis is 
pragmatic in the sense that it recognizes the need for law to evolve in accord with 
changes in technology and business customs. Legal rules are tested in the crucible of 
experience; outdated rules are discarded or reformed.180 Such overt anti-formalism may 
rankle policy makers grown distrustful of widespread governmental discretion. After all, 
the hallmark of totalitarian legal regimes has always been the subservience of the rule of 
law to the expedience of policy.181 Professor Shozo Ota raises this very point in 
explaining a philosophical obstacle faced by law and economics scholars working in 
Japan.182 He writes: 
Law used to be viewed as a tool to oppress people and an instrument to control 
people against their will, especially before World War II. Arguments based on 
the assumption that law is one of the instruments for social control have a strong 
association with the pre war era among liberals. Accordingly, law & economics 
receives a strong negative reaction from the liberals.183 
A similar observation is made by Professor Christian Kirchner.184 Kirchner argues that 
legal instrumentalism has been discredited in the Federal Republic of Germany by the 
Nazi experience, and that Ge rman courts insist upon formalistic reasoning, never citing 
policy.185 Arguing that "legal reasoning matters" he suggests that jurisprudential 
179 See POSNER, supra note 58, at 353-393 (linking economic analysis of law to a mature form of 
instrumental pragmatism). 
180 For an excellent discussion of the instrumental pragmatism see GORDON, W. & ADAMS, J.: Economics 
as Social Science: An Evolutionary Approach 72-77, 83 (1989) (identifying the historical roots of legal 
instrumentalism in the works of the American pragmatic philosophers, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, 
and John Dewey). 
181 See HAZARD, supra note 80. 
182 OTA, S.: "Law & Economics in Japan: Hatching Stage", 11 International Review of Law ami Economics, 
301 (1991). 
183 Id. at 306. 
184 KIRCHNER, С.: "The Difficult Reception of Law & Economics in Germany", 11 International Journal 
of Law and Economics, 277 (1991). 
185 Id. at 281-286. Notwithstanding the observations offered by Professor Kirchner, our discussions of the 
German approach to both the "battle of the forms" and the excuse doctrines for unforseen events suggest that 
the German courts enjoy a marked degree of discretion. 
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disputes are significantly retarding the influx of law and economics insights in 
Germany.186 
One may wonder whether a similar cultural impediment may present itself in 
Hungary and other post-communist societies. These nations, too, have had a long 
experience with totalitarianism and the consequent disrespect for the rule of law. The 
third economic tenet—providing stability—is designed to allay these concerns. Law and 
economics scholars implicitly assume the need for legal predictability.187 In a post-
communist context, this tenet needs to be explicit Due respect for the rule of law is 
essential to economic efficiency, and should not be taken for granted. 
Perhaps more to the point, Hungarians cannot afford to ignore the pragmatic 
consequences of legal reform. They need legal change, and sensible change requires 
policy analysis. Insistence on legal formalism is really not an option. 
Even if one accepts the need for a policy orientation to direct legal change, one may 
still challenge whether economic analysis of law provides the appropriate tools. This 
challenge presents a third obstacle to the influx of law and economics: the perception in 
many circles that the economic approach is fundamentally flawed either in its method or 
in the goals it seeks to attain.188 We briefly address each concern. 
According to orthodox (neoclassical) economic theory, people are rational, self 
interested, and calculative.189 Differing legal institutions provide differing incentives, 
and legal change is assessed in terms of the incentives it creates. But what if people are 
not rational? And do not people follow altruistic impulses? In short, if one does not 
accept the economic assumptions regarding human behavior, how can one accept the 
policy prescriptions that flow from that analysis?190 The answer to these questions is 
that assumptions of hyper-rationality are not central to economic theory; they are only 
central to neoclassical theory.191 Although most economists work within the 
neoclassical paradigm, many do not. For example, Herbert Simon prefers an assumption 
186 Id. at 285. 
187 We have found no explicit references to the need for "legal stability" in the law and economics literature. 
Tlie principle, however, is implicit in all such work. 
188 In the United States, an entire school of critical thought has arisen in direct response and opposition to the 
law and economics movement. See KELMAN, M.: A Guide to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 114-185 
(linking "legal economics" to "conservative preferences"); UNGER, supra note 55 (condemning law and 
economics scholarship as promoting oppression). 
189 See BECKER, G. S.: The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 3-14 (1976) (defining any question that 
can be stated as a choice between rational alternatives as an "economic" question). 
190 In a well known essay. Noble Laureate Milton Friedman argued that realistic assumptions are not necessary 
to scientific inquiry. According to Friedman, the value of an assumption depends solely on its ability if they 
generate testable hypotheses. FRIEDMAN, M.: Essays in Positive Economics (1953). 
191 The hyper-rationality assumption of neoclassical theory becomes more realistic as one introduces the 
concepts of imperfect information and uncertainty. See ST1GLER, G. J.: "The Economics of Information", 69 
Journal of Political Economy, 213 (1961) (widely cited as a seminal work on the economics of imperfect 
information); KNIGHT, F. H.: Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) (the pioneering work on uncertainty from 
a neoclassical perspective). 
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of "bounded rationality";192 Oliver Williamson couples Simon's bounded rationality 
with "opportunism";193 and institutional economists working within the tradition set by 
Thorstein Veblen assume that people are creatures of habit, often following outdated 
behaviors that no longer generate good results.194 
The economic approach to law is best conceived as a heuristic device. It directs the 
analyst to consider the impact that legal change will have on human behavior and insists 
upon a comparative cost perspective. These two directives define the approach as 
economic and provide a central core that facilitates the collaborative advancement of 
theory. Yet, within the two directives there is room for intellectual diversity.195 
Alternative behavioral assumptions are possible; the analysis can be static or dynamic; 
it can be cross cultural or it can ignore the cultural context. In short, economic analysis 
of law is not dependent on any given set of methodological assumptions. 
A related objection focuses less on the method of economic analysis, than on the 
goals it is designed to achieve. To some, economics analysis is hopelessly tainted with 
a conservative political bias.196 The trouble lies in the economic vision of "allocative 
efficiency". As discussed earlier, economists define an efficient allocation of resources 
as that allocation which would result, in the absence of transaction costs, from the 
exhaustion of all mutually advantageous exchanges.197 The second economic tenet—re-
ducing transaction costs—seeks to promote this goal. Yet, this notion of efficiency is a 
function of the initial distribution of societal wealth. Different initial distributions will 
generate different exchanges, hence, will result in different "efficient allocations."198 
This suggests that efficiency is somewhat limited as a moral precept; if the initial 
distribution of societal wealth is unjust, any resulting efficient allocation will be similarly 
unjust. Thus, the approach appears to be biased in favor of the status quo. 
192 See SIMON, H. A.: "Theories of Bounded Rationality", in Decision and Organization 161-76 (C. B. 
McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1972) (bounded rationality results from a persons inability to assemble and use 
all available information); SIMON, H.: Models of Man (1957). 
193 See WILLIAMSON, O. E.: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 43-52 (1985) (defining opportunism 
as "self-interest with guile"). 
194 See, e.g., VEBLEN, Г.: The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) (providing a anthropological perspective 
on business decision making). 
195 See LIEBHAFSKY, H. H.: " l aw and Economics from Different Perspectives", 21 Journal of Economic 
Issues, 1809 (1987); OSTAS, D. T.: "law and Economics Revisited: Distinguishing Three Contemporary 
Theories on the Basis of History and Policy", 10 Journal of Legal Studies, Educ. 171 (1992). 
196 For example, Goran Skogh argues that many Sweeds resist economic analysis of law because they perceive 
it to be tainted with a "right wing political bias". See SKOGH, G.: "Law and Economic in Sweden", 11 
International Review of Law and Economics, 319, 322 (1991). Wolfgang Weigel reports a similar perception 
among Austrian policy makers. WEIGEL, W.: "Prospects for Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: 
Austria", 11 International Review of Law and Economics, 325, 327 (1991). The same objection motivates many 
who write within the Critical Legal Studies tradition in the United States. See supra note 188. 
197 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
198 See SAMUELS, W. J.: "Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes", 14 Journal of Law & 
Economics, 435 (1971) (offering the same observation in an applied context). 
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We find little merit in the above argument. First there are areas of the law in which 
distributional concerns legitimately play no role. Contract law provides the mos t obvious 
example. Liberal democracies have elected to address distributional issues through 
general tax and transfer legislation, not through contract law.199 A contract between 
a millionaire and a pauper raises the same issues as a contract between people of equal 
economic status. Second, and more fundamentally, economic analysis can be used to 
promote progressive policies, including the redistribution of wealth. In fact , the first 
great movement in law and economics arose in support of President Roosevel t ' s New 
Deal legislation.200 The economic principle of "diminishing marginal utility" suggests 
that the marginal utility of a last dollar earned by a person is less than the marginal 
utility of the first dollar earned.201 Thus, if one permits interpersonal utility compa-
risons,202 progressive taxation coupled with wealth transfers is well within the purview 
of economic analysis.203 Adopting a law and economics perspective does not preclude 
establishing a meaningful social safety neL204 In fact, the perspective supports it. 
In summary, we find that the first three obstacles to law and economics are largely 
based on perceptions, rather than substance. Law and economics insights apply equally 
well in civil law and common law countries; its jurisprudence is neither radically 
indeterminate nor overly formalistic; and criticisms of its methods or goals are driven by 
overly restrictive views of the economic discipline. 
The fourth obstacle, however, is more substantive. For law and economics scholarship 
to have an impact in post-communist societies, its central tenets and insights must first 
be disseminated among the relevant policy-makers. Evidence suggests that advances are 
being made in the European Community. Faculty and student exchange programs are 
playing a role;205 law and economics textbooks and scholarship that once appeared 
199 See KRONMAN, A. T.: "Contract Law and Distributive Justice", 89 Yale Law Journal, 472, 473^74 
(1980) (finding a consensus among American scholars of all political leanings that distributive issues should 
play no role in contract law adjudication). 
200 See HOVENKAMP, H.: "The First Great Law & Economics Movement", 42 Stanford Law Review, 993 
(1990). 
201 Id. at 1002-1009. 
202 Some, but not all, economists argue that interpersonal utility comparisons are illegitimate. Id. 
203 Economic analysis also points to "market failures" as a justification for government actions in the name 
of public welfare. Examples include: active antitrust policy to correct for monopoly power; consumer legislation 
to correct to information asymmetries; environmental policies to correct for externalities; and the provision of 
public goods such as education to correct for "free rider" market failures. None of these policies can be labelled 
"conservative". 
204 Interestingly, Santos Pastor reports that there has been relatively little resistance to law and economics 
scholarship in Spain, governed currently by a socialist government. He writes: "|D)espite the rule of a socialist 
party, most policies tend to be pro-market and pro-competition. In the government's understanding, this is far 
from being contradictory, especially when redistribution policies are taken into account." PASTOR, S.: "Law 
and Economics in Spain", 11 International Journal of Law and Economics, 309, 309 (1991). 
205 See HERTIG, G.: "Switzerland", 11 International Journal Law and Economics, 293 (law and economics 
influencing Swiss policy through study abroad). 
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exclusively in English are being translated into Japanese, Italian and other languages;206 
and several international seminars have been devoted to the topic. Similar institutional 
inroads need to be made in Hungary and other transforming nations. This article is 
offered in that spirit. Legal reform throughout the post-communist world can benefit from 
the insights offered by law and economics. 
206 See OTA, supra note 182, at 306 (citing Japanese translations); MATTÉI A PARDOLES1, supra note 178, 
at 274-275 (providing an extensive bibliography of law and economics scholarship either translated to or 
originally produced in Italian). 
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Retributive or Restorative Justice? 
11 th International Congress on Criminology 
(22-27 August, 1993, Budapest) 
In a broader sense—as restitution, restoration of the legal order, which had been violated 
by the crime—every criminal justice system has restorative purposes, tendencies. Inflicting 
a punishment, however, means always a malum, a negative experience for the offender, 
a retribution, for the crime committed. 
Restorative efforts from time to time appeared in the history of criminal law. The 
restoration has sometimes symbolic, sometimes more instrumental character. 
The vast majority of crimes are defined as dangerous to society, even if the victim 
is a natural person. The prevailing criminal justice system—in the name of society—pro-
secutes the criminal offender, bringing accusation and proceeding against him at trial. 
This method has more guarantees and efficiency than the individual victim's action. 
In a great number of the crimes of public prosecution, the crime is strictly directed 
against the citizen's person and/or property. According to this fact, the expectation 
would be a similar rate of victim's initiation to start a criminal procedure. In reality 
this occurs only in two-thirds of the cases. The difference can be explained by the fact 
that, according to cost-benefit balancing, it is sometimes more favourable for the 
victim to disregard a smaller damage, than a long, time-consuming and unpleasant 
procedure. 
According to our law, the necessary condition to qualify a person as a victim is to 
be injured in rights or legal interests. This forms a basis to appear at the authority in 
the role of the victim, who has to be informed of all the important decisions already in 
the pre-trial phase. 
As the accused is represented by the prosecutor in the case of public accusation, the 
victim's procedural role changes radically. The victim, who initiates the procedure, who 
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is the starting point of this process, paradoxically is not at the centre of the procedure. 
On the contrary, the victim is step by step displaced to a marginal position. 
Criminal procedure has strict rules, and its participants have certain roles. Under such 
constraints, the will, wishes and claims of the victim have a limited possibility of 
fulfillment. The accusation-monopoly of the state has a special consequence: the response 
to the crime given by criminal law is more repressive, than reparative or restitutive. For 
this very reason we have to pay more attention to secure the rights and legitimate 
interests of the victim. In such a manner we can avoid or reduce the risk of so-called 
"secondary victimisation". 
Whenever a crime is committed against person or property, the citizen suffers 
physical and/or psychological harm. This is the primary, actual process of victimisation. 
If the criminal proceeding is directed only for official, organisational interests, the victim 
will remain in a handicapped situation. The result is "secondary victimisation", for which 
it is not the offender who is to be blamed, but the organs and persons participating in the 
criminal procedure. In this way, criminal procedure serves the system, but not justice. 
Criminal procedure, in neglecting the interests of the victim, compounds the future 
risk of the victim's reluctance to initiate and assist in prosecution. Further consequences 
are an increase in hidden criminality and encouragement to commit new crimes, etc. If 
criminal procedure neglects the victim's interests to such a degree that the organisational 
interests of proving evidence are considerably dominant, the victim's human rights may 
be violated. 
In the case of crimes against the individual, the victim is primarily motivated by a 
claim for moral compensation. Therefore, the process can cause a new t r auma a harm, 
similar to the crime itself. We cannot avoid this unpleasant consequence by overruling 
procedure, but by instituting a practice which takes into consideration official, 
organisational and individual interests. When people are selected to work in the criminal 
justice system, we have to pay attention not only to their professional knowledge, but 
also to their human qualities. 
It is said that criminal law has developed an autonomous and repressive character, 
while post-modem law needs a responsive direction.' I am convinced that present 
criminal law all three features have to be represented in harmony. Criminal law always 
has been more or less repressive because it has punitive sanctions. This character cannot 
be denied even in the most rehabilitation-oriented system. But to a certain degree, 
criminal law has to be autonomous to avoid to serving only dominant political interests. 
It is also an appropriate wish to strengthen the responsive character of criminal law, 
meaning that it should serve social interests. It cannot be too autonomous, though. For 
instance, the criminalization of a great number of acts which are not against public 
morals would be a dictatorical overemphasis of autonomy. This would also be 
unreasonable because the massive law-breaking that would arise under such circum-
1 HAI.LIDAY, T. C.: Civic Professionalism: Melding the Sociology of law and Lawyers in Historical and 
Comparative Research p. 104. Onati Proceedings 1. Legal Culture and everyday life, 1989. 
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stances would reduce and not increase respect for the law. However, I have to remark 
that the widespread rule—breaking does not necessarily represent the inaccuracy of norms, 
but may reveal problems in other areas of society. Correction of such problems is not the 
task of criminal law alone. 
Returning again to our original subject, all of this (namely my remarks on the 
repressive, autonomous and responsive character of criminal law) means, that res-
ponsiveness can be a basis for strengthening the victim's position. This is emphasised in 
the institution of mediation, which helps to reach an agreement between offender and 
victim. Of course, mediation is effective only in minor cases. 
I should like to emphasize that the transformation of an individual harm to a social 
one cannot neglect the victims' interests, neither on a general nor on a concrete level. 
Criminal punishment is a special kind of response, social reaction to crime. The 
repressive character, the tendency of law and social order forward stability also cannot 
be denied. From the victim's view, to punish the offender serves also a moral judgement. 
In most cases however, the victim's aim is connected with material compensation. The 
situation is simple when stolen property is found and can be returned to its owner. But 
in Ulis case, it is also necessary to make decision, as soon as possible. We have to avoid 
depriving the victim of his property longer than is absolutely necessary. When the 
property is not at our disposal, compensation of the victim is difficult and long, especially 
when he does not have insurance. The offender generally does not have property or 
regular income, and his prison work income—in consequence of the well-known causes—is 
not sufficient for victim compensation. In the field of insurance there are also many 
difficulties. If the offender is unknown, it is relatively simple to get compensation from 
an insurance company. Paradoxically, the victim's financial interests are positively against 
helping in the discovery of the offender by telling details of the crime or speaking of his 
suspicions. If he does, he has to wait until the end of the criminal procedure, which can 
last one to two years or more, to receive full compensation. The insurance company 
generally pays the whole sum of money after the criminal procedure is finished, and only 
for the value of property proven to have been stolen (with exception of cash and stocks, 
which are originally excluded from insurance coverage). 
The offender is primarily liable for compensating the victim for damages sustained 
as a result of his criminal act. As a rule a civil claim can be filed in connection with the 
criminal trial (the principle of adhesion). (Adhesion makes it possible for the victim to 
follow the fate of the offender.) However, it is within the discretion of the criminal court 
to separate the civil claim and transfer it to a civil proceeding, if adhesion might protract 
the criminal proceedings to which the victim acceded as intervener. 
The offender is encouraged to make restitution on a voluntary basis. An offender who 
abandons a crime or voluntarily prevents harmful consequences cannot be punished for 
attempt. It is one of the mitigating circumstances, if the offender makes efforts to provide 
restitution, compensation, reduceinent of damages, or the damages fully, sometimes 
partially are recovered even if independently from his own will. 
In the course of the criminal process our aim has to be the protection of victims' 
rights and legal interests not only by legal regulation, but good practice. It is necessary 
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that the organisations and persons intervening in the process apply the principle of 
fairness, which can be respresented by such small gestures as respecting the victim's 
occupation in deciding the time of the hearing. If the victim is not regarded as a puppet 
to be summoned whenever the authority wants, then he will be more willing to participate 
in and clarify the case. This is not only question of legal regulation but also of human 
treatment and fairness. 
In Hungary, we are facing changing opinion regarding criminal law, in which the 
focus is on the interests of the victim. Since the seventies, victimological questions have 
become the centre of attention, and several scientific studies have been dedicated to this 
subject. Since 1973, victimology also had a significant role in educational programs of 
the universities and the Police Academy. 
In 1989, within the organisational framework of the Hungarian Society of 
Criminology, the Section of Victimology was formed with its own scientific program. 
This section has several special features, including regularly organised discussions in 
which foreign and non-lawyer experts are also involved; research and development of 
scientific activity of this field; provision of information; and national and international 
relations, too. 
Of the recent victimological research, I should like to mention two empirical studies. 
The first is on the victims of traffic offences, and the second is on the compensation of 
burglary-victims. The latter, initiated by the president of the Hungarian Section of 
Victimology, also described a model victim/witness service, based on the experiences of 
the research.2 
In 1989, the White Ring was created as an independent social organisation, aimed at 
financial, physical and legal assistance for victims of crime, and also at the prevention 
of crime. The organisation is in the early stages of activity, but there are promising views 
concerning its future. 
The re-codification of our criminal and procedural law offers the possibility to 
enlarge the rights of victims. We must pay more attention to the idea of state 
compensation. As it is well known, this idea is based on different theories, as follows: 
1) Idea of law-breaking—since the state prohibits private vengeance and arbitrary 
action for compensation of damages, the state must be responsible for the result if its 
measures do not effectively prevent crime. 
2) Idea of social contract—the citizens transferred the responsibility of crime 
prevention to the state, so the state bears the burden for its failures and has a moral 
obligation to remedy the harms. 
3) Idea of rationality—A state compensation is beneficial because if the victim is 
assured redress he is more willing to cooperate with the criminal investigation authorities, 
consequently improving public security. 
2 FEHÉR, L. : A betöréses lopás sértettjének kártalanítása — empirikus vizsgálat). (Compensation of victims 
of burglary—an empirical study) Kriminológiai Közlemények No. 38-39. pp. 45-65, Budapest, 1991. 
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4) Idea of insurance—the state itself is a contractor/entrepreneur that collects taxes and 
is responsible for any negative results during its operation. State compensation is a 
measure of distributing the losses and the risk of crime.3 
In summation, under these arguments the state is responsible for compensating the 
victims of crime. In the majority of western countries the institution of state 
compensation is already effectively functioning. I believe that Hungary should adopt the 
same system in the near future. 
I should like to conclude that: 
— As long as the criminal justice system cannot assure the victim's rights and legal 
interests on a higher level, there is a great demand for effective victim/witness services 
and projects. 
— In order to solve the problems of compensation, it is unavoidable to deal with the 
idea of state compensation, as well as mediation as a sanction-variant or diversion. 
— The intensity of scientific research in victimology is an effective method of 
discovering and solving the victims' problems. 
— The results of victimology has to be applied in the practice of criminal prosecution 
and prevention as well as in court procedure to a higher degree.4 
— The victim plays a dual role: he is an instrument in the truth-finding process as 
well as an agent, asserting his personal rights. It is necessary to provide victims with 
better information regarding not only their duties, but also how to exercise their rights. 
The clear tendency is to give the victim a more active role in the proceedings. 
— There is great demand for mobilisation of supportive, assisting forces in society. 
The mass media has a great responsibility and important role in this effort.5 
— Lastly, we must examine the further realisation of the principles of the international 
declarations and recommendations in our law and legal practice. We regard as especially 
important the recommendations of the Council of Europe and UN declarations on victims. 
Our legal regulation concerning victims is open to the possibility development. We 
should start dealing with compensation problems and encouraging mediation between 
offenders and victims, as in most cases the victim's primary interest is material redress. 
Material compensation involves a humanitarian attitude toward the victim, as well as the 
offender, dominantly expressing at the same time the responsive character of postmodem 
law.6 
Lenke FEHÉR 
3 KRATOCHWILL, F.: A sértett jogi helyzete a magyar büntető eljárási jogban. Separatum, p. 13. (Legal 
situation of victims of crime in the Hungarian criminal procedure.) 
4 VIGH, J.: Szolgáltassunk igazságot a bűncselekmények áldozatainak is. Separatum, p. 20. (Let's be just 
to the victims of crime.) 
5 VIGH, J.: 1. c. 
6 De SOUSA SANTOS, В.: Towards a Postmodern Understanding of Law p. 117. Onali Proceedings I. 
Legal Culture and everyday life, 1989. 
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The New Croatian Maritime Code 
1. Introduction 
After promulgating the Constitution in 1990 (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Croatia—hereafter OGRC, No. 56/90) and after declaring its independence by the 
Dissolution Act of 8 October (OGRC, No. 31/91), the Republic of Croatia embarks upon 
the task of regulating numerous issues, thus creating a genuine legal constellation and 
legal system. Part of the above are the rules which govern the field of maritime 
navigation. So the Croatian Maritime Code (hereafter-CMC) was passed on February 2, 
1994, and came into force on March 22, 1994 (OGRC, No. 17/94).1 The new Code 
regulates maritime navigation and encompasses all law of the sea, administrative law, 
property law, contact law, incident of navigation and conflict of laws rules.2 
2. Structure of the CMC 
The CMC extensive text is divided into thirteen parts and has 1.056 Articles. 
Part I (Articles 1-5) of common provisions and contains 38 definitions some of 
which call for certain comments (e.g. ship, boat, ship operator...). 
Part II (Articles 6-47) deals with the fundamental institutes of the law of the sea in 
the Republic of Croatia (internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, 
continental shelf and right of hot pursuit) which are regulated in conformity the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. 
Part III (Articles 48-80) describes the public maritime domain (order and 
consessions).3 
1 The CMC derogated The Maritime and Inland Navigation Law of the Republic of Croatia (OGRC, No. 
53/91) which is still on force only for inland navigation. 
2 For more details see GRABOVAC, I.: Novo hrvatsko pomorsko pravo, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4064, 
1993. pp. 1-2. 
3 Cf. STANKOVIÖ, G .: Pomorsko dobro u Pomorskom zakoniku Republike Hrvatske, Informator, Zagreb, 
No. 4197—4198, 1994, pp. 6-7, ÍIZMIÓ, J.: New I .aw on concession of the Republic of Croatia, International 
Business Lawyer, London, Vol. 21, No. 6, June 1993, p. 287. 
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Part IV (Articles 81-192) includes safety of maritime navigation (navigable water-
ways, ports, navigation and pilotage, ship-floating object, boat, ship's crew).4 
In part V (Articles 193-222) the nationality, identification and registration of ships 
are elaborated. In this part the CMC adopts the relevant solutions of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 1982 and the UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of 
Ships, 1986.5 
Part VI (Articles 223-404) treats law of property matters concerning ships (the rights 
on ships). The CMC incorporates the clauses of the International Convention Relating to 
Maritime Liens and Hypothecs of 1926 so that its provisions conform to the rules of the 
Convention.6 
Part VII (Articles 405-447) regulates the liability of the ship operator and procedure 
for the limitation of his liability. The central person in the Law is the ship operator, who 
is defined as "a natural person or a legal entity who as the holder of the ship is in charge 
of navigation ventures, the presumption being, until the opposite is proved, that the ship 
operator is the person enterd in the register of ships as the owner of the ship". Substan-
tive-law provisions on the limitation of the liability of the operator are taken over from 
the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976.7 The procedure 
for the limitation of liability was originally drafted by Croatian law-makers in keeping 
with the rules of the nonlitigious procedure. 
Part VIII (Articles 448-760) deals with contracts (shipbuilding contract, contracts for 
the employment of ships, contract for maritime ship agency services and contract of 
maritime insurance).8 In this connection it should be emphasized that under Croatian law 
contracts for the exploitation of ships are divided into two groups: maritime contracts, 
which are contracts for work (locatio operis) and hire of a ship (locatio navis), which is 
a contract of using a ship (the latter contract has been translated as "charter by demise" 
because this is the nearest to the English system of ship exploitation). The maritime 
4 In content of part IV the CMC enacted new provisions in the matter of the ship operator's liability for 
death and physical injury of crewmembers (Art. 161). His liability is based on presumed negligence or strict 
liability—see BOLANÖA, D.: Nekoliko pogleda na materijalnu odgovornost pomoraca de lege lata i de lege 
ferenda, Privreda i prove, Zagreb, No. 5-6, 1993, p. 399. 
5 See HODAK. L. M.: Hrvatski upisnik pomorskih hrodova, Pomorski zbomik, Rijeka, No. 30, 1992, pp. 
259-279. See also STANKOVIÓ, G .: Upis hrodova i brodica u novom pomorskom zakonodavstvu Republike 
Hrvatske (Informator, Zagreb, No. 4186, p. 9), Postupak upisivanja hrodova i brodica u upisnike (Informator, 
Zagreb, No. 4189, p. 17), Neka pitanja u svezi s postupkom za upisivanje hrodova (Informator Zagreb, No. 
4190, p. 14). 
6 GRABOVAC, I.-STANKOVIC, G.: llipoteka na brodu kao stvarnopravni oblik osiguranja trazbina prema 
Pomorskom zakoniku, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4192-4193, pp. 19-20. 
7 It is the first convention of maritime law ratified by Republic of Croatia (OGRC-International Treaties, 
No. 2, 1992)—see BAKOT1Ó, В.: Biljeska povodom pocetka sluibenog objavljivanja tncdunarodnih ugovora 
u Republici Hrvatskoj, Zakonitost, Zagreb, No. 1. 1993. p. 23. 
8 For more details see GRABOVAC, I.: Neke napomene о posebnoslima ugovora о gradnji broda u 
Pomorskom zakoniku, Informator, Zagreb, No. 4204 4205, p. 13, Drago Pavic Plovidbeno (pomorsko) 
osiguranje u reformiranom plovidhenom pravu Hrvatske, Pomorski zbornik, Rijeka, No. 30, 1992, pp. 
237-258. 
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contracts are carriage of goods (the Croatia received the solutions of the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, 1924,9 the 
Brussels Protocol 1968—Visby Rules and the Brussels Protocol 1979), carriage of passen-
gers and luggage (the CMC follows the instance of the Athens Convention on Shipping 
of Passengers and their Luggage, 1974, and the Londons Protocol 1976), towing and 
pushing and other maritime contracts (e.g. biological exploration, pipe and cable 
laying...). 
In part IX the legislator analyses the incidents of navigation (collision of ships, 
salvage, wreck, general average, tort liability of operator, liability of operator of nuclear 
ship). In the subject of collision of ships the CMC accepts the provisions of the Inter-
national Convention for die Unification of Certain Rules of Law in Regard to Collisions, 
1910. The institute of salvage consists of the rules of civil and administrative law from the 
International Convention for die Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974, and the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Respecdng Assistance and Salvage 
at Sea, 1910 (with the Brussels Protocol 1970). Also, the new Code adopts some principles 
from the new International Convention on Salvage at Sea, 1989 (e.g. the payment of a 
special compensation to salvors according to established criteria).10 
Part X (Articles 867-988) spells out the legal consequences of the execution and 
measures provisional on the ships and goods." 
Part XI (Articles 989-1009) contains conflict of laws rules.12 
Part XII (Article 1010-1037) describes the maritime transgressions. 
Part XIII (Article 1038-1056) provides the transitional and final clauses. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
The CMC has been enacted in order to provide clear and consistent regulations governing 
the most important insdtutes of the law of the sea and maridme law (particularly its 
administrative and civil aspects). In this field the Republic of Croatia has always most 
9 The former socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) ratified that convention 1959. The 
Republic of Croatia has determined its position as to the treaties to which SFRY was a Contracting Party by 
the Treaties Conclusion and Application Act of 8 October 1991 (OGRC, No. 53/91). According to the tran-
sitional provision of Art. 33 of this Act, treaties ratified by SFRY, or to which SFRY acceded, will apply in 
the Republic of Croatia if they are not contrary to the Constitution and the legal order of the Republic of 
Croatia in accordance with the rules of international law on the succession of states with respect to treaties. 
According to Art. 134. of the Croatian Constitution, international agreements to which the Republic of Croatia 
is a party and, in terms of legal effect, have primacy over internal law. 
10 See STANKOVIÓ, P .: Nova Me&inarodna konvencija о spasavanju na moru, 1989, Uporedno pomorsko 
pravo, Zagreb, No. 2—4. 1989, p. 296, Ljerka Mintas llodak: Novi Pomorski zakonik, Pomorski zbomik, Rijeka, 
No. 31, 1993, pp. 35-36. 
11 See GRABOVAC, I.-STANKOVIÓ, G.: Osiguranje traibina u svjetlu novog pomorskog zakonodavstva 
Republike Hrvatske, rewiew from Zbornik radova: Zastita vjerovnika, Zabreb, 1994, pp. 61-71. 
12 Cf. GRABOVAC, I.: Mjerodavno pravo Republike Hrvatske о pomorskoj plovidbi, Informator, Zagreb, 
No. 4143, 1994, pp. 1-2. 
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administrative and civil aspects). In this field the Republic of Croatia has always most 
extensively respected the provisions and principles of various international conventions 
in creating its own maritime legislation. With respect to the maritime orientation of the 
Republic of Croatia at the time when this recently recognized country is engaged in 
establishing new proprietary and commercial relations based on market economy and 
private enterprise, the CMC satisfies the legal requirements of modem sea transport 
document. The maritime transport is the pillar of the world trade, and for a small 
economy such as that of the Republic of Croatia, the world market is a condicio sine qua 
non of its existence.13 
Jozo CIZMIC 
13 Compara BOLANÓA, D.: Poloiaj Republike Hrvatske u odnosu na pravo i politiku Europske zajednice 
prema pomorskom transportu, Pravni vjesnik, Osijek, No. 1-4, 1992. p. 149. 
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Peter DORALT-Gábor TÖRÖK: A G-Mustersatzung Ungarn. Ungarisch-deutsch mit 
Kommentar (Model Charter for Joint-Stock Companies, with Bilingual, Hungarian-German 
Commentary, Fachverlag Service, Wien, 1995. pp. 221) 
The Vienna University of Economic 
Sciences, Institute of Research on Central 
and Eastern European Economic Law 
(FOWI) has enlarged its series of publi-
cations presenting the former socialist count-
ries' economic legislation and forms of 
companies, so far consisting of six works, 
by a new publication probably arousing 
the attention and interest of practising 
lawyers. 
This publication is the first one, and 
hopefully not the last one in the series that, 
following the presentation of legal solutions 
introduced and applied in other countries of 
the region (Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Russia), deals with Hungarian legislation in 
force, in a way that makes it especially 
useful for practitioners. 
The two co-authors do not need a long 
introduction since both of them are active 
and well-known representatives of the 
domestic and international scientific life 
dealing with economic law. 
Professor Peter Dorait is a Head of 
Department at the Vienna University of 
Economic Sciences, and Director of FOWI, 
while Gábor Török is an Associate Professor 
at the Budapest University of Economic 
Sciences, as well as at the College for Pub-
lic Administration. 
The book's main part consists of a 
Model Charter of Joint-Stock Companies 
complying with the legal rules in force in 
Hungary. 
It is unique from the point of view that 
the Model Charter is bilingual (Hungarian-
German) and, for better orientation, it is 
edited in a mirror-structure. 
The intention of the authors is obvious: 
the book is intended to serve as a point of 
reference for practitioners in the course of 
establishing a joint-stock company which is 
an increasingly wide-spread form of com-
panies in Hungary. 
Guided by this intention, the authors do 
not present the system of companies accord-
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ing to Hungarian company law, they do not 
place joint-stock company in this system 
or delimit it from other forms, their inten-
tion is solely to assist those who practice 
law. 
Indisputably the book has come in time 
and has been of good use since investments 
coming from German-speaking countries are 
dominant in Hungary. Those German-
Hungarian, Austrian-Hungarian or entirely 
German or Austrian companies that were 
founded after the entry into force of the Act 
No. VI of 1988, primarily in the form of 
Ltd, as far as they proved to be viable and 
had serious intentions of remaining in 
Hungary's economic life, nowadays—being 
mostly companies of a bigger size, having 
numerous owners or a considerable capi-
tal—face difficulties due to the form of Ltd 
in attracting or mobilizing capital. 
Due to this recognition, mostly since the 
beginning of 1994, many German and 
Austrian companies originally established 
as Ltd., have transformed into the form of 
joint-stock company, hoping to strengthen 
their economic position with help of the 
opportunities inherent in this capital-uniting 
form of company. 
The wave of transformation will prob-
ably increase in the years to follow, there-
fore attorneys, legal advisers and even 
judges destined to carry out the transform-
ations will get useful assistance by studying 
the precise and authentic terms and the clear 
structure. 
It is a special value of the publication 
that each Article of the Charter is supple-
mented with a bilingual commentary in the 
form of footnotes that helps to find one's 
way around the difficulties of interpretation. 
In a number of cases, besides presenting 
the Hungarian legal background, the com-
mentary refers to German or Austrian 
company law solutions. 
The Model Charter is introduced by a 
brief description of the development of 
Hungarian legislation relating to joint-stock 
companies and is supplemented by an annex 
indicating die relevant sources of law. 
This enables the users of the book to 
compare, without a significant loss of time, 
legal rules regulating Hungarian, German 
and Austrian legal institutions and solutions. 
Considering the values referred to and 
other virtues of the book not mentioned in 
the present review, the book, being also 
published in Hungary in the first part of 
1995 by die Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyv-
kiadó, will certainly engage the attendon of 
legal practitioners. 
János Tamás VARGA 
András BRAGYOVA: Az alkotmányhíráskodás elmélete (Theory of Constítuüonal Review, 
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó — MTA Állam- és Jogtudományi Intézete, Budapest, 
1994., pp. 208) 
I. Having read the book under review, the 
reviewer has two different approaches to 
follow. Either he reads it as a monograph 
of legal theory, the subject of which is 
constitutional jurisdiction, or by reason of 
its subject he treats it as a work of consti-
tutional dieory that tries to grab the 
background of this important constitudonal 
institution by taking into account aspects 
of legal philosophy as well. The reviewer 
has chosen the former approach because of 
his own interest. 
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If we estimate the work from a legal 
theory point of view and first of all briefly, 
we have to say that it is a great intellectual 
accomplishment on two accounts. Hungari-
an legal theory literature is beginnig to 
wake from its four decades' slumber and 
takes a look around the world. For, apart 
from a few exceptions, no writings came 
into being in the last periode that would 
have been worthy of the intellectual stan-
dard that was hallmarked in the interna-
tional legal literature by the names of Felix 
Somló or Barna Horváth. But reading this 
monograph or certain parts of it, the reader 
gets the definite feeling that something is 
beginning to revive in this field of jurispru-
dence that was always very close to politics 
and therefore teemed with theories putting 
forward political considerations. 
But the reviewer finds this work 
remarkable not only with respect to domes-
tic legal theory literature. He claims that 
certain parts of the book contain such 
chains of thoughts or inspiring findings that 
can be regarded as novelties in general and 
enrich legal theory literature by all means. 
We will try to prove this statement in the 
next part. 
Here, we must mention another feature 
of the book that makes the critiques against 
it understandable. This is the ambivalent 
standard of the work. For it is hard to 
understand that following a promising 
Introduction, a First Chapter (Constitutional 
Jurisdiction and Legality of the Legal 
System) abounding in ideas and an excel-
lent Second Chapter (Constitution and 
Constitutional Jurisdiction) why the author 
produced Third Chapter (Constitutional 
Jurisdiction as Constitutional Justification 
of Legal Nonns) and a perhaps even more 
disintegrable Fourth Chapter (Constitutional 
Review and Legal Reasoning). The general 
explanation may be found in the answer to 
the question of why the author developed 
the first two chapters' chain of thoughts the 
way he did. 
We can support this statement by the 
fact that the proportion of footnotes com-
pared to the length of chapters increases 
throughout the work. The reviewer has come 
to the conclusion that the author did not 
succeed in making the last two chapters as 
consise and coherent as the first two chap-
ters. Furthermore, the above statement is 
supported by the fact that while the foot-
notes in the first two chapters usually refer 
to names belonging to the neo-kantian 
school, in the third and fourth chapters, we 
can find references to sociologists (N. 
Luhmann, J. Habermas), political scientists 
(R. Dworkin), hermeneutic philosopher (H-
G. Gadamer), writer on theory of science 
(P. Winch). These names show that the 
author changed his general, neo-kantian 
legal theory and philosophy methods into 
a specialist approach wanting to take into 
account all sorts of aspects that has led, as 
the reviewer sees it, to a significant decline 
in the standard of the work. And strict 
methods are fundamental for a neo-kantian 
theoretician. 'This trend in legal theory shuts 
out all metajuristic elements from research 
and deals with law as law. The author has 
fully succeeded in doing so in the first two 
chapters as we try to show it after this long 
but justified introduction. 
II. His basic propositions are as follows: 
a) the basic category of constitutional 
jurisdiction is the validity of legal norms; 
b) its function is to decide on the 
constitutional validity of norms; 
c) and its task is to ensure the legality 
of the legal system. 
The author argues that constitutional 
jurisdiction as function and, depending on 
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the type of constitution, also as organization 
is the category that is capable of and suitable 
for deciding on the validity, necessarily 
constitutional validity, of a given norm and 
judging whether the norm satisfies the re-
quirements that are set by the rules relating 
to nonn-making, usually to be found in con-
stitutions. 
Here, we only focus on one of the 
answers to the prepositions. The author 
applies certain distinctions that show that 
he is in possession of an analytic capacity 
comparable to very few others. The 
reviewer found the categorization between 
constitutions (statutory and substative 
constitutions: pages 58-59), accordingly the 
perception of the existence of differences 
between various systems of constitutional 
jurisdiction ("Statute" jurisdiction and norm 
jurisdiction: pages 66-67) and what had 
been said about promulgation, derogation 
and abrogation (pages 77-82), as well as 
the clear explanation of the differences 
between consistency and coherency of the 
legal system (pages 90-92) especially 
ingenious. 
The author managed to create models 
that are suitable for helping to understand 
the differences between various categories 
that are seemingly alike but very different 
in their origin and consequences. He also 
managed to avoid the risk of actualization 
though it is very tempting to apply the ideal 
types (e.g. in case of constitution types) to 
their realized forms. 
The reviewer, however, cannot find an 
explanation to the questions of why those 
issues are covered under the headings of 
the last two chapters that can be read in the 
third and fourth chapters, why the author 
turns away in these chapters from the previ-
ously successfully applied method of using 
ideal types and thinking the ideas consist-
ently over, and why he fails to go on with 
the praising convincingly his propositions. 
Ш. Summing up, we can state that in 
spite of the above-mentioned ambiguities the 
author produced a valuable work for those 
who like theory (and hopefully for lawyers 
practicing in the field of law-making). 
Sándor PALÁSTI 
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